



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search


Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>



1. 27

40
30












THE
BRITISH AND FOREIGN
EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

EDITED BY THE
REV. H. SINCLAIR PATERSON, M.D.



LONDON:
JAMES NISBET & CO., BERNERS STREET.
EDINBURGH: OLIVER & BOYD.
MDCCLXXXI.

**PRINTED BY THOMAS AND ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE, PRINTERS TO HER MAJESTY,
AT THE EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY PRESS.**

CONTENTS OF VOL. XXX.

NO. CXV.—JANUARY 1881.

	PAGE
I. Agnosticism. By the Rev. ROBERT FLINT, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh, .	1
✓ II. Evolution and the Hebrews : a Review of Herbert Spencer's "Hebrews and Phœnicians." By the Rev. ALFRED CAVE, B.A., Hackney College, London, .	17
III. The Eloquence of the Pulpit. Translated by CLEMENT DE FAYE from the French of the late ADOLPHE MONOD, .	39
IV. Two Modern Apostles. By the Rev. ALEX. MACLEOD SYMINGTON, B.A., Birkenhead,	59
V. Christian Philosophy of Patience,	77
VI. The Observance of the Sabbath. By the Rev. LEONARD BACON, D.D.,	93
VII. Evolution in relation to Species. By the Rev. J. H. M'ILVAINE, D.D.,	103
VIII. Criteria of the various kinds of Truth. By the Rev. JAMES M'COSH, D.D., President of Princeton College, N. J., .	122
IX. The Regeneration of Palestine. By Professor WILLIAM WELLS, Union College, Schenectady,	144
X. The Faith of Islam. By the Rev. EDWARD SELL, Church Missionary Society, Madras ; Fellow of the University of Madras,	165
XI. Current Literature,	191

NO. CXVI.—APRIL 1881.

I. On some outstanding Features of the Gospel History. By the Rev. PRINCIPAL BROWN, Aberdeen,	213
II. The Divine Names in Genesis. By the Rev. J. URQUHART, Kirkcaldy,	227
III. Christian Morality, Expediency, and Liberty. By PROFESSOR LYMAN H. ATWATER, Princeton College, N.J.,	243
IV. The Incarnation. By the Rev. JOHN BAIRD, Rafford,	265
V. A Basis of Theism. By M. H. TOWRY,	280
VI. Joyous Spirituality of Christian Pilgrimage ; or, Pilgrimage —not Penance,	290
VII. Hymnology : The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the Hymns of the Church. By the Rev. ANDREW CARTER, London,	305
✓ VIII. The Persistence of Force ; a Point in the Argument of Natural Theology. By F. GARDINER, D.D., Professor in Berkeley Divinity School, Middletown, Conn.,	324
IX. Postulates of Ethics. By PROFESSOR BORDEN P. BOWNE, Boston University,	345
X. Current Literature,	372

NO. CXVII.—JULY 1881.

	PAGE
I. Recent Attacks on Calvinism. By Rev. R. M'CHEYNE EDGAR, Dublin,	401
II. The Christian Ministry not a Priesthood. By Rev. JOHN KELLY, London,	424
III. Culdee Colonies in the North and West. By Rev. JOHN CAMPBELL, Montreal,	455
IV. A Great Doxology,	477
V. The Liberal Theology. By Sup.-Lic. GUST. KREIBIG, of Arnswald,	404
VI. Presbyterian Consolidation in Canada; a Chapter in Canadian History. By Rev. ROBERT CAMPBELL, M.A., Montreal,	524
VII. The Reasonableness of Faith. By PRINCIPAL SHAIRP, St. Andrews,	537
* VIII. Inspiration. By Dr. A. A. HODGE, Princeton College, New Jersey, and PROF. B. B. WARFIELD, Western Theological Seminary, Alleghany,	569
IX. Current Literature,	605

NO. CXVIII.—OCTOBER 1881.

* I. The Old Testament in the Jewish Church. By Rev. ALFRED CAVE, B.A., Professor of Hebrew and Church History, Hackney College, London,	613
II. The Probability of a Revealed Religion. By Rev. WALTER MORISON, D.D., London,	638
III. The Archæology of Celtic Christianity. By Rev. C. G. M'CRIE, Ayr,	652
IV. Forgiveness—Human and Divine,	678
V. Zoroaster and Zoroastrianism. By Rev. J. N. FRADENBURGH, Ph.D., Franklin, Pa.,	692
VI. Our Earlier Literature. By PROFESSOR THEODORE W. HUNT, Ph.D.,	708
VII. The Jewish Question in Europe. By PROFESSOR S. H. KELLOGG, D.D., Alleghany, Penn.,	728
VIII. Causation and Development. By Rev. JAMES M'COSE, D.D., President of Princeton College, New Jersey,	750
IX. Current Literature,	771

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

JANUARY 1881.

ART. I.—*Agnosticism*.¹

AGNOSTICISM is a most comprehensive theme, and it cannot reasonably be expected that the few remarks which are all that time permits me to offer regarding it should do more than touch a very small part of its surface. Where it would be absurd to attempt to be profound or thorough, I shall seek merely to be practical. With this aim in view, I shall confine myself to a consideration of the causes of the present prevalence of Agnosticism in the region of religion, and to an indication of the counteractive or remedial forces.

The term Agnosticism is often vaguely and loosely employed. It is only, I believe, accurately and appropriately employed when regarded as an equivalent for what has been variously called philosophical, or theoretical, or metaphysical scepticism. The limitation of the word to the sphere of religion is most objectionable, and should be resisted. There is no reason for calling a man an agnostic merely because he is an atheist, or a positivist, or a materialist. The name is only appropriate to one whose refusal to believe in the existence of God and of spiritual things is rested on the allegation that the human mind is inherently and constitutionally incapable of ascertaining

¹ Read, in part, before the Presbyterian Alliance, at Philadelphia.
VOL. XXX.—NO. CXV.

whether there is such truth or not. The weakness of the human mind is a plea which may be brought forward in any region of inquiry; and the plea is the same no matter in what region it is brought forward. Things, however, which have the same nature should have the same name. Wherever, therefore, assent is withheld because of the alleged incompetency of the mind to ascertain the truth, there is Agnosticism. The rejection of any one kind of truth on that ground is as much Agnosticism as the rejection of any other kind. What is essential in Agnosticism is the reason on which it supports itself, the attitude toward truth and knowledge which it assumes. What is non-essential are the objects or propositions to which it is applied. Some have represented the scepticism which may appropriately be called Agnosticism as negation or disbelief; others contend that it should be confined to doubt. For reasons which I have not time here to state, I hold that it may be either doubt or disbelief. It is not, however, either merely doubt or disbelief; but the doubt or disbelief which rests on the supposition that what are really powers of the human mind are untrustworthy; that what are actually normal perceptions, natural or even necessary laws, and legitimate processes, are not to be depended on. Ordinary doubt and ordinary disbelief have their reasons in the objects or propositions examined by the mind, not in distrust of the mind itself. They imply nothing more than the conviction of the absence of evidence for, or the existence of evidence against, the particular position in dispute. But Agnosticism challenges evidence, and refuses to be convinced by it on the deeper and subtler ground that the mind is not endowed with faculties by which it can derive truth and certainty from what is alleged to be evidence.

In the present day Agnosticism is seldom applied, as it was by the ancient Greek sceptics, to all forms and kinds of what is called knowledge. It is also rarely now maintained, as it has, however, not unfrequently been maintained, to be valid with respect to what is termed reason and science, but not to faith and religion. On the contrary, it is only in reference to the spiritual and the supernatural that it is now prevalent, and as regards them it is alarmingly prevalent. Contemporary Agnosticism, unlike the more consistent Agnosticism of former ages, endeavours to show that ordinary experience and the

positive sciences may be received with deference and confidence, but that religion and revelation must be rejected, as presenting only credentials which the human mind is incapable of testing. Why is Agnosticism in this form so common, and how is it to be dealt with?

First, then, although this special form of Agnosticism (Agnosticism in regard to religion) be far more common than any general form of Agnosticism (Agnosticism in regard to knowledge in itself), the latter may fairly be specified as one of the causes of the former. The general doctrine to some extent originates and explains the special doctrine. Those "dead but sceptred sovereigns [Hume and Kant] still rule our spirits from their urns." The Agnosticism of Sir William Hamilton and of Dean Mansel as to knowledge of the infinite was but a modification and application of Kant's theory of cognition, and the entire process of argumentation by which Mr. Herbert Spencer relegates religion and its objects to the region of the unknowable is borrowed from Hamilton and Mansel. One constantly hears the agnostic views of Hume and Kant, of Comte and Mill, expressed and avowed by men who have never read a page of their writings, but who are not the less influenced, on that account, by their opinions. Then, every phase of Agnosticism in religion must, when called upon to defend and justify itself, appeal to the Agnosticism of metaphysical theory. The negations of the positivist as to the spiritual and the supernatural, for example, are mere arbitrary assertions until based on some agnostic theory of the nature and conditions of cognition. It is this necessity of vindicating Agnosticism in religion which has, more than anything else, I believe, led recently in Germany to the resuscitation of the negative or sceptical portion of the philosophy of Kant; or, in other words, to the spread of what is called Neo-Kantism. A very large number of the Neo-Kantists are men utterly incapable of understanding the system of Kant as a whole, and utterly devoid of sympathy with what is best in the spirit of that system; men who accept what they call "critical" philosophy in the most uncritical way; men, whose blind and idolatrous worship of the weaknesses and defects of the philosophy of Kant has its main source in the fancy that a simple appeal to the negative conclusions of the *Critique of Pure Reason* will entitle them to treat

religion as an illusion, and to disregard everything but what they are pleased to call Experience. Of course, although a doctrine like Neo-Kantism may owe its existence mainly to religious scepticism, once it has been produced, it will aid in confirming and spreading the scepticism in which it originated.

The practical inference which I draw from what I have now indicated is that the churches are vitally interested in the prosperity of the mental and speculative branches of knowledge—such as psychology, logic, and metaphysics. Agnosticism in religion must have its roots there, and can only be completely overcome by being eradicated there. It may be so far met by being shown to be arbitrary in its rejection of ultimate and self-evident principles—to be essentially inconsistent and self-contradictory in every form, general or special, total or partial, in which it can be exhibited—and to be pernicious in its consequences; but the only thoroughly adequate antidote to it is a truthful and comprehensive mental philosophy. Agnosticism is largely founded, for example, on narrow and partial doctrines as to the nature of belief. The theory of Hume, that belief is constituted by vivacity or strength of impression; of James Mill, that it is resolvable into the inseparable association of ideas; of Dr. Bain, that its basis and ultimate criterion is action; of M. Renouvier, that its essence is an act of free determination, etc., must lead to Agnosticism in some form. Then, in order to preclude it in all forms, a true doctrine of belief must be supported by a true doctrine of knowledge, and that again by a correct and adequate doctrine of evidence. Agnosticism must be the necessary result of overlooking or depreciating any element, power, or means of knowledge, any kind of evidence, or any natural and truthful criterion of evidence. Place, for instance, the criterion of truth exclusively in sense or sentiment, in the theoretical reason or the practical reason, in authority or universal consent; reduce it with Locke to the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, with Leibnitz to the absence of contradiction, with Herbert Spencer to the inconceivability of the negative, etc., and you must logically become if only a partial Agnostic, still an Agnostic on a very large scale. The more a man, therefore, reflects on this subject of Agnosticism, the more must he be impressed by the conviction that all our Churches are vitally interested, and all true theology is greatly and intimately

dependent on the successful culture and general diffusion of a sound and enlarged philosophy, such as will repel all exclusive doctrines, allow us to be just to every order of facts and ideas, and leave room for faith and affection fully to develop themselves.

In the next place, the anti-religious Agnosticism of the age is, of course, greatly favoured by the critical temper, the analytical spirit, of the age. We are living at a time when a very large number of persons claim the right to exercise their own judgment who have, unfortunately, but little judgment to exercise; when a very large number of persons forget that the right of private judgment, although very important, is only a half truth, and that the duty of judging rightly is its complement, and equally important. We cannot help this, because the reason of it is that God has willed that we should live in this nineteenth century; and probably we do not need much to regret it, because, with all its faults, the nineteenth century is by no means the poorest in which our lot might have been cast. It is a century, however, pervadingly and predominantly critical, and even largely hypercritical. Research takes us back in all directions to a state of society very unlike that which now prevails. The communism which some writers present as the ideal of the future is found to have been a general fact of the past. There is evidence that in the history of every country inhabited by any division of the Aryan race, Hindu, Persian, Greek, Latin, Slavonic, Celtic, Teutonic—there was a time when private property in land did not exist; when the soil was distributed among groups of self-styled kinsmen; when separate ownership was scarcely known. In this archaic state of society, man, as an individual, may be said to have scarcely existed. The law and religion which corresponded to this state knew next to nothing of individuals. They were concerned with families, with groups. No man felt with any distinctness that he had rights and duties simply as a man. The rights of private judgment and of independent action were not so much denied and restricted as undiscovered and unimagined. Social authority was omnipotent. It is under the sway of this principle that all societies have grown up through infancy and youth. But in every progressive society there comes a time when its stronger minds feel that they are not merely parts of a social organism, but have a life and

destiny, rights and duties of their own, and simply as men. There are, then, two principles in the world—the principle of authority and the principle of liberty; the principle of society and the principle of individuality. These two principles coexist at first in a few individuals; but in process of time they come not only to coexist in some degree in all, but to manifest themselves apart, and then there are not only two principles, but two parties in the world, the one inclining more toward the side of social authority, and the other more toward individual independence; each party existing in virtue of its assertion of a truth, but existing only as a party, because it does not assert the whole truth; each conferring its special services; each having its special dangers; each being certain to ruin any society in which it succeeds in crushing the other; but the two securing both order and progress, partly by counteracting each other and partly by co-operating with each other. When the principle of authority is generally and spontaneously accepted, we may be said to have what Saint-Simon called an organic or synthetic period of history; when the principle of individual independence is predominant, we may be said to have what he called a critical or analytic period. According to Saint-Simon, all history may be divided into critical periods and organic periods. The critical periods are those in which the minds of men are employed in investigating the principles of government under which they live, in endeavouring to amend old institutions and to invent new ones; in which no creed commands the assent of all, so that society is without principles, discontented, changeful, and, in a word, in a state of anarchy. Organic periods, on the contrary, are those which possess an accepted doctrine, in which society is cemented by the synthesis of a common faith, in which the actual institutions give satisfaction to the world, and men's minds are at rest. Thus pre-Socratic Greece was organic; post-Socratic Greece, critical. Roman history began to pass from organic to critical with Lucretius and Cicero. With the definitive constitution of the Christian Church in the sixth century began the new organic period of feudalism; and in the sixteenth century the Reformers inaugurated another critical period, which the philosophers, scientists, and others have continued until the present time.

This generalisation may not improbably be in various

respects imperfect; and yet it may be accepted as containing a large amount of truth. Three centuries ago a doubting, questioning, scrutinising spirit began to make its presence widely felt in many forms, and down to this day it has been continually growing in strength. Its history is the main current of modern history. Its course and character have been very largely directed and determined by forces and modes of thought which are not specifically religious, and which may readily become anti-religious. It has shown itself in the region of intellect chiefly in the elaboration and application of the physical, experimental, positive, inductive sciences, and in the region of action by wonderful ingenuity and energy as regards things secular. It is apt in the one sphere to become empiricism or materialism, and in the other to become worldliness; and those who are carried by it to either error are necessarily disposed to justify themselves by adopting Agnostic views and supporting them by what are alleged to be critical methods. This alliance of Agnosticism with criticism is a source of great influence to the former, while it vitiates and corrupts the latter and is undoubtedly very dangerous to religion. Many of our modern critics first assume that there can be no real objective knowledge of God and divine things; that the phenomena of religion, those of Christianity included, may be fully explained on naturalistic principles, and, at least, without reference to special revelation; and then proceed to explain away, by means of narrow and one-sided theories of development and ingenious but inconclusive critical processes, everything which conflicts with their assumption in the history of the Jews, in the character, words, and works of the Saviour, in the lives of the apostles, in the Bible, and in the Church.

How are our churches to comport themselves towards this danger, which threatens them all, and which in some place, some modification, some degree, may present itself to any one of them any day? Well, each Church must, of course, bear its own burdens, and perhaps the more each Church is left to deal with its own cases, free and unbiassed by extraneous opinion, and the less reference is made to them by other Churches, the better. It is certainly a very mean and unworthy thing in any Church to try to make ecclesiastical capital out of the troubles of a sister Church. What I wish,

however, to emphasise here is this: that the mere exercise of discipline by any Church must be deemed a very poor method indeed of replying to agnostic criticism, or any kind of illegitimate criticism of religion and revelation. The only method of meeting it which can be reasonably expected to do permanent or general good is by opposing to it criticism of a legitimate kind. Its irreverence must be confronted with piety; its narrow and exclusive views of development with adequate and comprehensive ones; its ingenious but erroneous conjectures with sound and true inductions; its hypotheses, plausible merely because drawn from facts arbitrarily selected and illusively combined, with conclusions drawn from all classes of the relevant facts. A truly reverent, truly enlightened, profound, and thorough biblical scholarship can alone successfully combat Agnostic criticism. Presbyterian churches, I am sorry to say, have seemed, in general, but little to realise how important such scholarship is. It is high time that they were doing so now. If they are foolish enough to think that they can supply the place of it by suspensions and excommunications, they will find themselves deplorably mistaken. These, even when most cautious and most just, will do little positive good; if hasty, harsh, or unjust, they must do much positive mischief. I would in no respect despise or depreciate the faithful exercise of church discipline; but, obviously, although that may affect the fortune or status of some individual Agnostics, other weapons are required in order to combat Agnosticism itself.

In the third place, dogmatic systems have often powerfully contributed to the origination and diffusion of anti-theological Agnosticism by one-sidedness and exclusiveness, and pretensions to perfection and finality. The dogmatic attitude of mind naturally and inevitably precedes the agnostic attitude. The earliest attitude of all, indeed, is that of credulity. Until men have acquired a considerable experience both of physical nature and of human nature—until they have learned how easy it is to err and how difficult it is to estimate evidence aright—they inevitably believe too readily and too much. Ages are needed to give them this experience—to teach them this lesson. The earlier thinkers of all lands have displayed an overweening confidence in their power to explain mysteries

the most profound and to solve problems the most inaccessible. The latest thinkers of all lands certainly do not, as a body, err by excess of caution and of self-distrust. Criticism and scepticism only present themselves when the systems which have originated in the over-confidence of reason and of faith have discredited one another by their conflicts and contradictions and opposition to experience. Hence Agnosticism appears at first and for long only in connection with, and dependence on, dogmatic forms of philosophy. In the course of Hindu speculation, for example, there was gradually brought into being a large amount of Agnosticism strictly so called, but it remained always involved in the great dogmatic idealisms, as one of their subordinate elements, and never worked itself free of them, so as to become an independent and hostile theory. It was largely present in the same manner in the Eleatic and other early philosophies of Greece; but it only acquired a separate substantive existence in Greece when all these philosophies were felt to have failed, and the Sophists could employ the arguments of the idealists against the empiricists, and of the empiricists against the idealists, in order to destroy both idealism and empiricism, and to prove that there was no true or certain knowledge. When the defects and weaknesses of the various dogmatic systems competing with one another have been most felt, agnostic theories have been most prevalent.

Strictly theological dogmatic systems have often the faults and imperfections which generate Agnosticism. System in itself is, of course, no fault or imperfection either as regards theology or any other department of knowledge, although there are persons who speak as if it were, and recommend us to banish from theology the spirit of system. Science is essentially system, and theological science is theological system. To systematise is no evil; it is an intellectual necessity. It is merely systematising erroneously which is evil. Unfortunately it cannot be denied that there has been a vast amount of systematising in theology of a kind well fitted to cause aversion to system altogether, and to generate suspicions that religious truth is unattainable. Thus there are elaborate systems of Christian Dogmatics—systems in good repute and of unquestionable orthodoxy—which so ignore or contravene

the laws and findings of the very sciences presupposed in the truth of their primary assumptions and data,—Apologetics, Biblical Criticism, Biblical Theology, etc.—that they appear almost as structures suspended in the air. Systems which so obviously set at defiance the requirements of science as to the ascertainment even of their materials have a decided tendency to cause inquisitive minds, especially if at all sceptically disposed, to conclude that theology lies beyond the sphere of science and deals with the unknown and unknowable. There are other systems the doctrines of which have violence done to them by being shaped and distributed according to principles drawn from inappropriate sources,—systems, for example, moulded throughout by the metaphor of disease and its remedy, or the analogy to a covenant, or some scientific theory, or metaphysical tenet, or dialectical formula. There are systems which have been formed as exclusively as possible by induction, and systems which have been formed as exclusively as possible by deduction. There are empirical systems and there are speculative systems. The idea of God so rules in some systems that injustice is done to many facts of human consciousness; the sense of man's personality so dominates in others that the idea of God is obscured and mutilated. Such dogmatic thought leads to Agnosticism not only by its own exclusiveness, but also by the reactions which its exclusiveness occasions, by the contradictions latent or explicit in the systems which it generates, and by the unsettlement and perplexity of mind caused by doctrinal controversies.

The Church ought, consequently, to strive to keep its thought free from the defects which have been indicated. It should seek to be faithful to the catholicity of the creeds; it should seek even to have its faith broad enough to mirror truly the whole revelation of God. It should cherish a healthful dread of all theological systems which are predominantly polemical, and give its confidence rather to those which aim at the conciliation of all relevant principles, even those which seem to be antagonistic, and at the inclusion of all spiritual facts, even those which have been least appreciated. It should trust in no single process of investigation, and should distrust none, but should encourage the employment of all the resources of method in theological criticism and speculation. It should show that

it has a thorough conviction that God's revelation of Himself, in Scripture as well as in Nature, is not only true and capable of abiding the severest scrutiny, but an inexhaustible source of truth. Churches often forget that it is their duty not only to retain the religious truth which has been transmitted to them, but to increase it by ever fresh and fuller studies of all God's disclosures of Himself; that it is their duty to be constantly deepening, enlarging, and improving their theology. There can hardly be a more serious danger. It is by an ever-growing appropriation and application of the truth which God has revealed that a church advances towards the realisation of its ideal and mission, and the appropriation and application of truth presuppose its apprehension. A church which rests satisfied with the acquisitions which former generations have drawn from Nature, Providence, and Scripture—which does not seek to add to the old treasures, stored up in its creeds, catechisms, and dogmatic systems, new treasures—may be orthodox, may have espoused as yet no grievous positive falsehood; but its whole attitude towards the truth is a wrong one. It is at heart disloyal to the truth and dead to the love of it; and once a church is dead and disloyal to the truth, it will soon be dead and disloyal to all that is good. When a church loses that love of the truth as it is in Christ which constrains it to seek in him ever new treasures of wisdom and knowledge; when it comes to look with suspicion on new discoveries and to discountenance the spirit of independent and original investigation; when theological research and theological instruction are the last things it strives to encourage; that church is not far from the terrible condition in which errors are justified and lies embraced. Every such church practically and most powerfully teaches agnostic disbelief in spiritual truth. Every such church presents its theology in a light admirably calculated to make men conclude that it is a sham science—a pretended exposition of the unknown and unknowable. Every church, on the other hand, which seeks earnestly more and more divine light—which welcomes what is new in theology, if it be true—which encourages fresh and original theological speculation, if only it be sincere and reverent,—cannot but bear a powerful practical testimony that theology is real and vital knowledge and eminently worthy of study. I have great respect for

Calvin; I believe in the doctrine of the Westminster Confession; but I utterly disbelieve the notion—which I regard as one of the most powerful causes of Agnosticism—that theology came to a stop with Calvin or the Westminster Confession. I believe, on the contrary, that the human mind scarcely ever worked more energetically or successfully in the fields of theological science than it has been working during the nineteenth century,—entire theological sciences, like Biblical Theology and Comparative Theology, having been built up almost from the foundations within that period. And there are still in theology worlds to conquer by the human mind divinely guided and enlightened. “There remaineth yet much land to be possessed.”

Agnosticism arises—it must be remarked in the fourth place—from false views of the relations of science to religion, and must be combated by true views on this point. The false views to which I refer are very commonly entertained even by theologians. Not a few theologians, for example, instead of exerting themselves to show that theology, the science of religion, is truly a science,—as truly so as chemistry, or geology, or psychology, or ethics,—calmly admit that it is no science at all, and even fancy that in making the admission they are doing theology a service. If theology be not a science, science, they argue, can have no right to meddle with theology; their spheres are distinct. Perhaps. But may theology not have a distinct sphere, although a science? If it be the science of religion, it is not chemistry, or logic, or ethics, or any other science in the whole circle of the sciences, but itself, and no science can legitimately enter its peculiar province. No science can without being untrue to itself—without so far ceasing to be science—intrude into the place and usurp the office of another science. To deny, however, that theology is a science can be no special reason for science not interfering with it, nay, may rather be a reason for its interfering with it, seeing that it may not be a science, because what is not true, or, at least, what cannot be proved to be true, and with everything of this kind science has not only a right but is bound to interfere. That theology is not a science, is outside of science, can only be made out by showing that the objects with which it deals are objects which cannot be known either immediately

or mediately, either directly, by rational apprehension, or indirectly, by rational inference; in other words, only by showing that the sphere of theology is not a sphere of knowledge, and of the faith which follows knowledge and corresponds to evidence, but a sphere of the faith which is distinct from knowledge, and undetermined by evidence. When that has been made out, however, it seems to me that what has been established is not that theology is unassailable, but that anti-theological Agnosticism is true. Faith is belief, and the only soil of belief which is separate from, and independent of, knowledge is false belief. Belief ought to be precisely co-extensive with knowledge. It is actually far more extensive, for it coincides with error as well as with truth, but so far as it extends beyond knowledge it is an aberration or malady of mind. We cannot believe what we do not know or think that we know, and we have no right to believe what we merely think that we know; we have no right to believe more than we know. Belief is assent to what is regarded as true, and it can have no rightful place in the mind if what it regards as true cannot be shown to be true. Evidence alone should be the measure of assent, and assent should be precisely in proportion to evidence. Not by proving that theology lies outside of the sphere of science, and cannot abide being treated as a science, but by proving that, unless the term "science" be arbitrarily and inconsistently limited to some particular group of sciences, theology must be admitted to be a science, and can stand to be scrutinised by all appropriate scientific tests, is anti-theological Agnosticism to be repelled.

The Agnosticism of the present day rarely ventures to attack reason within the limits of the sciences of things seen and secular. Vast provinces of knowledge are generally admitted by it to be unassailable, and, it is very instructive to observe, these are just the provinces which in the earlier periods of its history it most keenly and confidently attacked. The agnostic movement in antiquity, no doubt, ultimately undermined the classical theology or mythology, but at no stage of its course was it primarily and predominantly directed against it, but against knowledge as such, science in general. When the same movement reappeared in modern times, it was at first, and for more than a century and a half, on the whole, a movement in

defence of religion and in opposition to secular science. It is only in comparatively recent times that it has taken to flatter science and to single out religion as the special object of its hostility. This change of attitude is not unworthy of consideration. It is only a change of attitude, not a change of nature. Agnosticism is still in reality as little the true friend of science as before. Modern Agnosticism is as inconsistent with science in itself as was ancient Agnosticism. The facts which it denies and the principles which it assails are facts and principles essential to the existence and development of science; and if the Agnosticism of the present day were more ingenuous it would openly, like the Agnosticism of old, pronounce all science, and not merely the theological sciences, illegitimate and illusory. It shows want of courage and want of thoroughness in acting otherwise; it would be more to be commended and more useful if it were more impartial in its criticism and scepticism. In this respect the recent able work of Mr. Balfour—*A Defence of Philosophic Doubt*—is an honourable and admirable exception to the general tenor of agnostic publications. It proceeds on a clear recognition of the obligation under which the agnostic logically lies to subject science in its idea, premisses, inferences, methods, and internal organism, to scrutiny; and it shows that when this is done the case against religious science is no stronger than against other science. What is the consequence? Our ordinary agnostics—agnostics of the type of Mr. Leslie Stephen—are just the persons who are most embarrassed with this defence of philosophic doubt. They find one candid friend more troublesome than many enemies.

The chief reasons why Agnosticism has so generally ceased to assail certain sciences, and especially the physical sciences, are the obvious and wonderful progress which these sciences have made in modern times, the great results which they have achieved, and the wide diffusion of the habits of thought which are implied in their culture. They have thus gained a reputation and influence among the men of our day which secure to them immunity from the assaults of those who should in logical consistency be their enemies. Far be it from me to grudge them an immunity so honourably won. My wish would be that the theological sciences—those which have to deal with

religious truth—may in time gain a like immunity. If they are ever to do so, it must be in no inconsiderable degree by theologians vindicating in a thoroughly practical manner the rights of their various departments to be regarded as fields of genuine science. It must be by their cultivating those departments with the energy, originality, and profundity required to make manifest their fruitfulness. It must be by their showing that spiritual experience is as real and reliable as sensible experience—that theology, instead of declining, demands the criticism of its data and the verification of its conclusions—can employ every trustworthy process of scientific method, and fears the application of no truly scientific test.

Theology is a science, but, of course, like every other distinct science, has a sphere of its own, within which it alone is entitled to rule. To attempt to explain the phenomena proper and peculiar to it—the facts of religion—by the laws of other and lower sciences can only result in sophistically explaining them away. Such attempts have been numerous. Some would resolve all the phenomena of religion into mere states of history; others would reduce them to subjective dispositions and illusions; others fancy that they can explain them by matter and motion. There are scores of attempts of this kind, and every one of these naturally and necessarily tends to Agnosticism. Obviously they all proceed from the same error—a false view as to the relationship of theology to other sciences. They are all of essentially the same nature as attempts to explain the laws of thought by the principles of mechanics, or the truths of morals by the processes of physiology. The chief cause why attempts so unscientific are so often made by scientific men is the blindness or short-sightedness produced by excessive specialism. All that tends to prevent and counteract such specialism tends also to prevent and counteract Agnosticism. Now, the things most powerful, and, therefore, most needed in this way are, I believe, these two: first, that the common education of a country should be a truly good and really general education, what is spiritual receiving due attention as well as what is physical; and, second, that in the higher education—the education of men destined for the learned, liberal, and scientific professions—history and literature, and mental, moral, and religious science, should have a

proper place secured to them. All churches are vitally interested in their conflict with Agnosticism in obtaining these two things, and all religious men should take a side, and the right side, in regard to them. A correct and comprehensive exhibition of the natural relations of the sciences to one another, and so of theology to other sciences, would also be helpful as a counteractive to the excesses of specialism and to the Agnosticism which they generate. To give us this is what we are entitled to look for from philosophy, seeing that one of its essential functions is to show how science is related to science, where each science is in contact with another, and in what way each fits into each, so that the whole of which they are parts may be a cosmos. Unfortunately philosophy has not of late been prosecuting this part of its work with much vigour.

A large amount of anti-theological Agnosticism may be traced to ignoring the fact that religious knowledge, like every other distinct kind of knowledge, presupposes special qualifications in those who require it. There is no science which does not require special aptitudes in its cultivators. The study of formal logic demands a purity of reason which many persons do not possess. Mathematics cannot be followed far by those who have not an exceptional power of apprehending quantitative relations. Chemical or physiological investigation requires much which is not called for in mathematical investigation. Conscience is an indispensable prerequisite in moral science but not in biology. A person devoid of susceptibility to the beautiful can be no authority in questions of æsthetics. In like manner, there is nothing strange that unspiritually-minded men should fail to perceive spiritual truth even where it undoubtedly exists and where the evidences of its presence are abundant. Hence one can easily understand how the science which deals with things seen and which is productive of what satisfies our sensuous and selfish nature, may be little troubled by Agnosticism, while the knowledge of what is unseen, spiritual, repugnant to the sensuous and selfish nature, may, although equally certain and more important, be keenly contested and set at naught by it. The secret of the prevalence of the Agnosticism which reverences empirical science while it discards and despises the knowledge of what is spiritual, is, to a large

extent, a very open secret indeed ; it is that many are alive to the things of sense and self who are dead to higher things.

The attitude of distrust and antagonism which religious men have often assumed towards the physical and various other sciences would naturally fall to be now mentioned as another cause of Agnosticism ; but here, I am sure, you may fairly take in what has been already said by gentlemen than whom none more competent to treat of it could possibly have been found, and then, if you like, you may credit me, on the score of superior comprehensiveness, with all the merits in the papers of President McCosh and Professor Calderwood.

If time had allowed, I should, finally, have dwelt on the thought that whatever tends to make us unspiritual, worldly, selfish, is favourable to Agnosticism ; that all that tends to raise us above unspirituality, worldliness, selfishness is unfavourable ; and that the strongest of all anti-agnostic forces—in fact, the one great safeguard of humanity against the general or final triumph of Agnosticism—is none other than the redemptive power of the glorious Gospel of Jesus Christ. Each one of you, fathers and brethren, by simply so living as to show that religion is supremely worth believing, may do far more to combat the spirit whence Agnosticism arises than I or any one could do merely by a formal written attack upon it. The grand argument against anti-religious Agnosticism is the practical one of a consistent and vigorous Christian life—an argument which, through God's grace, we may all use.

R. FLINT.

ART. II.—*Evolution and the Hebrews : a Review of Herbert Spencer's "Hebrews and Phœnicians."*¹

MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S System of Philosophy may be summed up in two phrases,—Nescience of Substance and Evolution of Phenomena.

¹ *Descriptive Sociology*, or groups of Sociological Facts, classified and arranged by Herbert Spencer. Division II. Part II. : *Hebrews and Phœnicians*, compiled and abstracted by Richard Scheppig, Ph.D. London : Williams and Norgate, 1880.

1) On the one hand, the Spencerian philosophy presents itself as an eirenicon. It seeks to reconcile the rival claims of science, philosophy, and theology,—by the extinction of theology. For religion some room is to be left, religion consisting of a reverential awe for the somebody or something unknown and unknowable, demanded both by science and philosophy, concerning which we neither know nor can know anything, concerning which therefore we cannot affirm whether it is one or many, material or spiritual, motionless or mutable, existent in unrelated solitude and majesty or moving through endless flux and ceaseless metamorphosis. Theological research is declared to be useless, seeing that both science and philosophy are at one in revealing, inductively from general and special experience, and deductively from the nature of the reason, that the power which the universe manifests is inscrutable. [The ultimate nature of what is manifested to us both by science and philosophy we cannot know, says Spencer; but that there is an ultimate nature we cannot but know from these two branches of evidence.] Accordingly Spencer declares both Hamilton and Kant to be right, since consciousness, common sense, bears testimony to the existence of a supreme being, whereas we can never know the nature of this *Ding an sich*. All therefore, in the way of investigation, that remains for man is science (or knowledge of phenomena of the specialised form) and philosophy (or knowledge of phenomena of the highest degree of generality). Science and philosophy are the great tasks for wisdom, and philosophy is but a science of science. Let us quote Mr. Spencer's own words :

[“The range of intelligence,” he writes, “we find to be limited to the relative. Though persistently conscious of a power manifested to us, we have abandoned as futile the attempt to learn anything respecting the nature of that power : and so have shut out philosophy from much of the domain supposed to belong to it. The domain left is that occupied by science. Science concerns itself with the co-existences and sequences among phenomena ; grouping these at first into generalisations of a simple or low order, and rising gradually to higher and more extended generalisations/. . . . Philosophy may still properly be the title retained for knowledge of the highest generality. . . . The truths of philosophy bear the same relation to the highest scientific truths, that each of these bears to lower scientific truth. As each evident generalisation of science comprehends and consolidates the narrower generalisations of its own division, so the generalisations of philosophy comprehend and consolidate the widest generalisations of science.”

Or, as the same definitions are more tersely expressed in another place :—" Knowledge of the lowest kind is *un-unified* knowledge ; science is *partially-unified* knowledge ; philosophy is *completely-unified* knowledge."

One characteristic then of the Spencerian philosophy is the denial of any knowledge of things as they are, whether it is a knowledge of self, or of things in themselves, or of God. The Spencerian philosophy has no place for a psychology which deals with the nature of the soul, or for an ontology which deals with the nature of things, or for a theology which deals with the nature of God. When a Christian thinker speaks of his knowledge of a personal Deity, of adorable attributes, in three Persons, the Creator and the Preserver of the world, the Father and the Redeemer of mankind, Mr. Spencer asserts himself to be absolved from even investigating into the truth of such beliefs,—they are to him initially incapable of proof. All that man does know or can know, he says, of a super-sensual world is that "he is conscious of an incomprehensible cause, of an inscrutable power." Consequently, it is alleged, "our highest wisdom and our highest duty is to regard that through which all things exist as the Unknowable." And our author enlarges upon the folly, nay, the impiety of those who pretend to a knowledge of the unknowable. Let us again quote his own words :—

"Volumes might be written," says Mr. Spencer, "upon the impiety of the pious. Through the printed and spoken thoughts of religious teachers, may almost everywhere be traced a professed familiarity with the ultimate mystery of things, which, to say the least of it, seems anything but congruous with the accompanying expressions of humility. And, surprisingly enough, those tenets which most clearly display this familiarity are those insisted upon as forming the vital elements of religious belief. The attitude thus assumed can be fitly represented only by further developing a simile long current in theological controversies—the simile of the watch. If for a moment we made the grotesque supposition that the tickings and other movements of a watch constituted a kind of consciousness, and that a watch possessed of such a consciousness insisted on regarding the watchmaker's actions as determined, like its own, by springs and escapements, we should simply complete a parallel of which religious teachers think much."

Were we criticising Mr. Spencer's philosophy as a whole, we should wish to draw attention to the "grotesque supposition" indeed, that "the tickings and other movements of a

watch constituted a kind of consciousness;" if they did, we should see no presumption in arguing that the consciousness which works by springs and escapements might infer that similar springs and escapements, working for similar ends, originated in consciousness too. Mr. Spencer wholly mistakes the argument from design. It is untrue to say that the theologian insists that "a watch possessed of such a consciousness" argues that the divine watchmaker's actions are "determined, like its own, by springs and escapements." From the existence of the human body, the springs and escapements by which the tickings and movements of the human watch are produced, no theologian has inferred that the Deity has a similar body with senses, muscles, and nerves; all that the theologian argues is that, since a certain cause which he knows, namely, his conscious self, produces by design an effect which he knows, namely, a proposed end, he is at liberty to conclude whenever he sees the evident adaptation of means to ends in nature, that so analogous an effect to what he has himself produced is the effect of a similar cause, namely, a self-conscious designer. So, too, if we were examining Mr. Spencer's philosophy as a whole, we should have much to say about the inconsequence of his method of definition by average. But this is not the aim before us. We simply wish at the present moment to give an outline of the Spencerian philosophy. That philosophy, for one thing then, disclaims all knowledge of the nature of things in themselves, and is therefore not inappropriately called an Agnostic philosophy.

On the other hand, the Spencerian philosophy claims to present the one principle which constitutes all science deductive. It would subsume under one comprehensive formula all the processes of mind and matter cognisable by man. To use its own terminology, science, or partially-unified knowledge, becomes philosophy, or completely-unified knowledge, by virtue of this one crowning generalisation. This principle, this formula, this generalisation, is that of evolution (and its converse, dissolution). The two laws thus designated are supposed to state "the whole series of changes passed through by every existence in its passage from the imperceptible to the perceptible, and again from the perceptible to the imperceptible." The exact significance of the processes or laws thus

named is shown most lucidly, and it is necessary to bear in mind the definitions appended, seeing that they are so frequently and so vaguely employed in popular discourse. As Mr. Spencer himself says :—

“These titles are by no means all that is desirable; or rather we may say that while the last [dissolution] answers its purpose tolerably well, the first [evolution] is open to grave objections. Evolution has other meanings, some of which are incongruous with, and some even directly opposed to, the meaning here given to it. The evolution of a gas is literally an absorption of motion and disintegration of matter, which is exactly the reverse of that which we here call evolution—is that which we here call dissolution. As ordinarily understood, to evolve is to unfold, to open and expand, to throw out, to emit; whereas, as we understand it, the act of evolving, though it implies increase of a concrete aggregate, and in so far an expansion of it, implies that its component matter has passed from a more diffused to a more concentrated state—has contracted. . . . We everywhere mean by evolution, the process which is always an integration of matter and dissipation of motion.”

To state the same truth in another way :—Evolution and dissolution, which together make up the entire process through which things pass, have as their only postulates, as far as the faculties of man are concerned, knowledge of the substance causing these postulates being impossible,—matter, motion, and force, *i.e.* the indestructibility of matter, the continuity of motion, and the persistence of force. Of these three postulates the last is ultimate, and the others are derivative. The great unifying formula must therefore manifestly be an expression of the continuous redistribution of matter, or static force, and motion, or dynamic force. Now a wide induction makes it manifest what this expression is : it is a statement of the truth that the concentration of matter implies the dissipation of motion, and that, conversely, the absorption of motion implies the diffusion of matter. Hence the formula previously quoted : Dissolution is the absorption of motion and disintegration of matter ; Evolution, under its most general aspect, is the integration of matter and dissipation of motion. A simple illustration will make this technical language clearer. Heat a little iodine in a test-tube, and a beautiful blue vapour will be seen to rise. Now both vapour and crystals are equally iodine, but the difference so apparent to the senses is explicable as follows :—heat, which is a mode of motion, has been absorbed,

and the material operated upon has been disintegrated ; this is dissolution in its simplest form. Continue the experiment ; allow the vapour to pass through a long glass tube, and it will condense again into crystals by contact with the cold glass ; in this case the superadded motion is dissipated, and consequently the material used is integrated. A slightly more complex instance is seen in the action of an electric spark upon a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen, when a few drops of water are *evolved*, or, in the reverse experiment, where a galvanic battery is brought to bear upon a little water, when it *dissolves* into its constituent elements. It is these truths, thus exhibited in very simple forms, which Mr. Spencer declares to rule the universe of cognisable things. The entire cosmos is, he says, a demonstration, in general and detail, that all orders of existence exhibit a progressive integration of matter and concomitant loss of motion. Every concrete science, therefore, bears its testimony to the astonishing fact. It is the one generalisation which the chemist—the investigator of elements, and the geologist—the investigator of the rocky structures of the earth, the astronomer—the student of the stellar motions, and the physiographer—the student of the stellar structure, the physiologist who analyses the body, and the psychologist who analyses the mind, the moralist who treats of individuals, and the sociologist who treats of societies, are all combining to elucidate. This ceaseless evolution and dissolution, it is contended, is equally visible in the tiniest molecule and in the most highly organised bodily structure, in the movements of atoms and the progress of societies, in the history of the earth and in the biography of every planet in the solar system, in the *nebulae* of the heavens and in the sidereal universe. All things knowable, it is said, are governed by the same great law, which, stated in its most abstract form is this :—“ Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.” The same law might be stated, we presume, somewhat as follows : All things are manifestations of force, that is to say, of static force or matter, and dynamic force or motion ; the history of the universe is but a history of the redistribution of static

and dynamic force ; and this history is the history of a growth, dynamic force becoming absorbed, and passing into static force, and of a growth which, in the diminution of dynamic force, is ever toward a more and more organised structure and function. Such, then, is the great generalisation which is to transform science into philosophy. And this generalisation is put forth as being both a valid deduction and a perfect induction,—a valid deduction as Mr. Spencer claims to have demonstrated in his *First Principles*, and a perfect induction as he is endeavouring to substantiate in the successive volumes of the system, entitled *The Principles of Biology*, *The Principles of Psychology*, *The Principles of Sociology*, and *The Principles of Morality*.

The Spencerian philosophy being summarised then in the two phrases, Nescience of Substance and Evolution of Phenomena, it is immediately evident how grievously such a philosophy comes into conflict with Christianity, and with that methodised form of Christianity which is named theology. So opposite are they, that as wholes they must be exclusive. The horizon of a Christian philosophy must be very much wider than the horizon of the Spencerian. A Christian philosophy cannot be satisfied with asserting our insuperable ignorance of aught but the manifestations of matter and motion. The knowledge which man may co-ordinate into science cannot be limited by any Christian philosophy to the domain of physical law, and to the sphere where the relations between matter and motion are alone known. The Christian philosopher pretends to a knowledge of a Deity who has graciously revealed Himself ; he cannot restrict his statements to vague allusions to an Unknowable Power and an Inscrutable Cause. To him the Deity, the Fount of all being, is One, Sole, Simple, and Infinite ; to him the Deity is a Spirit and a Person ; to him the Deity is absolute Life, absolute Harmony, absolute Beauty, absolute Justice, absolute Goodness, absolute Intelligence, absolute Wisdom, absolute Love ; to him the Deity is at once the origin of His own Being, and the Being originated ; to him the Deity is One God in three Persons. The Christian philosopher speaks of creation as well as of evolution ; there was for him an exact moment in Time when the Triune "created the heavens and the earth." He possesses, it is his reasoned belief, a wide range of interconnected and

credible propositions relative to the dealings of God with men, and knows, as does the Known and Knowable Deity he worships, the end from the beginning. In short, Christian Theology, which is but the ordered presentation of Christianity as truth, is a Christian philosophy, and a philosophy which cannot but be a rival of any philosophy which, like the Spencerian, restricts all knowledge to sensuous experience.

¶ On the surface it must be apparent that Christianity and the Spencerian philosophy cannot both be true.

However fascinating, therefore, the spell woven around the intellect by so homogeneous, simple and comprehensive a theory of the universe, which arranges beneath one law the minutest molecular change and the advance of constellations, the accretion of a flint and the complicated conditions under which a civilised society progresses; however pleasurable the thrill of delight at so splendid a generalisation, illuminated by so special a scientific knowledge,—it is natural that the Christian philosopher should neither be lulled into acquiescence nor warped into irrationality. Theories in philosophy as well as in science, x he will remember, are most readily tried by some crucial instance. And there are many such tests which almost spontaneously occur to him. ¶ That there is a process of development of some kind or other in the history of the spiritual as well as the material world, he is fain to believe; but when he is challenged under the exigencies of a philosophic deduction to surrender all convictions as to the existence of a personal Deity, all persuasion of a Divine interference in human affairs, all hopes of a Divine voice, which, breaking the silence of nature, speaks of a possible friendship with the Father of all, or promises a blessed immortality,—in short, all the indissoluble dictates of his renewed consciousness,—when such demands are made at the bidding of a philosophic speculation however brilliant and inclusive, it is not wonderful if, almost weary of more subtle logical processes, he bluntly compares hypothesis with facts, and overthrows an elaborate theory by a simple *experimentum crucis*. And numerous facts and experiences irreconcilable with the proffered hypothesis present themselves. Not to delay, one such crucial instance which the Christian philosopher will require any philosophy which pretends to be a unification of all knowledge to explicate, is that complex

phenomenon which is known by the name of the Hebrew religion. Can the Spencerian philosophy, the Christian, nay, the rational thinker must inquire, adequately explain the origin and influence of the several facts of that religion of the Jews which has proved itself so magnificently influential in the history of the world?

It is, therefore, with considerable interest that the Christian thinker turns to this last product of the Spencerian philosophy, Mr. Herbert Spencer's *Hebrews and Phœnicians*. Here the mine will be sprung beneath the citadel itself. Here an attempt will be made to show the harmony of the great crucial test with the evolutionary hypothesis. Sinai and Bethlehem will be demonstrated to be but stages in the natural growth from the Egypt of the Pharaohs to the Judæa of the Proconsuls. *The Hebrews and Phœnicians* is part of a larger work called *Descriptive Sociology*, which proposes to supply the student of social science with large accumulations of data for subsequent induction. Each division of the larger work, of which this is the second, comprises a set of tables exhibiting many facts concerning societies of various types, arranged according to a uniform classification; each division also comprises a large mass of miscellaneous quotations and abridged extracts very widely selected, on which the tables are based. To use the words of the Provisional Preface:—

"The condensed statements, arranged after a uniform manner, give in each table or succession of tables the phenomena of all orders which each society presents, constitute an account of its morphology, its physiology, and (if a society having a known history) its development; on the other hand, the collected extracts, serving as authorities for the statements in the tables, are classified primarily according to the kinds of phenomena to which they refer, and secondarily, according to the societies exhibiting these phenomena, so that each kind of phenomenon, as it is displayed in all societies, may be separately studied with convenience."

It goes without saying that this tabular classification which has been invented by Mr. Spencer displays considerable ingenuity, and ought to be of large usefulness to subsequent investigators (as it manifestly has been to Mr. Spencer himself in the volumes of his *Principles of Sociology*), or perhaps we ought to qualify the statement by saying, in the study of some societies. The aim has been to present at a glance the

relations of simultaneity and succession in social phenomena ; and the tabulation has been so contrived that "by reading horizontally across a table at any period there may be gained a knowledge of the traits of all orders displayed by the society at that period, while, by reading down each column, there may be gained a knowledge of the modifications which each trait, structural or functional, underwent during successive periods." A clearer idea of the object proposed may possibly be insured by regarding the volume before us. Let us restrict ourselves to the Hebrew table. Concise remarks precede the tabular arrangement upon the inorganic, organic, and sociological × environment (to use the well-known Spencerian terminology) and upon physical, emotional, and intellectual character. Then comes the table itself. Longitudinally it is divided into numerous columns devoted, to give their titles exhaustively, to such details as these—operative and regulative facts, giving information as to the divisions and rules of labour ; political facts, civil and military ; ecclesiastical facts ; ceremonial facts, referring to bodily mutilation, funeral rites, laws of intercourse, habits and customs ; chief persons ; sentiments, ideas and language ; processes of distribution, exchange, production, arts, rearing, etc. ; products of labour, viz., landworks, habitations, food, clothing, implements, weapons, æsthetic products ; events. Latitudinally each column contains divisions into the successive periods of Hebrew history—the pre-Egyptian and the Egyptian periods, the periods of the Judges, the Monarchy, and the Two Kingdoms, the Exilic period, the Persian, the Greek, and the Roman periods. The mass of information collected is immense, and it is conveyed in a handy and useful form. So much we cannot refrain from saying by way of commendation. But here commendation must cease. Alas ! in this division of the work at any rate, in spite of Mr. Spencer's deliberate assertion to the contrary, the facts are not collected and arranged "apart from hypotheses." Both extracts and classification are *ex parte*. As data for any sociological induction these tables and these excerpts are valueless, as will presently appear.

Examining the *Hebrews and Phœnicians* from a specialist's standpoint, there seems to be a perilous onesidedness in its bibliography. There are everywhere signs, it is true, of

German patience and industry; nevertheless, either the compiler is working upon unfamiliar lines, or his movements are circumscribed by a somewhat limited circumference. Moreover, just where impartiality is vital, the limitation, whether of knowledge or theory, is most conspicuous. In such purely antiquarian studies as form the large proportion of treatises and monographs upon the geography, numismatics, music, medicine, fauna, and flora of the Bible, there is a fair show of learning and an apparent candour. The Hebrew language also comes in for a tolerably adequate treatment, when the conjectural character of our early knowledge of Hebrew, and the slight sociological reference of linguistic lore are borne in mind. But when we come to such weighty subjects as the age and interpretation of the earlier books of the Old Testament, as Jewish history and Jewish archæology, as the theology of Mosaism and of the Prophets, a bias in the consultation of authors becomes manifest which jeopardises the trustworthiness of all inductions from such data. The common archæological handbooks of De Wette, Keil, and Oehler are, of course, used, but there is a conspicuous absence of the leading monographs upon such decisive points for any theory of the ritual and significance of Mosaism, whilst the authors quoted are placed indiscriminately upon a similar level of authority without any attempt at a critical valuation of the worth of their evidence, such obsolete writers as Saalschutz and Ackermann being cited, and Bähr, Hofmann, and Kurtz being wholly omitted. Smith's *Dictionary of the Bible* is constituted an authority, when Riehm's *Handwörterbuch des biblischen Alterthums* is not so much as named. Further, whereas upon the important point of Biblical Archæology there is unmistakable evidence of a lack of wide, accurate, and judicious acquaintance with the relative literature, there is in Jewish history a palpable restriction of view to historians of one school. Baudissin, Bertheau, Ewald, Grätz, Hitzig, Holtzmann, and Kuenen are so completely relied on that one would never dream, from a study of this book, notwithstanding the large selection of extracts, that there was quite an opposite rendering of Jewish history. The same onesidedness appears in the matter of commentaries upon the Old Testament books. With respect to the Pentateuch, the works made use of belong, with one exception, to the

rationalistic and critical schools, the weight of the argument and excerptation being laid upon Graf and his followers, Kuenen, Kayser, and Colenso. In the Book of Job, another point of stress, Renan, Merx, and Hirzel are followed, not Dillmann nor Hengstenberg, not Budde, Ebrard, nor Hahn. Upon so important a work as the Chronicles the revolutionary opinions of Bertheau and Graf are alone mentioned. Nor is the case otherwise with so essential a subject as Biblical Theology, where, Ewald excepted, Kuenen, Duhm, and Schultz, all of whom are exponents of the theory of Graf, are put forward as the interpreters of the doctrine of the Law and the Prophets. This onesidedness in the consultation of authorities is surely no slight indictment to bring against the trustworthiness of a classified collection of facts professedly made "apart from hypotheses."

And this sense of distrust, born of an apparent partiality, grows upon a more minute inspection. It is not long before the reader is met by a singular discovery. Not only does the compiler confess his inability to observe the only legitimate conditions of the problem, but a very gross example of reasoning in a circle soon appears. The preface itself affords large matter for amazement in a work constructed "apart from hypotheses." There Dr. Scheppig speaks of "the excellent treatment Hebrew religion has met with at Kuenen's hands," and longs for the time "when all branches of Hebrew life shall have found" the same "excellent treatment;" he also gives a sufficiently clear account of the preference thus accorded to the Dutch Professor, an account that may well be carefully pondered. "As to the historic period" of Hebrew history, writes Dr. Scheppig, "much depends on the dates assigned to certain Biblical books." "A very sparing use," he therefore continues, dogmatically enough, "has been made of the Psalms because of the impossibility of dating most of them." He even adds that "in agreement with the prevailing opinion facts drawn from the Book of Job have been set down as referring to the latter part of pre-Exilic times," considering, however, that "these very fragments will suggest a later date of origin"—to the Evolutionist we suppose. But it is to the following confession to which we would draw attention, inserting here and there italics of our own:—"The greatest difficulty," Dr.

Scheppig adds, "prevails as to the date of the component parts of the Pentateuch. *When the compiler, in 1874, commenced collecting his material, he adhered to the older hypothesis, according to which the three chief elements, now commonly termed Elohistie, Jehovistic, Deuteronomic follow each other in the order stated. When, however, in 1875 and 1876, he came to arrange the facts, he became fully convinced that the Elohistie element cannot but belong to the Exilic and post-Exilic periods. Accordingly he made up his mind to adopt, as the basis of his compilation, the hypothesis called after the names of Dr. Graf and Professor Kuenen.* Fortunately he has found no reason to regret the resolution thus arrived at; in the progress of his labours he has gladly seen how much light is thrown, by the hypothesis adopted, on almost all parts of Hebrew civilisation." Translate these words and they mean this, and nothing but this:—*The hypothesis of Kuenen has been adopted because it best harmonises with the hypothesis of Evolution.* This we call a virtual confession of inability to use the facts of Hebrew history in support of the evolutionary theory upon any other supposition than the supposition of Kuenen. For what do these prefatory words state? That even so composite and laboured a theory as Ewald's or Knobel's of the authorship of the Pentateuch puts endless difficulties in the way of the sociological induction of Spencer, and that Mosaism was too hard a nut to crack, or rather phenomenon to classify, except on the assumption of its post-Exilic origin; and Dr. Scheppig expressly says that he accepted the critical views of Graf and Kuenen, although it was necessary to issue a list of errata to the pages drawn up on the hypothesis of Ewald and Knobel with which he started, because "so much light" was thereby thrown upon "almost all parts of Hebrew civilisation," which, being interpreted, means, because such views enabled "almost all parts of Hebrew civilisation" to square with the Spencerian theory of Evolution. We call this acceptance of a theory at the call of a theory a resignation of the only conditions under which the problem of Hebraism could be solved. For, be it remembered, Dr. Scheppig does not feel his way to the critical hypothesis of Graf on grounds of language or internal philological evidence—he accepts that hypothesis because of the difficulty of illustrating the Spencerian Evolution

by the facts of Scripture on any other. > He arranges Scripture according to the method of Graf, because such a method best exhibits the philosophical theory of Evolution. But, we continue, this is but saying that he arranges Scripture according to the theory of *Evolution*, because the theory of Evolution best exhibits the theory of Evolution. / Here what we have called a gross instance of reasoning in a circle discloses itself. Graf and his followers frame their hypothesis because they accept the theory of evolution ; the expounder of the theory of evolution proceeds upon the hypothesis of Graf because of the arrangement thereby afforded of otherwise disconcerting facts. Graf accommodates Mosaism to the doctrine of evolution, and Scheppig is actually gratified to find that Mosaism when so accommodated illustrates evolution. In short, the one party calls upon us to accept their amended version of the Old Testament because of the cogency of the great law of evolution ; the other party calls upon us to accept evolution because of their amended edition of the Old Testament.] Lest these strictures appear too sweeping, let the exact words of Graf, Kuenen, and Kalisch be recalled. All three of these writers make evolution their last stronghold. Thus Graf says, in his treatise on *Die geschichtlichen Bücher des alten Testaments*: "The question is worth answering, in what epoch we regard the Mosaic Law as completed, whether, conformably to nature and analogy, we are to regard it as a witness and result of a gradual evolution from a fruitful germ, or as something initially perfect and underlying every subsequent development." Kuenen proceeds confessedly from what he is pleased to call "the standpoint of modern science," and hopes to show "a natural development both of the Israelitish religion itself and of the belief in its heavenly origin." Kalisch is yet more bold : "He would fain hope," he says, "that he has furnished a few available stones for that new edifice which it is the labour of our age to erect ; that he has aided, however humbly and modestly, in supporting by arguments derived from his special department of study the philosophical ideas which all genuine science at present seems eager to establish,"—the ideas, that is to say, "of Buckle," and "the fearless and penetrating investigations of Darwin, Huxley, and Lyell." Thus Graf relies upon evolution to prove his theory, and Scheppig relies upon Graf's theory to prove evolu-

tion. Is it too severe a criticism to designate such reasoning a gross example of a "*circulus in demonstrando*"?

Hence, then, it is permissible to assert that the work before us, not being compiled "apart from hypotheses," is valueless as a classification, and wellnigh valueless as a collection of facts. Its sole use is as a collection and classification of facts made according to a theory which is still *sub judice*. Nor can any evidence it affords for the probation of the Spencerian or any other doctrine of simply natural evolution be regarded as reliable, inasmuch as the manifest accommodation of the only accessible records to suit the theory to be substantiated cannot logically be made available as evidence for that theory. The exceptional position of the Hebrew nation for which every Christian contends is not disproved in any way. One theory is not disproved by bare assertion of another. Whether it can be disproved is another question. Where Spencer and Schep-pig have failed, who shall succeed?

It may be well, therefore, to distinctly ask whether there are not exceptional phenomena presented by Hebraism which are fatal to any theory of a merely natural development, and which are inconsistent with an evolution which is a bare deduction from the persistence of force. Surely, if anywhere, it is in the history of the Hebrews that unmistakable facts are found which bespeak the intervention of an overruling Providence who breaks through the rigid reign of what is called physical or natural law for moral ends. It is not said, be it observed, that the facts of Hebraism are inconsistent with any idea of evolution. Given a personal Deity, and all that becomes may be designated an evolution of Him,—an evolution, however, which cannot be foretold by the most scientific, since, by hypothesis, being personal, God is a free agent. Or the whole universe of being may be called an evolution of the purposes of the Deity, who, being the Deity, thinks His thoughts from all eternity, and takes eternity to work them out; although, in this case again, the idea of evolution is no supreme concept from which all things visible and invisible may be deduced. And another distinction appears between the Christian and Spencerian idea of evolution. To him who holds the former, miracles are an anthropomorphism; to him who holds the latter, miracles are an impossibility. What the Christian calls

a miracle he knows to be the consequence of the limitation of his vision. A miracle seems to him to result because he has made a hasty generalisation concerning the future from the present; that is to say, because he has hastily inferred the existence of an invariable law from too exclusive a regard to the world of sense. A miracle is, therefore, perfectly credible to the Christian, because, as part of that divine plan according to which the universe is unfolded, perfectly natural; whereas he is aware that a miracle only appears to be supernatural because he has too hurriedly assumed that he knew the order of the universe because he knew part of that order. Thus the Christian evolutionist finds room for the seemingly abnormal events associated with the history of the Jews, even for so apparently abnormal an event as the birth or the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. With the Spencerian evolutionist it is different. He knows the invariable order of nature. What is, is the criterion of what shall be. There is no room for the infringement of what appears to be the order of things. Of a Deity he knows nothing but His, or Her, or Its bare existence (he does not even know which pronoun is correct). To him, a divine interference in the established order he has inferred with the limited means at his disposal is an impossibility. To him, the only postulates necessary for the explanation of the totality of being are these—matter (which is indestructible), motion (which is continuous), and force (which is persistent); indeed, since matter and motion are but varieties of force, his only postulate is the persistence of force; he knows nothing of God and His attributes. To the Christian evolutionist, then, the world has undoubtedly been evolved, it is part of an interminable chain, or rather combination of strands, of causes and effects; the universe at any one moment, with all its manifestations, though they include such events as Sinai, or Bethlehem, or Calvary, being the result of all the causes existent the moment before, including God, and will in turn be the cause of the totality of things the moment after: to the Spencerian evolutionist, all he knows is that the universe at one moment is the consequence of the combined matter, motion and force existent the moment before, and will be the cause of the combined matter, motion and force existent the moment after. In short, the Spencerian evolutionist believes in an evolution

which is the consequence of the persistence of force; the Christian evolutionist believes in an evolution which is the consequence of the persistence of God. And with an evolution which is simply a consequence of the persistence of physical force, the data afforded by the Hebrew religion cannot be made to square. No "integration of matter" can coalesce into a Messianic prophecy; no "dissipation of motion" can crystallise into the Mosaic code. The "indefinite, incoherent homogeneity" of the patriarchal age can never become of itself and by merely physical agencies the "definite coherent heterogeneity" of the life in the wilderness and the promised land. No metamorphosis of physical force can evolve a Christ. Other agencies than pre-existent matter, motion, and force were necessary to the production of Mosaism, Prophecy, and Christianity. In short, the cardinal facts of the Hebrew religion from Abraham to the Apostle John could only arise upon what, from the standpoint of physical science, we must call a Divine interference, or, from the standpoint of theology, we must call a new phase of the Divine purpose. This we hope to suggest in the brief space that remains.

How, for example, can the Spencerian theory of evolution explain the existence of such a religion as that associated with the name of Moses? It is for the sake of argument simply that we say "associated with the name of Moses." For the moment we express no opinion about the age when that religion was given; our question is this simply—irrespective of the age of this religious system (whether it was given at Sinai in the infancy of the Hebrew nation, or whether it was given during a long course of years and not completed till the days of the Hebrew prime)—how can any theory of natural or physical evolution account for such a spiritual product? Two varieties of attempts have been made to show that the origin of the Levitical system was due to a merely natural development. An attempt has been made to show that Mosaism is purely a human expansion of the religion of the ancient Egyptians; and an attempt has also been made to show that Mosaism (meaning thereby the religious system of the Pentateuch, without expressing any opinion upon its age), is purely a human outgrowth of those political and social Jewish leaders known by the name of prophets. Is it too much to say that

Mosaic religion

both attempts have signally failed? During the last century, especially after the voluminous contributions to Egyptian lore collected by Mr. Herbert Spencer's predecessor, Dr. Spencer of Cambridge, in his largely read work *De Legibus Hebraeorum Ritualibus et earum Rationibus*, the natural development of Mosaism from Egyptian ideas and practices was a favourite argument with the Deists, but would any competent antiquarian make a similar affirmation to-day? The new-born science of Egyptology has already demonstrated the impossibility of deriving the religious ideas of the Pentateuch from those of Egypt, and no further attention need be given to an extinct method of reasoning. The careful study of monuments has increasingly developed the opposition between the gods and ritual of Egypt and the God and ritual of the wilderness of Sinai; indeed, in comparison, whilst the former may well be described as "a feeling after God if haply men might find him," the latter seems only describable as a Divine revelation, an express Divine interference for the moral, social, and religious good of the Chosen People. Is the success of a merely natural method of development any greater in the endeavour to deduce the growth of Mosaism from prophetic or priestly teaching, supposed to be solely of a natural kind? It will be noted that this last proviso is important, being indispensable to the course of the reasoning; for if the prophets are conceded to be partakers of a supernatural inspiration, the Spencerian hypothesis is straightway relinquished, according to which the priests and prophets who brought the Levitical law little by little to completion are themselves embodiments of nothing but pre-existent matter, motion and physical force. Professor Robertson Smith perceives the force of this objection apparently, for, according to his teaching, the prophets, whom he regards as the originators of Mosaism, received their gift of prophecy "by the inward and immediate call of Jehovah," and they "generally spoke under the immediate influence of the Spirit or 'Hand of Jehovah.'" But Kuenen has reconstructed the entire history of the Jews from the standpoint of a purely natural development, and the question may well be asked, with what success? According to him, the massive and rounded cultus of the Temple (for in his view the Tabernacle is a fiction), was evolved during a

lengthy struggle of priests and prophets, the religious conservatives and liberals of their age, the fittest products of their intellect and genius surviving. The present writer has examined this theory at some length elsewhere, and he will not repeat what he has there said; in this place he will simply give the summary of his contention:—

"Is it too much to affirm," he wrote in the *Princeton Review* for May 1879, "in view of the extraordinary unity and adaptation of the Mosaic worship, that the common sense of Christendom will be unable to see in this hypothesis any adequate solution of the question of origin? For, be it remembered, we have not to deal with a complex and apparently contradictory mass of facts, such as is visible in the world of nature, defying scientific classification and baffling the shrewdest and most patient by all sorts of intermediate varieties; we have not even to do with a heterogeneous assemblage of principles, the accumulation of many ages and traditions, like modern law, where equity conflicts with the written code, precept wars with precedent, and unity only exists upon the assumption of many a legal fiction; the religious precepts of Mosaism form so concatenated a whole that the omission of any part causes the rest to lose cohesion. Mosaism is the manifest product of design. Surely such a cultus, regarded in itself and in its influence, it was totally out of the power of such a priesthood as the Jewish to produce. Even if Ezra and Ezekiel be thrown into the list of authors, the problem is but slightly lessened, for unless some supernatural gift be ascribed to them (and if ascribed to them why not to Moses?), all we know of both Ezekiel and Ezra negatives the possibility of their authorship."

Besides, the arbitrary selection of materials to suit a theory should be noticed. The Old Testament affords proof positive that prophets acknowledged their indebtedness for their religious training to that very law they are supposed by Kuenen to have aided in framing; whilst the Old Testament affords proof as positive of the low religious tone of the priestly class. By what right is the unquestionable testimony of the records now ignored and now emphasised? The practice of Wellhausen, the latest exponent of the views of Kuenen, gives a sufficiently clear reply; he rejects any passage as spurious or interpolated which contains anything antagonistic to the evolutionary theory. But, as has been previously remarked, an interpretation of Jewish history cannot be first accommodated to a theory of evolution and then quoted as an illustration of such a theory.

Further, how is that notable phenomenon of the Hebrew religion called prophecy to be regarded as a datum on which

to found the Spencerian theory of evolution? The reply afforded by the advocates of a theory of natural development is,—by banishing from prophecy any idea of prediction. Here again we are amongst facts. The question arises, whether the idea of prediction can be disassociated from the biblical idea of prophecy? This is firm ground. If there is a single instance of prediction in the Old Testament which cannot be adequately described as conjecture, then any such theory as the Spencerian is declared insufficient for its explanation. In this case also, be it observed, it is unnecessary to settle with any accuracy the dates of the several books of the Old Testament in order to demonstrate the conclusiveness of this argument. Even granting that it is possible to subsume the religious life and magnificent example of the great prophets beneath the law of evolution, although with the extraordinary spectacle which they and their words present this is more than doubtful, the question before us resolves itself into this plain inquiry, Are there in the history of the Hebrews any undeniable instances of minute, exact, and supernatural prediction? Such facts as the adoration of the Magi and the fulfilment to the letter of Daniel's prophecy of the seventy weeks, which might be augmented an hundredfold, provide incontestable proof of the reality of prediction, and these facts receive a most impressive recognition from the laboured attempts of rationalistic interpreters to explain them away. We do not care to enlarge. The course of Messianic prophecy alone would convince any special jury.

Nor will we hesitate to draw attention to that crowning phase of the Hebrew religion which is so incompatible with the Spencerian theory. Is not any philosophy which sees in the character, circumstances, and utterances of Jesus of Nazareth—we speak in all reverence—simply the natural outgrowth of His time preposterous and self-condemned? And yet, by hypothesis, if the Spencerian philosophy be true, the babe of Bethlehem and the confessor of Calvary is nothing but the integration of pre-existent matter, motion, and force. We do not delay upon the verbal utterances of Jesus Christ, unexampled as they are, and calling as they do for the most continuous study, every age finding them more inexhaustible, and every personality, from its special training, appreciating some

new aspect (as it were) in their magnificent many-sidedness, every age, therefore, having no phrase to describe those words but "a divine revelation;" but we do delay for a little while upon the character of Jesus the Christ. Unlike all other teachers, who say "Do as I say, not as I do," Jesus, as all His memoirs agree, draws special attention to Himself. He does not shrink from inviting His enemies to convict Him of any meanness, insincerity, self-seeking, or wrong-doing; He expressly concentrates the gaze of all upon what He is and how He bears himself. Is such a character in any sense the outgrowth of His age? Is so astounding a sinless personality the result of a purely natural development? The question is asked in all seriousness. So impressive and unique was that character that it made substantially the same image upon the minds of each of his biographers, and, with all the diversities of their narratives, the picture which they draw is as unusual as it is sharply defined. He shows no traces of the typical Jew, not to refer to His freedom from the littlenesses of the greatest. He who has but slight acquaintance with the Gospels may possibly think but little of the carpenter of Nazareth, who calls Himself both Son of Man and Son of God; but as familiarity with the records grows, so does respect; whereas profound knowledge produces profound self-abasement, for He whose outline is thus clearly limned seems distant as the fixed stars from the highest and purest and best of the world's noblest. He claims unity with Deity, and no unworthy and inconsistent lapse belies the lofty assertion. He can sustain the character He claims. The claim itself, stupendous as it is—since, for argument's sake, we are standing on the human level, and are not insisting that the claim is true—opens up an ideal overwhelming and unexpected, nevertheless possessed of a wonderful force of persuasion and verisimilitude. For let the circumstances of His unparalleled arrogance, if His character be but the outgrowth of His age, be remembered. He calls Himself divine, and yet confesses to be bound by the limitations of a human body. He designates himself God, and consents to suffer. These words are not mere rhetoric. They strive to call up by a few rapid touches a few salient features of a most un-Jewish and most ideal whole, so removed from being the natural outgrowth of his age, that he is verily the Son of

Man, the true citizen of the world. We would concentrate attention, in short, upon His disproved sinlessness, His astounding personal claims, and His extraordinary catholicity. Not only has that perplexing contrast of an arrogated divinity and an assumed cross fired the enthusiasm of many in every subsequent age, and awakened an ideal of which the world was previously unaware, but it has convinced thousands upon thousands, and those not the most unreasoning, of its truthfulness.] Surely philosophy has set itself an impossible task when it endeavours to explain by purely natural causes the growth of that stem out of Jesse, who, born in an obscure village and trained amongst a pastoral and untravelled people displays in one manysided life a more than Oriental sublimity, a more than Greek intelligence, a more than Roman self-control, blended with a moral force and a penetration into the heart of things which was not only all His own, but unrivalled, not to say unsurpassed, in any age since as well as before. It is a matter of fact that no age of the world has produced any second leader of men who, in comparison with Jesus Christ, has not seemed so puny, so sinful, so partisan as to belong to a wholly different category. Now it is not necessary for us to maintain that Christ's own words are the sole adequate explanation of Himself when He said, "I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world; again I leave the world and go to the Father;" all that we are called upon to maintain is that the Spencerian doctrine of evolution can afford no adequate solution of the problem presented by the person and character of Jesus Christ.

That the Spencerian philosophy has an immense value and bearing in the realm of physical investigation must be manifest to every scientific inquirer; it is a useful and suggestive and stimulating, if not a true, unification of the facts of the physical sciences. But that this philosophy is a unification of the whole universe of being, present, past, and future, even with the preliminary concession that there is a great Unknown and Unknowable Something or Somebody which we must believe in but cannot in any way understand, no Christian can for a moment credit. [Many of the facts presented by the Hebrew religion, from its knowledge of a creation down to the training it afforded to the great pioneers of Christianity, obstinately

refuse to be classed with merely natural phenomena. Just as the Christian believer has, in his personal experience of salvation, a testimony to a Divine interference which he can no more disavow than the testimony of his senses, so he sees in the development of Jewish ideas as recorded in the Old Testament a series of evidences to supernatural interference which he can no more discredit, than the surest product of his intellectual faculties. The philosophy which ignores the facts either of Christian experience or Jewish history is, in the esteem of the Christian thinker, convicted of unphilosophical partiality; the philosophy which is ignorant of the same two branches of evidence is convicted of unphilosophical insufficiency. The former philosophy is unreliable because partisan; the latter philosophy is unreliable because immature.

ALFRED CAVE.

ART. III.—*The Eloquence of the Pulpit*.¹

THOUGH the art of effective speech depends more on practice than on theory, it has, nevertheless, certain rules which ought to be present to the mind in order that the student may apply himself with success to the exercises required. I shall confine myself to the expression of a few general hints, such as admit of being given within the limits of a discourse, and which find their application everywhere.

I may summarise my present subject as follows :—

General Considerations on the Art of Reciting—Its Importance—Its Difficulty—Its Nature—A Question Examined.

It is scarcely necessary for me to remind you of the importance of a good delivery. Of all human means, there is not one which contributes more to fix the attention of men, and to move their hearts. Many a discourse which, delivered in a bombastic and monotonous tone, leaves the hearer unmoved, and seems to invite him to allow his thoughts to wander, would have riveted his attention, convinced him and touched

¹ Preliminary discourse of a series on Pulpit Eloquence delivered in the Faculty of Montauban, on the 26th of November 1840, by Adolphe Monod. (*Traduction autorisée.*)

him, had it been given as spoken from the soul, with the intonations natural to feeling and reason. It is useless to object that this is a point of form which ought not to take too strong a hold on the Christian orator. Were delivery a secondary thing for the speaker, which it is not (for the state of the soul has more to do with it than is generally thought), there would still remain in it an important element, a capital one, for the hearer, since it has such a powerful influence on his thoughts and dispositions. Believe two men who knew something of the matter—Demosthenes and Massillon. The more different the kinds of eloquence in which they have respectively excelled, the weightier the testimony they have rendered to the power of elocution and oratorical action. Demosthenes was asked which was the first quality of the orator. "It is action," answered he. "And the second?" "Action." "And the third?" "Action." Massillon was of the same mind, having said one day to a person who had asked him which was, in his opinion, the best of his sermons: "The one I know best." "Why?" Because the one he knew best he repeated best. We may be allowed to think that these two great masters of art have made too much of this thought, in order to make it more striking; but fundamentally they are quite right. Not only is their opinion true, it is a fact which experience bears out, and which cannot be contested.

There is nothing in what we have said to startle a pious soul. True, piety does not forbid the use of the natural faculties which God has bestowed on us, but it obliges us to employ them for His glory, and the good of our fellow-men. What Bossuet said so well of God's inspired servants may be applied with much more reason to all others: "True wisdom makes use of all, and God does not wish that those He inspires should neglect the human means which come no less from Him."

To abstain is the motto of the morals of mysticism; that of evangelical morals is to *sanctify*. And surely the second is above the first; for to *abstain* only requires to distrust, but to *sanctify* requires to believe. Apply yourselves without scruple to elocution and oratory, but let it be in a Christian spirit. Let the art of eloquent speech be for you not an *end* but a *means*. If I have no other end in view in endeavouring to speak well than "excellence of speech," and the praises men lavish on those

that speak well, I am no more a preacher, not even an orator, I am simply an actor. But if I cultivate speech as a means of glorifying God, and of doing good to men, I fulfil a duty, and the more earnest I am in this study, the better shall I be able to implore with confidence that grace, without which the most eloquent is but "sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal."

This study is the more necessary as the difficulty of the art which occupies us equals its importance. Experience proves it, those who speak well are rare. There is, however, a distinction to be made here between the reciting of the actor and that of the orator. The first is much more difficult than the second; and if the orators who speak well are few, the great actors, at least the tragical ones, are phenomena which scarcely appear once in a century. This is because the actor has two things to do, while the speaker has only one. It is enough for the latter to express feelings which he himself experiences, but the former has to express those of another. Now, in order to express these, we must first of all appropriate them to ourselves, and this necessity which does not exist for the orator, requires in the actor a study altogether special, and forms probably the most difficult part of his art. To identify oneself with a personage who is a complete stranger to you, possess oneself of his manners, his character, his passions, his language, and nevertheless remain master of oneself, and keep one's mind free (for it would be weakness in the actor to confound himself with the part he is playing to the extent of forgetting himself, and no more observing himself as he plays)—this is a prodigious faculty, and one which appears to belong to certain natural dispositions of a special order.¹ It seems as if there were a peculiar organ for the dramatist's art, and it has been remarked that celebrated actors have not always been men of lofty minds. Thus we can draw between the orator and the actor the same distinction that Cicero drew between the orator and the poet: *Nascuntur poetæ, fiunt oratores*. Thank

¹ You may be anxious to see in what the great actors themselves make their talent to consist. "What people call my talent," Talma has said somewhere, "is perhaps nothing more than an extreme facility of raising myself into feelings which are not my own, but which I make mine through imagination. For a few hours I know how to live the life of others, and if I am not allowed to call back to life the historical personages with their earthly form, at least I oblige their revived passions to come and swell in my breast."

God, we are less dependent on the organisation, and this power of imagination is not indispensable; our task is nobler and also less complicated. To communicate our feelings and our thoughts in a way becoming, appropriate, expressive, is all we require.

But how is it that those who speak well in public are not more numerous? Without mentioning the speakers at the bar or in the House, how do we explain the fact that Christian preachers sometimes deliver their discourses without life, and even without the right inflections, while we cannot for an instant question the sincerity of their faith or the interest with which their subject inspires them. We are the more justified in wondering at this, that many a time these same men show in an animated conversation those very qualities which they lack in the pulpit, and that they would only require, it would seem, to remain themselves in order to be excellent speakers. The question is difficult. Let us, however, endeavour to solve it.

We acknowledge at once that there is a vast difference between conversation, even grave, interesting, animated conversation, and preaching. A discourse in which you are anxious to develop two or three propositions, speaking alone for an hour and before a large audience, must be consecutive and sustained in a way not necessary to conversation. This is no more nature left to herself. You require to calculate your resources, to manage carefully your voice, strengthen your intonations; in a word, to *observe yourself*; but, as soon as you observe yourself, you are no more in that true and pure atmosphere where nature shows herself, and gives herself up entirely. Preaching requires also certain faculties, physical and moral, which are not the possession of all, and which conversation does not require. Therefore the two cases are not on a par, and that would be sufficient to explain how a fine talker can run aground in the pulpit.

This first difference, which is in the nature of things, produces another, which attaches specially to the orator. In order to rise above the tone of conversation, the majority of preachers withdraw too far from it. They swell their delivery, and declaim instead of speaking. Now when bombast comes in, nature goes out. We must not be too hard upon them :

whether by the influence of example, or the tradition of bad taste, or the easiness of a method in which a pair of strong lungs takes the place of work, thought, and the power of feeling, there is, perhaps, not one of us in whom is not concealed some leaven of declamation, and who preaches with perfect simplicity.

We read, we recite, or we extemporise. If we read, it is nearly impossible to take a tone entirely natural, perhaps because the art of reading well is still more difficult than that of reciting well, or because the preacher who reads when he is considered to be speaking, puts himself by this means into a kind of false position, of which he must bear the consequences. It will be better to recite after having learnt by heart; it is still speaking from one's paper, that is true, but it is speaking for all that. That it is after having prepared one's thoughts, and even one's words, the hearer has no means of knowing; besides, a good delivery generally hides this to those not in the habit of speaking in public themselves. The mind, the voice, even the attitude of the body, everything is freer, and the delivery much more natural. But can it be completely so? I do not know. Art can go very far, but it is always art, and there is a certain tone of semi-declama-tion which we scarcely ever escape; it is a tax to be paid to the method—a method which, after all, we in no wise condemn, and which appears to have been followed by some of God's servants in whom He has been most glorified.

Finally, can we avoid the inconveniences which we have been noticing, and can we be certain of reciting in a simple way, when we extemporise? I well believe that it is in this way we may expect to attain the best delivery,—on this condition, nevertheless, that the preacher possess a facility great enough, or a preparation complete enough, or still better, both, in order not to be painfully seeking for his thoughts and words; if not,—of all the methods this is the worst, both for manner and matter. But even should we have received from nature, or acquired by exercise, a real facility, should we have meditated seriously on the connection and order of our thoughts, should we have done so pen in hand, as a help, there will always remain something of that trouble which belongs to the searching and order of what is to be said; and as the

labour expended in getting at the words absorbs the greater part of the energies of the mind, the speaker will find it difficult to command enough liberty of utterance to keep his tones always natural. Thus simplicity will be interfered with—from other causes, indeed, than those which hold good of the speaker who repeats from memory—but still interfered with. This is a fact, that false or exaggerated inflections are not scarce in men who speak extempore, except in the moments when their mind is completely free, and when they are in full possession of their utterance.

I have spoken of liberty of mind. It is that which, more than anything else, enables the preacher to be natural, and therefore to give the right tone. Were he completely at home, the greatest hindrance to a true and natural eloquence would be removed. But it is this that is most wanting, both in those who extemporise (which can easily be understood) and in those who repeat a discourse they have committed to memory.¹ When they see themselves in presence of a congregation they get frightened; they fear to displease; or they have higher feelings—they fear not to make impression on those who listen to them; or, again, they experience a vague embarrassment which they cannot easily account for, and from which some pious ministers are not altogether free. Now, it is the people that intimidate them; now it is a few of the hearers; yea, perhaps, a single hearer more enlightened, more difficult to satisfy, or even of a higher rank than others: poor human heart! As soon as that unfortunate timidity enters the soul, all is lost. The eye of the mind gets obscured, the thoughts become confused, the feelings grow blunt; the voice itself falters, a too short breathing fatigues the lungs and foretells a coming hoarseness. If the speaker extemporises, he runs the risk of coming to a dead stand, or else by a kind of calculation which he makes almost unconsciously, he will try to conceal the poorness of the matter under the *éclat* of the manner, and will throw out commonplace ideas, badly developed, and scarcely just, in a solemn voice and declamatory tone, which will leave his hearers as cold as himself, and which,

¹ Whitefield, if we believe some of his biographers, recited, at least sometimes, sermons learned by heart. He even repeated the same discourse several times.

once adopted, or rather submitted to, will hold the speaker captive till the end of his discourse.

We hear a great deal about talent and facility of speaking. I am far from accepting the principle which is said, rightly or wrongly, to belong to Jacotot—that all capacities are equal. But this error would only be, like many others, the exaggeration of a truth. In the distribution of His gifts, God has shown Himself neither so parsimonious nor so partial as is thought, as there is scarcely any soil which, by dint of labour, cannot be forced to yield at least the most necessary products; there is hardly an intelligent being who is not able, under good training, to speak in a right, interesting, and impressive way. The wide difference which is observed in this respect between orator and orator comes far less than people imagine from a natural inequality, and much more than is thought, from that other inequality which depends on the will of man and on his efforts. This appears right and desirable; and it is so, doubly so, with respect to pulpit eloquence, where the moral element acts such a great part. To confine myself to the subject which has brought forth this reflection, the power with which some men speak and the trueness of their delivery are owing greatly to the fact that they have been able to make themselves quite at home in a position where others are strange and awkward. If trouble paralyses all the faculties, freedom of mind intensifies them. Of two men who have met some peril, it is not always the more skilful who gets out of it best; it is ordinarily he who keeps all his *sang froid*, and the greatest genius is good for nothing when fear has benumbed him. Were you blessed with the finest faculties, of what use would they be to you were your mind not free? But he who is full master of himself not only says what he wishes, but says it *as* he wishes, reflects, stops an instant, if necessary, to find a word or a thought, even borrows from that suspension an inflection or a gesture natural and expressive, takes advantage from what he sees and hears, throws out all his energies, and this is saying much, for “the spirit of man is the lamp of Jehovah, which searcheth all the inward recesses.”¹

Perhaps you will tell me that this confidence which I enjoin upon you is a favour we may desire for a man rather than a

¹ Boothroyd.—Tr.

disposition we can recommend to him; that it is the happy fruit of temperament, of success obtained, of talent itself, and that it is not given to every speaker who desires it to feel at home. I grant that this freedom of utterance depends partly on temperament, and this is a reason for strengthening it if it be naturally weak; partly on success obtained, and this is a reason why a young man should endeavour by all means to make a good start on the way; it may also depend on talent, and this is a reason for carefully cultivating the measure which has been granted. But there is another element which enters into that ease which I desire for ambassadors of Jesus Christ, sent from God to sinful men: Believe that He who sends you will not allow you to speak in vain; seek the salvation of those to whom you speak as well as your own; forget yourselves in order to see only the glory of God and the spiritual good of your hearers; then will you tremble more before God but less before men. Then will you speak with liberty, and, therefore, with that amount of facility and accuracy which you possess in other circumstances of life. Were our faith perfect, we should no more run the risk of falling into false and declamatory intonations than we do in crying out to a man who is drowning to catch the rope which is thrown to him in order to save him.

Thus I explain the inferiority of many in pulpit oratory, partly by the difficulty which attaches to a public and continuous discourse, but partly also by the absence of certain moral dispositions; whence it follows that it is by working assiduously and progressing spiritually that the preacher will come to carry into the pulpit those same faculties of speech which he enjoys elsewhere.

But this particular question has led us too far from our subject. It is time to go back to it, and to give an account of what constitutes the art of oratory.

Nature is at the basis of every art, but nature embellished; poetry and eloquence do not depend on conventional rules: it is the heart and the mind of man—of man as he is—which are to be described and interested. But art founds on nature beautified, idealised; it imitates, it does not copy. When Barthélemy describes to us the massacres of September in words which make us not so much know them as see them

with our eyes ; when his muse, dripping with blood, has no other ambition than to inspire us with the very horror the hideous spectacle would have inspired, and into which he delights to drag us along with himself, Barthélemy, with all his skill, has violated his art. It is no more description or poetry, it is a slaughter-house. We should not desire to dwell too much on art, in speaking of a preacher's delivery. However, we can say, in general, that this delivery also starts with the imitation of nature. Listen to those who speak well, observe them when they are not observing themselves, remember their intonations, and make them pass into your delivery. But, while you adopt them, take them up ; see that you, too, imitate but do not copy them. Talk not in the pulpit. An exaggerated familiarity would be a mistake nearly as great as declamation : it happens more seldom ; it is, nevertheless, found in certain preachers, those especially who have not studied. The tone of good conversation, but that tone heightened and ennobled, such appears to me the ideal of pulpit delivery.

From these general considerations I pass to the exercises about to occupy us, and the remainder of this discourse will be employed in giving you some directions, bearing first on the physical, and secondly, on the moral elements in oratory.

Directions as to the physical elements.

We have just said—and we shall have occasion to repeat it again—that this part of eloquence is secondary because it is instrumental. In recitation, as in all the operations of the intellect, the organs are but the agents of the mind. These agents, however, are indispensable, and, in proportion as they serve the intellect the better, the recitation (*ceteris paribus*) will be more powerful. We must not, therefore, despise the physical side of delivery. Still we shall be brief on this point, as each can be his own director with the help of a few indications.

The voice must be exercised frequently and carefully. Endeavour to render your voice at once clear, strong, sonorous, and flexible. To attain this, long practice is required. Apply yourselves to master your voice. He who can do so will find resources even in an unpromising voice, and obtain great results with little fatigue. But the greater part of those who recite are the slaves of their voice ; they govern their voice less

than they are governed by it. In such a case the best qualities are all in vain; it is a rebellious instrument. You need not fear that the daily exercises necessary in order to become master of the voice and render it flexible, may hurt the chest. On the contrary, if they are moderate, they will strengthen it, and experienced doctors advise delicate persons to sing and to recite. The most favourable time for these exercises is an hour or two after meals; the stomach should be neither empty nor full.

Next to the care of the voice comes attention to pronunciation. There is a natural pronunciation. I call *natural* the pronunciation of the elements of speech which are common to all languages. There is a *conventional* pronunciation, which each people adopts for the words of their own language.

Begin by rendering yourself perfectly master of the natural pronunciation, and by learning to give to each vowel the sound which belongs to it, and to each consonant the movement it requires. The last point is the most important. If the purity of the vowel sounds contributes greatly to the grace of the discourse, it is especially the articulation of the consonants that gives distinctness, vigour, and expression. A speaker who articulates well can be heard far away without crying out, and even when making the vowels scarcely audible. It is the means resorted to on the stage by actors, who, in order to feign to be dying, speak in a demi-tone; they force out the consonant and keep back the sound. But he who articulates badly will never make himself heard at a distance, and, in straining the vowel, he would only add confusion. It is also in the pronunciation of the consonants that we meet with the most common errors, and there is hardly any one who, observing himself very closely in this respect, will not find himself guilty on some points. This one speaks thickly (*grasseye*); he pronounces the *r* with the uvula and in the throat, instead of pronouncing it with the tongue and against the palate. This other lisps (*blaise*¹); in uttering the *s* he advances the tip of the tongue betwixt the two rows of teeth, and brings out a kind of English *th*, instead of a pure sibilant. Many people

¹ Old French from *blæsus*, stammering. The *blésité* consists in substituting a weak consonant for a strong one; thus *z* for *s*, *s* for *g*, *zerbe* for *gerbe*, sheaf; *zeval* for *cheval*, horse (Littre, *Diction*.) In English the lisper utters *th* for *s*, as *yeth* for *yes*—most common in children (Ogilvie, *Imper. Dict.*).—Tr.

fail with *ch* ; they substitute for it either an *s* or a kind of *f*, or a badly enunciated *ch*, which results from taking a slightly oblique position in the mouth. There are none of these defects that cannot be cured with perseverance. You remember the example of Demosthenes, whose principal efforts were directed to the development of the voice and the pronunciation of the *r*. It would be a desirable thing to accustom children to early exercise in the correct formation both of the sounds and the movements ; teachers would then secure without trouble results which, at a more advanced age, cost them pains without end, and precious time.¹

The conventional pronunciation, suitable to the language we speak, can only be learned with a good guide.

There remains another point altogether forgotten by those who recite, and which nevertheless is of very great importance. It is the art of *breathing when required*. A man who breathes *à propos* will fatigue himself less in speaking three or four hours, as do some political orators, especially in England, than another in speaking half an hour. The orators who can speak so long either have studied the art of breathing, or are men who extemporise, but speak well, because breathing follows its own law without the speaker's notice, just as in conversation ; but it is not the same thing in repeating a discourse *memoriter*, especially if it be the discourse of another person ; for in writing we take care unconsciously to adapt the length and the turn of our periods to the habits of our lungs. But the exercise which most tries the breathing powers, because it takes us away more than anything from the tone of nature, is reading. So it is remarked that reading fatigues sooner than speaking. Few can go through half an hour's reading, without feeling a slight obstruction in the throat. There are many who can speak an hour without trouble. The difficult point is to breathe in such a way as always to fetch your breath an instant before you have exhausted it. For that purpose breathe very often, and with that view, take advantage of the short pauses in reciting. Fear you that this necessity may hinder your delivery and throw cold water on it ? On the contrary, the pauses thus managed by one trained in speaking help the delivery as much as the voice. They convey to the discourse

¹ A paragraph is omitted here as useless to an Englishman.—*Tr.*

that kind of slowness which gives weight and vigour to the thought, and this fortunate infirmity becomes thus an additional strength.

Lastly, it is in breathing at the right time that you will avoid a fault very common and very serious; that is, allowing the voice to fall at the end of phrases—a fault which renders reciting both indistinct and monotonous. This is the abuse of a rule to which nature points, for it is natural slightly to lower the voice when we are finishing a phrase, at least in the greater number of cases; but there are certain thoughts, on the contrary, which require the raising of the voice at the close. That fall, however, is rendered too sensible, and is taken from too high a pitch, so that there are often three or four words that are scarcely heard, or not heard at all. Great enough would be the evil, were the expression to lose nothing along with the voice. General rule: keep up your voice till the end of the phrase, save at the slight lowering and short rounding-off, so to speak, which shows that the sense is finished. But this requires breathing at the proper place, for when we have exhausted our lungs we allow our voice to fall; when there is no more breath there is no more sound.

Directions as to the moral element of Recitation.

This title alone shows in what point of view we consider the whole art of recitation, as well as the fundamental principle on which rest all its rules. It depends less on the mind than on the soul. I should run the risk of being misunderstood had I not begun by putting in my *caveat* in favour of the vocal part of recitation. Very far am I from wishing to sacrifice that part; but I suppose here that the instrument is well exercised, the organ flexible and strong, the pronunciation good, the articulation clear, the breathing easy. This preparation finished, and the time now come to recite, remember that reciting is first of all an affair of the soul, and make it as independent of the organ as you can.

In deepest reality, it is the soul of the reciter that speaks to the soul of the hearer. The organs of speech in the former, and those of hearing in the latter, are only a medium between the mind of the speaker and that of the hearer. The sooner you can cross that passage—the sooner you can forget the

organ in order to allow the soul to appear—the better you will recite. Let the soul, the whole soul, with her constant unity as well as with her infinite movement, be seen through the speech, like the bottom of a stream through water perfectly clear—so clear that it seems not to be there. In the same way, the organs ought to be the interpreters of thought so docile, so faithful, that they appear not to be there; they must obey so as to disappear. That is their glory, their proper glory, and their mission, and that ideal realised would suppose the perfection of the organ as much as that of the feeling. Hence our fundamental principle: It is the soul which recites. We are going to draw from it a few general reflections, which, rightly considered, are but so many applications.¹

I. Let the reciting be *true*, or just; let it give to each thought and to each feeling the emphasis which belongs to it. Why does such an accent belong to such a movement of the soul? Why, for instance, do we raise our voice at the beginning of the phrase and let it drop at the end when we ask a question to which we expect an answer? Why do we the contrary in that kind of question which requires no answer, and which is another form of affirmation? Why does this intonation mark a mere affirmation, this other doubt, the other surprise, this other anger, etc.? No answers to these questions can be given. We state that it is in nature; observe it and act upon it, that is all the burden of recitation. But, explain the secret connection which exists between the movements of the mind and the inflections of the voice, none can but He who has formed the soul, and the organs which allow man to communicate his impressions. That there do exist, in that respect, laws constant and well determined, the two following observations sufficiently prove. First, all men, not excepting those who have never made a study of recitation, recognise a true inflection when they hear it. Secondly, there are inflections which may be called primitive, and which remain invariable in passing from one nation to another, and from one idiom to another, in spite of the infinite diversity of all that is conventional. But these accents of nature, how to find them? The first way which

¹ In the lesson each of these directions was followed by examples which served to illustrate it to the pupils.

presents itself to the mind is to observe them in others, and it is excellent. But we cannot make use of it in all cases. We do not always have the opportunity of hearing men who speak well, pronounce precisely this or that word, this or that phrase on which we cannot decide. I suppose therefore that we are left to ourselves. How to find the accents of nature? I answer, let us seek for them in our soul. We must begin by discerning the inward impression, and that impression, well rendered, will reveal to us the accentuation. This is the first consequence of the general principle which we have set down previously, or rather it is only that principle applied.

Needless is it therefore to go trying all kinds of intonation, throwing out one's voice in all directions at random : let us sit down, reflect, understand, feel, and interrogate in silence our mind and our heart. It is only after the inward preparation that we can try our voice to some profit. These efforts will end by enlightening and animating the movement of the mind which first awoke them in us. In this way we shall finish by finding out little by little the true tone which, once found out, and found in this manner, will remain in the soul's memory, and will re-appear and present itself when required. A very useful help in this research is to translate the thought into other words, and into words more homely than those of the discourse, or, again, still better, to seek how we should render an analogous sentiment in the course of ordinary life. This method of going carefully back from the words to the thought, and of asking the soul to reveal the inflections of the voice, is the more necessary, as the same phrase, the same word, is susceptible of a multitude of diverse inflections which the soul alone can distinguish, and of which it perceives the most delicate shades, while language and the pen have but one expression for all that. Take the most insignificant word you can find, a proper name, a monosyllable, Paul. There is but one name Paul for writing and for language, but there are ten, twenty, an infinite number for the soul and for the organ which it inspires. By the mere way in which an intelligent reciter, still better, a man who speaks without observing himself, pronounces that name, and without waiting till he adds anything, you can perceive whether he is going to praise or to reprove, give good or bad news, incite to some plan or dissuade from it, call from a distance or close by, question, attract,

repel, etc. There would be no end were we to enumerate all the thoughts which can be crammed into that little name. Now, in that infinite variety what rule could we follow? what but the mind—a mind well balanced and disciplined—will be able to find in reciting the tone which our circumstance and the moment at which we speak require? I cannot therefore repeat it enough. Recite *ex animo*. It may appear to you that this is a matter of course, and that our recommendation is useless. But experience will teach you that it is not so. I will ask leave to put forward the authority of a man whom God had endowed with a rare genius, but who, alas! spent it in vain things; I allude to Talma. Listen to that man when he is himself explaining his art to some particular friends,—for he has not written anything very considerable in the way I have marked out, and we may be allowed to believe that one of the causes of the reform he introduced in theatrical recitation is the care he took in seeking the inflections in his soul, and employing the organs but as docile instruments designed to reproduce inward impressions :—

“Men of parts, even enlightened men, imagine that in my studies, I sit before a mirror, as a model before a painter in his studio. In their opinion I gesticulate, I rend with my cries the ceiling of my room; in the evening, on the boards, I utter accents learnt in the morning, inflections prepared; sighs of which I know the number; I imitate Crescentini, who in *Romeo* shows a despair noted beforehand, on a score sung a hundred times at his house with the accompaniment of the piano. It is a mistake; thinking is one of the greatest parts of my work; like the poet, I walk, I dream, or I sit down on the bank of my stream; like the poet I scratch my forehead, that is the only gesture I allow myself, and, as you see, it is not very noble. Oh! how true that word which has become history! Were one to ask me how I have found the greater part of the great sensations (*effets*) I have produced, I too could answer: “By always thinking over them.”¹

The true accent found, it is necessary to give to it a degree of intensity higher than would be done in conversation. Hence the *energy* of recitation. Of course this energy must be in keeping with the nature of the subject treated. It will be now the energy of reasoning, now that of passion, etc., but it will always be the energy of justness and of truth. That accent at the same time accurate and quite firm, those inflections true and boldly struck out, have a great charm for the hearer, and they can render the discourse interesting from beginning to end, even in its less animated parts.

¹ *Musée des Familles*, vi. p. 124.

II. Let the recitation be *simple*, or natural. Another consequence of our fundamental principle. In reciting from the soul, you will recite simply, for the soul is simple. The presence of man alone can render us affected. With ourselves we are always simple, for the one reason that we are ourselves. The accent of the soul is that of nature. It is the accent that ought to be reproduced, and we must take care not to put in its stead an accent of convention or of arbitrary choice, however flattering it may be to the ear and taste of a congregation. The hearer must recognise himself, and the instinct of his nature must be satisfied in each of our inflections. In other words, speak, do not declaim. I have said it before: raise, ennoble the tone of conversation and of daily life, but in raising it, do not abandon it. A skilful painter does not copy servilely the features of his model; he idealises them and commits them to canvas only after having caused them to undergo a kind of transfiguration in his brain; but in idealising them, he nevertheless imitates them, so that they are known at once; it is in this way that a picture is a perfect likeness, and, for that matter, finer than nature. So it is in a good recitation. The tones of ordinary life are embellished; still they are perfectly recognisable, because their essence has been carefully preserved. But to declaim, to take a new tone because one ascends the pulpit, to speak as one is not accustomed to speak, is a very great mistake, and nevertheless, strange to say, a mistake very common, very difficult to avoid, and of which no one of us perhaps can ever entirely get rid. For it is much easier to keep up a tone always equal than to follow step by step thought and feeling in their infinite windings, and also because there is never a lack of hearers of bad taste who are imposed upon by the pomp of language. Notwithstanding, even in consulting the human effects of your preaching (were not that point of view unworthy of you), the man who *speaks* in the pulpit will in the end get the better of him who *declaims*. Even those who allow themselves to be carried away by the fall of periods and by the *éclats* of the voice, get wearied of them in the long-run, and prefer to the bombastic preacher him whose accent alone causes them to feel that he thinks all that he says. And what shall I say of the difference that will exist in the true and real effect produced by these two preachers? How the latter will better find, I should say *alone* find, the

way to the heart and to the conscience ! How his moments of vehemence will be ennobled by the calm and simple tone of his usual recitation ! How much better will he be what he ought to be in presence both of God and of men, by remaining himself and not going out of the truth in order to teach the truth ! Yes indeed, if you are anxious that your preaching should be noble, Christian, and deeply impulsive, speak quite simply, say things as you feel them. Do not even put more warmth in your delivery than there is in your heart. That straightforwardness of recitation, allow me the word, far from throwing a damp on your discourses, will oblige you to put in them a warmth, truer, deeper, and which you would never have found in another way. Besides, it will react in a wholesome way on your preparation and on your soul itself. For, in showing things as they are, it will leave your faults naked, and warn you to correct them.

I have spoken of the pulpit. Were it the place to speak of the theatre, one might say things of the same kind about it. The great actor does not declaim, he speaks. Talma, whom I named to you just now, had begun by declaiming, as all the other actors did. An interesting circumstance made him feel the need of adopting a new way, more conformed to nature, and since that day he became another man in reference to his art, and obtained prodigious success. Persons who have heard him will tell you that the extreme simplicity of his play astonished them at first sight, and that they were tempted to take him for rather an ordinary man, who had over others little more than the advantage of a magnificent organ ; but soon that natural play overpowered them, and the strong impression which penetrated them made them feel that the very simplicity of his action was its strength, while it constituted, at the same time, its originality.

"We were rhetoricians" (it is Talma who speaks) "and not 'characters.' What scores of academical discourses on the theatre, how few simple words ! But by chance I found myself one evening in a drawing-room with the leaders of the party of the Gironde ; their sombre countenance, their anxious look attracted my attention. There were there, written in visible letters, strong and powerful interests. They were men of too much heart for those interests to be tarnished by selfishness ; I saw in them the manifest proof of the danger of my country. All come to enjoy pleasure ; not one thinking of it ! They began to discuss ; they touched on the most thrilling questions of the day. It was grand ! Methought I was attending one of the secret

councils of the Romans. 'The Romans must have spoken like these,' said I. 'Let the country be called France or Rome, it makes use of the same intonations, speaks the same language: therefore, if there is no declamation here before me, there was no declamation down there, in olden times; that is evident!' These reflections rendered me more attentive. My impressions, though produced by a conversation thoroughly free from bombast, deepened. 'An apparent calm in men agitated stirs the soul,' said I; 'eloquence may then have strength, without the body yielding to disordered movements.' I even perceived that the discourse, when delivered without efforts or cries, renders the gesture more powerful and gives the countenance more expression. All these deputies assembled before me by chance appear to me much more eloquent in their simplicity than at the 'tribune,' where, being in spectacle, they think they must deliver their harangue in the way of actors—and actors as we were then—that is, declaimers, full of bombast. From that day a new light flashed on me, I foresaw my art regenerated."¹

III. Let your recitation be *varied*. We know how recitation in general is monotonous, and though each one feels how great a fault is this monotony, there are few who succeed in avoiding it. The best way to attain this end is to observe our principle as to the recitation of the soul. The soul is full of variety to the brim. If there do not exist on a tree two leaves quite alike, far less are there, in the human soul, two feelings perfectly identical. Listen to a man as he speaks in an animated conversation: you will be confounded at the wonderful flexibility of the human mind, and at the infinite number of shades it can affect by turns. The organ will bring out all the movements of the soul. Let us also acknowledge that there is no reason for being monotonous in reciting. Get acquainted with the signification of each phrase, of each member of the phrase; you will discover in the thought a perpetual mobility, and you will have only to adhere closely in your reciting to what is true in order to have much variety. There is in particular a kind of variety which will be found in this method, and which will extend to all the rest; it is that of *time* in the delivery. It becomes nature to speak now slowly, now quickly, sometimes even very slowly, sometimes very quickly. On such a word it is necessary to pause for an instant; such a phrase, on the contrary, must be rather thrown out, and it must be pronounced with all the rapidity of which the organ is capable, while keeping the articulation clear. A recitation where these differences are levelled down and each phrase comes in its

¹ *Musée des Familles*, vi. p. 280.

turn with a measure always equal and almost with the same rhythm, contradicts nature, and loses half of its power. We must break that monotony, we must do so at any price. Far better, too much motion and abrupt transitions, though we ought also to avoid that other excess, because it gives recitation something too theatrical, or rather because it violates nature in exaggerating it.

In general, people recite too quickly, far too quickly. When a man speaks, the thoughts and feelings do not come to him all at once; they take birth little by little in his mind. It is necessary that this labour and this slowness appear in the reciting, or it will always come short of nature. Take time to reflect, to feel, and to allow ideas to come, and hurry your recitation only when constrained by some particular consideration. That quickness, brought by some reason, will give your delivery more movement and vivacity, but that other quickness which comes only from perplexity and from a want of intelligence or of reflection, confounds all the inequalities of thought, and produces a recitation soft, dull, lifeless, and without interest.

IV. This variety brings us under another condition, without which variety itself would fall to pieces and have no basis: it is Unity—Recitation must be one. In other words, we must endeavour to have a *récitation d'ensemble*; a result also of the principle we laid down at the beginning. For if words are many, thought is one and indivisible in our mind. Were we pure spirits, we could communicate our thought to other spirits of the same nature without decomposing it. But constrained to clothe it in words, we have to break it, and it becomes manifold in speaking, instead of the simple thing that it was in our mind. To take hold of and transmit to the hearer that thought in its oneness, to go back from language to the soul, and from the multiplicity of words to the simplicity of the intelligence, such is the work of a good recitation. Then the gathering of those diverse sentiments of which I was speaking just now into one common sentiment, will deserve this definition which has been given of the beautiful: "Unity in variety, or variety in unity." Besides, that will not always be done in the same way. In general, in a well-constructed phrase, it is more the *ensemble* which is to be brought out, and the stress to

be laid on the end, for it is in the genius of our language to put the emphasis constantly, though slightly, at the end of each word, and consequently also at the end of the phrase. There are, nevertheless, cases where you are obliged to bring out some words, or even one single word, because that word is the principal one. But even then the words ought to rule the phrase, not to absorb it. It is always the thought that must appear, and appear in its unity. A recitation broken by jerks, ascending and descending by turns, is worth nothing. But here we must do justice to our language. Foreigners sometimes accuse it of wanting in movement because it has no accent, and, in fact, that accent which returns regularly at the end of each word is in reality the absence of accentuation. This, however, appears to me to constitute in favour of the French language a real advantage in point of recitation. The reciter, not being fettered by any *accent of pronunciation*, is free to put where he likes the *accent of recitation*, which liberty offers him a very great facility, and perhaps there is no other language in this respect which offers so great facilities as our own for eloquent delivery.

I might add other counsels, but I have given those which experience has taught me are the most useful; and by means of the hints I have given, you may yourselves make other applications of the general principle to which we must always go back, and in which all these directions meet.

I have said nothing of the gestures. It is a subject by itself, and one which I have no time to treat at present. I shall only say that the preacher must indulge in few gestures, and that these must be very simple; above all, we must be guided by the movements of the soul as well as by the inflections of the voice.

To sum up: If you are anxious to learn to recite well, begin by preparing your mind and your heart. Then seek through reflection, helped by observation, the inflections of the soul, and oblige your organ to conform to these humbly and exactly. After all, let it be your conviction that the more you keep in the background, the better you will recite; that the best delivery is that which draws the attention from the speaker to the things he says; and that, lastly, the climax of art, especially in the preacher, is to make himself be forgotten.

CLEM. DE FAYE, 7r.

ART. IV.—*Two Modern Apostles.*¹

THE names of John Wilson and Alexander Duff are already a heritage and an inspiration to the land which gave them birth, and to the Church everywhere. The interest of their lives is personal, no doubt,—two stories rich in character and event; but it is also historical. The two men represent a remarkable epoch in the history of the Church of Christ—an epoch which they were largely instrumental in making. They were born about the time when the spirit of missions was beginning to stir and heave in the Churches of Great Britain, just emerging from long spiritual slumber. The period of their public labours is the most important half-century in the history of the Church, being that in which the gospel has enjoyed triumphs larger in amount, more rapid, and more generally diffused, than in any similar period since Pentecost. Indeed, looking at the matter in this light, as Dr. Christlieb's lively survey enables us to do, seeing how the fiery circumference of the "city without walls" widens every day and glows with the conquering presence of her King, even these great lives become dwarfed; at least we learn how alone the lives of men can be justly estimated, seeing their littleness as well as their greatness.

Wilson and Duff were both Scots to the backbone, and splendid instances of the Christian force compressed during the reign of Moderatism within the older and more rigid piety of Scotland,—compressed, but only till it should become intense enough for apostolical achievements. They were genuine apostles both, catholic-hearted, full of the spirit which can sustain an unworldly enthusiasm to the end—a Barnabas and a Paul. They ran their course in almost the same years, and both in British India, the one in the west, the other in the

¹ 1. *The Life of John Wilson, D.D., F.R.S.* By GEORGE SMITH, LL.D., C.I.E. Second edition. London: John Murray. 1879.

2. *The Life of Alexander Duff, D.D.* By GEORGE SMITH, LL.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1879.

3. *History of the Missions of the Free Church of Scotland in India and Africa.* By the Rev. ROBERT HUNTER, M.A. London: T. Nelson and Sons. 1873.

4. *Protestant Foreign Missions: Their Present State.* A Universal Survey. By THEODORE CHRISTLIEB, D.D., etc. Translated by David Croom, M.A. London: J. Nisbet and Co. 1880.

east. We may therefore with advantage survey their lives, not successively, but together.

John Wilson was a Border man, born at Lauder, December 11th, 1804, of a farmer stock rooted there for two hundred years. From his parents he derived a tough, enduring constitution, and an undeffered heritage of prayers. The boy of three years, put to sleep with his aged grandfather, received his first impressions of spiritual things from witnessing the fervour of the old man's devotions, and never forgot the emphasis with which the old saint would repeat the last verse of the twenty-third Psalm. He had deep convictions of sin at a very early age, and himself believed that the Lord then "took saving dealing with his soul." The fruits, so far as they can now be known, seemed to bespeak a tree made good. "He was a modest, earnest, affectionate, gentle boy," faithful and diligent in his school work, a favourite, and exercising good influence, among his companions. One of these, the late Dr. Fairbairn of Newhaven, tells how they had, "in one of the intervals of our school day, started up the burn for fishing and other diversions. Seduced by the summer sunlight (oh, how bright it was in those days!) we heeded not the lapse of time till the school hour had passed. Then came a conference to determine what we would say for ourselves, and various proposals, savouring, I fear, of diplomacy, were made. But the discussion was cut short by John Wilson saying, in a tone unusually energetic for him, 'I tell you what; we will tell the truth.'" This was better evidence of grace than the fact, also highly prophetic, that one sacrament Sabbath evening, the boy was found preaching to the people from a hollow tree behind Thirlstane Castle.

In the year following the battle of Waterloo, old Dr. Waugh of London came to plead the cause of the Bible Society (of just the same age as Wilson) in the Burgher meeting-house of Lauder; and Dr. Fairbairn thinks that, "if the seeds of the evangelistic spirit were not that night sown for the first time in John Wilson's mind, they were, to say the least of it, very copiously and effectually watered." Henry Grey, Andrew Thomson, and specially Robert Gordon, proclaiming a gospel which seemed new in Edinburgh then, little thought they were

pouring the water of life into a channel through which it would flow forth over the thirsty deserts of western India ; but so it was. The young student, already converted, received from Dr. Gordon that feeding and enlargement of heart which he did not get within the University of Edinburgh, which Nesbit and Duff were getting from the Professor of Moral Philosophy in St. Andrews.

What chiefly determined John Wilson for missionary service in India was his becoming tutor for four years—1820 to 1824—in the manse of Dr. Cormack, at Stow. There he had for pupils three nephews of Mrs. Cormack, sons of Colonel Rose, sent home from India to be educated. The little boys spoke only Hindustani, one of the languages in which the young tutor, long before he was thirty years of age, was to proclaim the gospel in the bazaars and streets of Bombay. At that time a good old Indian officer, General Walker, was living near, and gave Wilson his friendship. He had distinguished himself, when Governor of Baroda, by his efforts to prevent female infanticide, and now he instilled into Wilson's heart sympathy for the "dark places of the earth, full of the habitations of cruelty."

About his twentieth year we find him reading the life of Brainerd, the monthly extracts of the correspondence of the Bible Society, the London Missionary Chronicle, and the Scottish Missionary Register. The Church of Scotland had not then, in any of its branches, a missionary society fairly formed, but the Scottish Missionary Society had, since 1796, been doing the work which is best accomplished by a Church if to its Scriptural organisation there be added spiritual life and zeal. On Saturday, the 5th of February 1825, when his twentieth birthday was not two months past, Wilson paid a memorable visit to his parents at Lauder. The record of it must be given in his own words, unabridged :—

"This day visited my dear parents and friends at Lauder. Mentioned to them my intention of soon offering myself as a missionary candidate to the Scottish Missionary Society, and oh ! what a burst of affection did I witness from my dear mother. Never will I forget what occurred this evening. She told me that at present she thought the trial of parting with me, if I should leave her, would be more hard to bear than my death. When I saw her in tears, I cried unto God that He would send comfort to her mind, and that He would make this affair issue in His glory and our good.

I entreated my mother to leave the matter to the Lord's disposal ; and I told her that I would not think of leaving her if the Lord should not make my way plain for me, but that at present I thought it my duty to offer my services to the Society. She then embraced me, and seemed more calm. My father said little to us on the subject, but seemed to be in deep thought. In the course of the evening the words, 'He that saveth his life shall lose it,' and 'He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me,' came home to my mind, and kept me from making any promise of drawing back in my resolutions to preach the Gospel, by the grace of God, to the heathen world. O Lord, do thou, who hast the hearts of all men in thy hands, and who turnest them according to thy pleasure, grant that my parents, with faith in thy word and promises, may joyfully commit me in all things to thy disposal, and may willingly obey thy will in all things, for Christ's sake. Amen."

We do not wonder that Robert Nesbit should have asked his friend Wilson to break to *his* mother the tidings of his resolve.

He spent some time in training under the Society's care : he wrote a life of John Eliot, the apostle of the Indians : he founded "The Edinburgh Association of Theological Students in aid of the Diffusion of Christian Knowledge : " he was ordained by the Presbytery to the office of the holy ministry : he was married to Margaret Bayne, a lady endowed with many gifts and much grace : and on 30th August 1828, when still but twenty-three years and nine months old, set sail for India.

We linger willingly among the pleasant associations of old Scottish piety, in order to trace to its spring-head the wealthy river of Duff's Christian enthusiasm.

Alexander Duff was a Highlandman, born at Auchnahyle, in the parish of Moulin, April 25th, 1806, being sixteen months younger than Wilson. His father, James Duff, was a small farmer. Both he and his wife were fruits of that remarkable revival which arose from the influence of Charles Simeon on Mr. Stewart, the minister of the parish, ten years before. The son speaks of his father as a man mighty in prayer, and "endowed with an uncommon gift in the practical exposition and home-thrusting enforcement of Scripture truth." "In appealing to the conscience, and in expatiating on the bleeding, dying love of the Saviour, he displayed a power before which many have been melted and subdued. In addressing the young, he was wont to manifest a winning and affectionate earnestness, which soon riveted the attention and captivated the feelings ; his very heart seemed to yearn

through his eyes, as he implored them to beware of the enticements of sinners, and pointed to the outstretched arms of the Redeemer." He instilled into his son's mind the spirit of missions, telling him of the recent triumphs of the Gospel, showing him pictures of the heathen gods, and dwelling on the love of Jesus; yet he was scarcely prepared for the sacrifice he was himself called to make.

Strong-limbed, earnest, pure, tenacious of good purposes, combining in an unusual degree solid common sense with Celtic passion, Alexander Duff rapidly took a first place in the University of St. Andrews. Men looked after him on the streets and said, There is Duff! "He had a weight and downright earnestness about him which everybody felt; he was the boast of the College." The five years of Chalmers's residence there as Professor of Moral Philosophy coincided with those of Duff's career as a student; and he was chief among the six whom the greatest man of his day inspired with the grandeur and courage of world-subduing faith. The other five were Nesbit, Adam, Mackay, Ewart, and John Urquhart. Nesbit was the companion of John Wilson in Bombay; Adam, Mackay, and Ewart were the companions of Duff in Calcutta; but who was John Urquhart?

He was a lad who had followed Duff from the Perth Academy to the University, and had shared his lodgings there. They were to one another as Jonathan to David, each deepening in the other's soul the sense of holy consecration. Urquhart was the life of the first Students' Missionary Society, formed in the session of 1824-25, under the smile of Chalmers, and the frown of all the other authorities. He went up to London to confer with Morrison about the spiritual wants of China; and, addressing the Society on his return, stated that he had devoted himself to the service of Christ on the mission field, and laid it on the consciences of his companions to consider whether they also were not called to give more than their prayers for the gathering in of the travail of the Master's soul. Urquhart was then a stripling of seventeen years.¹ The following passage gives us a bright parallel to the pathetic home-scene of Wilson's consecration:—

¹ See *Memoir, including Letters and Remains, of John Urquhart*. By William Orme. With Prefatory Notice by Dr. Duff. London: Nisbet. 1869.

"Session after session, as he returned from the winter's study at St. Andrews to the quiet of his Grampian home, the student had delighted his parents with details of his doings. John Urquhart had always been first in his talk. Especially had his father been struck with admiration of that student's determination to be a missionary to the Hindus. In 1827 the usual budget of intelligence was produced, but as the parents hung on their son's revelations, now with tears, now with smiles, and ever with thankfulness and pride, the loved name of his Jonathan was not once mentioned. 'But what of your friend Urquhart?' at last exclaimed the father. 'Urquhart is no more,' said Duff, with the almost stern abruptness of self-restraint; and then slowly, wistfully added, 'What if your son should take up his cloak? You approved the motive that directed the choice of Urquhart: you commended his high purpose—THE CLOAK IS TAKEN UP!' Mother and father were awed into silence at this, the first breaking to them or to man of the vow that had already been made to God."

Alexander Duff well understood that his parents had set their hearts on seeing him ere long—for he was now twenty-one—settled as minister of some Highland parish; and he proved the intelligent strength of his supreme devotion to Christ by foreclosing discussion. Before ten years had passed they had reason to be more than content, seeing him leap into the foremost place as the advocate of missions, warming the Church at home and shaking the strongholds of idolatry in India by the force of his magnificent enthusiasm.

"Believing," Duff did "not make haste" to engage himself to any particular sphere of labour. He had still two sessions to study before he should be ripe for ordination; and it is quite possible, although nothing is told us to that effect, that his penetrating sagacity led him to shrink from those trammels of the Scottish Missionary Society which Wilson found it necessary before many years to shake off. At any rate, when at length he yielded himself to the Church of Scotland as her first missionary, he was careful to secure for himself full liberty of action. Dr. Inglis had roused that Church so far as to secure the appointment of a committee on foreign missions, and had since 1825 been seeking in vain for a fit man to send forth to assault the heathenism of Bengal. Counsell'd and blessed by Chalmers in name of the Church, the young hero set sail in September of 1829, thirteen months after Wilson had sailed for Bombay. Twice shipwrecked and stripped of all his books and goods, Duff and his right-hearted wife were tossed on the shores of India by a fierce

cyclone in May of 1830. When the story of the voyage was told in the Calcutta newspapers, the natives said, "Surely this man is a favourite of the gods, who must have some notable work for him to do in India."

Thus were the two apostles thrust forth into the harvest-field. In some things they were very unlike: Wilson always calm, Duff restlessly eager; Wilson equalled by many in the matter of speech, Duff equalled only by Chalmers, and not even by him surpassed in the priceless gift of persuasive utterance; Wilson making himself more master of the tongues of India than of his own, Duff using English education as the lever with which to overturn age-long delusion. But in the greatest things they were one; in early and thorough consecration, in most fervent zeal for the good of men, in warm apprehension of the redeeming love, in wisdom and holiness, in the unbounded sweep and courage of their aspirations, for both surveyed the world only from the true standpoint, beside the throne of the reigning Mediator between God and men.

The career of John Wilson in India began in February of 1829, and ended with his death in December of 1875. He twice returned to this country, in 1843-46, and again in 1870-71; but his work and influence were unbroken all these forty-seven years.

There was little of other men's foundations to build on when Wilson reached Bombay. Carey had published his grammar and dictionary of the Marathi languages in 1810: he and his brethren of Serampore had translated the New Testament into that language in 1811, and before 1813 they had received some Marathas into church-fellowship. The American missionaries, coming at the beginning of 1815, had improved the version of the New Testament and gathered some converts. The Church Missionary Society had begun work in 1820, and the Scottish Missionary Society in 1822. Wilson was the seventh man sent by that Society to the western Presidency, his predecessors being Donald Mitchell, who died after eight months' service; John Cooper, James Mitchell, and Alexander Crawford, who arrived in 1823; John Stevenson, the next year; and Robert Nesbit, the pupil of Chalmers and friend at home both of Duff and Wilson, who

reached the field in September of 1827. These brethren had turned away from the city, partly because thinking it pre-occupied by the American and Episcopal missionaries, but chiefly on account of the frowns of the British Government, and had begun to toil in the southern Konkan. They had got some hold on vernacular schools and had baptized a few converts, the first of whom, however, in 1823 rushed from the Lord's Table when the bread was about to be broken, crying, "No, I will not break caste yet!" John Wilson joined his brethren at Bankote, a town of the Konkan, and "on the first Sabbath after his arrival witnessed the baptism of the second Hindu convert of the mission."

We are not to attempt even an outline of the long career thus begun, but shall rather indicate some of its more striking features and results.

The most prominent feature of Wilson's work was his vernacular preaching. For this he prepared himself in almost eight months after his arrival, stimulated and guided by his friend Nesbit, working nine hours a day.

"I am accused of injuring your health," wrote Nesbit to him, "by making you study Marathi, and talk with me at night. Will the exhortation to take good care of your health now make any amends? Get up at six, by all means; and that you may be able to do so, go to bed at ten."

Splendid as the teacher's attainments in Marathi were, he was soon outstripped by the pupil. His gift for languages was quite unusual, his diligence unwearied, and the supreme motives lying behind—compassion for souls and zeal for the glory of Christ—were always growing more intense to the last. In six months he was able to preach his first native sermon, and before long Gujarati, Hebrew, Portuguese, Sanskrit, and, indeed, any other language, dead or living, learned or vulgar, which could help his work, were familiar to his tongue and pen. Strongly persuaded that the greatest, the highest, part of a missionary's work consists in proclaiming to men in their own tongues the unsearchable riches of Christ, John Wilson found his chief delight in using for this end the languages he acquired. He had full faith in the Gospel, if brought fairly into contact with man's mind and heart. And he acquired such facility and perfection of idiom as to make his utterances equal to those of any educated native.¹

¹ Not to him would the humorous suggestion which Henry Rogers makes

Another distinguished missionary, Dr. Shoolbred, speaking of a tour made by him in the company of the great linguist in 1859, says :—

“As a writer or speaker of English, Dr. Wilson was apt to be somewhat stiff and stilted. His style was heavy, and his periods Johnsonian. Judging of his power to persuade solely from his English style, it is not to be wondered at that Dr. Norman Macleod gave expression to the opinion that even a century of such preaching would fail to make converts. But had the genial doctor understood the Indian vernacular, and heard Dr. Wilson preach in that, he would have found reason, not only to modify, but reverse his judgment. As a vernacular preacher, he was simple, direct, and effective. Even with my imperfect knowledge of the language in those days, I felt this, and could note the effect which he produced in winning the attention and, not rarely, even the sympathies of his audience.”

Wilson's own words, in 1834, are these :—

“I have often wondered how Whitefield could preach so frequently in England ; but it is now a considerable time since I discovered that practice in public speaking makes it comparatively easy. Some advocates speak four or five hours daily at the bar during the press of business ; and we, who are called to act as ambassadors for Christ to our perishing fellow-men, may well continue our ministrations during a longer time. . . . When the Gospel is generally preached, as I hope it soon will be, through the length and breadth of the country, individual conversions will become more frequent. It is the *general* apathy of the unenlightened which destroys the ardour of individuals on whose minds favourable impressions are produced. I fervently wish that evangelical *agitation* were the order of the day in India.’

Rightly judging that one sure sign of the true apostolical succession is to be found in turning the world upside down, he used all his powers to produce such agitation, sometimes by carrying on disputations with the learned apologists of idolatry, sometimes by the press, but chiefly, and to the end, by direct manifestation of Christ crucified, in the vulgar tongue.

This feature of John Wilson's work strikes us as specially

in letter *ix.* of his delightful *Correspondence of R. E. H. Grayson, Esq.*, apply : “I sometimes image to myself the unconscious blunders,—no doubt, often ludicrous enough,—nay, the downright, though most innocent errors, heresies, and blasphemies, which have fallen from the missionary's lips in his early efforts. I am afraid the Gospel, if we were heathens, would stand but a poor chance of being listened to with attention if a foreigner came to preach to us in broken English, with a foreign pronunciation, and a foreign idiom ; if one told us, with the Frenchman, ‘Dat de evangile was come from Heaven to be a book of revelation of the will divine, and to cause to repent a man of all his sins ;’ or with the German, ‘Dat it vos a melancholy ever-by-man-to-be-remembered fact dat we vos cucumbers of de ground.’”

admirable, and the more worthy to be dwelt upon that his fame among Europeans rests on other grounds. Dr. Duff was certainly not to be blamed for winning boundless popularity by his splendid rhetoric; but his reward was, so far as man can give it, more immediate. Dr. Wilson simply scattered the good seed of the kingdom wide-cast in bazaars, villages, temples, streets, with no stimulus of present acceptance. His reward, like that of every true labourer, is following him; and, so far as it is of earth, it consists in his name being more extensively revered among the common people of Western India than that of any other European.

The long tours in which he did this work formed another distinctive feature of Wilson's apostleship. The records of them occupy a large portion of his biography. He enjoyed them thoroughly, and made those who had the good fortune to be his companions enjoy them by his constant buoyant flow of wisdom and pleasant wit. He carried on from step to step highly intelligent and scholarly observation of men and buildings and stones and flowers, storing the results for many a pleasant lecture in the city on his return. But the great aim, of delivering the message of His Master's love, was always conspicuously first. On occasion, he would appeal to the Master's example, and that of the twelve, for vindication of this method of working. When urged to leave open-air preaching to native evangelists, better able than he to bear the exposure it involved, his answer was:—

“Even after we have been blessed, through God's mercy, with native preachers, we must, for some time, show them in our own persons the lively example of an apostolic ministration. Xenophon remarked that the Asiatics would not fight unless under Greek auxiliaries.”

The man whose reputation as a scholar stands so high that Edinburgh sent him the diploma of D.D., and Bombay made him President of her branch of the Royal Asiatic Society before he was quite thirty-two years of age, was also the most unwearied open-air preacher. He turned back in sadness only when he had reached tribes to whom he could not yet so speak in their own tongue as to expound to them redeeming love.

Many a missionary has felt himself called, like William Burns in China, to do such work only, leaving organisation to others. It was not so with this man of various powers so

admirably balanced. When the season for travelling was past, he returned to the city to pursue labours manifold in connection with schools, daily preaching, the organising of congregations, and the press. Within two years after his arrival in Bombay, he formed a church in his house after the Presbyterian model, consisting of a few of the men and women gathered out of the mass around him. The missionary institution was under his care from its beginning as a school in the Fort in 1832, although it owed much also to Robert Nesbit, and in later days to John Murray Mitchell. Indeed, in his case, as in Duff's more conspicuously, it was not one institution that had to be formed and fostered, but a second also, after the day of the Disruption, a day now so bright in retrospect however gloomy then. In 1830 he started *The Oriental Christian Spectator*, which continued for thirty years to do very valuable service to the missionary cause among those who could read the English language. His own vernacular schools, and those female schools in which his wife nobly exhausted her strength, were constantly superintended. All the time he found leisure—who can tell how?—for those profound studies and for that social intercourse with educated Europeans of all ranks, by which his influence was so largely increased. The following words, written in 1836, but quite as applicable at the close of his career, show the proportion which such labours bore in his judgment to the direct work of preaching. They occur in a letter to a friend who had mentioned Duff's degree:—

“Dr. Duff's warm advocacy of the Calcutta Institution has been far too *exclusive*. I rejoice in the prosperity of the Seminary and wish it every support; but he ought not to have advocated its cause by disparaging the direct preaching of the Gospel to the natives in their own languages by Europeans, and overlooked female education and the general education of the natives *through the medium of their own tongues*, which form the readiest key to their hearts. The higher institutions are well calculated to attract the higher classes of society, and to educate teachers and preachers. We must have a body of Christians, however, from which to select these agents. For this body of Christians we must not mainly depend on our academies. ‘To the *poor* the Gospel is preached.’ Of the little flock, and present inquirers at this place, some were first impressed by hearing the Gospel in the crowded bazaar, some by hearing it at the margin of the sea, some in church, some in the school-room, some in the place where the Lord of Glory was born when he came on his mission to this world, some in the social circle, some in the private chamber, and some by the perusal of Christian publications. I bless God for what I have already seen as to the

diminishment of prejudices against highway missionaries. Six years ago my countrymen laughed at me when they saw me 'haranguing mobs.' These same gentlemen have conferred on me their highest literary honour, and notwithstanding my street-preaching propensities, have put me into the chair formerly occupied by these great men, Sir James Mackintosh, Sir John Malcolm, etc., and suffered me to harangue them as their president! I had serious thoughts of saying, *Nolo episcopari*; but when I thought that I might contribute to shield the whole class of Ranters from contempt, and use my influence for the Lord's cause, I refrained."

And nobly did he shield them: nearly forty years after writing this letter, on the 7th of April 1875, he appeared for the last time among the non-Christian natives of Bombay at the farewell meeting held by that evangelist of the world, Dr. A. N. Somerville.

The personal influence of Wilson on all classes must be specially marked. Calm, courteous, wise, full of knowledge, full of kindness, he began early to make the power of his character, at once lofty and lovely, felt by all classes. Men high in the civil or the military service, travellers, governors, were his friends and guests, and under his roof native gentlemen were brought into contact with such men as Sir Bartle Frere, Lord Northbrook, and Mr. Grant Duff. This influence, although most free from anything like ostentation, could not be said to be unconscious: it was deliberately and prayerfully cultivated, with considerable expenditure of his private means.

"The interest he manifested in the spiritual welfare of the officers both of the army and the Indian navy soon made Ambrolie Mission House a great centre of attraction for many in both services; and the awakening to spiritual life that manifested itself very decidedly on the western side can be traced to the prayers and influence of Dr. Wilson."

These are the words of an English naval officer.

"Dr. Wilson did not make me a Christian, but I hope I am a better man for having known him than I would otherwise have been," said a Parsee gentleman after Wilson's death. Hindus of distinction came from great distances to receive his dying blessing, and begged for his body that they might bury it. The common people equally, or even in greater measure, felt the power of his life-long devotion to their highest interests. "We are so glad," said one of these to a British officer, "that Dr. Wilson will never go home. You all go and leave us: we know you are always looking longingly to

England : but Dr. Wilson will never go home." He did go to Scotland twice ; but even on the second occasion, receiving every honour his Church could give him and keenly feeling the sorrow of a second widowhood, he had no thought but to return to India as the home of his heart. It held the dust of the two wives who had so admirably helped his public work and seconded his private influence. Besides, the apostolic thirst was not slaked by forty-three years' service : his words, written to a sister-in-law from Brindisi, were these : "I go bound in the Spirit to India to declare the Gospel message. Nothing but this object sustains my heart. I am sure you will all pray for me. My solace is in the Lord."

Turning now to the career of Duff, we may best convey an impression of the relations between the two modern apostles by quoting the words of each about a meeting which took place on the banks of the Indus on the 31st of January 1850. They had met before at Bombay in 1840, when Duff was returning from his first visit to Scotland :—

"I translated the two first chapters of one of my tracts into Persian in my tent at the river-side. On the completion of this exercise I took hold of my telescope, and, sweeping with it the Indus before me to the north, I discerned what I took to be Dr. Duff's boat gently dropping down the river and approaching the spot where I was encamped. My ardent hopes and wishes were realised ; and we soon embraced one another, with the heart as well as with the hand. The emotions of both of us, meeting at the very ends of the earth after an interval of ten years, so eventful to our families, our missions, and our Church, and after multifarious labours and sufferings and extended travel by land and sea by both of us, were well-nigh overpowering. The gracious and faithful providence of God to us both it was impossible for us to overlook."

With highly characteristic difference of language, but with the same heart, Duff writes :—

"Need I say with what intense feeling of delight we hailed each other, face to face, on the banks of that celebrated stream, and in a spot so isolated and remote from the realms of modern civilisation—a spot never before trodden by the feet of two heralds of the Cross, but conspicuously displaying, among the edifices which crown the rocky heights of Sehwan, the symbols of the Crescent, and as visibly exhibiting, in the scattered ruins and desolation all around, the impress of rapacious and short-sighted tyranny ? Joyous was our meeting, and sweet and refreshing has been our intercourse since. How have our souls been led to praise and magnify the name of our

God for his marvellous and ineffable mercies ! It is now ten years since we last parted in the neighbourhood of Bombay ; and what centuries of events have been crowded into these ten years—alike in Europe and Asia, alike in Church and in State ! ”

The chief event in the Church for both had been the Disruption of the Church of Scotland, the greatest event that had taken place for two centuries. It has not, however, been decisive, as we now see, as to the question of the Church's spiritual independence : that question is destined ere long to discussion on a larger scale, and it may be with more searching keenness. Wilson and Duff, like all the foreign missionaries of the Church, without a single exception, at the cost of very great sacrifices but with no hesitation, took the side of spiritual independence as a necessary consequence of the living reign of Christ in His Church ; and it is most earnestly to be desired that when the discussion is renewed men may fix their attention chiefly on the validity or otherwise of that judgment.

Dr. Duff's career in India, looked at with reference to dates, seems fragmentary. Landing in the summer of 1830, he was carried suddenly on board the first homeward-bound ship that could be found in July of 1834, the doctors stopping their ears to his pitiful remonstrances. Permitted to return to Calcutta in 1840, he was again forced home in 1850. Getting back in 1856, he was obliged finally to relinquish India in 1863. Thus the number of years spent by him out of India, after his ordination, was larger than the number spent in it. But the career was not interrupted : it was one of continuous and mighty influence all through.

In accepting the post of the General Assembly's first missionary, Duff carefully stipulated for a large amount of independence. Knowing how adverse were the influences of the capital, the Committee instructed him to establish his institution, not in Calcutta, but in some outlying region near. His first act, when he had surveyed the ground, was to set this instruction aside. His large brain and larger heart had conceived in faith the purpose of pouring Christian education—not in part but in whole, all that he himself possessed, all that any Scotchman could get, and distinctively Christian—into the heart of India, with the confidence that, being truth, such knowledge—scientific, historical, biblical and spiritual,—must

extrude superstition and error. A man with such a purpose was likely to be misunderstood. Some thought he was relying too much on secular education and would "deluge Calcutta with rogues and villains;" others feared that he was neglecting the commission in not making conversions, even of the poorest, his direct and immediate aim. But he understood himself: his soul was ardently fixed on the Redeemer in most genuine dependence: so that, while his heart was a perennial fountain of compassion for the perishing heathen, his will was triple steel. His answer was: "We think not of individuals merely; we look to the masses. Spurning the notion of a present day's success and a present year's wonder, we direct our views not merely to the present, but to future generations. While you engage in directly separating as many precious atoms from the mass as the stubborn resistance to ordinary appliances can admit, we shall, with the blessing of God, devote our time and strength to the preparing of a mine and the setting of a train which shall one day explode and tear up the whole from its lowest depths." He never lost sight of this magnificent conception, nor faith in its ultimate realisation, through nearly fifty years; and the fifty years justified him. Even within the four years of his first residence in Calcutta, he became one of the men of most influence in the Indian capital, and the annual examination of his Institution was one of the sights to which natives and Europeans resorted with eager interest.

Duff's career was one long conflict. A Celt to the backbone, uniting a singularly fervent piety with large education and strong intelligence, and penetrated through and through with intense convictions, the very courage of his faith made him a man of war from youth to age. And not on the high places of the field only. Abroad, he said, "The beliefs and habits of the peoples of India are one mass of soul-destroying error: let them perish!" But at home also, he found his lofty convictions opposed by the *vis inertiae* of indifference, long neglect, and dwarfing greed. Returning in 1835, his health restored by the five-months' voyage and his heart brim-full, he was shocked to find no knowledge of his work, and no interest in it among the friends at home. Even the committee was not called together until the convener, hearing that Duff was holding drawing-room meetings in Edinburgh of

his own motion, thought the over-zealous man must be placed under some sort of regulation. We wish there were some graphic record of that meeting: it must have been as though a sturdy fellow of six feet, exuberant with manly vigour, had burst in among a congregation of cripples sipping salts in the pump-room of a fashionable spa, slapping them on the back, and bidding them get up and dance with him! Nearly all the members of committee were present. The convener explained that he had thought it needful to summon them, seeing that their agent had been acting in a very irregular and unwarrantable manner. Then "their agent" rose. His exact words are not recorded, but knowing how he spoke a few months later, we can guess them. He is said to have been perfectly calm; but he offered to write out his resignation on the spot if the committee thought it well to abridge his liberty of speech, and told them that if they were willing to leave him reasonable freedom, he might, by speaking, do something to increase the funds of the mission and the number of its agents.

"For, the people being profoundly ignorant of the whole subject, their being wakened to take a deeper interest in so spiritual a work as the evangelisation of the world would not only be carrying out more fully the last great commission of our blessed Saviour, but also tend in many remarkable ways, spiritually, to benefit their own souls."

When he sat down, there was a rush to the door, and the worthy convener was left standing alone in the middle of the floor in dumb amazement! "Probably we have had enough of the subject for this day," said Duff, with great calmness; and we may be sure Dr. Brunton quite agreed with him. From that day he was the warm admirer and steadfast friend of the Boanerges of missions.

The scene in the Assembly of 1835,—a scene to which there had been nothing like in ecclesiastical history, and followed by most gracious results,—is probably familiar to most readers. Rising from his bed, Mr. Duff made his way to the church in time to speak in connection with the Foreign Mission Report, pushing aside all remonstrances of the friends who feared he would do himself harm. When he sat down, after two or three hours, "drenched in perspiration as if he had been dragged through the Atlantic," all his hearers, moderates and lawyers quite as much as the evangelicals, were overwhelmed;

all wept. After Dr. Gordon had prayed, it was found that indifference to the great cause was gone like summer snow. Those who had heard Fox and Pitt declared that they had never heard any speech to equal this "in transcendent eloquence and overpowering impressiveness." Forty thousand copies of it were, by order of the Assembly, sent out over Scotland; and the missionary—to whom the University of Aberdeen threw a D.D.—spent the years from his twenty-ninth to his thirty-third in rousing the Scottish people in every parish to a juster estimate of the Church's greatest work.

We make no attempt to follow Dr. Duff through the rest of his noble life. The singleness of his aim and the magnificent force which he brought to bear on its accomplishment, may be understood. Whether in Calcutta or in Edinburgh, in Philadelphia or in London, he was the same man to the end, and his power the same; for his faith never contracted its scope, nor faltered.

An estimate of the fruits resulting from the lives of these two apostles is, happily, impossible. In part, they are to be seen in the figures which represent the numbers of converts fifty years ago and now; in the flourishing missionary institutions; in the machinery devised and set in motion. But these are, after all, the least. The vindication of apostolical Christianity in its universal adaptation and power, which both Wilson and Duff supplied by their lives, and Duff also by the consecrated devotion of his transcendent gift, is of more value than any results which admit of being statistically tabulated. And it is even more heartening and enlarging for us to follow the suggestions which these lives frequently supply concerning those "other sheep," not of any particular fold, whom only the Chief Shepherd knows, and whom He is bringing, that they may hear His voice in ways past our finding out. When Lord Polwarth was standing at the open grave of Duff, in Edinburgh, he saw, beside him, "a black lad, gazing with his big rolling eyes into it." Whence had he come? And how many such are there? In far Kurachee, so early as 1850, Wilson found "converts and students from the Christian College of Dr. Duff holding the highest positions, and influencing all around them for good;" and at the same time he met with the first Hindu

woman whom he had himself received into the Church, and baptized her grandson, "one of the most promising pupils."

If he met thus with one or two, how many more are there reserved, to be discovered in the day when they that sowed and they that reaped shall "rejoice together"? At a place called Deesa, in 1840, Wilson encountered a man who had assumed the profession of Christianity, and had begun to propagate it "without any consultation with Europeans." Six years before, a soldier in the camp had given him a Gujerati tract, *The Great Inquiry*, and a Marathi tract, *The First Book for Children*. These had "awakened great anxiety about the salvation of his soul." He had travelled far and wide, seeking light, and had at length, through some portions of the Bible, more tracts, and conversation with a friend from Bengal, "become convinced that Jesus Christ is the only Surety and Saviour of men, and resolved, without consulting with flesh and blood, to devote himself to His service." The good missionary answered his questions, being surprised at the evidence they furnished of his intelligence; and found, on examination, that he "distinctly ascribed the origination of the plan of redemption to the Father, its accomplishment to the work and merit of the Son, and its application to the Holy Spirit, of whose various operations he spoke in a way strictly consistent with the Divine testimony." The man, Narottam, had seven converts, and about a hundred inquirers around him, to whom he ministered, and by whom he was supported. He said he meant to go on doing so; and Wilson left him after fervent prayer, feeling the privilege of such a meeting abundant reward for a long and trying journey. In such incidents the angel's message is repeated: "Run, speak to this young man (who is setting forth with a measuring line to measure Jerusalem), saying, Jerusalem shall be inhabited as a city without walls for the multitude of men and cattle therein. For I, saith the Lord, will be unto her a wall of fire round about, and will be the glory in the midst of her" (Zech. ii. 4, 5). That is to say, it is not for us to attempt to measure with our line what is too great to be measured. It is better for us, gladly relinquishing such attempt, to work somewhere on the glowing circumference under the safe shield and the strengthening warmth of the Master's presence.

A. MACLEOD SYMINGTON.

ART. V.—*Christian Philosophy of Patience.*

AN entire philosophy of the Christian grace of patience is contained in the words:—"We, through the Spirit, wait for the hope of righteousness by faith" (Gal. v. 5).

This utterance is oracular; and we propose, in the *first* place, to explain, and in the *second* place, to confirm it; or, in other words, *first*, to show its *meaning*, and *then* its truth,—*first*, to exhibit the specific thought which the oracle contains,—and *secondly*, to show how that thought is realised as a fact in the Christian life,—in, not the natural virtue, but the grace of patience.

I. In the first place, then, as to the *meaning* of the words. It may be noted that the thought is a somewhat complex one, binding together in one proposition several terms which are, each of them, very important in itself,—peculiarly so when they are brought into this particular relation to each other. Taking the terms in their reverse order, we have to notice—"faith," "righteousness," "hope," "waiting;" and this "waiting" achieved "through the Spirit." The graces of faith, hope, and patience fall thus to be considered, both in their relations to one another, and also as they somehow stand connected with "righteousness;" for certainly the term "righteousness" plays a great part in this oracle, and indeed constitutes its hinge and most important term. The three graces here mentioned—faith, hope, patience or "waiting"—have, in fact, no point of support, except in this "righteousness," to which they stand related. They must have *some* ground, *some* foundation, *some* great and effectual support out of themselves; else would they fade away into fancy and sentimentalism. Every grace whatsoever in the believer's soul is, at the best, but imperfect, frail, and not self-supporting. It must have some external, or, as it is often called, objective, or outward support. How grand a support would "righteousness" be! It plays precisely this part, or fulfils precisely this office, towards the several graces here mentioned; and to show this, is really to open up the oracle.

Notice, then, in the first place, how "faith" is connected with this "righteousness;" in the second place, how "hope" is connected with it; and then, in the third place, we shall see how patience comes into exercise,—patience or "waiting."

1. Notice then, first of all, that this righteousness is "by faith." "We, through the Spirit, wait for the hope of righteousness *by faith*." That is just the name of this righteousness,—*"righteousness by faith."* It is not a righteousness which consists in works, or comes by works, but by faith. Hence it is not our own, in the sense of being wrought by us, or wrought in us. It is not even a righteousness wrought by God *in* us, but wrought by God (Immanuel) *for* us. The faith, and hope, and patience, are all wrought *in* us by the Spirit; but the righteousness is not something standing in the same category with these graces,—these inward subjective principles of the Divine life: it is something outward and apart from them all, having its own perfect and unchangeable subsistence separately from them, and around which, in its perfection and unchangeableness, they, in their imperfection, may cluster and cling. In a word, it is the righteousness of Christ, the Head and Surety of his people, the glorious and perfect obedience unto death of God's dear Son, standing in the name and stead of his covenant people,—their last Adam, the Lord from heaven.

Blessed be God, this righteousness stands outside and apart from all our graces, however good and excellent, partaking in no degree of their frailty and variableness; in no manner endangered by our varying frames of spirit; not waxing or waning with our spiritual welfare or decay, but itself beyond the reach of change; the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. He "brought in an everlasting righteousness."

It is ours by faith. It is especially designated "righteousness by faith." Speaking of it to the Philippians, Paul says: "Yea, doubtless, and I count 'all things but loss, that I may be found in him, not having mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith." It is "of faith," or "by faith." Righteousness comes not by the law, but by faith.

The treacherous and jealous heart of unbelief would fain

find righteousness by works, understanding how to trust to a binding bargain, but seeing no valid security in mere grace. Nevertheless, "it is of faith, that it may be by grace, to the end the promise may be sure." It is of faith, expressly that infallible security may be found. And infallible security is thus found. For, in itself, the righteousness is perfect; all satisfying to the law and justice of God,—unalterably so. It is freely given by God, in his omniscience, which sees and foresees all our unworthiness; given in his sincerity, which is truth at first, and faithfulness thereafter unto eternity. Perfect in itself, and freely given, in the face of all that in the past, the present, or the future, could be supposed to induce God to refuse, or withhold, or withdraw it, no possession held by any creature can be on firmer tenure than this righteousness,—this righteousness which is of God by faith.

2. Notice, secondly, there is a hope connected with this righteousness. "We, through the Spirit, wait for the *hope* of righteousness by faith." This righteousness brings a certain hope in its train. And well it may, and a great and glorious hope too. For, only consider:—What may you not hope for, if you are in possession of this righteousness,—this righteousness which is perfect and everlasting, which cannot be changed in itself, and cannot be alienated from you? What will it not entitle you to anticipate and to expect in the bettering of your condition, in the establishing of your welfare, for ever? First of all, and most obviously, it must *justify* you in the sight of God. It cannot possibly do less. Yea, it cannot possibly do less than justify you at once, and once for all, perfectly and unalterably. For, by faith, this righteousness is your righteousness; it is so now and for ever, once and once for all. It meets all that God's law demands as preliminary, necessary, or conditional to the bestowment of eternal life;—life in the favour of God, which is life indeed; in his loving-kindness, which is better than life. You stand acquitted of all guilt or blame before God; accepted, also, into all just rights and titles to the favour of God. Like Abraham, you have believed God, and righteousness is imputed to you, and you are called the friend of God.

If this is true, what may you not hope for? Deliverance from all evil,—*that* at least you may expect. An omnipotent God

is not likely to let anything whatever injure his friends. If God be for you, who can be against you? Who is he that shall harm you? "What ill shall thee befall?" Nay: not only deliverance from evil, but the attainment of all good—of all positive blessedness—may well be expected by those that are the friends of God. On the one hand, he is your shield:—on the other, your exceeding great reward. Spurning and fleeing from danger, you find the Lord is your refuge: desiring good, the true good and satisfaction of your nature, you find the Lord is your portion. He is your refuge and your portion in the land of the living. You hope for perfect exemption from evil, and full enjoyment of good.

If you are altogether righteous before God, this is reasonable:—it is a natural, warrantable, well-grounded hope. The Judge of all the earth sees in thee no spot or wrinkle or any such thing. He thinks of thee as all fair and comely—clothed in garments of salvation and robes of righteousness. He sees thee washed and justified and sanctified in the name of the Lord Jesus and by the Spirit of thy God. He sees, it is true, that thine own inward righteousness of sanctification is imperfect, and that sin still dwells within thee. But that enters not into his estimate of thy relation to his own law in the judgment of justification. Clothed in righteousness, perfect righteousness, by faith, thou art acquitted and approven at his bar; and thou art a friend of God. He is thy God; and thou art his son.

Can hope build too much on this foundation? Will a just and justifying Judge leave you destitute of the deliverance from evil to which your acquittal entitles you—or destitute of the positive good to which his own righteous approbation gives you ground to aspire? I call on you again to think that if righteousness—complete and finished and final—is yours, justice itself declares that you can never righteously be subjected to any penalty whatever, nor righteously kept out of your reward and your inheritance: that no evil can befall you—no real blessing be withheld from you. Rather than a single stroke of real hurt should light upon you, it were only just and warrantable to hope that all heaven's angels should come trooping forth and compass you around in one impregnable encamping host of light and fire. Rather than a single

boon of real and needed good be wanting, it were but reasonable and right to hope that rocks should give you water, ravens bring you bread, and stars should change their courses and their seasons, if need be, to give you light. What *can* be too great to hope for on behalf of those whom the King and Judge, eternal and supreme, hath justified—whom Heaven hath made its friends?

Is it not a plain deduction of reason, that all possible victory and blessing must accompany, or flow from, your being righteous before God?

Scripture sanctions this. It calls those who are righteous by faith—God's justified ones,—it calls them kings and priests; sons and heirs of God. It declares that all the angels are ministering spirits sent forth to minister to such. It distinctly asserts that no evil shall befall them;—that the angels of God are charged and commissioned to watch over them;—that all things whatsoever shall work together for their good;—that the Lord names them Beulah, for they are married to him, and Hephzibah, because he delighteth in them;—that they are more than conquerors over all evil, and proprietors of all that could be desired—of, literally, *all* things, whether Paul or Apollos or Cephas, or the world or life or death, or things present or things to come, all are theirs, for they are Christ's, and Christ is God's.

3. But is this practically, presently, sensibly the condition of the righteous? Do they already realise, and presently possess, and sensibly enjoy, all that they are thus entitled to expect as the fruit of their "righteousness by faith"?

Why, their condition, sensibly and obviously, is the very reverse of what they might seem entitled to expect. The moment they become righteous by faith, they become pilgrims on the earth; starting on a wilderness journey, instead of entering on a garden of pleasures; undertaking a new and hitherto inconceivable conflict, instead of being proclaimed victorious; bending their shoulder to receive a heavy cross, instead of their head to receive a sparkling crown;—and Jacob's only palpable proof that he is Israel, a prince with God, is that he "halts upon his thigh"!

This is a sore trial: it is a great temptation. To become more sorrowful, just as you are acquitted and accepted as

righteous and right with God's law for ever;—to have new and wellnigh insuperable difficulties with yourself, with the world, with unseen foes, just as all difficulties in your relation to God have disappeared;—to have to resign your most cherished desires at the very time, (perhaps,) when told that God is henceforth to hear your supplications and give you all that is good;—to find yourself for the first time awake to the hatefulness of sin, aware that it defiles you and dwells in you, at the very time that you are considered of God as arrayed in a righteousness in which is no sin and no spot, nor any such thing;—is it not a most perplexing contradiction, fitted to make you call in question whether you really can be righteous before God at all—fitted to make you reflect unfavourably on the accuracy of your judgment in thinking that you had in any sense become righteous by faith? You know not what to think. You are perplexed as with a painful mystery. You think that if really justified,—really established before God on the footing of righteousness and friendship,—an accepted servant and beloved friend of Heaven;—surely it would be different with you—greatly different and better. Sorrow would not fall so largely to your lot; affliction would not so often weigh you down, or so variously befall you; your reasonable wishes would not be so frequently crossed; the tender point of your heart so often and painfully touched; your conflict with sin so constant and so little victorious that the evil still lurks within you, watches to break forth, and stirs to humble and defile. You think again on all that you might so warrantably hope for on the ground of this righteousness—not on the ground of your faith, for it trembles oftentimes in its weakness, and these very tremors of doubt and of perplexity arise from the frailty and infirmity of faith. But this righteousness is the ground of all your expectation. And, behold! how good it is—how glorious—how worthy even of the Father's approbation! Should not they that receive abundance of grace and this gift of righteousness reign in life? Should they not have a right royal life of it—kingly and noble, with no meannesses and limitations, and festering sores and heavy burdens, prompting to sighs and tears and irritating tendencies to give up the conflict in despair? Why should there be a conflict at all, when the great question with my

God is settled, and settled so blessedly and well,—settled in this, that I am a friend of God?

It is a sore perplexity ; what are you to make of it ? What has been wrong ?

There has been nothing wrong. Your hope has not been wrong. Your hope has not been too great, too high, too ambitious. You have reason for it, and Scripture ; yea, for more than eye hath seen, or ear heard, or hath entered into the heart of man. You are by no means to give up your hope ; there has been nothing wrong with *it*.

For there is nothing wrong with the righteousness round which it clings, and which it honours ; to which it only does simple justice, when cherishing on the ground of it the noblest ambitions that can stir the soul of man. And your faith has not been wrong. Your faith has not been unwarrantable, presumptuous, premature. Appropriating the righteousness in the very light in which God presents it in his word—a gift to you freely, in all its fulness, without money, without delay, without recalling,—yours, because you need it in your want of righteousness, in your sin and misery : your faith, thus receiving what God thus gives, is every way warrantable and pleasing in his sight.

No ; there is nothing wrong in the faith which embraces the righteousness ; and nothing wrong with the large, and warm, and boundless hope which you feel entitled, on the ground of that righteousness, to cherish ; and nothing wrong with the righteousness itself, for it is beautiful and glorious, excellent and comely, and a price with which to buy all heaven for those who have it.

Why, then, have you not a present, perfect, painless victory over all evil—a present, unalloyed possession of all that is good ? Why should not the righteousness achieve that on your behalf at once ?

It *would*, were it not “righteousness by faith.” It *would*, were it your own personal, inherent righteousness, righteousness wrought out in you and by you to its present perfection and heavenly glory. In that case there would be no deferring of your hope, and no object to be gained by deferring it. But it is yours *by faith*. You must be content that its fruits and purchase be yours *by faith too* : and they *are* all yours by faith

with delay, and without drawback,—without admixture or alloy. They *are all* yours by faith already.

But faith is not sight; faith is not present full fruition; faith is not heaven, except as by faith you may have a heaven upon earth—a defiled earth as yet, cursed, and sorrowful, and groaning, and travailing in pain and bondage until now. You live in two kingdoms or realms, that of faith and that of sense. In the kingdom of faith there is no sin, but perfect righteousness; no death, but only life eternal; no curse and sorrow, but only peace and joy, and the love of God unmingled; no darkness, but only the light and sunshine of a Father's countenance. In the kingdom of sense again all is sin, and death, and sorrow, and sighing: and living, as you must, in both these realms at once, your function and office, as a king and priest to God, is to see to it that you bring the powers and privileges of the kingdom of faith to bear on the powers of the kingdom of sense, to control and conquer them all. Sense sends up its clouds into the realm of faith, to darken your sunshine; and its pains and agonies to try your peace; and its death-powers (though stingless) to grapple with your heavenly life; and its sins of the flesh to mix with its fruits of the Spirit. Still: give the kingdom of faith its own character; do justice to it; accredit it not with what comes from sense, and the flesh, and the world, and the devil; take it as it is, God's realm of marvellous light in Jesus the Son of his love;—and there is no evil in it at all; there is no possible good wanting in it; it rests on the finished righteousness, which is itself, as all else in the kingdom of faith, a righteousness *by faith*; and by *faith* you possess *already* all that the righteousness entitles you to claim. In the kingdom of faith you already by faith possess a victory by faith over all that is evil, and an inheritance by faith in all that is good. Still: you possess as yet only *by faith*. Your hope is warrantable, your title is impregnable, for it is the finished righteousness. Your faith, the faith by which you hold the righteousness, is good; but faith is the substance of things as yet only hoped for, the evidence of things that are not yet seen. Hence the need of WAITING. “We, through the Spirit, wait for the hope of righteousness by faith.”

And thus our explanation has blended into our third point,

—the relation in which patience stands to hope and faith, and to that righteousness without which all these graces are impossible.

Without the grace of patience what can the believer do? He has need of patience. In the deferring of his hope; in the increasing pressure of his cross; in the ceaseless variation of his sorrow; in his consciousness, very specially a growing consciousness, of sin's exceeding sinfulness; he has strong temptation to think his faith untrue, his hope unwarrantable—strong temptation to strike sail and let the ship be driven. But patience whispers, "Wait:" "It is good that a man should both hope and quietly wait for the salvation of the Lord." The righteousness is all-perfect, and it has purchased all things. To have it by faith is a good and secure tenure; this very temptation, in all the ground and reason of it, shows more and more that righteousness cannot be by worth or works of yours; clearly it must be alone by faith; it must be by faith, that it may be by grace; and it is by grace, to the end the promise may be sure. The righteousness is all-perfect, and to have it by faith is right; the hope, therefore, may be deferred, but it maketh not ashamed. When the righteousness shall have become yours not by faith only—not merely by promise on God's part, secretly sealed by faith, in the court of conscience here below; but yours sensibly, obviously, ostensibly, publicly proclaimed on God's part in the court of heaven's high judgment-hall above, then shall it not merely be by faith that you shall possess the objects of your hope, the high and holy things, the victory, the blessing, the fulness of joy, the perfection of holiness in all its bliss and beauty; not only by faith shall these things be yours *then*—they are all yours *now* by faith, which is the substance, earnest, evidence, essence of them all already;—but yours they shall be *then* in all their fulness—in all their circumstance and garniture of glory—altogether unmingled with evil, conflict, sorrowing, sighing, sin,—with no good thing wanting, with unmingled pleasures for ever, in more even than the glory of the celestial vision, which, made to pass before the sorrowful believing soul by anticipation, has so often evoked the cry, "O mother dear, Jerusalem, when shall I come to thee?"

Bear up then; endure; stand out; under present trial, under

the peculiar perplexity and temptation that arise from believing that you have a right to a position very different from that in which you still find yourself placed. You *have* that right. The righteousness gives it to you; and the righteousness itself, you have a sure right to *it* on the word of him who cannot lie, and therefore it is yours by faith. No hope can be too high, too inspiring, too encouraging, when it is the hope of righteousness. The hope that is founded on righteousness is a righteous hope indeed, and cannot righteously be defeated,—that is, simply, cannot be defeated at all. But it is founded on the righteousness *of faith*: it is a hope therefore that is reserved, that is laid up for you, that is deferred till faith is no longer needed. Be patient until then. Be patient till the coming of the Lord. Wait for the hope of righteousness.

Such, then, is the meaning of this intensely wise and interesting oracle, as it describes the believer's present position on earth. It is that of one who is "waiting for the hope of righteousness by faith."

II. And now, that this is true; that he is really enabled through the Spirit to maintain this position; we shall briefly show. In other words, we shall explain how the Spirit enables the believer to wait for the hope of righteousness by faith.

1. First of all, then, the Spirit enables the believer to wait for the hope of righteousness by faith, by *giving him glorious views of that righteousness*.

"I have expected more from my justification than I was entitled to expect; and I have thus greatly deceived myself," the believer is tempted to say. "I thought to have enjoyed an unmingled and unclouded peace from the moment of my being counted righteous in the sight of God. I had regarded my justification as so valid and complete from the first that it would shield me ever after from all pain, and settle me securely in all bliss and peace. But I have been mistaken. It cannot have been so sure, so valid, so perfect as I had thought, or I cannot have so firmly and faithfully taken hold and kept hold of it."

In this snare, or difficulty, or crisis of despondency, the Holy Spirit intervenes. He "convinces of righteousness, because Jesus has gone to the Father." He "shines in the

heart to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." He reveals the glory of his person as the Eternal Son of God—the brightness of the Father's glory and the express image of his person. He unfolds the wonders of that condescension in which he humbled himself, and took upon him the form of a servant, that he might be obedient unto death, and bring in, *and be*, a justifying righteousness. He discloses the awful rectitude of heart in which Jesus continued faithful even unto the cursed death of the cross, and the matchless love in which he laid down his life for the sheep. The Spirit, further and very specially, shines upon the holy law of God, the standard of righteousness, and fills the soul with admiring views of its justice, holiness, beauty, goodness; inclines the heart to love it, and to admire and love therefore all that is a fair response or counterpart to it; to admire and love, above all, that righteousness of Immanuel in which the full glory of the law stands forth, not in cold tables of stone or in awful commandments, but in the fascinating embodiment of a perfect personal obedience to all requirements. The blessed Spirit thus fulfils the promise made by Jesus concerning him: "He shall glorify me; for he shall take of mine and shall show it unto you." He specially takes the righteousness and thus gloriously reveals its excellence, its trustworthiness as a ground of hope; and reassures the Christian that he cannot hope for too much as the purchase of a price that is beyond all price. And faith, staggered and at fault, returns to its full assurance once more—(and full assurance, though it may not have been as yet developed, is always in the heart of that faith which has the Spirit and Word of God for its co-ordinate and concurring causes: "*we believe and are sure*"),—and maintains that its justification is perfect, glorious, unassailable, eternal, whatever may appear to sense and reason to the contrary.

2. The Spirit *strengthens the faith* by which the righteousness is appropriated and held fast. He does so in and by the very act of displaying the moral excellence and perfection of the righteousness. For he sets it forth always as a vicarious righteousness—the righteousness wholly and exclusively of a substitute:—in that sense not so much Christ's as ours—not needed for himself, but his people's righteousness;—himself,

Jehovah our Righteousness, predicted, promised, proffered as such—as when Isaiah says, “Surely shall one say (*i.e.* it shall be the joyful watchword of his kingdom)—In the Lord have I righteousness.” And faith, seeing this all-perfect righteousness—vicarious in its very nature and deepest undeniable history; useless, therefore, save to clothe the unrighteous with—and seeing it proffered always in the Word in that light, wherever it is there referred to and described, acts its appropriation more intelligently, more clearly, more firmly, more consciously, more victoriously, more joyfully, more God-glorifyingly, saying, “In the Lord have I righteousness: Christ is the end of the law to me for righteousness: I count all things but loss, to be found in Christ, having the righteousness which is of God by faith.”

3. The Spirit, revealing the fulness and perfection of the righteousness, and strengthening the faith by which it is embraced, further *strengthens the hope*—the lively hope to which he hath begotten us. See this very systematically explained in the fifth chapter of Romans, where the faith, hope, and patience under the hope deferred amidst tribulation, are all placed in their true mutual relations to each other and to the pristine central righteousness, and where the function of the Spirit is also beautifully brought out. “Being justified” in this righteousness “by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ.” So much for the “faith” which embraces the righteousness. A “hope” should grow out of it. That is noted next:—“By whom also we have by faith access into that grace wherein we stand, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God.” But there is need of patience; and the apostle proceeds to say so:—“And not only so, but we glory in tribulations also; because tribulation worketh patience; and patience, experience; and experience, hope; and hope maketh not ashamed, because the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost given unto us:” our hope doth not shame us; it is maintained as true and valid, such as we need not be ashamed to profess, “because the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts,”—the great grace and tender fatherly love of God is poured into our souls sweetly,—“by the Holy Ghost given unto us.” He is the earnest of our hope. He gives us in the love of God a taste and foretaste of

all that we hope for. He is the seal of our inheritance, the earnest, the first-fruits : and in his gracious, blessed work of causing us to feel that the Lord is good, and that blessed is the man that trusteth in him, he supports our hope ; and we, through the Spirit, wait for the hope of that righteousness in which, being justified by faith, we "rejoice in the hope of the glory of God."

4. Once more the Spirit deals with us concerning our patience itself ; strengthening it as a distinct grace itself, by enabling us to maintain communion with Heaven amidst all the trials of earth, amidst all that would seem to forbid our hope. In other words, he enables us to wait for the hope of righteousness by being a Spirit of prayer and supplication to us.

This is finely brought out by the Apostle Paul in the eighth chapter of the Romans. He has been speaking of those sufferings which seem so ill to befit the heirs of heaven—so incongruous in the lot of the sons of God. Truly their rank is concealed, and the honour due to them is delayed. Nay : all nature seems very sensible of that ; all her sorrow is because of it. All her voices, alike of terror and of plaintiveness, are bewailing it. What are the wild waves saying ? What says the moaning midnight wind ? What mean those tempests that wrap all heaven in darkness and the great deep in fury ? Why is all creation groaning ? It is with one intent—with one hope in view—a hope that cannot always be deferred : it is "in hope of the manifestation of the sons of God." All nature travaileth in pain, because the present state of God's children conflicts so perplexingly with their rank and rights as justified in the righteousness of the Only-Begotten.

Ourselves also groan for the adoption—the public proclamation of our righteousness and sonship, which shall be given at the redemption,—that is, the resurrection of the body. But till *then*, our adoption, our justification, is a secret ;—valid, indeed ;—carrying rights and titles with it ; but not giving us infirmity here. "We are saved," it is true ; but it is "in hope" (Rom. viii. 24). But hope that is seen is not hope, for what a man seeth why doth he yet hope for ? Meantime our faith is sustained by the Spirit. Our patience is supported by his gracious aids. We do not fail in our infirmities. We do not, in sickness of heart, give up our hope because it is

deferred,—as hope from its very nature must always be. We do not say in trial, “This evil is of the Lord: why should I wait for him any longer?” We do not “strike sail and let the ship be driven.” For we betake ourselves to the haven of prayer; and there we have the Spirit’s strengthening aid, along the lines of what I shall call that blessed soul battle-cry: “Likewise also the Spirit helpeth our infirmities; for we know not what to pray for as we ought; but the Spirit maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered” (Rom. viii. 26).

It is thus pre-eminently that we through the Spirit wait for the hope of the righteousness which is by faith. No antagonism between what is promised to our faith, and what we meet with in the kingdom of sense, is able now to stagger us. Present in the body, we are absent from the Lord; but we walk by faith, not by sight. “The body is dead because of sin, but the spirit is life because of righteousness” (Rom. viii. 10). The body, yet unrenewed, yet unregenerated (regenerated it will be only in resurrection), while we wait for its redemption (which must come through death and the grave), links and binds us to the realm of sense; and in that realm we are conversant with sin, sorrow, sighing, trial, difficulty, darkness, clouds returning after the rain, disease, infirmity, death coming in behind them all, and Satan seeking to serve himself of all these evils, if possible, to our ruin! —“But the spirit is life because of righteousness;” and the renewed spirit, —already redeemed and renewed, with God’s Spirit as the first-fruits dwelling in it,—the renewed spirit links and binds us in with the kingdom of faith; and there we meet a righteousness in which is no sin, a victory which is already achieved and unalterable, a life that is eternal, and a joy that is unspeakable and full of glory. By faith we dwell in this unseen kingdom, looking to the things that are unseen and eternal. And while we do so, we are enabled by the Spirit to wait for the hope of righteousness. We cast not away our confidence, we seek not to be justified by circumcision or by sacraments, by works of any kind, by help of priests or penances, or aught but simple faith alone. And to this justification we cling, though our possession of it by faith gives us no *sensible* advantage; though it makes not the fig-tree to blossom, nor saves our flesh and

our heart from failing. Still we wait; we stand fast in our liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free. We hanker not after any sensible prop to hope, any tangible ground of righteousness, as it were by works. To all seeming, dealt with by Providence as roughly as if we were not justified of God, we hold fast our righteousness by faith, and our hope that rests thereon; and though naturally looking to be dealt with as justified—acquitted and accepted and adopted of Heaven—reasonably hoping, scripturally hoping, to be dealt with as kings and priests unto the Father, heirs of glory, friends of heaven, sons of God (unutterably the highest reach of aspiration); we can still wait for the “manifestation” of our rank and the conferring of our rights; not making shipwreck of our faith, nor abandoning our claim because our hope stands over to another day, but waiting through the Spirit for the hope of righteousness by faith.

That's our position and present spiritual state as justified by faith, clothed in the righteousness of God, and entitled to call the adorable Supreme “Our Father who art in heaven.” We do not admit or apprehend the very slightest flaw in our justification or adoption because our outward estate may be as troubled as before we had peace with God, or, it may be, far more so. We do not disparage our righteousness (the righteousness which we have by faith) because it has not yet infested us into unclouded blessedness and sunshine; we still maintain that it is a righteousness more august, more delicate, more beautiful, more worthy than aught that angels wear, claiming greater admiration and a sweeter song than theirs. Nor do we doubt whether faith gives us a true and valid hold upon it, for it is by very designation (registered in the court of heaven) “the righteousness which is of God by faith;” and faith’s title is as good as exists or can be imagined, resting on the word and promise and oath of God. No, we are not driven to tamper with the fulness and perfection of our justification, or to doubt whether it has taken place because outwardly all things come alike to us and to the wicked, or because we are more in trouble than they. And when urged by the sore temptation, “Is this all that your justification in a perfect and eternal righteousness does for you? have you no better hope than this?” we reply, “We have a lively hope, a good hope through grace, a hope

resting on righteousness (or justice), a hope that maketh not ashamed, an expectation large and limitless as the grace which reigns through righteousness, and sure and kingly as the reigning righteousness itself." Doubtless there is much in our present state to cloud that hope, but the clouds come only from the region of sense. There are no clouds in the kingdom of faith, where our righteousness is, and our hope. Therefore, though even Abraham should be ignorant of us, and Israel acknowledge us not; though the fig-tree should not blossom, and there be no fruit in the vine; though heart and flesh should fail; still while the Holy Ghost lives, and is full of grace and love, we will be strong in the faith, against hope believing in hope. For by faith we will receive the promise of the Spirit: and "through the Spirit we will wait for the hope of righteousness by faith."

μ-

ART. VI.—*The Observance of the Sabbath.*¹

THE question concerning the proper observance of the Christian Sabbath may be considered in either of two aspects—the secular or civil, and the religious or spiritual.

In the former aspect, the Sabbath—that is, the measurement of time by weeks, each period of six days separated from the next by a day of rest from ordinary labour—is a social institution of prehistoric origin; and the Christian Sabbath, in distinction from the Jewish and the Mohammedan, is characteristic of all the nations in the foremost rank of civilisation. Geography distinguishes between the civilised nations and the semi-civilised. Diplomacy makes the same distinction. Nations that recognise in some sort the Christian Sabbath are included in Christendom, and Christendom includes all civilised nations. China is older than any other existing empire; is rich with the accumulations and the ceaseless productiveness of peaceful industry; boasts of its heroes and sages, its schools, its

¹ This article has special interest from the fact that it has been published in a Review (*North American*) which is not distinctively theological or religious; and also as indicating, in accordance with its *locale*, the secular rights and advantages of the day of rest.

libraries, its most voluminous literature, its art of printing practised long before Faust or Gutenberg had dreamed of such an invention ; includes within its limits almost a third part of the earth's population ; has had from immemorial ages a highly-developed system of government—yet China is only the oldest and the richest of the semi-civilised nations. When China shall have learned to measure time by weeks, and to recognise the Christian Sabbath, that greatest of empires will no longer be classed with the semi-civilised. Turkey and Egypt are semi-civilised ; but when Sunday instead of Friday shall be the Sabbath at Constantinople and Brusa, at Cairo and Alexandria, those two countries will have been advanced from the semi-civilised class to the civilised. Japan, having become the most earnestly progressive nation outside of Christendom, is now just learning to date in years of the Christian era, to number the days of the week, and in some sort to mark the Christian Sabbath as a day of rest ; and, simultaneously with the new ways of thinking and living which these changes imply, Japan is coming into co-ordination and parity with the powers of the civilised world. France, in the early frenzy of that revolution which “the whirligig of time,” after whirling almost a hundred years, is now bringing to a sane and settled conclusion before the admiring gaze of Christendom, attempted to abolish the Christian Sabbath with its division of time into weeks ; but the attempt was ludicrously unsuccessful. The system of weights and measures, invented when France was making all things new, remains, and is winning its way to universal acceptance ; while the revolution calendar of decades and festivals, by which the nation was to be taken out of Christendom, is an almost forgotten folly. It is noteworthy, as matter of fact, that the Christian Sabbath is inseparable from Christian civilisation, and that the highest civilisation outside of Christendom is only semi-civilised.

Considered in this aspect, the question concerning the proper observance of the Sabbath presupposes another question : Has this element any potency in the civilisation of Christendom ? Is it worth having ? Is it worth saving ? What is the use of it ? Does it contribute anything to the superiority of Christendom over the semi-civilised nations ?

Rest is the primary and fundamental idea of the Sabbath.

All other uses of the institution are either incidental to this or developed from it. Work is a necessity of human nature. But work must not be without intermission ; and one day in seven, separated from the six and guarded by prohibition of ordinary work, secures to all the needed interval of rest. Accordingly, the Hebrew decalogue, consecrating the six days to work and the seventh to rest, provides explicitly that the Sabbath shall be, not the luxury of a few, but the right of all. "Work through the six days as God wrought through the cycles in which he was creating the earth and the heavens : but the seventh is the consecrated rest. On that day thou shalt not work—thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, nor thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle—no, nor the stranger that shares thy hospitality." I am not citing the fourth commandment as a divine law, binding all men in all ages, but only for illustration. Be it that (as some Christians hold) Christ has abolished the decalogue ; be it (as sciologists claim) that Sinai is a myth ; not the less will it be true that the Sabbath, in its origin and essence, is simply a day for the intermission of ordinary work. It is a day on which all men, the poor as well as the rich, the hireling as well as the employer, the bondman as well as his master, may rest from labour. I am not begging any question concerning the Mosaic institutions ; I am only showing that the Sabbath, whatever its origin or authority, is in its idea the working man's day of rest. It is with touching significance that the Book of Deuteronomy, in its rehearsal of the decalogue, says : "Keep the Sabbath-day, that thy man-servant and thy maid-servant may rest as well as thou ; and remember that thou wast a servant in the land of Egypt."

"So teach us to number our days ;" for surely this Christian numeration—six days of labour, counted from one day of rest to another—is something which Christendom could not afford to forget even if the Sabbath were nothing more than rest for muscles weary and stiff with the week of labour. There are two great nations in which, pre-eminently, the day of rest is guarded by law and by religious sentiment. How great a boon is Sunday, simply as rest from labour, to the millions of hard-working men and women in the United States and the United Kingdom !

If the Sabbath is, in its essence, a rest from the work of one week, and a refreshment for the work of another, then one incidental characteristic of it must needs be quiet enjoyment, or rather (to use a word for which there is no exact equivalent) comfort. It is not a fast, but rather a festival. The legitimate aspect of rest from labour is not gloom but cheerfulness. Therefore the right conception of the Sabbath makes it a day of family enjoyment. Honour to the Puritans for their testimony when James I. and Charles I. attempted to pervert the English Sunday into a day of revelry ! If we admit that in their controversial zeal, eager to reach the opposite extreme from wrong, the Puritan Sabbath became almost Pharisaic in the rigour and the minuteness of its prohibitions, and more than Pharisaic in its austerity, let us nevertheless remember that, if Puritanism had not protested by word and deed against the Stuart kings, there would not have been in England or in Scotland such a Sabbath as is implied in the "*Cottar's Saturday Night*." To the labouring man without a home, or whose home is far away—if, having been obedient to the law, "Six days shalt thou labour and do all thy work," he remembers the Sabbath-day, and claims his privilege of rest—the day of rest, though it be in a mining camp, or in the woods, or on shipboard, is freighted with memories of home ; and though tears may come into his eyes at the thought of those who remember their absent one, and perhaps are praying for him, his Sabbath is not less on that account, but so much the more, a refreshment and a joy. The ideal Sabbath is the Sabbath at home when the head of the household—farmer or mechanic, merchant or lawyer, capitalist or operative—enjoys his weekly rest among those for whom his six days of labour have been spent. Whether the sabbatic institution was or was not created by the fourth commandment, there seems to be in those words, "Thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, nor thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant," a glimpse of the restful enjoyment which the day of rest, in the primitive conception of it, would bring to the families that keep it.

The day of rest, being rest and not revelry or dissipation, and being therefore a day of home enjoyment, brings with it opportunity for sober thought and conference. A Sabbath-keeping people will become a thoughtful people, and such

thoughtfulness is manliness. All men, and especially the busy millions in an advanced civilisation like our own, need for the mind's sake, not less than for the sake of wearied nerves and muscles, the seventh-day intermission of their ordinary work. A true Sabbath is something far more restful than a day of noisy jollity. In its calm air the mind rests by thought, not thoughtlessness—by quiet musing, by conscious or unconscious retrospection; perhaps by consideration of what might have been, perhaps by thinking what may yet be, perhaps by aspiration and resolve toward something in the future that shall be better than what has been in the past. The home in which Sunday is a day of rest and home enjoyment, is hallowed by the Sabbaths which it hallows. In the Sabbath-keeping village, life is less frivolous, and at the same time industry is more productive, for the weekly rest. A Sabbath-keeping nation is greater in peace and in war for the character which its tranquil and thoughtful Sabbaths have impressed upon it.

I have not yet mentioned the distinctively religious character of the day of rest; yet, even in its secular and civil aspect, the fact that our Sabbath is a day for public worship and for moral and religious instruction cannot be overlooked. Remembering what is the essence of the Sabbatic institution—six days for work and one day set apart for rest—we can hardly resist the conviction that, even from prehistoric times, a religious element must have entered into the conception of that day of rest. Earlier than synagogue or temple, earlier than the tabernacle in the wilderness, earlier than any instituted form of public worship, the resting on the appointed day of rest was itself, if I may so express it, a religious service. Most naturally, therefore, that day became a day for religious assemblies. Thus, long before the Christian era, there began to be, among a Sabbath-keeping people, and as an outgrowth of their day of rest, the institution of the synagogue and the public reading of the Scriptures, with prayer and exposition. Thus, in the separation of Christianity from Judaism, the day on which those who believed the gospel held their assemblies for worship became "the Lord's Day." We cannot duly estimate the value of the Sabbath in its secular and civil aspect unless we take into consideration the matter of fact that to the public at large—not to some austere sect nor to a minority,

but to the millions—it is their day for worship. On that day millions of people in these States, as in other Christian countries, claim the privilege of rest, that they may resort to their places of worship without hindrance or annoyance, and that each assembly, whether greater or less, may offer its homage to God according to its own convictions, and may receive instruction from its own religious teachers. Admit whatever may be reasonably alleged concerning ignorance or fanaticism on the part of worshippers and of teachers; admit that sometimes the coming together “is not for the better but for the worse,” and, after every such exception, there will be no room for doubt as to the utility of this element in our civilisation—the Christian Sabbath, with its worshipping assemblies and its moral and religious instructions. As a Protestant, I have my own opinion concerning certain peculiarities of Roman Catholic worship and doctrine. Yet I hold that, for the millions of Roman Catholics in this country, their own worship and the teaching which they get from their clergy are far better than none. As a Protestant of what is called an “evangelical denomination,” I may even abhor the misbelief and no-belief of so-called rationalism; yet I hold that it is better for rationalists of every grade to hold their assemblies on the first day of the week, after a Christian fashion, than to forsake the assembling of themselves together and have no Sabbath. What is a rainy day worth to the country, in terms of money, when a “spell of dry weather” has been broken, and, from the Atlantic to the Alleghanies, cities, gardens, farms, and forests are refreshed and enriched? So, we may ask, what is a Sabbath-day worth as it traverses the continent with rest for toiling millions, with “sound of church-going bells,” and with all its refreshing and educating influences?

Our question is then, in effect, How shall this immemorial institution, the weekly Sabbath—this institution, characteristic of the most advanced civilisation—the Christian Sabbath—be preserved? Under the existing organisation of industry, in the relations of capital to labour, and in the rapid growth of city populations, there are obviously certain tendencies which must be counteracted by adequate moral forces, or the Christian Sabbath will be lost.

The Sabbath can be preserved as a beneficial element in our

civilisation only by observing it, and carefully guarding it as a day of rest from work, and of rest for all. For me, the Sabbath institution has a divine authority, and my observance of it is therefore a part of my religion. But, aside from any supernatural revelation, the grand beneficence of the institution is its sufficient warrant. The division of time into weeks—six days for labour and one day consecrated to rest from labour—is, first of all, an arrangement in the interest of working men, and, for the sake of greater emphasis, I say of working women. That rest is for them. It is their privilege. He who, under any pretence, or by any method of inducement, would deprive them of it, is their enemy. He whose influence tends in that direction is regardless of what—whether by a divine ordinance or by a beneficial and immemorial usage—is really their right. On that day the ordinary operations of industry must rest; that the labouring millions may rest—all for the sake of each, and each for the sake of all. The steam-engine, the water-wheel, all the resounding machinery in which the forces of material nature are harnessed to work in the service of man, must rest, that man himself, the image of God, and therefore nobler than all material things, may have his rightful rest.

Jesus Christ said—and it is one of those sayings, so frequent in His teaching, which reveal the truth as by a flash of light—“The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath.” If the weekly rest is *for* man, instead of being an end to which man is subordinate, the best observance of it is that by which it contributes most to human well-being. Simple as this truth is—almost a truism—the ancient Pharisees did not know it, and even Christians have sometimes seemed to forget it. A Pharisaic “fence,” guarding the commandment by a code of minute regulations, may have the effect of making the Sabbath, in the feeling of those who keep it, an end rather than the means to an end, a burden and a weariness instead of a sacred rest. Nor will the effect be essentially different if the “fence” has been constructed by Puritan casuists. Yet the principle which the Great Teacher gives us, and which I may venture to describe as evangelical in distinction from legal—the principle that the best Sabbath-keeping is that which is most conducive to the welfare of the individual, of the family, and of society—may be applied to illustrate some particulars both of privilege and of duty.

Under this principle the strictest of Christian Sabbath-keepers make large allowance for "works of necessity and mercy." Legalism said to the hungry disciples rubbing the ears of wheat in their hands to separate the kernels from the chaff, "You are breaking the Sabbath by work; for the plucking of those heads of wheat as you passed through the field was equivalent with reaping, and the rubbing is only another way of threshing." Legalism said, "It is not lawful to heal on the Sabbath-day, for healing is work." The evangelical answer was, "It is lawful to do good on the Sabbath-day." A law for the tribes of Israel in their own country prohibited the kindling of a fire, even for domestic use, on the day of rest—a regulation not inappropriate under the sky of Palestine, but superseded by the higher law of necessity and mercy. That higher law cannot be so formulated as to leave no room and no demand for the exercise of individual discretion. Love is that higher law, and "love worketh no ill to his neighbour." The law of the Sabbath is rest from labour; but the Sabbath is for man, who is greater than the Sabbath, and the paramount law of love does not permit that the hungry should faint or the sick languish untended, lest the Sabbath be broken.

Inasmuch as the Sabbath is essentially a day of rest, and inasmuch as the rest is for all, every man's share in it should be respected and carefully guarded. Every man's rights are limited by his neighbour's rights. Every man must so use his own liberty as not to infringe his neighbour's liberty. I have a right to the day of rest, but, inasmuch as every other man in the community has the same right, I must take care that in my use of that day I do not hinder others from making the right use of it. On this principle it is that society acknowledges and protects the day of rest, and in so doing has no occasion to decide any religious question. The Constitution of the United States recognises Sunday as *dies non* for the President. The governments of the several States and of the Union recognise the right of all their functionaries to the Sunday rest, limited only by what each government judges to be "necessity and mercy." The legislation of every State acknowledges, in one way or another, the civil and secular value of the Sabbatic institution, and more or less carefully guards every man's privilege of rest by requiring that all shall rest.

There is a close relation between rest and quiet. A day of dissipation and riotous living is not a day of rest. The Sunday which is followed by "blue Monday" is not a Sabbath; nor does it yield to the individual or to society, to the labourer or to the employer of labour, the benefits which come from the Sabbath. What is it that capitalists are doing when they conspire to abolish the day of rest by turning it into a day of revelry? The managers of railroad corporations, whose Sunday excursion-trains defy the law and the public sense that makes the law, know that they rob the hard-working men in their service, whom they compel to forego the working man's sacred privilege of weekly rest; nor is it beyond the reach of their discernment that they cheat the heedless customers whom they persuade to turn the day of rest into a day of frolic which is not rest. As the proprietor of a drinking-saloon knows that the dimes which he gathers into his till are the price paid by his customers for personal degradation, for disease in body and mind, for wretchedness at home, and for unlamented death—as he knows that brawls and fights, with now and then a murder, are the inevitable incidents of his "dreadful trade;" so the proprietors of a Sunday excursion-steamboat know what they are doing. They know that their greed is robbing their servants by compelling them to work on the day of rest. They know that the gain they get from the Sunday excursion is "filthy lucre" at the best, polluted with the "evil communications" that infect the sweltering throng of passengers. They know that by the promise of fresh air and a good time, they persuade their customers to substitute a day of dissipation for the quiet rest which would have refreshed them for their six days' work. They know that dissipation is not rest; but what is that to them if their dividends are the greater for other people's dissipation?

In proportion as Sunday becomes a day of dissipation, it ceases to be a day of rest, and in that proportion society loses the benefit of a true Sabbath. The State, therefore, in the interest of productive industry and of the industrial classes, and especially in the interest of the millions whose industry is manual labour, must take care that Sunday shall be for all a quiet day. Without invading the rights of conscience by attempting to enforce a religious observance, it may and must prohibit those uses of the day which are not rest but dissipa-

tion, or which impose hard work on one portion of society that another portion may have a frolic. It must put a strong barrier of law between working men's privilege of rest and the power of capital, especially of associated capital, proverbially soulless and heartless.

In its religious and spiritual aspect, the question of Sabbath observance is one over which civil government has no rightful authority—certainly not if the American doctrine of religious liberty and of the relations between Church and State is true. While I insist that civil government may recognise the weekly rest as beneficial to the commonwealth, and may therefore provide by law, and by the enforcement of law, that every man shall have the privilege of that rest, I deny that the jurisdiction of the State extends to the religious question. While I maintain the right of the State to prohibit the perversion of the Sabbath to debasing and destructive uses, I deny its right to require that any man shall keep the day otherwise than by abstinence from work. With the great body of the people the Christian Sabbath is a day for public worship. The State may therefore recognise that fact, and may provide that assemblies for worship on the day of rest shall be undisturbed. But the State must not attempt to enforce a religious observance of the day. It can only protect such observance. To me the weekly rest is more than an immemorial tradition, more than an institution beneficial to the commonwealth. To me it is a divine provision for one great need of human nature; a monument more ancient and more enduring than the Pyramids; a memorial of the world's Creator and the world's Redeemer; a symbol and foretaste of a better rest hereafter. In my own home and household I may keep the Sabbath holy according to this religious view of its sanctity. But, if I would bring my neighbour thus to keep it, I must remember that I cannot compel him by any other compulsion than that of example and persuasion. I may associate with others like-minded in a church which celebrates the holy day with public prayer and praise, and with religious inculcation of duty. As a church, united in a spiritual fellowship, we may have our own theory of the Sabbath, and may determine under our responsibility, not to the State, but to him whom we acknowledge as our Lord, what observance of the Lord's day is necessary to the religious life, either as a manifestation of it or as a help to its growth.

All such things belong, not to Cæsar, but to God, to the conscience and intelligence of the individual, and to associated intelligence and conscience in the church.

To the individual, then, conscious of his religious nature and of his relations to God, the question of Sabbath observance presents itself in its religious and spiritual aspect. In this aspect of the question, as in the other, the first thing to be remembered is that word of the Great Teacher, "The Sabbath was made for man." You are human. Inseparable from your nature is that need for which the day of rest was instituted. The Sabbath is for you because you need it. Accept it as a gift from God, not reluctantly, as if it were a penance, but thankfully. Then remember that the Sabbath is essentially rest from work. Let your own six days' work stand still; and bring not the worry of the week into the day of rest. Let your household affairs be so arranged that the holy day shall brighten your home with quiet enjoyment, and even the little ones shall welcome the Sabbath as a happy day. But to you the day of rest, whatever it may be to others, is more than simple rest. It has its employments as well as its repose—employments that are themselves repose. To others it may be a day of lazy pleasure; to you it is a day for serious thought, and therefore for worship—the holy day—the Lord's day. Let it bring you and yours into the worshipping assembly, not only for the help you may get there, but also for the help you may bring to those who worship with you. In your own home let there be household prayer, redolent alike of tender memories and immortal hope, with lessons of wisdom from above, and with Sabbath music—"psalms and hymns and spiritual songs," hearts and voices making melody to God. Such Sabbath-keeping consecrates the home, and brings into it, in all experience of change, a light from heaven.

The readers of this journal know that what I have described as the proper observance of the Christian Sabbath from the religious point of view is a reality. It was so in the old days of Puritanism. Even then the holy day, though sanctified with more than Jewish rigour, cheered and blessed the home. The same reality exists to-day in thousands of Christian homes, bridging as it were the distance between earth and heaven.

LEONARD BACON.

ART. VII.—*Evolution in relation to Species.*¹

I PROPOSE, in this brief article, to submit some objections, of a strictly scientific or logical character, against the now fashionable hypothesis of evolution as an explanation of the origin and mystery of species in organic nature. I shall take occasion also to criticise the logic of its advocates. But I shall lay no stress upon its supposed sceptical tendencies for several reasons.

One of these reasons is, that although infidels with their keen instinct everywhere welcome and defend extreme views on this subject as unanswerable arguments against the truth of the Holy Scriptures, yet all evolutionists are not sceptics. Some of them are firm believers in the Word of God, and declare that, as they understand it, they find nothing in it opposed to evolution. Some are clear and strong Theists, whether believers in revelation or not, strenuously maintaining that the forces of nature by which the processes of evolution are supposed to be carried on, are not in any sense the properties of matter, but the uniform action or energy of the Divine will. Others, whilst claiming that these forces are truly the properties of matter, escape the gulf of scepticism by holding also that God, by an original and personal act, endowed matter with these properties. Others still exclude the human soul entirely from the hypothesis, and claim that for its existence a creative act of God must be supposed. In all these cases, doubtless, evolution doctrines may be held in consistency with faith in the personality and providence of God. There are others, however, and not a few, who affirm and maintain that the evolution forces are the properties of matter in such a sense that the question, how it came to be possessed of these properties, is excluded from scientific investigation and from the domain of human knowledge. These are the agnostics, for whom it would seem that materialism and atheism are unavoidable. But with such as these, of course, none but scientific objections can have any weight.

Another reason for confining myself here to such objections

¹ From *The Presbyterian Review*.

is, that science, as it seems to me, can be safely left to refute its own sceptical tendencies. For it is essentially progressive and ever advancing to new positions or points of view, from which its previous hypotheses and theories are necessarily seen to be incomplete, or inadequate, and many of them entirely false. Consequently, scientists often advocate at one time what they strenuously oppose at another. In this way, the objections which they raise against the Scriptures, and which appear to many to be unanswerable, at one stage of their progress, they often, at another stage, overthrow and trample upon. Of this, evolution itself affords us a notable example. For only a few years ago, it was fashionable among a certain class of scientists to deny the truth of the Mosaic account of the deluge on the ground that the different species of living creatures were so numerous that they could not possibly have found room in Noah's ark. But now the evolutionists are moving heaven and earth to convince us that there never were any such things as permanent species, and that all organised beings have been evolved out of a very few primordial forms, perhaps from a single one, and ultimately from inorganic matter. Consequently, they have dropped this argument against the Scriptural account of the flood as a live coal; for at the time this great catastrophe occurred, which may be placed as far back as any one chooses, the several varieties of land animals may have been so few as to find ample accommodation in the ark. In this way, science is constantly dealing with its own errors, which, therefore, may be safely left to its own correction.

In the meantime, before we accept any hypothesis of the scientists, it will be wise for us to wait until we see whether they themselves will not turn against it, as they have done in so many cases. Nor should we, to whom the faith of Christianity is everything, ever allow ourselves to admit that if this or that claim of science be made good we must give up our Bible. We should rather say to the scientists, with a certain wise and great man in his day—

“Go on, gentlemen, make all the discoveries you can. We are not afraid of the truth. But you will please to remember that whilst you are disputing about anything, we are not obliged to accept it. It is our place to wait until you have come to an agreement. And when you have established

any new truth so that you yourselves no longer dispute about it, we will accept it in perfect assurance that it cannot possibly have any bad influence upon our faith. For since, as we hold, the Author of nature and of revelation is one and the same infinitely wise and good Being, true science and true religion can never have any quarrel with each other."

Moreover, it is irrational for us to submit our minds blindly to the general theories, hypotheses, speculations, inferences, and reasonings which are so often put forth in the name of science. For scientists, like all other men, are fallible, and much given to speculative and discursive views. I venture to affirm that theology itself (which is saying a great deal) was never more prone to daring speculation than is physical science at the present time. We should bear in mind also, now that it has become fashionable with scientists to submit to the public in popular lectures the evidences upon which they rely for the proof of their general and speculative conclusions, that their hearers are often quite as good judges of the nature, validity, and force of their proofs, and of the soundness of their reasonings, as they themselves can possibly be. For logic is one and the same thing in all the departments of human thought and life. There is not one logic for physical science, another for moral science, another for political economy, and another for business affairs. There are no better practical logicians than our ablest men of business. Hence the statesman, the theologian, the lawyer, and the mind that has been well trained in business, are abundantly competent to judge whether the proofs of such general speculations in science are conclusive or not. Otherwise, what good reason can be given for submitting them to the public in popular lectures? Consequently, when we detect in them the most palpable violations of the universal and immutable laws of logic, as any intelligent person may often do, we need not hesitate to reject them. But with respect to the facts of observation or experiment, the case is all different. Here we may well accept in faith and with gratitude those vast and priceless treasures of information with which the discoveries of science are constantly enriching human life.

I come now to the scientific or logical objections which I propose to offer against this boasted hypothesis of evolution, which makes it necessary for me to enter here into some dis-

cussion of the essential nature and proper definition of species in the organic world.

The principle of classification, then, as is well known, lies at the foundation of science and of human knowledge. Consequently, it is everywhere represented in the languages of mankind, for every common term is the name of a class. Classes are formed by the mental processes of comparison and generalisation. When we direct our attention to individual objects, we immediately begin, by an instinct of reason, to compare them with each other, and to note their points of resemblance and difference. Those that resemble each other in the greatest number of particulars we group together, and thus form our primary or lowest classes. Such a class of individuals is termed a species. These primary classes, again, we compare with each other, noting their points of resemblance and difference, and thus group them into classes of classes. Such a class is called a genus. Applying the same process to these higher classes, with similar results, when we have carried it as far as possible, we are finally arrested at one highest of all classes, which is that of undifferenced being. The word *being*, as denoting barely that which exists, or the word *thing*, which means whatever can be thought of, is the name of the highest class which it is possible to form. Among all these classes, and in every branch of science alike, that which bears the name of species, being a class of individual objects bearing the greatest resemblance to each other, is the most important. It is upon this that every system of classification rests.

But here a great difficulty is encountered in determining the limits of species, from the fact that a great number of objects, especially in the world of organised beings, are found, upon inspection of their mutual resemblances, to shade off by almost or quite insensible gradations, and even to overlap, so to speak, upon each other. Thus the Virginia mocking-bird, one of the thrushes, and the most richly endowed of all singing birds, partakes of the nature of the hawk; it is, to a certain extent, a bird of prey, for in its wild state it will kill and eat a sparrow as naturally as does the sparrowhawk. In addition to this, creatures which bear the closest outward resemblance to each other are often found to be very different in their inward structure; whilst those which are most alike both in appear-

ance and in structure often differ greatly in their physiological characters, especially in life and life's powers, faculties, and manifestations. The Saint Bernard and terrier dogs, for example, have little outward resemblance, but their life is so nearly or quite identical that it can be freely propagated between them, and their offspring are also fertile one with another. On the other hand, the Muscovy and common duck bear a much stronger resemblance to each other, yet they are so diverse in life, that although it can be propagated between them, their offspring is a hybrid or mule, in which, consequently, the development of life and variation on that line comes to an end. Also, it has been often asserted that the Caucasian man of the highest type and the negro of the lowest differ from each other in appearance and structure more than the negro and orang or chimpanzee; but the former are so completely identical in life that it is not only propagated between them with the utmost freedom, but their offspring are as fertile one with another as themselves; whilst the negro and the orang are so diverse in life that it cannot be propagated between them at all. Thus it appears that the veiled mystery of life is most salient, and its distinctions most capable of being apprehended by the mind, in the phenomena of its reproduction.

For these and other reasons, our elder naturalists, and all until very lately, were agreed in regarding as subordinate all other points of agreement and diversity, for the purpose of determining the limits of species in the organic world, and in attaching a paramount importance to those of life and life's organs, functions, operations, and manifestations. Thus Linnaeus, the founder of the modern science of natural history, selected those organs in plants by which their life is propagated, and neglecting all other points of agreement and diversity, erected upon them alone his all-comprehending system of classification. Thus also the naturalists of succeeding times have grouped in species all known organised beings which they regarded as possessed of such a unity of life as that it could be propagated among the individuals of the same species in a permanently fruitful form. I do not mean that experiments upon this point were actually made in one case out of a thousand, but simply that hybridity was universally regarded as a final test of species in this sense, that all

organised beings which might be found normally incapable of propagating among themselves a fertile offspring should be classed as of different species, and all which were capable of this, in the same. The divergences by intermixture and other circumstances among the members of a species, rendering them liable to constant change in their peculiarities, were made the basis of certain fluctuating subdivisions, which, with the strictest regard to etymological propriety, were termed varieties.

Now these statements readily furnish us with a definition of species which is sharply determinative of the extent and limits of the idea. For, according to these views, species in natural history can be nothing else but that unity of life in a group of organised beings in virtue of which they resemble each other, and are normally capable of propagating among themselves a permanently fruitful offspring. This definition was substantially concurred in by all naturalists until the rise of evolution, and it is abundantly confirmed by the following passage in "the still classical work of Cuvier," in which he says :—

"The birth of organised beings is the greatest mystery of the organic economy and of all nature. . . . All organised beings produce similar ones, otherwise, death being the necessary consequence of life, their species would not endure. . . . *There is no proof that all the differences which now distinguish organised beings are such as might have been produced by circumstances.* All that has been advanced upon this subject is hypothetical. Experience seems to show, on the contrary, that, in the actual state of things, varieties are confined within rather narrow limits ; and, so far as we can retrace antiquity, we perceive that these limits were the same as at present. We are obliged, then, to admit of certain forms which, since the origin of things, have been perpetuated without exceeding these limits ; and all the beings appertaining to one of these forms constitute what is called a species. Varieties are accidental subdivisions of species. . . . Fixed forms which are perpetuated by generation distinguish their species. . . . Generation, being the only means of ascertaining the limits to which varieties may extend, species should be defined the reunion," or grouping, "of individuals descended one from the other, or from common parents, or from such as resemble them as closely as they resemble each other."¹ To this it should be added, that "allied species produce between themselves an infertile offspring. Remote species of the same genus are those between which hybrids are never produced."

¹ *Animal Kingdom*, edited by Dr. Carpenter, Introduction, pp. 18, 19.

Now, it is admitted on all hands, for it is undeniable, that this characterisation of species, in which, as I have said, all the elder naturalists are substantially agreed, marks a real distinction in the actual state of things, and represents a vast range of facts in the organic world. An immense number of organised beings either cannot interbreed with each other at all, or their offspring is infertile. An immense number of others are capable of being grouped into classes such that the members of each class can and do freely interbreed with each other, and their offspring are no less fertile than themselves. And here I raise the question against evolution: Ought not the classifications of science to mark and signalise this great and broad physiological distinction and difference between organised beings? Is it true science utterly to ignore it in classification as if it did not exist? Yet this is just what all evolutionists are forced to do. The fact, indeed, is so undeniable and significant that they cannot help recognising it from time to time, but the point which I make against them here is, that in their classifications, the primary object of which is to mark resemblances and differences, they utterly ignore it. Is this true science?

That I do not misrepresent them is evident from the fact that their hypothesis itself is the assumption that there is no such distinction in permanence; that wherever it exists it is the result of circumstances; that all the differences between existing species have arisen through gradual divergences, in the course of innumerable ages, among the descendants of common parents, which, therefore, were formerly capable of interbreeding, and may again become capable. It is still more evident, if possible, from their own characterisations of species. For although, for obvious reasons, they fight shy of precise definitions, yet they explain with sufficient clearness the meaning which they would if they could attach to the word. Thus Professor Huxley in his *Origin of Species*:—

“If in a state of nature you find any two groups of living beings which are separated from each other by some constantly recurring characteristic, I don't care how alight and trivial, so long as it is defined and constant, and does not depend upon sexual peculiarities, then all naturalists agree in calling them two species; that is what is meant by the word species; that is to say, it is, for the practical naturalist, a mere question of structural differences.”—P. 104.

Now, all this is very curious. For in the first place, Huxley's assertion, that "all naturalists agree" in this characterisation of species, is as far from the truth as possible. The truth is, that no naturalist, not even himself, as we shall presently see, practically distinguishes species from each other by any such tests as these. Secondly, by this expression, "a mere question of structural differences," he excludes all such as are physiological and biological, which include all the phenomena of life, among which, of course, are those of its propagation, and which, as we have seen, are the most significant of all the differences by which organised beings are distinguished from each other. This makes good what I have said, namely, that evolutionists ignore all such differences in their classifications, and again raises the question, is this true science? Thirdly, in making the distinction between species to depend upon any "constantly recurring characteristic," no matter "how slight and trivial," he lays down a principle which requires him to class the white man and the negro as of different species, for what can be a more "constantly recurring characteristic" than their opposite colours? But this neither he himself nor any other evolutionist pretends to do; for it is not favourable to their hypothesis, and Huxley himself, in the work already referred to, explicitly says:—

"I am one who believes that, at present, there is no evidence whatever for saying that mankind sprang originally from any more than a single pair; I must say that I cannot see any good ground whatever, or even any tenable sort of evidence, for believing that there is more than one species of man."
—P. 113.

He has forgotten the constantly recurring, though trivial, characteristic of colour, by which the black man and the white are distinguished. Thus, in fine, he finds it impossible consistently to abide by his own characterisation of species. He loses sight of it on almost every page of the work in which it is given, and uses the word as including physiological traits, which he had expressly excluded. For example, in his discussion of hybridity, he says:—"Hybrids are crosses between distinct species. . . . Between species, in many cases, you cannot succeed in obtaining the first cross (remote species). . . . Here is a feature, then, great or small as it may be, which distinguishes natural species."—P. 107. Here we have,

on a single page, three examples, taken at random from innumerable others, in which he recognises physiological distinctions between species, and uses the word precisely as defined by Cuvier and the elder naturalists. Especially in the last example, what does he mean by "natural species"? We see in these criticisms and quotations the sense which evolutionists desire, in the interest of their hypothesis, to attach to the word species, and how utterly unable they themselves are to use it in this sense, by reason of the opposition which they everywhere encounter from the stubborn facts of nature.

I come now to discuss the arguments upon which they rely for the overthrow of the older definition, and for the establishment of their hypothesis, in which we shall see with what reason Cuvier could say, in the words which I have placed in italics, "There is no proof that all the differences which now distinguish organised beings, are such as might have been produced by circumstances. All that has been advanced upon this subject is hypothetical." For these statements are as true now as when they were put on record by that great man. To this day all that has been advanced in favour of evolution is "hypothetical."

There are only two such arguments, each of which, however, includes a multitude of particulars.

The first of these is the argument from analogy, which is thus stated by Professor Packard:—

"Reasoning *a priori*, we assume that organisms, both plant and animal, have been created out of pre-existent forms because it agrees with the general course of nature. All agree that the solar system was evolved; that the earth was evolved; . . . that . . . the nebular hypothesis is necessary to account for the origin of our earth. . . . Hence evolutionists assume that plants and animals share in this process of evolution."¹

Thus far, then, the hypothesis can be no better characterised than as a mere assumption. But this argument includes also the many cases in which organic forms which had been hastily regarded as of different species have been discovered, upon more perfect knowledge of them, to be mere varieties of the same, as the squirrels of tropical America, for example, have been reduced from fifty-nine to twelve species. Evolu-

¹ *New York Independent*, Feb. 5, 1880.

tionists lay much stress upon these discoveries and reductions, as if they indicated that the differences between all species might, conceivably at least, be thus reduced. But here, as in many other cases, their logic is manifestly false; for all that such reductions can prove is, that naturalists are liable to error, and have erred, through imperfect knowledge, as was unavoidable, in regarding as of different what were in truth varieties of the same species. Nor does it matter how many more such discoveries may be made, in so far as the evolution hypothesis is concerned, because, whatever definition of species be adopted, in ten thousand cases for every one of them, it must still and for ever remain as impossible to reduce the differences among organised beings to a unity as it is that the lion should interbreed with the cow, or the mouse with the elephant.

But now this whole argument from analogy, however numerous the particulars it may include, can never, with its utmost logical force, prove that anything is so; the most that it can prove is that it may be so, and raise an antecedent probability in its favour. For thus Leverrier, for example, reasoned from many strong analogies to the probability that there was a certain undiscovered planet on the outskirts of our solar system; but he did not pretend that this was to be received as a truth of science until he had discovered, and could show, his planet, Neptune, through the telescope. Upon this evidence from analogy, therefore, whilst scientists may fairly accept evolution as antecedently probable, and as a good working hypothesis, which is full of suggestion, and which may lead, as it has led them, to many valuable discoveries; yet they cannot logically claim for it the character of a scientific truth, which others are obliged to accept, and with which other known truths must be harmonised, until it shall have been demonstrated by proofs of an entirely different character.

The only other argument for the hypothesis is, that it will account for, explain, or render intelligible, a vast number of facts in nature, especially the resemblances and differences among organised beings. These facts are such as the following:—The existence of rudimentary organs—the rudimentary hand in the whale's flipper; the male mammæ, which are supposed to have been dwarfed by ages of disuse, together with all the female organs in the male in a rudimentary or *atrophied*

condition; and, in like manner, all the male organs in the female, in a similar condition—the changes which are observed to take place in organised beings under the influence of circumstances, such as those by which, it is admitted, the various types or races of mankind have been formed; the progress in organisation from the lower and more simple to the higher and more complex types, which is everywhere conspicuous; the manner in which the differences in organisms shade off into, and overlap upon, each other by almost insensible gradations, especially as this has been disclosed by late discoveries of fossil remains; the origination of new forms successively in the lapse of past ages; together with the perishing of such as were ill-adapted to, and the preservation of those which were in harmony with, their changing physical conditions and surroundings. These are only examples of a great multitude of facts in organic nature which it is claimed that this hypothesis will account for and render intelligible.

Now this argument, which is strictly inductive in its character, if it were without flaw and perfect, would, I frankly concede, be demonstrative; that is to say, if the hypothesis were in itself conceivable, and if it would fairly account for all the facts to which it properly applies, and if these facts could be accounted for in no other way, then we should be obliged to accept it as a scientific truth, resting upon evidence precisely similar and equal to that upon which we receive the Newtonian theory of gravitation. But, unfortunately for its advocates, all of these three necessary conditions are wanting, as I now proceed to show.

In the first place, then, it is not claimed that it will account for all the facts to which it properly applies. It is admitted on all hands that it includes as yet unsolved difficulties, some of which will be referred to in the sequel. Now, in this state of the case, the fact that it will account for a great number of phenomena is not sufficient evidence to establish it as a truth of science. For other hypotheses, as is well known, have been maintained on similar grounds, and yet have subsequently been found untenable. Thus in astronomy the Ptolemaic or geocentric construction of the solar system was for a long time universally accepted on the ground that it accounted for a vast number of facts and celestial phenomena; whilst the vortices

of Descartes accounted for almost as many of them as the theory of gravitation itself. Yet both of these celebrated hypotheses are now universally rejected, and few persons are now aware of what a place in science they formerly occupied. Such, therefore, notwithstanding the number of facts which it is claimed that it will explain, may hereafter be the fate of evolution. Professor Huxley is well aware of this, and in view of it he well says, though in palpable inconsistency with other deliverances of his to which I shall refer:—

“You must understand that I accept it provisionally, in exactly the same way as I accept any other hypothesis. Men of science do not pledge themselves to creeds. . . . There is not a single belief that it is not a bounden duty with them to hold with a light hand, and to part with it (!) cheerfully, the moment it is really proved to be contrary to any fact, great or small.”—*Origin of Species*, p. 145.

But how he can reconcile this with what immediately precedes it, and of which it is given in explanation, passes my comprehension. For there he says: “I think it is Mr. Darwin’s hypothesis (of evolution) or nothing; that either we must take his view, or look upon the whole of organic nature as an enigma the meaning of which is wholly hidden from us.”—P. 144.

Moreover, it is very far from being true that it is either evolution or nothing. For all these facts, especially the resemblances and differences among organised beings, can be equally well and better accounted for by another and totally different hypothesis, namely, that of the distinct and independent creation of species as defined by Cuvier and the elder naturalists. Evolutionists, indeed, contend that this is rendered improbable by many facts, and that it is utterly overthrown by the late discoveries among fossil remains of intermediate forms between existing species, which, as they claim, render the transition of one species into another an easy matter. Thus Professor Huxley, in his New York lectures, ventured to assert that if but one more “missing link” should be discovered—namely, a horse with five toes—“evolution would be demonstrated.” But here, again, he sets all logic at defiance. For what if his five-toed horse were found? Nay, what if any number of such approximations were discovered, and the structural differences between all species were reduced to a minimum? How would that “demonstrate” that any one species has been actually derived

from, or evolved out of, another, whilst the bar of their inability to interbreed remains between them, and whilst their resemblances can be fully accounted for on a different hypothesis? How many things bear the closest resemblance which yet no one pretends to have sprung one from another? The planets of our solar system, for example, are very much alike, but this does not even suggest that the earth has been evolved out of Jupiter, or both out of the sun. Such is the logic of evolutionists by which they demonstrate their hypothesis, and overthrow that of the distinct and independent creation of species!

But now, if we concede that either of these two hypotheses will equally well account for the facts in question, there still remains a logical necessity for an *experimentum crucis*, a crucial test—that is, a fact verified and established which can be accounted for by one of them, but not by the other, in order to determine, on scientific evidence, which of them is to be preferred. Now, such a crucial test we have in the universally acknowledged fact, that individuals of different species can produce between themselves no fruitful offspring, and, in most cases, no offspring at all. For this fact, which, as we have seen, is one of vast range throughout organic nature, is fully and satisfactorily accounted for on the hypothesis of the distinct and independent creation of species, whilst it is utterly inexplicable on that of evolution. This, as we shall see directly, is admitted by Professor Huxley. For what conceivable reason can evolution give us why the descendants of the same parents should ever come to be normally incapable of continuous propagation with each other? On the other hand, no such crucial test in favour of this latter hypothesis is conceivable except an actual, observed, and verified transition or transformation of one species into another, such as that of a bison into a cow, a dog into a cat, a horse into an ass, a chestnut tree into an oak, or the development of a new species out of a pre-existing one, so that their members should be incapable of crossing breed with each other. In order that this hypothesis should rise even to the character of a scientific theory, at least one beast must be observed to have become a man, or one animal or one plant to have been transformed into another of a different or new species. But no such trans-

formation has ever been observed. No evolutionist pretends to have discovered any such crucial test. In two or three cases, indeed, among the lowest forms of organic life, doubtful claims have been put forth to the evolution of new species out of pre-existing ones; but in all these cases the species have been distinguished by mere structural differences, and the question, whether they could interbreed with each other or not, upon which in this argument everything depends, has never been tested.

Professor Huxley, in the work already referred to, has given this subject an extended discussion, and we may safely accept his admissions:—

"We have seen," he says, "that breeds known to have been derived from a common stock by selection, may be as different in their structure from the original stock as species may be different from each other (?). But is the like true of the physiological characteristics of animals? Do the physiological differences of varieties amount in degree to those observed between forms which naturalists call distinct species? This is a most important point for us to consider. . . . For there is a most singular circumstance in respect to natural species" [again, what does he mean by "natural species"? for true science knows no others], "at least about some of them—and it would be sufficient for the purposes of this argument if it were true of only one of them, but there is, in fact, a great number of such cases—and that is, that similar as they may be to mere races or breeds (varieties), they present a marked peculiarity in the reproductive process. . . . If you take members of two distinct species, however similar they may be to each other, and make them breed together, you will find a check. . . . If you cross two such species with each other, then—although you may get offspring in the case of the first cross (allied species), yet, if you attempt to breed from the products of that crossing, which are called hybrids . . . then the result is that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred you will get no offspring at all. . . . Between species, in many cases you cannot succeed in obtaining even the first cross (remote species). . . . This is a very extraordinary circumstance." [He has just said that it is so ordinary as to be almost universal.] "One does not see why it should be." [Here he admits that evolution cannot account for it.] . . . "Here is a feature, then, great or small as it may be, which distinguishes natural species of animals. Can we find any approximation to this in the different races (varieties) known to be produced by selective breeding from a common stock? Up to the present time, the answer to that question is absolutely a negative one. As far as we know at present, there is nothing approximating to this check. . . . Here you see is a physiological contrast between races (varieties) produced by selective modification and natural species. . . . By selective breeding we can produce structural divergences as great as those of species (?), but we cannot produce equal physiological divergences."—Pp. 104-111.

Subsequently he adds :—

“ Mr. Darwin, in order to place his views beyond the reach of all possible assault, ought to be able to demonstrate the possibility of developing from a particular stock by selective breeding two forms which should either be unable to cross one with another, or whose cross-breed offspring should be infertile one with another. . . . Now it is admitted on all hands that, at present, so far as experiments have gone, it has not been found possible to produce this complete physiological divergence. . . . If you have not done that, you have not shown that you can produce, by the cause assumed [evolution] all the phenomena which you have in nature. . . . If it could be proved not only that this *has* not been done, but that it *can not* be done.” [So! by what law of logic does he require us to prove a negative?] . . . “ If it could be demonstrated that this is impossible (*sic*) . . . I hold Mr. Darwin’s hypothesis [evolution] would be utterly shattered.”—Pp. 140, 141.

Now I have been compelled to leave out much of this long-winded discussion, which is loaded with verbiage, but I have given in the author’s own words his exact meaning in every particular, as any one may see by reference to the pages quoted. Here, then, we see it fully and expressly admitted that the crucial test which the hypothesis of evolution requires, has not been discovered, and we are gravely challenged to prove the negative, that its discovery is impossible! in which case, we are told that the “ hypothesis would be utterly shattered,” as if the burden of proof rested upon its opponents, and not, as it does wholly, upon its advocates. No, the evolutionists do not pretend that they have discovered their crucial test. They tell us that they have not yet had sufficient time, for one such transformation may require many thousands of years. Says Professor Jevons :—

“ The deeper differences between plants have been produced by the differentiating action of circumstances during millions of years, so that it would naturally require millions of years to undo this result, and prove experimentally that the forms can be approximated together again.”—*Principles of Science*, p. 414.

Give us time enough, they say, and we will show you plenty of such transformations. Well, we may safely give them all the time they ask, and a million of years hence, when they shall claim to have discovered one such fact, we—will examine it.

But the inability of different species to produce a fertile offspring is not the only fact which cannot be explained on the hypothesis of evolution. In addition to this there is a vast

number of other facts, and these the most important of all ; namely, the facts of human consciousness, of which it gives us no rational account. This is frankly admitted by some evolutionists, who, therefore, exclude the human soul and all the phenomena of consciousness from their hypothesis, and claim that it is to be applied only to man's physical nature, together with the lower organic world. But the great majority of its advocates, and all the ablest logicians among them, steadfastly refuse to make this exception, because they see plainly enough that, if it can be applied to the mental faculties of animals, no scientific interest requires them to exclude those of man. In fact, the exception is made by those only who are trying in this way to guard their religious faith. But inasmuch as this objection against the hypothesis, that it does not rationally account for the phenomena of consciousness, has been frequently and strongly pressed by others, I shall do little more than state it here.

Our mental faculties, then, and their operations—reason, sensibility, and will ; our conceptions of abstract, universal, and necessary truths ; our ideas of the true, the beautiful, and the good ; our moral distinctions between right and wrong ; our consciousness of freedom and immortality, of God, and of the whole invisible, supersensual, and spiritual world—these great salient facts cannot be accounted for by the uniform forces of nature, nor by the properties of matter, whatever “potentialities” be ascribed to it, nor in any way consistently with the evolution hypothesis. Its advocates do, indeed, make spasmodic efforts to explain the phenomena of our moral nature ; but the best they can do is to tell us that our distinctions between right and wrong are nothing but the summation or result of the experiences of good and evil through which our ancestors have passed, transmitted to us, their descendants, by the principle or law of heredity. Thus what was in them a distinction based upon experience becomes in us a distinction independent of, and prior to, our own individual experience. In the same way precisely they try to explain the operations of animal instinct. But even in this latter case they signally fail ; for it is incredible that bees, for example, should have learned by manifold experiments through innumerable failures how to construct their perfect hexagonal

cells, which combine the greatest possible mechanical strength and capacity of contents with the least possible expenditure of material and waste of room. Otherwise their intellectual faculties must be regarded as vastly superior, for such purposes at least, to those of human beings. The same is equally true of the operations of an ant-hill, of the flight of birds of passage, of the unerring return of the young fish from their wanderings in the ocean to the river or stream where they were spawned and hatched, and of almost all the phenomena of instinct properly so called. Much more is this explanation inadequate to the phenomena of the conscience, of which the most fundamental and essential elements—namely, its authority and its moral character—are left unexplained. For it does not touch the fact of our consciousness of moral obligation, which obviously is not contained in, and consequently cannot be derived from, the mere experience of good and evil, howsoever prolonged through innumerable generations. Neither does it touch the authority with which the conscience delivers its sacred oracles—that “categorical imperative” the awful impression of which Kant the philosopher could compare to nothing but that of the starry firmament. In fact, this explanation reduces this great mystery of “the voice of God in man” to a faculty of mere prudential wisdom, to a selfish regard for our own welfare and happiness, to a complete level with animal instinct. This is not to account for facts, but to deny, or at least to ignore them. In like manner, our sensibility to the charms of moral sublimity and beauty, the admiration we feel for an act of noble self-sacrifice, the promptings of great and heroic souls, our indignation at injustice and iniquity—all these, and other similar facts, are inexplicable on the hypothesis of our derivation from ape-like creatures, in which no such susceptibility has ever appeared. Together with these, and above all, the phenomena of the human will can never be accounted for by the properties of matter, nor from the uniform operations of natural forces, nor in any way consistently with evolution. For if we know anything, it is that the will of man is not subject to the uniformity of natural laws, that it is a self-moving power (*autokinétos*). Human life, as proceeding from the will, does not run in fixed grooves, as the wheels of a steam-engine. We have the ability to choose for ourselves whether

we will go in one direction or another, which is a freedom absolutely inconceivable as a property of matter, or as a quality of any of the natural forces.

In fine, the hypothesis of evolution necessarily involves and implies particulars, processes, details of transition or transformation which cannot be represented to the mind, of which no conception can be formed, which are absolutely unthinkable. Among these are the origin of vegetable life from inorganic matter; that of animal life, with its mental faculties and operations, from the vegetable; the transition of sexless into sexual beings; the separation of the two sexes, previously combined in the same individual, into individuals of either sex alone; the transformation of insensible, irrational, involuntary, impersonal, unmoral things into sensible, rational, voluntary, personal, moral beings. Not one of these transformations is conceivable or thinkable in the several steps or details of the process which it necessarily implies. Nor is the difficulty lessened, though it is veiled and disguised; on the contrary, it is increased by the immense length of time which is required and allowed for each of them. Especially, with respect to the evolution of sexual out of sexless forms, we have a logical right to ask, What was their condition at each step or stage of this transformation? In what conceivable way could their existence have been preserved, and their species propagated (if species they can be said to have had), during those hundreds of thousands of years whilst they were neither one thing nor the other, but partly sexual and partly sexless forms? Let any one undertake to represent to his imagination the procedure and details of what must be supposed to have taken place, and assuredly he will find that they are inconceivable. Again, in the separation of the two sexes, what were the several steps and details of the process? Whilst that which is now the male was ceasing to bear children; whilst his mammae, now dwarfed and *atrophied* by ages of disuse, were ceasing to give suck; whilst all the female organs in the male were, from the same cause, falling into a state of atrophy; in like manner, whilst that which is now the female was beginning to bear separately, and her bosom was undergoing development; whilst all the male organs in her body were falling into a similar state of atrophy—together with all the prodigious

changes in the internal structures and physiological traits of both which are necessarily implied—what, then, and through all the ages of this transformation, were the physical and mental conditions of the creature which is now the male and female man? How was its existence maintained, and how was its species (?) propagated, during all these immense periods of time, whilst it was neither male nor female, but partly both? Is it not evident to all men that, before we can be even plausibly required to accept this hypothesis as a truth of science, we have a logical right to demand of its advocates that they shall represent intelligibly all of the several steps, stages, processes, details, if not those which were actually followed, at least those by which the transformation might possibly, or conceivably, have taken place? But none of them, though they have been often challenged, indirectly at least, and though the necessity of it is palpable to all men, have ever dared or attempted to furnish us with any such scheme, and this, for the best of reasons, because it cannot be done. For these and all the transformations which have just been enumerated, together with innumerable others involved in the hypothesis, do necessarily include procedures, particulars, details, which no mind can, by any possibility, represent intelligibly to other minds, nor to itself—which are absolutely unthinkable. Now, what other refutation does true science require of any hypothesis or theory than that, in its particulars, it is unthinkable?

The late lamented Professor Henry, secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, whilst he filled the chair of physics in Princeton College, was always very full and explicit on the nature and uses of physical hypotheses and theories. He took great pains to impress upon his classes that they were very useful in giving direction to experiment and research, and thus in leading to new discoveries. But he was accustomed to add: "Young gentlemen, your hypothesis is good for just so many new facts or truths to the discovery of which it can lead you. When it will yield you no more discoveries, you have no further use for it—you may throw it away." Now, agreeably to this view, it is undeniable that evolution has opened the path of scientific research in many important directions, and has led to the discovery of many new facts and truths in the organic world. Neither have we any reason to think that it is yet

exhausted. For scientists it may long continue to be a good and fruitful working hypothesis. But, for such reasons as these which I have here given, it has no claim to be regarded as an established truth of science with which other known truths must be harmonised; and I venture to predict that the time is not far distant when, as an explanation of the origin of species and of the mystery of life, it will be cast by scientists themselves "to the moles and to the bats," with the Ptolemaic system of astronomy, the vortices of Descartes, the notion that nature abhors a vacuum, and other Baconian "idols of the tribe and the theatre."

J. H. M'ILVAINE.

ART. VIII.—*Criteria of the various kinds of Truth.*¹

IN respect of religious opinion the educated young men of this age may be described as *unsettled*. They cannot be represented as having deep convictions, yet they are not unwilling to listen to the claims of religion and of all kinds of it. They cannot be designated sceptics; the most of them resent it as a calumny when they are charged with being atheists or materialists, though numbers are cherishing views which are hurrying them on in this downward direction. They are not satisfied with the past, with its opinions or practices. They do not show any partiality for old creeds and confessions. Authority is not worshipped by them. They are bent on searching into the foundation of every belief, and therefore they would dig down deep, and are stirring up the rubbish and dust that stand in their way. They will not accept without first doubting and sifting even such truths, supposed to be long ago established, as the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, and the essential distinction between good and evil. It is an age out of which good and evil, either or both, may come according as it is guided. We may cherish hope, for it is an inquiring age. We may entertain fears, for it is dancing on the edge of a precipice down which it may fall.

This age, like every other, is a transition one. Nothing

¹ From the *Princeton Review*.

here is abiding : the stream is ever flowing on ; the present is hastening on to the future. The generation that now is will soon divide into two : one abiding in, or going back to, what will be very much the old faith, the other going on to a scepticism exceeding in boldness anything that has ever gone before. Somehow or other an old fisherman who lived eighteen hundred years ago, the same who anticipated the modern scientific doctrine that the earth is to be burned up, had a fore-glimpse of this state of things : " There shall come in the last days scoffers walking after their own lusts, and saying, Where is the promise of his coming ? for since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation." Meanwhile Pilate's question is being put—" What is truth ?" Philosophers tell us that we have truth when our ideas are conformed to things. But can truth in this sense be found ? This is the question eagerly put. Are there things to be known ? or are our minds capable of knowing them ? The extreme form in which this spirit embodies itself is Agnosticism—it used to be called Nescience, and the issue in which it lands us, Nihilism—and many are following it without knowing that they do so. It acknowledges with Hume that there are impressions and ideas, but without a mind impressed or entertaining the ideas ; it admits, with Kant, phenomena in the sense of appearances ; it believes in pleasures to be eagerly sought and avoided, but can find behind or beyond (or where it is to be found) in these no proof of a reality natural or supernatural. In such an age it may serve some good purpose to show that a certain amount of truth can be found, and that there are criteria which determine when we have found it.

Kant and the German metaphysicians have shown again and again that there is no one absolute criterion of truth to settle all truth for us ; that will determine, for example, at one and the same time, whether there is a fourth dimension of space, whether the planet Jupiter is inhabited, who is to be the next President of the United States, and what is to be the price of coal a year hence. But it can be shown that there are truths which can be ascertained, and that there are criteria which show when they are so, and these clear, sure, and capable of being definitely expressed. But the test which settles one truth does not

necessarily settle all others or any others. It will be necessary to distinguish between different kinds of truth (and this is the merit of this article, if it has any); and we should be satisfied if we can find a criterion of each kind. It will be found that there are three kinds of truth, each of which has its own tests. The primary aim of the criteria, it should be noticed, is not to help us to discover truth, but to determine when we have discovered it.

I.—CRITERIA OF FIRST TRUTHS.

The mind must start with something. There are things which it knows at once. I know pleasure and pain. I do more; I know myself as feeling pleasure and pain. I know that I am surrounded with material objects extended and exercising properties. I know by barely contemplating them that these two straight lines cannot contain a space. These are called first truths. There must be first truths before there can be secondary ones; original before there can be derivative ones. Can we discover and enunciate these? I believe we can.

We are not at liberty, indeed, to appeal to a first principle when we please, or because it suits our purpose. When we are left without evidence, we are not therefore at liberty to allege that we need no evidence. When we are defeated in argument, we are not therefore to be permitted to escape by falling back on what is unproved and unprovable. It is true that we cannot prove everything, for this would imply an infinite chain of proofs every link of which would hang on another, while the whole would hang on nothing—that is, be incapable of proof. We cannot prove everything by mediate evidence, but we can show that we are justified in assuming certain things. We cannot prove that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, but we can show that we are justified in saying so. We can do so by the application of certain tests.

SELF-EVIDENCE is the primary test of that kind of truth which we are entitled to assume without mediate proof. We perceive the object to exist by simply looking at it. The truth shines in its own light, and in order to see we do not require light to shine upon it from any other quarter. We are conscious directly of self as understanding, as thinking, or as feeling, and we need no indirect evidence. Thus, too, we perceive

by the eye a coloured surface, and by the muscular touch a resisting object, and by the moral sense the evil of hypocrisy. The proof is seen by the contemplative mind in the things themselves. We are convinced that we need no other proof. A proffered probation from any other quarter would not add to the strength of our conviction. We do not seek any external proof, and if any were pressed upon us we would feel it to be unnecessary—nay, to be an incumbrance, and almost an insult to our understanding.

But let us properly understand the nature of this self-evidence. It has constantly been misunderstood and misrepresented. It is not a mere feeling or an emotion belonging to the sensitive part of our nature. It is not a blind instinct or a belief in what we cannot see. It is not above reason or below reason; it is an exercise of primary reason prior, in the nature of things, to any derivative exercises. It is not, as Kant represents it, of the nature of a form in the mind imposed on objects contemplated and giving them a shape and colour. It is a perception, it is an intuition of the object. We inspect these two straight lines, and perceive them to be such in their nature that they cannot enclose a space. If two straight lines go on for an inch without coming nearer each other, we are sure they will be no nearer if lengthened millions of miles as straight lines. On contemplating deceit we perceive the act to be wrong in its very nature. It is not a mere sentiment, such as we feel on the contemplation of pleasure and pain; it is a knowledge of an object. It is not the mind imposing or superinducing on the thing what is not in the thing; it is simply the mind perceiving what is in the thing. It is not merely subjective, it is also objective—to use phrases very liable to be misunderstood; or, to speak clearly, the perceiving mind (subject) perceives the thing (object). This is the most satisfactory of all evidence; and this because in it we are immediately cognisant of the thing. There is no evidence so ready to carry conviction. We cannot so much as conceive or imagine any evidence stronger.

NECESSITY is a secondary criterion. It has been represented by Leibnitz and many metaphysicians as the first and the essential test. This I regard as a mistake. Self-evidence comes first, and the other follows and is derived from it. We

perceive an object before us and we know so much of its nature; and we cannot be made to believe that there is no such object, or that it is not what we believe it to be. I demur to the idea so often pressed upon us that we are to believe a certain proposition because we are necessitated to believe in it. This sounds too much like fatality to be agreeable to the free spirit of man. It is because we are conscious of self that we cannot be made to believe that we do not exist. The account given of the principle by Herbert Spencer is a perverted and a vague one: all propositions are to be accepted as unquestionable whose negative is inconceivable. This does not give us a direct criterion, as self-evidence does, and the word inconceivable is very ambiguous. But necessity, while it is not the primary, is a potent secondary test. The self-evidence convinces us; the necessity prevents us from holding any different conviction.

UNIVERSALITY is the tertiary test. By this is meant that it is believed by all men. It is the argument from catholicity, or common consent—the *sensus communis*. All men are found to assent to the particular truth when it is fairly laid before them, as, for instance, that the shortest distance between two points is a straight line. It would not be wise nor safe to make this the primary test, as some of the ancients did. For, in the complexity of thought, in the constant actual mixing up of experiential with immediate evidence, it is difficult to determine what all men believe. It is even conceivable that all men might be deceived by reason of the deceitfulness of the faculties and the illusive nature of things. But this tertiary comes in to corroborate the primary test, or rather to show that the proposition can stand the primary test which proceeds on the observation of the very thing, in which it is satisfactory to find that all men are agreed.

Combine these and we have a perfect means of determining what are first truths. The first gives us a personal assurance of which we can never be deprived; the second secures that we cannot conquer it; the third that we can appeal to all men as having the same conviction. The first makes known realities; the second restrains us from breaking off from them; the third shows that we are surrounded with a community of beings to

whom we can address ourselves in the assurance of meeting with a response.

But in order to be able to apply these criteria properly, we must carry along with us certain explanations and limitations.

1. It should be noticed of intuitive truths that they are in the first instance *individual* or *singular*, and that we need to generalise the single perceptions in order to reach general maxims. In them we begin with contemplating a single object, say an external object and know it to be extended and solid, or an act of benevolence and know it to be good, or an act of cruelty and proclaim it to be evil. But we can generalise the individual perceptions, and then we have general maxims or axioms, which we can apply to an infinite number of cases. We perceive that these two parallel lines will never meet; and we are sure that we should affirm the same of every other set of parallel lines, and hence we reach the general maxim that parallel lines will never meet. We perceive on the bare contemplation of this deed of deceit that it is base, but we would feel the same of every other deed of deceit, and hence the maxim Deceit is evil. But it should be observed that in the formation of these general principles there is a discursive act in the shape of a generalising process involved. It is here that there may creep in error, which is not in the intuitive but in the discursive process; for we may form a partial, a one-sided, or exaggerated generalisation. Thus, on discovering a particular effect we at once judge or decide that it has a cause. But when we would make the principle universal we may fall into a mistake, and declare that "everything has a cause," which would require an infinite series of causes and make it necessary to hold that God himself has a cause. In such a case our generalisation is wrong. But let the maxim take the form that "everything which begins to be has a cause," and we perceive that on a thing presenting itself to us as beginning we should proclaim it to have had a producing power. We thus see that there may be both truth and error in our metaphysical or moral maxims: truth in the primitive perception at the basis of the whole, but it may be hastiness leading to mutilation in the expression. Hence the wrangling in metaphysics. Thus, everybody acknowledges that two parallel lines can never meet, but there may be disputes as to the fit

form in which to put the axiom. So, in regard to the generalised principles that every effect has a cause, that every quality implies a substance, that virtue is commendable; there may be a difficulty in expressing exactly what is meant by cause and effect, what by substance and quality, and what by virtue and moral good; and we may find that when we would make the expressions definite we fall into grievous mistakes, and this while we are certain that there is a self-evident, necessary, and universal truth if only we can seize it.

2. First truths are of various kinds, which we should endeavour to classify. Some of them are—

Primitive Cognitions.—In these the object is now before us, and is perceived by us. We perceive that this body has three dimensions in space, and cannot be made to believe otherwise. We decide that this thing, material or mental, cannot be and not be at the same time; that these two things, being each equal to the same thing, are equal to one another. In these cases the object is perceived at once and immediately. But there are others in which the object is not present, and the convictions may be regarded as

Primitive Beliefs.—Here there is still an object. It is not present, but still it is contemplated. We have known the object somehow, and on conceiving it beliefs become attached to us. Thus, we know time in the concrete, and in regarding it we believe that time is continuous, that time past has run into time present, and that time present will run into time to come. A number of such faiths gather round our primitive cognitions and widen them indefinitely. We see two points in space; we are sure that there is space between, and that the shortest line between the two is a straight line. We can rise to still higher faiths. We believe of certain objects, say space and time, and God—when we come to know him as being infinite, that is—that they are always beyond our widest image or concept, and such that nothing can be added to or taken from them. The senses cannot give us these beliefs, nor can the understanding construct them out of the materials supplied by the senses. Some of them, such as the idea of the infinite, the perfect, lift us above our immediate experience into a higher sphere. We begin in all such cases with realities perceived or apprehended; and we are sure, if we proceed legiti-

mately, that we end with realities. It should be remarked that in order to our having these cognitions and beliefs it is not necessary to express them or even put them in the shape of propositions. It is necessary first to have cognitions or beliefs regarding them before we form comparisons of them or affirm that they exist or possess certain properties. But out of these we can form

Primitive Judgments, in which we predicate—that is, make affirmations or denials—or discover certain properties or relations, as when we say space and time are without bounds, and exist independent of the contemplative mind. In order that these judgments may be primitive, they must be pronounced as to objects which have been perceived by intuition.

I ought here to add that the mind is capable of perceiving at once certain moral qualities, and we have

Moral Cognitions, Beliefs, and Judgments. On contemplating an act of self-sacrifice done for a friend or a good cause we know it at once to be good, or an act of selfishness we perceive it to be evil. When these acts are done by our neighbours we cannot notice them directly, but we are sure that they are good or evil; and these may be regarded as beliefs. When we put them in propositions we exercise judgment, as when we declare that sin deserves punishment.

3. The complexity of our mental states places difficulties in the way of our applying the criteria. There are opinions which have been acquired by a lengthened and constant observation, which association has wrought into our very nature, so that we feel as if they are native and necessary: and yet some of them may be mere hereditary or popular prejudices which have no warrant in reason. In particular, experiential truths or even fancies and prejudices may so mingle with our intuitions that it seems impossible to separate them and determine which is the self-evident principle in the complex notion. These circumstances, it should be admitted, do throw difficulties in the way of the application of our criteria. But these are not greater, after all, than the application of tests in any other department of knowledge, as, for example, chemical tests to determine the existence of poisons in very complex mixtures, and generally the verification of scientific discoveries of every description. But, in spite of these difficulties, the tests can be applied if only

pains be taken to distinguish the things that differ, and to lay aside the things that are irrelevant. It is possible by a careful discrimination to separate the associated from the primitive judgment, and thus seize the conviction that is native and necessary, and apply the tests to it.

4. In many instances it is essential to apply the tests to alleged intuitive truths before we put trust in them. In some cases, indeed, the spontaneous belief is so clear and assured that we may follow it without instituting any reflex examination. But in other cases the supposed necessary truth may be mixed with extraneous matter which adulterates it. Every one acknowledges that for the purposes of accurate science it is of importance to have the axioms of mathematics and mechanics so enunciated that no empirical element has entered. In morals and jurisprudence evil consequences might arise from mixing up doubtful principles with true ones, from assuming, for instance, that the promotion of happiness is the sole and essential quality of virtue. Without a sifting we might often be tempted by indolence or prejudice to assume as true what ought to be proven, or what in fact cannot be proven. It is of special importance to apply these tests to all those higher faiths which perform so important a part in mystic philosophy and theology. In these there is commonly a real intuition, and this possibly of an elevating, inspiring order as a nucleus ; but around this there may gather a halo consisting merely of mist irradiated by light in the centre. All high minds have felt the influence of these faiths, and some have been transported by them. But earthly ingredients are apt to mingle with the ethereal and heavenward aspirations, and claim all the authority which these have. The gilding gold is made to give currency to the coin. Truth and error thus come to be hopelessly intermixed, and visions of fancy come to be regarded as revelations of heaven. The sceptic detects this, and in pulling up the tares he uproots the wheat ; to vary our illustration, in tearing down the creepers he pulls asunder the wall on which they grow. These results are to be avoided by a reflex examination of the whole mental exercise. The idea of Plato, the ecstasy of the Alexandrians, the perfect of Descartes, Malebranche's vision of all things in God, the absolute of Kant, Schelling, and Hegel, the supposed inspirations of poets and the revelations to

prophets who utter grand truths—all these point to and imply high realities. But they are liable to run into fancies and extravagances, into follies and deceptions, which delude and mislead those who believe in them, pervert their judgments, and render them ridiculous in the view of the world. There is gold in the mine, and all we have to do is by crucial tests to separate it from the dross that we may have the true metal.

Had our limits allowed I should have liked much to apply these tests to two works of ability recently published—Caird's *Philosophy of Religion*, and Balfour's *Defence of Philosophic Doubt*. The first of these is a Hegelian defence and exposition of religion. It is elevated both in style and thought, and will recommend Hegelianism (which has run and finished its course in Germany) to the British public more effectively than any other book written in the English tongue. The fault of the author is that of Hegel: he denies what he should have assumed, and assumes what he should have denied. Our tests would cut down a vast number of his principles and his reasonings. He represents intuitive or immediate conviction as purely empirical, whereas it is the primary exercise of reason. He asserts after the manner of the old Eleatics the unity of thought and reality, whereas thought affirming its own reality discloses a reality comprehensible by thought, but which is different from thought. He is perpetually assuming an absolute of which he does not condescend to give any intelligent account. He denies the logical validity of the argument from design for the existence of God, and thus undermines the old philosophic faith of Scotland, and gives us an argument from historical development which no shrewd Scotchman or American is likely to adopt. He insists after the manner of Hegel that truth is made up of contradictions. He reaches a refined rationalism different entirely from the evangelism hitherto preached in Scotland.

If Principal Caird errs by excess, Mr. Balfour errs by defect. It is not easy to determine the precise end he has in view. He is not to be regarded as a sceptic, least of all as a religious sceptic. His objections to all kinds of supposed truth are directed far more against boasted scientific certainty than religious faith. He has certainly been successful in showing that the objections taken by scientific men to religion apply with far greater force to their own dogmas. Some religious

men are therefore rejoicing in what he has done. But it is somewhat perilous to make men doubt everything in order to shut them into some favourite tenets which they wish them to believe. They may thus be led into a bog from which they have no ability nor inclination to extricate themselves. He and his brother-in-law, Professor Sidgwick, without being sceptics, are the most successful men in our day in starting doubts and difficulties. Mr. Balfour, whether sincerely or not I cannot say, represents our belief in truth, whether scientific or religious, as a vague and unreasoning instinct which the rising generation will regard as a poor defence against a reasoned scepticism. In this article I have carefully enunciated the canons of first truths, so as not to expose them to the cavils of Mr. Balfour, which are directed against representations of fundamental principles to which I am utterly opposed, and which cannot and should not be defended. By making self-evidence—that is, the perception of the thing—the primary test of fundamental truth we avoid his objections. He maintains that what we mean by ultimate is independent of proof. But we have shown that ultimate truths have their evidence in themselves in the realities perceived. He insists that when we say we believe we feel cold because consciousness tells us, and we believe in cause and effect because it is intuitive or *a priori*, the principle cannot be primitive, as it is represented as depending on something else. But in all such cases there is a mistake committed in the expression, often made, I admit, by metaphysicians, even by Hamilton, bringing in a reason or cause where there is none. We feel cold not *because* we are conscious of it; we believe in cause and effect not *because* it is intuitive or *a priori*. We perceive the cold at once, and believe that the effect has a cause by contemplating the effect; and there is no reason or cause, and the conviction is primitive. We call in the consciousness and intuition merely as criteria of what we have discerned directly.

II.—CRITERIA OF REASONED TRUTHS.

When we have got truth by self-evidence or by observation, we may add indefinitely to it by inference, in which we proceed from something given or allowed to something else derived from it by the mind contemplating it. If we have

truth and reality in what we start with, and if we reason properly, we have also truth and reality in what we reach. Of course if what we assume be fictitious, what we arrive at may be the same. These inferences may be of three kinds, each of which has its tests.

IMMEDIATE INFERENCES, or what I am disposed to call *implied judgments*. Here we have a judgment given, and we derive other judgments merely from contemplating the two notions compared. All general concepts, as logicians know, have both extension and comprehension. The extension has reference to the objects in the class; the comprehension to the qualities which combine them. Now, on the bare contemplation of the extension of the concepts we can draw certain inferences, as when it is granted that "all men have a conscience" we infer that "this man has a conscience" even though he be a liar. From the same proposition we can draw the inference in comprehension that the possession of a conscience is an attribute of man. The canon is that whatever is involved in the extension and comprehension of a notion may be legitimately inferred.¹

MEDIATE REASONING.—Here we do not discover the relation of two notions, or as we call them when expressed in language, terms, by directly comparing them, but we can do so

¹ From the proposition "men are responsible," the following may be drawn :—

In Extension.

Every man is in the Class Responsible ;
This man is responsible ;
Some men are responsible ;
Every tribe of mankind are responsible ;
It is not true that some men are not responsible, etc. etc.

In Comprehension.

Man exists ;
Responsibility is a real attribute ;
Responsibility is an attribute of every man ;
Responsibility is an attribute of this man ;
Responsibility is an attribute of every tribe of men ;
Responsibility is an attribute of some men ;
Irresponsibility may be denied of all men ;
No man is irresponsible ;
Irresponsible beings are not men ;
Men of wealth are responsible with their wealth ;
To punish men is to punish responsible men.

See *The Laws of Discursive Thought : being a Text-book of Formal Logic*, by James McCosh, LL.D.

by means of a third term which has a connection with both. Reasoning thus consists in comparing two notions by means of a third. The canon of reasoning in its most general form is, "Notions which agree with one and the same notion agree with one another," with a corresponding dictum for negative reasoning. But the word "agree" is vague, and it is necessary to state the nature of the agreement. This is done by two formulæ, which act as the criteria of reasoning.

The Dictum of Aristotle.—We have before us a crocodile, and wish to know how it brings forth its young. Our two terms are "crocodiles" and "bringing forth their young." We find that it has been ascertained by science that the crocodile is a reptile, and that reptiles bring forth their young by eggs. We are now prepared to reason: "The crocodile, being a reptile, must bring forth its young by eggs." Here we have three terms: two called the extremes, the original ones which we wish to compare, "crocodiles" and "bringing forth their young by eggs," and a middle, "reptile," by which we compare them. The process when expanded takes the form of two propositions, called the premises, and the conclusion drawn from them.

All reptiles bring forth their young by eggs;
The crocodile is a reptile;
Therefore it brings forth its young by eggs.

The conclusion is reached by the bare contemplation of the premises. The premises being true, the conclusion is true.

But this reasoning proceeds on a principle which it is desirable to have expressed and announced when it becomes the test of this kind of reasoning. It is, "Whatever is true of a class is true of all the members of the class." What is true of reptiles generally is true of the reptiles called crocodiles, and of every individual crocodile. If we have not something that can be predicated—that is, affirmed or denied—of a class to constitute a premise, no conclusion can be drawn. Thus, if only some reptiles are oviparous, if only the greater number are so, we are not entitled to conclude that the crocodiles must be so. We have thus a very decisive and easily applicable test of reasoning.

In formal logic this governing principle is spread out in various forms, so as to enable us to apply the test to every case of ratiocination. First, the syllogism is found to be the

universal form of mediate reasoning. Then logicians divide reasoning according to the position of the middle term, which is the nexus of the argument, and this gives four figures. I do not mean to unfold these; they are to be found in every treatise on elementary logic. All that I have to do is to show that thereby we have a criterion of ratiocination.

All this was established by Aristotle in his *Prior Analytics*. A number of attempts have been made since his day to set aside his analysis or to improve upon it. None of these have met with anything more than a temporary success. But I am not convinced that the dictum of Aristotle is the regulating principle of all reasoning; it regulates only that reasoning which involves a general notion—that is, a class notion. It can be shown, I think, that there is a ratiocination which does not proceed on the principle of classes, but of identity or equivalence. Thus, we find that the stick A is equal to the stick B, and the stick B is equal to the stick C, and we conclude that the stick A is equal to the stick C. Here we have no classes or members of a class. The canon is, "Notions which are equivalent to one and the same third notion are equivalent to one another." In ratiocination of this description the subject of the propositions may be made the predicate, and the predicate the subject:—

Shakespeare wrote "Hamlet;"

The writer of "Hamlet" is the greatest English poet;

Shakespeare was the greatest English poet.

All reasoning, in order to be valid, must fall under one or other of these rules, which are therefore the criteria of legitimate inference. When a professed argument cannot be brought under either of them, it is a proof that it is not reasoning. When, on endeavouring to bring it under them, we find that it is not in accordance with them, we may conclude that the inference is not valid.

Reasoning may take several forms, which are legitimate provided they are in conformity with the dictum of Aristotle or the principle of equivalents. The natural form in ordinary circumstances is the categorical, in which we lay down a general principle and bring a particular under it; as when we say, "Consumption is a fatal disease, and as this man has consumption he has a fatal disease;" or, not being sure of the fact, we

say, "If this man has consumption he has a fatal disease." This reasoning is hypothetical, and is quite as valid as the categorical. Or the reasoning may take the disjunctive form: "This disease is either a severe cold or consumption. It is not a severe cold; therefore it is consumption."

The greater portion of the reasoning in mathematics is regulated, not by the dictum of Aristotle relating to classes, but the dictum of equivalence or equipollence.

III.—CRITERIA OF INDUCTIVE TRUTHS.

My purpose in the present article is not to show how truth is to be discovered, a subject which may be profitably discussed in the *Prolegomena* prefaced to the several sciences: I am simply to show that truth can be reached, and to give the marks which certify that it has been attained. I have given a brief exposition of the tests of intuitive truths and of reasoned truths. But there are branches of knowledge which have to deal from first to last and throughout with scattered facts. These become known in the first instance by the senses, external and internal. In the case of the bodily senses our observations are aided by such instruments as the telescope, the microscope, and the blowpipe. The affections of the mind are revealed by consciousness aided by attention and analysis. The criterion in such cases is—

The Testimony of the Bodily Senses and Self-Consciousness.
—This is primarily of the nature of an intuition, the criteria of which have already been given. But it is to be remembered, what we have previously noticed when treating of first truths, that reasonings and even fancies are apt to mingle with our intuitions proper, and may perplex and mislead. In such cases we are carefully to separate all additions, illegitimate and legitimate, from the immediate perceptions of sense and consciousness. So far as they are fancies, they are simply to be cast aside. In some cases this is difficult, as there may be illusions to which we are naturally inclined by the laws of association. It is not easy in the multitude of our thoughts within us to specify our precise experience at any given time, and in the attempted description we may subtract or we may exaggerate. So far as the additions, or rather concomitants, are inferences, they may be tried by the tests of reasoning as given

above. In viewing along the surface of the ocean a rock which actual measurement tells us is two miles off, we regard it as only a mile away ; but in this we are drawing a wrong inference. By the eye we intuitively know only a coloured surface ; but we can come by experience to know distance, and we lay it down as a rule that when there are few things between us and an object, that the object must be near—a rule correct enough for ordinary use, but which may fail us in extraordinary circumstances. It is always possible, with the proper pains, to separate the perceptions of the senses from all adventitious circumstances, and to discover the truth pure and simple in the midst of the accretions.

But in all this we have only individual facts, which inform us of nothing beyond themselves. We have not as yet any means of anticipating the future from the past, or gathering wisdom from experience. In particular we have not as yet any science which consists, not of individual and scattered and isolated facts, but of systematised knowledge. In order to have science we must co-ordinate the facts. We do so in order to discover *laws*—that is, the order that is in nature. In doing so we can discover truths of which we can now give the criteria. These are called the

Canons of Induction.

It should be observed that these do not guarantee to us absolute certainty, what is called apodictive truth or demonstration. None of these are certified, as first truths are, by the law of necessity ; we can easily conceive any one of the ordinary physical laws not to be true universally, and we might believe so provided we have evidence. The evidence, after all, is merely a probability of a lower or higher degree, but may rise to a certainty only a little short of being absolute, and quite sufficient to justify us to put trust in it, and act upon it in ordinary, indeed in all circumstances. Such, for instance, is the proof which we have in favour of the law of gravitation. It is not demonstrative like a mathematical truth, but it satisfies the mind, and is verified by constant observation. The doubts raised by Mr. Balfour in regard to scientific truths, almost all derive their force from the circumstance that observation cannot reach all the facts and give us absolute certainty.

But the question arises, How, from scattered facts, do we reach a law which we may regard as universal? Most people, on the question being first put to them, would answer, By observing *all* the facts. But a moment's reflection suffices to show that in most cases, I believe in all, we cannot find out all the facts. Take the law, all mammals are warm-blooded, or that all matter attracts other matter inversely, according to the square of the distance. Nobody has gone the round of the universe and noticed every mammal and every particle of matter, so as to be able from his own observation to say that no mammal is cold-blooded, and no particle of matter is without the power of attraction. But we can, notwithstanding, from a limited number of observations, rise to a law which seems to be universal. The canons of induction determine for us when we have reached a law of nature.

There seem to be three grand ends which men of science have in view in their investigations. One is to discover the composition of the objects around us; the second is to discover natural classes; the third is to discover causes. There are canons which guide and guard us in each of these investigations.

I. *Canons of Decomposition.*—Almost all the objects we meet with in the world, whether material or mental, are composite. It is the aim of many departments of science, in particular of chemistry and psychology, to analyse them. This can so far be effectively done. There are certain rules to guide us, and these may be made more and more specific as the analytic sciences advance.

a. We must separate the object we wish to decompose from all other objects. If we wish to analyse water, we must have pure water separate from all other ingredients. If we wish to analyse intuition or reasoning, we must separate it from all associated observations and fancies.

b. When we have found the composition of any piece or portion of a substance, we have determined the composition of every other part, and indeed of the whole. When we have ascertained that a pint of water is formed of hydrogen and oxygen, we have settled that water everywhere is composed of the same elements. This arises from the circumstance that every substance in nature has its properties which it retains.

Having detected these properties in one case, we have found what they are in all.

c. The elements reached are to be regarded as being so only provisionally. We are not sure that in any cases we have found the ultimate elements of bodies. At present it is supposed that there are sixty-four elements, but we are not sure of any one of these that it will never be resolved into simpler substances. Meanwhile the chemical analysis is correct so far as it goes. It will always hold true that water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen, though it is possible that oxygen or hydrogen, one or both, may be resolved into something simpler.

II. *Canons of Natural Classes.*—There are certain sciences which are called by Whewell classificatory. They are such as botany, zoology, and mineralogy. In these our aim is to arrange the objects in nature in classes lower and higher, such as species, genera, orders, and kingdoms. They are so arranged by their points of resemblance. There are canons which may assist us in determining when we have reached these classes.

a. We must have observed the resemblance in many and varied cases, say in different countries and at different times.

b. We must be in a position to say that if there had been exceptions we must have met them. These two rules guard against forming a law from a limited class of facts.

c. There are classes in nature called Kinds, in which the possession of one quality is a mark of a number of others. All classes entitled to be called natural are more or less of this description. Thus mammals are so designated, because they suckle their young; but this characteristic is a mark of a number of others—that the animals are warm-blooded, and have four compartments in their hearts. Reptiles are recognised as producing their young by eggs, but they are also marked as having three compartments in the heart, and being cold-blooded.

These canons guarantee truth. When we are able to place objects in a class, we know that they possess the properties of the class.

III. *Canons of Causes.*—These determine for us when we have discovered the cause of any given phenomena. This subject was first systematically taken up by Bacon. He insisted on the careful observation of instances. But he knew that all

instances are not of like value, and he found it needful to specify certain instances as of greater significance than others. These he called *prerogativæ instantiarum*, and enumerates twenty-seven species of them, most of which are not applicable in the advanced stage of science we have now reached. It may be enough to give only one example, that of *instantia crucis*, the phrase being derived from the custom of placing a cross where two ways meet to guide the traveller. There are cases in which it is alleged that there may be one or other of two causes of the phenomenon. In these we should seek for a phenomenon which can be explained by the one and not by the other. Sir John Herschel has taken up the subject in his *Discourse on Natural Philosophy*. But the most lucid, and, upon the whole, the clearest and most satisfactory exposition of these methods, is by Mr. John S. Mill in his *Logic*. It should be noticed that his methods relate to causes, and we have not had from him an exposition of the canons of decomposition and classes as given above. He mentions four or five methods.

a. The Method of Agreement.—In the spring season we see innumerable buds, leaves, and blossoms appearing upon the plants, and we find the common cause to be the heat of the sun shining more directly upon the earth. The canon is, "If two or more effects have only one antecedent in common, that antecedent is the cause, or at least part of the cause." That canon is too loose to admit of a universal application, as we may not be sure that the point of agreement we have fixed on is the only one.

b. The Method of Difference.—In the very middle of the day I find the scene around me on the earth suddenly darkened. There must be a cause. I find that the moon has come between us and the sun, and this seems the only difference between the two states—the one in which everything was bright, and the other in which it is in gloom. The canon is, "If in comparing one case in which the effect takes place, and another in which it does not take place, we find the latter to have every antecedent in common with the former except one; that one circumstance is the cause of the former, or at least part of the cause." This method is the one employed in cases in which experiment with its separating power is available. It is the

most decisive of all tests when the circumstances admit of its application. There are cases in which this method is not applicable, when a sort of intermediate one may come to our aid.

c. The Indirect Method of Difference, or the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference.—The canon is, "If two or more cases in which the phenomenon occurs have only one antecedent in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common but the absence of that antecedent, the circumstance in which alone the two sets of cases differ is the cause, or part of the cause, of the phenomenon." The illustration given by Mr. Mill is:—"All animals which have a well-developed respiratory system, and therefore aërate the blood, perfectly agree in being warm-blooded, while those whose respiratory system is imperfect do not maintain a temperature much exceeding that of the surrounding medium; we may argue from the twofold experience that the change which takes place in the blood by respiration is the cause of animal heat."

d. The Method of Concomitant Variations.—We want to know the cause of the rise of water in a pump or of mercury in a barometer. The ancients accounted for this by nature's horror of a vacuum, which is inconsistent with the fact that water will not rise above a certain number of feet in the pump. Torricelli and Pascal gave a better explanation when they referred the rising of the water or mercury to the weight of the incumbent atmosphere, which Pascal proved by ascending a mountain with a barometer, and finding that, as he rose higher and higher, the mercury fell lower and lower in the tube. Here we have the effect varying with its alleged cause, which is an evidence that the alleged cause is the true one. The canon is, "Whenever an effect varies according as its alleged cause varies, that alleged cause may be regarded as the true cause, or at least as proceeding from the true cause."

e. The Method of Residues.—A farmer knows how much grain a particular field has yielded in the past. He mixes manure with the earth on the field, and finds he has a larger crop, and he ascribes the increase to the manure. He knows what the previously existing antecedents will produce, and after subtracting this he ascribes the residue to the new ante-

cedent. The canon is, "Subtract from an effect whatever is known to proceed from certain antecedents, and the residue must be the effect of the remaining antecedents."

I do not need here to give anything more than the above general account of these canons, which are fully unfolded by Mr. Mill. I mention them simply to show that when they are applied they settle for us what is truth.

Professor Jevons, I am aware, has made a determined attack on them (*Contemporary Review*, vol. xxxi.). For fourteen years he had used Mr. Mill's works as partially his text-books in teaching, but now he has discovered that his philosophy is sophistical and false, and doing immense injury; and in the reaction he has expressed himself strongly and passionately. I do not wonder that Mr. Jevons should speak thus of the metaphysics which underlies Mill's theory of induction. But his canons of causes (he does not mention decomposition and classes) seem to me to be the best that have been yet expounded. Certainly Mr. Jevons has not given nearly so satisfactory an exposition of the methods of science in his elaborate work, *The Principles of Science*. I am not disposed to argue that Mr. Mill's version is perfect, or that it will never be modified as science enters new fields. I am inclined to think that there is special need of a logic adapted to those sciences in which there is a union of induction and deduction, particularly where there is the application of mathematics to laws discovered by observation. This is a field in which Professor Jevons is fitted to labour with great success. The sciences which begin with induction, and which, I believe, shall have to end with induction in the verification of the previous inductions, are becoming more and more deductive, and we have need of a theory and canons of what I call the Joint Inductive and Deductive Method, as practised in the social sciences and in the more recondite branches of physical sciences, in which mathematics have to be used as an instrument.

The canons of induction admit of an application to all the sciences which deal with scattered facts. Subsidiary rules, however, require to be added for each department of knowledge. There are, for instance, *Canons of Testimony*. In order to believe the report of a witness I must have reason to believe that he has means of knowing what he relates to be true. I

must also have reason to believe that he is honest. Or, alternately, if I do not know him to be honest I must have reason to believe that he has no motive to deceive. Some other rules will also be followed: such as, it is a good thing when the narrative is easy and natural; it is a good sign when it is consistent. Again, it is a bad sign when it is artificial, or when its consistency is a laboured one. We use such guides as these in the common affairs of life, and we employ them in historical criticism.

These canons, as they determine what truth we can reach, also show how stringent are the limits laid on our researches and discoveries. Much as we know, there is evidently vastly more that we do not know, and probably infinitely more that we never can know in this world. "We know in part." Yes, we know, but we know only in part. We who dwell in a world "where day and night alternate," we who go everywhere accompanied by our own shadow—a shadow produced by our dark body, but produced because there is light—cannot expect to be absolutely delivered from the darkness. Man's faculties, exquisitely adapted to the sphere in which he moves, were never intended to enable him to comprehend all truth. The mind is in this respect like the eye. The eye is so constituted as to perceive things within a certain range, but as objects are removed farther and farther from us they become more indistinct, and at length are lost sight of altogether. It is the same with the intellect of man. It can penetrate a certain distance and understand certain subjects, but as they stretch away further they look more and more confused, and at length they disappear from the view. And if the human spirit attempts to mount higher than its limited range, it will find all its flights fruitless. The dove, to use a well-known illustration of Kant's, may mount to a certain height in the heavens; but as she rises the air becomes lighter, and at length she finds that she can no longer float upon its bosom, and should she attempt to soar higher her pinions flutter in emptiness, and she falters and falls. So is it with the spirit of man: it can wing its way a very considerable distance into the expanse above it, but there is a boundary which if it attempts to pass, it will find all its conceptions void and its ratiocinations unconnected.

Placed as we are in the centre of boundless space and in the

middle of eternal ages, we can see only a few objects immediately around us, and all others fade in outline as they are removed from us by distance, till at length they lie altogether beyond our vision. And this remark holds true not only of the more ignorant, of those whose eye can penetrate the least distance; it is true also of the learned; it is perhaps true of all created beings that there is a bounding sphere of darkness surrounding the space rendered clear by the torch of science. Nay, it almost looks as if the wider the boundaries of science are pushed, and the greater the space illuminated by it, the greater in proportion the bounding sphere of darkness into which no rays penetrate, just as (to use a very old comparison) when we strike up a light in the midst of darkness, in very proportion as the light becomes stronger so does also that surface dark and black which is rendered visible.

JAMES M'COSH.

ART. IX.—*The Regeneration of Palestine.*¹

PALESTINE has been for many years a land of ruins; and ever since its chosen people were banished, as a nation, from its confines, members of the race have indulged in spasmodic efforts to regain its fertile plains, beautiful valleys, and crowning city, as their own. But these efforts have not been national, not even general, and, as a rule, have been little more than vain and enthusiastic plans, plaguing the brains and torturing the hearts of a few of the faithful who have hoped to see Jerusalem regained and Israel re-established in his ancient home.

Within the last few years the Jews of some of the European capitals—London and Paris especially—have made some concerted trials to effect organisation, and to proceed in a regular manner to possess the land and make it their own. The wealth and influence of Montefiore and the Rothschilds, in combination with the labours of the “Alliance Israélite” of Paris, have succeeded at least in calling the attention of the world to the

¹ From the (American) *Methodist Quarterly Review*.

fact that the Jews are again active in the matter of regenerating the Promised Land, and fitting it for the advent of their long-looked-for Messiah; and occasional announcements of their enthusiasm and success have led to the popular belief that they are quite likely to be successful in their endeavours. We have been told that their promised inheritance is rapidly becoming their own, and that a remarkable change is taking place through them in the Holy Land. It is stated that the sceptre is even now virtually in the hands of that stanch Israelite, Baron Rothschild, who, for the loan of two hundred millions of francs to the Sultan, has a mortgage on the entire land, and may possess it any moment he pleases. According to these floating stories, great improvements are going on among the Jews of Jerusalem and the whole country; they are building up a new city in and around Jerusalem; are founding schools, hospitals, and newspapers; and a body of Venetian Jews is sustaining an agricultural school with a view to train up a community of their brethren to be tillers of the soil. The number of Hebrew residents has doubled, according to these statements, in the last ten years, and everything is on the high road of modern improvement, even to a railroad, etc.

Now, it is clear that these things are set afloat by interested parties and circulated by ignorant ones, and they are gladly believed, because it would be gratifying to the world at large to see this land of ruins regenerated, and at least fitted for the abode of men if not for the coming of the Messiah, either of the Jews or the Gentiles. But in the main these accounts are not true, and they have become of late so rife and mischievous that there appeared in a late issue of the *New York Christian Advocate* the following rejoinder to them all, from an authority well known to our Church and the nation, and which, we need hardly say, puts a very different face on the matter:—

“JEWS RETURNING TO ZION.—We have just clipped from a religious journal the following article on the return of the Jews to the land of their fathers, and the improved condition of Palestine, which contains so many statements calculated to mislead the public, I deem a correction necessary:—

“‘Meanwhile, a railroad stretches over a part of the Holy Land; the scream of the iron horse echoes among the hills and valleys where the old prophet long ago uttered his prediction of a chariot that in the great preparation day of the Lord would run like lightning. There are also two

hundred and fifty Protestant Churches worshipping among the sacred hills ; and seven hundred and sixty children in the Sunday-schools of Palestine ring out the very hymns and songs that our children know and sing here in America. Baron Rothschild, at the time of the last loan of two hundred million francs made to Turkey, accepted a mortgage on the whole of Palestine. Owing to the Jewish immigration, the population of Palestine has more than doubled during the last ten years.'

"The facts are : There is not a railroad in all Palestine. 'The scream of the iron horse' has never broken the deathly silence that pervades the land. There is not an American missionary in the Holy Land, nor a Sunday-school ; but one Protestant Church in Jerusalem, another outside the walls, and one at Nazareth. The Jewish population has increased during the last few years, but the population of the country has more rapidly decreased. The Jews have no intention of re-occupying the land. They go there to die, not to live. No Jew around Jerusalem owns or cultivates an acre of ground. Baron Rothschild has no mortgage on Palestine. He could easily purchase the country if he wanted it, but he does not covet it. The Jews of Europe and America will never return to Palestine unless forced back at the point of the bayonet.

F. S. DE HASS,
Late U.S. Consul at Jerusalem."

Now, harsh as these assertions may seem, they are corroborated by other authorities that we might quote, and by frequent correspondence from the Holy Land on the part of intelligent and disinterested observers. And it may now be well to consider the present condition of the country, and obtain a candid view of the real efforts that are being made by various parties to improve the condition of things in Palestine ; for there are many eyes turned thitherward in holy zeal and with a hope, almost forlorn, to be able by degrees to regenerate the land. But we need hardly say that the day has gone by, if it ever existed, when men of sound mind went thither as ordinary emigrants, in the hope of bettering their condition and making a fortune. When Canaan was the fertile land of milk and honey, we can comprehend why foreign nations regarded it with longing eyes, and desired to pitch their tents and guard their flocks on its plains. But at present the soil will not, certainly does not, support one-tenth of the population that then lived in plenty. The mountains are at present without forests, and, being scorched by the sun, are poor in running streams. Their sides were once made fruitful by terraces of rich earth, which long ago by neglect were allowed to be washed down by the rains into the water-courses, so that one sees everywhere little

else than bald and barren precipices. The fig, the olive, and the grape, once the glory and support of the land, are now so meagre and so poor as to have lost much of their value and fame.

The country possesses three large and fertile plains, which might be made the sources of great wealth. But the valley of the Jordan lies fallow because of the inertness of the government in superintending its irrigation, and what little is now produced is quite likely to become the spoil of the nomadic and thieving Bedouins. The plain of Esdraelon and the plain skirting the sea are still valuable, even with their primitive mode of cultivation; with a generously renewed soil and a modern style of culture they might be made mines of wealth. The natives, however, will make no effort to improve the condition of the land and introduce new methods, and strangers can hardly live there on account of the deadly fever. The Mennonites, who leave Russia in large numbers to escape military duty, and who are just now coming to us, for a while tried the plain of Sharon along the sea, but in the course of a year so many of them died of the fever, that the rest gathered up their effects, sacrificed what money they had invested, and came away.

The cultivation of the land by the native peasants—the so-called fellahs—amounts to merely enough to keep them from starving. If they produce a bushel of grain more than they need for their direct wants, it is taken from them by the Turkish tax-gatherers, who are experts in extortion. The extreme poverty of the poor natives is their only protection, and so the land lies neglected year after year. In the line of industry there is not any more encouragement: there is no market for their products, neither in the back country nor on the coast, for there are no ports for convenient export. All the ancient artificial harbours are in ruins, with one exception, that of Jaffa, which, though sufficient for the small sailing craft of ancient days, cannot accommodate the steamers of the period; these sometimes, therefore, lie for days before Jaffa in a storm, waiting to land passengers, or they carry them past to other ports, to be taken back to Jaffa by some returning vessel that may have better weather and consequently better success.

There is only one passable road in the country—that which leads from Jaffa to Jerusalem—and it is going to decay. It

was made some nine years ago, and has been neglected ever since. For a time there was some talk of a railroad on this route from the port of Jaffa to Jerusalem ; but the French company that proposed it did so as a matter of speculation, and as soon as it was seen that it could not be made to pay, the project was abandoned. No enterprise, indeed, can be carried on that needs fuel, for there is but little to be had ; and therefore manufactures that depend on it for steam power, as well as railroads, can have no success. Consequently camels are still the main means of transport for what little merchandise there is, which, indeed, scarcely extends beyond the olive-wood wares from Jerusalem and the mother-of-pearl work from Bethlehem. Even these industries are far from lucrative because of the active competition caused by the excessively narrow sphere for industrial labour.

These are clearly no very attractive conditions, and one is therefore surprised that men are ever inclined to go thither as emigrants, to better their material condition ; and, indeed, none have done so except a few visionary enthusiasts, like the Adams Colony, which emigrated from Maine a few years ago, but quickly fell in pieces, some of the colonists returning home, charitably assisted to do so by our authorities, and a few remaining to eke out a precarious existence as guides and dragomans to American and English visitors. Those who go to stay must have some stronger motive than that of making money. The Jews go in religious fanaticism, many of them to live and die as recipients of charity, if not as paupers. All the efforts that have been made at times in this country to get up colonies of Jews for Palestine have failed. The Israelites of this country know well enough that for them the Land of Promise is to be found in our large commercial centres, which have for them more attractions than Jerusalem itself. The only power that moves them thither is religious enthusiasm ; not even persecution can do it, for they put up with everything rather than desert their rich opportunities in the great cities of Europe and America. The present irritated feeling about the Jews in Germany will not send one of them to Palestine. Those who go thither are impelled by religious motives only, and of these there are not many, in comparison to the thousands scattered about the world.

For the last few years about four hundred have gone thither annually, as our consul says, "not to live but to die." These are mostly from Russia, and they come not so much to avoid military duty as to flee from the conflicts with their own brethren—the Reform or Progressive Jews. The strife between the Orthodox and the Liberal Jews often becomes so bitter as to divide families and introduce the greatest antagonism. The adherents of the Talmud would rather leave their homes than endeavour to live in peace with those who follow the dictates of the Cabala. The Russian and Polish Jews are extremely strong in their prejudices, and nothing can move them from their purpose. They believe that the kingdom of the Messiah will soon be re-established in Palestine, in accordance with the words of the prophet, and those who are there will be received with rejoicing. This hope to them is a magic power, and if not fulfilled during their lives, they will at least have the pleasure of laying down their bones in the valley of Jehoshaphat, whence they can see the coming of the Lord to judge the heathen and all oppressors of their people. And therefore are found among them so many old and decrepit men, who simply come to spend the evening of their days on the sacred mountain, and pray, and be buried, in view of the site of the ancient temple.

The present condition of the Jewish colonies in Palestine is anything but desirable. They are forced for protection to reside together in certain fixed settlements. Nobody likes them, and they could not settle anywhere at random; Oriental Christians, as well as Moslems, would persecute them, for Oriental Christians are experts in intolerance. There are now in the Holy Land about twenty-one thousand Jews, who live mostly in the rabbinical cities—Jerusalem, Saffed, Tiberias, and Hebron. About fifteen hundred live in the commercial centres, but the largest number is to be found in Jerusalem—thirteen thousand. These differ very greatly in costume and speech, according to their origin. Half of them are Spanish Jews, who took refuge here when expelled from Spain by Ferdinand and Isabella. In language, appearance, and dress they all betray their southern origin. The so-called German Jews are mostly Russian, Polish, or from the Danubian Principalities. They are very tenacious of their costume, even to

the fur cap, though in a warm southern country. Many of them are slovenly and filthy in appearance, and well calculated to inspire disgust at sight. One sees the same type at all the great fairs of Germany and Russia. Then there are some five hundred hailing from Northern Africa, who are in reality Arabs, and thus resemble the natives. But each of these groups has its national peculiarities, and they all have their antagonisms. The only national bond is the Hebrew tongue, which all male Jews must understand.

The Jews are mostly confined to their own quarter in Jerusalem, as they are in all the large cities of Europe; they are now, however, inclined to infringe on the Christian quarter, and especially to extend their district outside of the gates. But they largely tend to herd together and live in densely populated houses, partly for the reason that they may have access to the same cisterns for water, in the use of which they are forced to be very economical; indeed, many of them live almost without air, light, or water, and the result is a great mortality from fevers and other diseases, induced by uncleanly habits. Most of those who come bring a little money with them, but, in the absence of any remunerative employment, this soon runs out, and the impoverished depend on benevolence for support; and they would all assuredly starve were it not for the practice of the Jews in Europe to send large sums to the Holy Land for the support of their co-religionists. All Orthodox Jews continue to pay the ancient temple-tax, in the shape of alms for their brothers in the Holy City. Even the Liberal Jews of the European capitals will do this, in order to counteract the efforts of the Christian missions, which, as we know, make but little progress in reforming them. There is thus a steady stream of money flowing in to the rabbis for the support of synagogues, hospitals, poor-houses, and hospices for the temporary shelter of the unfortunate. In confirmation of which let the reader peruse the note below, lately sent from the Holy Land in correspondence to the *New York Herald*, by a gentleman who has lived there for over a dozen years:—

“JAFFA, November 12, 1879.

“‘The Jews regaining their Land,’ is the title of a paragraph going the rounds of the papers, to the effect that, ‘owing to the Jewish immigration, the population of Palestine has more than doubled during the last ten years.’ As a resident of this country since 1867 I can positively deny this

statement. Many Jews, it is true, have come to live in Jerusalem (not in other places), or rather to lay their bones in the Valley of Jehoshaphat, during the past decade, but it is incorrect to declare that 'the population of Palestine has been doubled' by such immigration. The population of this land was 1,200,000 ten years ago, and to maintain it has doubled would give us an influx of 1,200,000 Jews. The truth is that about five thousand have come to Jerusalem during the past ten years. Of these a large number have died, but others may have taken their places, leaving the number about the same. Nearly all these Jews live in poverty, and make appeals from time to time to their wealthy brethren in Europe and America for means to maintain themselves and their families. The immigration is, in fact, an influx of paupers, who expect to live in idleness upon the savings of their relatives in other lands who may take pity upon their destitution. Some are eventually disgusted at the penury which the rabbis' strict rule often enforces, and return to the countries whence they came. I helped a few weeks ago a poor American Hebrew to return to New York, and the United States Consul at Jerusalem has given assistance to many of various nationalities out of a fund sent him for that purpose. I am informed that there are sixty charity associations in Jerusalem, a city of 25,000 inhabitants."

These Jews of Palestine are neither inclined nor able to engage in trading or industrial pursuits; they have no culture for anything higher, and their entire energy is therefore concentrated on the matter of religion, which, in a certain sense, pays them, either from the poor fund or from their own zealous endeavours in behalf of others. A goodly number of the Polish and Russian Jews make a living by offering for their friends at home daily prayers, which, since the destruction of the temple, may take the place of the ancient sacrifices. For these they receive a regular stipend, which seems to satisfy both parties, though the prayer becomes a mere mechanical performance, totally destitute of unction and consecration; indeed, they are evidently a very burdensome task to the operators. Even the young men seem to have no ambition to work for an honest living, and their highest aim is to be promoted to the rabbinical order, to which end all their studies are directed. All studies are neglected that do not aim to fit them for the peculiar sect to which they may chance to belong. They thus acquire a skill in memorising the *minutiæ* of the Talmud, and maintaining hair-splitting disputations on points of the law; but they entertain a supreme contempt for the sciences and all the other refinements of western civilisation.

This state of things has been greatly regretted by intelligent Jews in Europe, who for many years have been making fruitless efforts to effect some improvement. In this connection we may

make honourable mention of Sir Moses Montefiore, the distinguished English Jew, who at the advanced age of ninety-three years, even now, it is said, contemplates a visit to Jerusalem to inspire energy into plans that he has created for the regeneration of his people and the country. His purse has long been open to their calls, and our journals have periodical paragraphs relating to the enterprises that are being carried on under the auspices of his bounty; but it is very doubtful if any good results from it. His friend and colleague in good efforts, Baron Rothschild, of Paris, has also not been weary in well-doing; and the Parisian Jews, under the lead of the statesman Cremieux, lately deceased, some time ago formed a Jewish league, termed the "Alliance Israélite," whose object is to aid the Jews of Palestine to help themselves. But the very moment any proposition is made to them to cast away their sluggish inertness, they find a thousand reasons for opposing it; nothing satisfies them that is not according to the letter of ancient law. This Parisian Alliance resolved to establish an agricultural school and colony near Jaffa, in the hope of introducing a better system of tilling the land, and above all of leading the young Jews to take an interest in agricultural pursuits, which would give them an honourable support and develop the latent wealth of the country.

A considerable sum of money was expended in securing a fine farm, erecting buildings, and supplying stock and agricultural utensils; but the Orthodox Jews, who still hold to the ancient laws—and they are by far the most numerous—looked coolly on the whole enterprise, and would have nothing to do with it unless the undertakers would consent to observe the sabbatical year, pay tithes for the priests and Levites, and make contributions for the elders. These exactions, of course, settle the case, for under the best of circumstances the enterprise would be a losing affair; while thus burdened it cannot be a success. This matter is also alluded to by the aforesaid correspondent from the Holy Land, and we feel it well to have the support of his assertions, which are as follows :—

"ATTEMPTS AT AGRICULTURE.—Sir Moses Montefiore has often aided his indigent countrymen, and recently sent a donation to the Judah Touro poor-houses. He is an advocate of the scheme of founding agricultural Jewish colonies in Palestine, and suggested that a fund be raised in London for this

object, and thus give employment to worthy Israelites. The success of such an undertaking is doubtful, judging from the attempt that has been made to found an agricultural model farm on the plains of Sharon, under the patronage of the 'Alliance Israélite' of Paris. A chief impediment is the fact that the young Jews disdain work so long as they can live upon charity. Much has been made in European journals of the growth of Jerusalem of late, by the building of houses outside of the walls. A number of new dwellings have, indeed, been erected on the Jaffa and Bethlehem roads during the last ten years, by both Jews and Christians, following the example of the Protestant and Russian missions, which first began to do so. These houses, being built over cisterns of rain-water, are for the most part nests of typhus and malarial fevers, and instead of contributing to the health of the city, have materially added to the prevalent insalubriousness of Jerusalem. In the city itself the soil is so saturated with the accumulated impurities of past generations, that any disturbance of the ground for building purposes invariably engenders malignant fevers. Captain Warren, R.E., and his corps of assistants, while making explorations and excavations in and about Jerusalem, suffered terribly from this cause. The scarcity of pure water is another source of evil at the Holy City, and although an abundant supply could be brought from the ancient pools of Solomon beyond Bethlehem, yet all efforts to repair or rebuild the aqueduct are thwarted by the fanaticism of the Moslem rulers. Baroness Burdett-Coutts offered the municipality £30,000 for this purpose several years ago, but her munificent gift was rejected on the ground that it was 'unlawful to receive money from a Christian for the expense of conveying the "gift of God" [water] to the holy mosque of Omar, and to the holy Moslem city "El Khuda."'

It is very clear, therefore, that not much is to be expected from the Jews as regenerators of the Holy Land, and there is not any hope of an improvement in the character of their immigration. As long as they will obstinately bring back the past rather than make an effort to introduce the manifold improvements and methods of the present, so long they will be in the way of any progress in Palestine. Indeed, the land seems cursed with all sorts of burdens; from Turks to Jews there is scarcely an element of its population that is not baneful to it, while its government by the Sultan is simply disgusting. The Turkish rule has no other interest than to farm the country out to tax-gatherers, whose extortions are so fearful that they lie like an Alp on every effort at improvement. If the Grand Turk could be bought out or driven out, and the land placed under an intelligent and progressive rule, it might again be made to blossom as of old. It only needs the *dictum* of the Great Powers to give the Sultan his walking-papers out of

Palestine ; but as long as these must expend their efforts in keeping up their own political balance, this will not be done. If these Powers were only willing to take Palestine among them, and hold it under an intelligent protectorate, there might also be some light ; but as long as the same brutal rule continues there, and the same degraded population curses the land, we may count on nothing good.

Is there, then, no hope for the regeneration of the Holy Land ? To this question we reply that we see a ray of light in an honest and intelligent enterprise that seems to have no herald to tell its story to the world. Nothing but new blood and new ways will effect the purpose, and these to some extent have been tried in certain colonies from this and other countries, and have failed. But something more is wanted than even these. The best of capacities must be sustained by a religious zeal and enthusiasm in the work of regenerating the land and preparing it for the second coming of the Lord. And agents of this kind have been silently growing up and gaining experience ; and the main object of this article is to call attention to their origin and plans, their struggles and partial success.

A few years ago there arose in Würtemberg, in Southern Germany, an association of Christian men imbued with the idea that it was their duty to prepare the way of the Lord for his second advent, which they believe will be in the land where He appeared of old. They were under the lead of the venerable Christopher Hoffmann, a most intelligent and enthusiastic divine, who felt himself moved to engage in this work as a special mission. To the German Protestant Church they were zealots and hare-brained enthusiasts, and they received but little encouragement. They termed themselves the Friends of Jerusalem, and declared their purpose to be to restore the "spiritual temple of the Lord in the Holy Land." They believe in the literal interpretation of the prophecies which foretell a glorious regeneration of the "Promised Land," whose citizens will not be Israel according to the flesh, but Israel after the Spirit. They believe they can succeed in making Palestine, in a spiritual and material sense, a model kingdom, which will incite all people to its imitation. In this land Christ will again appear in His glory and assume His

throne, and will, for His sympathising and happy children, inaugurate His reign of a thousand years.

Now, whatever may be said of these religious views, they at least inspired in earnest men that enthusiasm necessary for the great undertaking, in which they were encouraged by the King of Prussia, who had assisted in founding a Christian mission in Jerusalem. This, however, was about the only encouragement they received, for the State Church persecuted them, and the revolutions interfered with them, and their government authorities would not give them aid in negotiating with the Sultan for the privilege of settling in the land with protection; for the policy of the Turk always has been to keep all Christian effort away from Palestine, and until quite recently it was not possible for foreigners to acquire land; they were merely allowed to settle by sufferance, with the understanding that they might be removed at will. Under such conditions it was, of course, not possible to begin, and especially in Jerusalem, where they desired to make a commencement. Besides, an indispensable condition was a certain amount of capital, which their leader hoped to be able to obtain in Germany, Switzerland, Southern Russia, England, and America, and for which he continued to make great efforts by the formation of filial associations in these countries. At last it was resolved to send out a commission which should travel over the Holy Land and study the situation and all questions which could affect the weal or woe of new colonies going thither to settle. This commission returned in about six months with a passably favourable report, but based too much on the enthusiasm of spiritual zeal to be a practical recommendation to commence the work. It was thought best at first to encourage a few small parties to go out on their own responsibility, but under the shield and sympathy of the body, to stay and try their fortune in beginning a work and making a livelihood. Only a few of these were successful, and some met with a very sad fate from mishaps and climatic fevers. But their experience was valuable, and their counsels as to the best spots for settlement were regarded.

Finally, in 1867, it was resolved to make a formal commencement of the enterprise by a governmental organisation. A republican constitution was formed; Mr. Hoffmann was chosen leader, and a Mr. Hardegg made his right-hand man.

An executive board was appointed from the various associations and agents to oversee the matter of churches, schools, colonisation, industry, and commerce. A party went out, headed by Mr. Hoffmann, and they first visited Constantinople, with the hope of obtaining certain concessions from the Sultan; but with all the influence they could bring to bear, nothing could be effected. They therefore decided to proceed to Syria, and soon after founded a post at Haifa, at the base of Carmel. They bargained for a small piece of property not far from the post, where ten or a dozen families might lay the foundation of a settlement for those who might follow. The next move was the establishment of a permanent mission at Jaffa, as the port of Jerusalem, and the place to which come all travellers on their way to that city. In this they were favoured by the opportunity to buy the houses, mills, and other appurtenances of a Russo-German mission which was just retiring, and also the deserted houses of the Adams Colony, from Maine. The "Temple Association" thus rapidly got a start, and immediately proceeded to lay plans for operations and support. Hospitals and schools were needed, and even a hotel, for there was scarcely a decent refuge for the weary tourist in reaching Jaffa going to Jerusalem.

And in the midst of all their practical work, which was first necessary in order to lay a foundation for material existence, they also commenced to lay plans for a school of the higher order, that might train civil officers, physicians, teachers, and preachers, that would harmonise in their views regarding the restoration of Palestine. Their profession of faith and constitution are laid down in a work by Rev. Christopher Hoffmann, bearing the title of *Orient and Occident*. In this he develops the Mosaic law as far as it can be harmonised with the present order of things, and finally settles on the practical portions of the moral law and the principles of humanity to guide him as a ruler. Mr. Hoffmann is also the author of several works of a religious and historical character combined, in which he indulges in keen analysis and accurate criticism, viewing the course of history for the last two centuries in the light of religious truth, and showing the growing apostasy of the age. He is a man of very extraordinary intellect, and a writer of no mean powers. His great object now is to fight against the

social evils of the day, and lay the foundation of a system that may relieve the world from many of its present burdens and inconsistencies. In over-enthusiastic zeal he advances theories that many may find fault with; but this implicit faith in his system and hope in his work make him and his followers peculiarly adapted to meet and wrestle with the difficult material questions to be encountered in his present undertaking. It is success in this line that now mainly interests the world, and to which we think better to devote our labours. If he can regenerate Palestine, he will certainly be accounted a general benefactor; and if his religious zeal gives him a key to interest other men in a discouraging and painful work, we can easily afford to pass lightly over what the world may consider Utopian, to regard that which every one must see is of great practical good.

If any men can succeed in this work, these are they, for they come to regenerate the Promised Land through the sweat of their brow, and they undertake a task that can be carried out only by such men as martyrs are made of. They have already suffered a great deal, but are not discouraged; and it now appears that great social, religious, and political reforms in the Holy Land may eventually be achieved through them. None of their number are allowed to go there except those who have stood the test of trial and examination in their own country. The association refuses to help or send any who do not exhibit the characteristics needed for utility and success; it is not an ordinary emigration, but rather a species of pilgrimage to a shrine, with a lofty purpose.

The "Friends of Jerusalem" began to establish colonies in the Holy Land in 1868, and there are now there four of these settled in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, and Sharon. These came from Germany, the United States, and Russia, in which countries there are congregations of these Christians who have this cause at heart, and from which the fittest are sent to the Holy Land. We may mention Buffalo, Schenectady, and Chicago as being centres in this country, and the parties concerned are all Germans. These four colonies are virtually under one control, and each may have specialty in its efforts. Nearly all the men who go are hard-working, thrifty men, who know what it is to battle with life. The most of them are

agriculturists, and are, therefore, best adapted to what the land most needs ; namely, a practical training in the profitable culture of the soil. Their settlements are just outside of the towns at Jaffa and Haifa, where they have an opportunity to raise, besides the ordinary products of the country, many of the desirable vegetables of their native land. On the heights in the rear of Jaffa they have built up their settlement in such a pleasant manner as to attract the attention of the natives, and give them an object-lesson of much more value to them than any theories could be. The pleasant gardens and cheerful-looking houses are becoming the envy of the thriftless natives or indolent fellows, who are said to stand and regard them with a dreamy admiration that indicates a wish on their part to possess some of the same kind.

In Haifa, the colony has also made itself so clearly felt in good examples, that at the recent death of the valuable leader of that band, Mr. Hardegg, the entire community seemed to join in tokens of mourning. When the day for the funeral ceremonies arrived, the flags of the various consuls were placed at half-mast, and, to the surprise of everybody, the colours of the Turkish Pasha also came down. This is probably the first time that a Turk ever noticed the burial of a Christian. In this settlement there was opened in October last a boarding-school of higher order for girls, with some twenty pupils, in which there are several good teachers, undertaking, besides the ordinary branches, the French and English languages, and music. This will be a great blessing for Christian foreigners settled in Palestine, as well as for the Temple Community itself, who have not known hitherto how to have their daughters educated without sending them away to a great distance. The young ladies can take their exercise on the declivity of Carmel, with a charming prospect of the sea and of the snow-capped summits of Hermon. In Jerusalem a lyceum has been established for boys in the same careful way, both under the general supervision of the Rev. Mr. Hoffmann, which is security that the education imparted will be of a Christian nature. These institutions greatly need material aid, and they could not be sustained at all without great sacrifice on the part of the teachers and the Association.

The latest colony founded is that on the plains of Sharon, on

the site selected and built on by the Mennonites, who abandoned it in a short time because of the unhealthy situation and the difficulty in making it a profitable enterprise. The Temple Association took for a song what was left, and thus obtained a start. The natural supposition would be that this was not advisable, but the result proves that the enthusiasm and resolve of these men will carry them through difficulties under which others will sink. They placed most of their dwellings on a little more elevated ground, and thus escaped the ravages of the fever, to which they are becoming acclimated, and are now working industriously at their problem, which is to improve the agricultural methods in the country. A firm in Buffalo has presented them with a mowing machine, which is the wonder of the Arabian peasants, but which gives them some trouble because of the difficulty in getting Arabian steeds that will submit to the control needed to use it properly. This is being remedied by procuring a quieter race of horses. The report of their last harvest was quite gratifying. The land is rich, and seems to appeal to the traveller to stop and till it in a sensible manner. The yield of wheat and barley was good, and nearly all the produce of the field was bountiful. Grapes grew plentifully, and the hay harvest was rich, but they lost quite a number of their cattle from the plague. When the harvest was over, several new houses were erected, and the colonist not thus engaged found fairly profitable employment in transporting produce to Jerusalem. Thus it will be seen that the colonists put their hands to every available industry, and so set a valuable example to the thriftless people around them.

The Palestine of to-day has virtually no industrial occupations; the natives are confined to agriculture, cattle-raising, and trade. This was largely so in the olden time, but the land was then fully cultivated and gave forth a multitude of products. The few miserable struggling cities now on the coast, as the remnants of former times, still live on the little commerce that is carried on; but the population everywhere is greatly below the ancient figures. There were then, probably, ten millions of people in the land; now scarcely more than three hundred thousand. This is Palestine as ruined by Turkish rule. Jaffa is now a city of about twenty thousand inhabitants, and has a regular connection with Europe by means of the Austrian

Lloyd steamers from Trieste, which stop there twice a week. The harbour is very miserable, and mainly useful for small sailing vessels owned by the Greeks, who do most of the coasting trade; and yet this is the port through which most of the trade of Palestine is done. Haifa is mainly the outlet for the grain from the rich plains of Esdraelon and the mountains of Galilee, but its exporting facilities are not what they once were, and a portion of it is a miserable nest. Nevertheless, the Germans are doing much towards its regeneration. Jaffa is about the only port worth mention, and is the outlet for Jerusalem and all cities on the way or contiguous to it. The Valley of the Jordan and the land of the Moabites send their productions hither, and traders, pilgrims, and tourists, all land at Jaffa on their way to the Holy City.

The Temple Association has therefore done well to settle at Jaffa and enter into its industries. The city is surrounded by orange gardens for a considerable distance, which are artificially irrigated, and the oranges are largely exported.

The trade of Jaffa is now increasing, and the imports and exports are becoming more various: they receive coal, coffee, iron, sugar, petroleum, etc., from England, France, Italy, and the United States; and in return send out oranges, olive oil, barley, wheat, soap, etc. The Germans are engaging largely in the manufacture of soap from olive oil, and bid fair to build the business up to respectable proportions. It is a very acceptable article for the toilet, and may be procured at reasonable prices of many of the druggists in our cities; it is very solid and lasting, and is growing more popular every year. The imports of Palestine were in 1878 about \$375,000 and the exports \$1,500,000. In contact with Europeans the natives must soon learn to raise more and need more, and thus largely increase the trade. With the growing inclination to increase our trade in the Mediterranean and contiguous waters, it would not cost our vessels much more time to go to Palestine with coal in ballast, and bring back cargoes of Oriental fruits, olive oil, and the soap mentioned above. Coal is the great desideratum to progress in Palestine; it is needed for mills and machinery of all kinds on account of the dearth of fuel. Even building timber is brought into Palestine from Turkey and Austria. The era of steam mills is likely to com-

mence now by the enterprise of the German colonists. The last accounts inform us that they are constructing one in Jerusalem, much to the mystification of the natives, who see no water with which to run it. But the fuel will be a far more difficult question than water, and not much can be done in this line until the "coal question" can be settled.

The import trade is almost exclusively in the hands of foreigners, among whom the Germans have two large houses, one in Jerusalem and another in Jaffa. The heaviest import is that of salt, amounting to three millions of pounds, a greater weight than that of all other articles together. The cause of this is, doubtless, the fact that salt is used by all the inhabitants of Palestine, whereas all other imported articles are used only by small portions of the community. Even rice, which is largely eaten by the inhabitants of the cities, reaches the poor fellah's mouth only as an article of luxury on special occasions. The misery of these poor wretches is said to be nearly indescribable; they work all day for the merest pittance, and quiet their hunger with a few hard cakes baked on stones.

The export trade, on the contrary, is nearly all in the hands of native merchants, who, as land-owners and leasers, and money-lenders, have the poor fellahs so tightly in their hands that they get but little from their unwilling labours. The fellah seldom owns any land, or if he does he has not often the money wherewith to obtain cattle and seed. He either borrows money, or the cattle and seed are provided for him by the dealer, who in turn demands so much of the crop that the fellah gets scarcely enough for his sternest wants. In this way he seldom succeeds in saving anything, or if he does, the Turkish tax-gatherers, to whom the customs are generally farmed out, strip him to his back.

Of the articles of export, olive oil, tilseed for the manufacture of croton oil, and the olive-oil soap are the principal. Olive oil is to-day the leading production of Palestine. The olive-tree is found everywhere, and many new plantations are now being started. In the plains is the olive, as on most of the mountains around the villages; it is found on Carmel and around Bethlehem and Jerusalem. The monks of the cloisters are setting out new plantations. The Greek monastery in Jerusalem some time ago bought a waste piece of land

for \$4000, and covered it with young olive-trees, and now, in twenty years, they ask over \$100,000 for it. This fact shows the capacity of the country if cultivated with energy and thrift.

Palestine is pre-eminently the land of the grape in certain sections; but as the Moslem drinks no wine, he does not know how to make it, and, therefore, this industry has brought him nothing. But the grape is a very important article of food in the summer months, and what they do not eat they dry for raisins, or use in the manufacture of an excellent grape honey. The ancient grape city of Hebron is still surrounded to great distances with vineyards, which make it one of the prettiest places in Palestine. It is natural that the Germans should utilise the grape for the production of wine, after the manner of their home-life, and they are doing this in the neighbourhood of Jaffa, and especially at their settlement in the plains of Sharon, not far from Jaffa. They raised enough last season for their own use, but some of them are now beginning to acknowledge that in this Oriental land a pint of milk is of more value than a pint of wine—which is a great concession for a German to make,—and they are seriously discussing the question whether they will not gain more from their cows than from their wine-presses. It is doubtful whether they will ever make a good wine for export, although they are trying to do so.

One drawback to their success is an occasional bad harvest in certain regions. This has just been the case around the Bay of Acre, by which the colony at Haifa has severely suffered. On the contrary, the colony at Sharon had a very good year for wheat and barley. The Germans are teaching the natives the value of manuring the land, which they entirely neglect. Land from which the Arabian peasants had ceased to get anything is now bearing such fine crops as to be the admiration of the surrounding country. Last year the olive crop was a partial failure. This was a calamity, for olives are one of the principal articles of food of the fellahs. They are soaked in salt water and eaten with bread. Another curse of Palestine is the cattle pest. Owing to the carelessness of the government in regard to repressive measures, the disease rages over all the land, so that at certain periods there are no cattle for the agricultural work or for slaughter; mutton is, therefore, the principal article of animal food; but fowls are plenty, and

the forests furnish the wild boar. The Germans are meeting these troubles like intelligent agriculturists, and are making vigorous efforts to counteract the difficulties which they meet; and their success in proving that this Promised Land may again become one of milk and honey with intelligent care and treatment, is calling the attention of local authorities to their labours. The English ambassador, Layard, on his recent visit to Palestine, honoured them with a call, inspected their labours and their settlements, broke bread with them, and wished them great success. Some of the most intelligent American teachers and missionaries that have visited them—men, for instance, like Drs. Vandyke and Long—have said very kind and encouraging words to them, and bid them go on in spite of the many discouragements. In short, we think it fair to say that it is the general impression of those who study the case, that if Palestine is ever to be regenerated these are the men to do it.

In the theoretical study of Palestine and its scientific exploration the German *savants* have been active for many years. It was our rare opportunity years ago to hear that distinguished German professor at the University of Berlin, Carl Ritter, discourse on the Physical Geography of Palestine, after a scientific visit thither. He filled his hearers with a measure of his own enthusiasm, which has borne fruits, and since then the German mind has been closely engaged with the subject of Palestinean exploration, in its scientific aspects. Tobler has gained the reputation of being among the most learned of the Palestine explorers, and other noble names are arranged by his side, which, however, are but little known outside of Germany. The reason of this may be partially found in the fact that nearly all these men were poor, and most of them did what they did with their own scanty means, which were often too limited to secure a worthy publication of the results of their labours. Thus in the practical exploration of Palestine the Germans were not abreast of other nations, and their scientists have been obliged to stand in the background as mute observers of the work, or to be satisfied to point to harvests for others to garner. But they have watched the expeditions of the French, English, and Americans with careful eyes, and are well aware of the labours of Robinson, Van de Velde, Lynch, Sauley, and a host of others. They have looked with admiration at the exploration funds

that have been raised in other nations, and have enjoyed, without jealousy, their valuable results in the various works lately published on the exploration of Palestine.

In view of these results there has arisen in Germany a desire to unite all their forces for the exploration of Palestine. Their own national regeneration and the high respect that the German consulates now enjoy in Oriental lands give them much reason to hope that the time has arrived when they, too, can join the bands that are intent on investigating and restoring the land. About three years ago some German professors in Basle and Tübingen conceived the idea of establishing also a society for the exploration of Palestine. They constituted themselves as an executive committee provisionally, and succeeded in obtaining a score or so of others who were willing to join them; among these latter, some persons of high position in the Government, such as the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg and the famous soldier Von Moltke. They met at Wiesbaden, and formed an association, with a business committee, consisting of Kersten of Berlin and Guthe of Leipzig. This committee are now publishing, in Leipzig, a periodical devoted to the interests of Palestine, which is sent to the two hundred and fifty members of the association, who pay yearly only the small sum of two dollars and fifty cents as membership fees, which includes also the price of the periodical. The object of the association is the publication of all new and interesting knowledge gained in the matter of exploration, and the founding of a fund for self-labour of their own members. The Emperor of Germany and the Crown Prince, as well as the King of Würtemberg, are among the patrons, and the Emperor of Austria has also subscribed liberally to the funds of the Society. Among the scholars who take a special interest in it are such men as Delitzsch and Ebers in Leipzig, and Kiepert in Berlin. All the German consuls in the Holy Land are also members.

The first volume of the Proceedings has been issued, consisting of four numbers, and it is very rich with the contributions of its members. Nearly every field of labour in the exploration is well represented by text and engravings. We need scarcely say that the maps are very fine, as Kiepert has had them in charge. One of the members of the Society lives in Jerusalem, and he is regarded as the most critical judge of all

its topographical relations. He is the architectural member of the Turkish authorities there, and in all investigations that are made he has the best opportunity for information. The Germans hope for great success through this undertaking, and are desirous of extending its patronage beyond the limits of their country. They have thus fairly entered the arena of learned rivalry as well as that of practical regeneration. We are confident that their efforts in both spheres will be attended with success. The very foundation of these industrial and agricultural colonies on their part gives them a point of support that is very desirable in the work of regenerating this impoverished and desolate land, though in itself so rich and promising. And he who looks with reverence and love to the land where our Saviour mingled with men and imparted to them His divine teachings, must gather new hope for its restoration to civilisation and humanity, knowing the sturdy efforts that are now being made by men of pious enthusiasm and Christian zeal to introduce a better state of things. They are teaching by example as well as precept, and they have come to conquer or perish in the attempt. They are of the stuff of which martyrs are made, and if any can succeed in this much-needed work, they are these men.

WILLIAM WELLS.

ART. X.—*The Faith of Islám.*

III. THE BOOKS.

AL BERKEVI says :—

“ It is necessary to believe that the books of God have been sent through the instrumentality of Gabriel to prophets upon the earth. The books are never sent except to prophets. The Qurán was sent to Muhammad portion by portion during a space of twenty-three years. The Pentateuch came to Moses : the Injil to Jesus, the Zabúr to David, and the other books to other prophets. The whole number of the divine books is 104. The Qurán, the last of all, is to be followed till the day of judgment. It can neither be abrogated nor changed. Some laws of the previous books have been abrogated by the Qurán, and ought not now to be followed.”

The one hundred and four books were sent from heaven in the following order :—To Adam, ten ; to Seth, fifty ; to Enoch

(Idris), thirty; to Abraham, ten; to Moses, the Taurát (Pentateuch); to David, the Zabúr; to Jesus, the Injíl; to Muhammad, the Qurán. The one hundred to which no distinctive name is given are known as the "Suhúf-ul-Anbiya,"—Books of the Prophets. The Qurán is also known as the Fúrqán, the distinguisher; the Qurán-i-Sharíf, noble Qurán; the Qurán-i-Majíd, glorious Qurán; the Mushaf, the Book. It is said to be the compendium of the Taurát, Zabúr, and Injíl;¹ so Muslims do not require to study these books. The orthodox belief is that they are entirely abrogated by the Qurán,² though Syed Ahmad denounces as ignorant and foolish those Musalmáns who say so.³ Be that as it may, their inspiration is considered to be of a lower order than that of the Qurán. A large portion of the Injíl is considered as mere narrative. The actual words of Christ only are to be looked upon as the revelation which descended from heaven. It is so in the case of the Old Testament Prophets. "However, it was the rule to call a book by the name of the prophet, whether the subject-matter was pure doctrine only, or whether it was mixed up with narrative

¹ *Sharh-Aqáid-i-Jámi*, p. 140.

² *Ibid.* p. 147. Mansukh shud tiláwatan wa Kitábatan, i.e. abrogated both as regards reading and writing—entirely abrogated. Also Takmil-ul-Imán, p. 64. Din-i-wai Násikh-i-jamí'-i-adian ast.—"His religion abrogates all religions."

³ Commentary on the Holy Bible by Syed Ahmad, C.S.I., vol. i. p. 268. This Commentary is written in Urdu, but a translation is given for the benefit of the English reader. The passage referred to reads thus in English: "Those who imagine it to be part of the Mohamedan creed that one law has totally repealed another are utterly mistaken, and we do not believe that the Zuboor (Book of Psalms) abrogated the Taureit (Pentateuch); that the Taureit in turn gave way to the Injeel (New Testament), and that the New Testament was suppressed by the Holy Koran. We hold no such doctrine, and if any ignorant Mohamedan should assert to the contrary, he simply knows nothing whatever about the doctrines and articles of his faith." The learned Syed assumes the rôle of a liberal Musalmán before the Christian public, but unfortunately for his object the English translation of his Urdu text is by no means correct. The Urdu literally translated is as follows: "Now it should be considered that those who imagine it to be part of the creed of Muslims that the Taurát by the coming of the Zabur, and the Zabur by the coming of the Injíl, and the Injíl by the coming of the Qurán are abrogated on account of the idea that there is any defect in them, are utterly mistaken, etc."

The clause which we have italicised is entirely omitted in the English text; but it alters the whole passage. To his co-religionists the Syed says in effect: "The books are abrogated, but not because they were imperfect." Now, as no Muslim would believe that a divine book was defective, the Syed is simply asserting the fact of the abrogation of the previous Scriptures, and to the orthodox is orthodox. The leader of an apparently liberal section of Indian Musalmáns is in reality as conservative as the most bigoted.

also." "It is to be observed that, in the case of our own Prophet, the revelations made to him were intended to impart a special miracle of eloquence, and they were written down, literally and exactly, in the form in which they were communicated without any narrative being inserted in them."¹ The writings of the Apostles are not considered to be inspired books. "We do not consider that the Acts of the Apostles, or the various Epistles, although unquestionably very good books, are to be taken as part and parcel of the New Testament itself; nevertheless we look upon the writings of the Apostles in the same light as we do the writings of the Companions of our own Prophet; that is to say, as entitled to veneration and respect."² There are many verses in the Qurán which speak of previous revelations, thus:—"We also caused Jesus, the son of Mary, to follow the footsteps of the prophets, confirming the law (Taurát) which was sent before him, and we gave him the Injíl, etc.—(Súra v. 50.) "A blessed book have we sent down to thee."—(Súra lix. 28.) This probably refers to David and the Zabúr.

IV. PROPHETS.

Muhammad Al Berkevi says:—

"It is necessary to confess that God has sent prophets; that Adam is the first of the prophets and the father of all men; that Muhammad is the last of the prophets; that between Adam and Muhammad there were a great number of prophets; that Muhammad is the most excellent of all, and that his people are the best of all peoples; that each of the preceding prophets was sent to a special people, some with books, some without, but that Muhammad was sent to all men and also to the Genii; that his law will remain until the end of the world; that his miracles are many in number; that by his blessed finger he made waters flow; that he divided the moon into two parts; that animals, trees, and stones said to him, 'Thou art a true prophet.'

"We must also believe that one night he was transported from Mecca to Jerusalem, and from thence to heaven, where he saw both paradise and hell, conversed with the Most High, and returned to Mecca before morning. After him no other prophet will come, for he is the seal of the prophets."

The number of prophets sent by God to make known His will varies according to the tradition which records it. About two hundred thousand is the usual number stated. Twenty-

¹ Syed Ahmad's *Commentary on the Holy Bible*, vol. i. p. 22.

² *Ibid.* p. 31.

five are mentioned by name in the Qurán, of whom six are distinguished by special titles. Adam, Sufi-Ulláh, the chosen of God; Noah, Nabi-Ulláh, the prophet of God; Abraham, Khalil Ulláh, the friend of God; Moses, Kalím Ulláh, the speaker with God; Jesus, Rúh Ulláh, the spirit of God; Muhammad, Rasúl Ulláh, the messenger of God. These are called the Anbiya-ulul-'Azam (possessors of purpose), because they were the heads of their respective dispensations, and because they will be permitted by God to intercede in the day of judgment for their followers. They are the greatest and most exalted of the prophets.¹

There are degrees of rank amongst the prophets, for "Some of the Apostles have we endowed more highly than others. Those to whom God hath spoken, He hath raised to the loftiest grade."—(Súra ii. 254.) The Anbiya-ulul-'Azam are ranked in the following order: Noah, Jesus, Moses, Abraham, and as the chief of all, Muhammad, of whom it is said:—"He is the Apostle of God and the seal of the prophets."—(Súra xxxiii. 40.)

A Hadís, as usual, supports his position. "I am the chief of the sons of men." "Adam and all beside him will be ranged under my flag in the judgment-day."² It is said that the law given by Moses was harsh and severe; that by Christ was mild and gracious; but that the law given by Muhammad is perfect, for it combines both the quality of strictness and that of graciousness; according to the Hadís, "I always laugh, and by laughing kill."³ Each prophet is said to have been sent to his own tribe, but Muhammad was sent for all men. A Hadís is adduced to support this statement: "I was raised up for all men, whether white or black; other prophets were not except for their own tribe." The Qurán also states: "We have sent thee (Muhammad) for all men."

There is some difference of opinion as to whether the prophets are superior to the Angels. The Hanifites hold that the prophets amongst men are superior to the prophets amongst Angels, who in their turn are superior to the ordinary run of men, to whom again the Angels, other than prophets, are inferior. The Mutazilites say that the Angels are superior to the prophets. The Shí'ahs assert that the twelve Imáms are superior to prophets.

¹ *Takmil-ul-Imán*, p. 59.

² *Ibid.* p. 59.

³ *Ibid.* p. 65.

The way in which Muhammad received inspiration has been shown in a previous chapter; but Ibn Khaldoun gives such an interesting account of prophetic inspiration that we give the substance of his remarks here. He speaks somewhat as follows.¹ If we contemplate the world, and the creatures it contains, we shall recognise a perfect order, a regular system, a sequence of cause and effect, a connection between different categories of existence, and a transformation of beings from one category of existence to another. Then the phenomena of the visible world indicate to us the existence of an agent whose nature is different from that of the body, who is in fact a spiritual existence. This agent, which is the soul, must on the one hand be in contact with the existences of this world, and, on the other, with the existences in the next category of superiority, and one whose essential qualities are pure perception and clear intelligence. Such are the Angels. It follows, then, that the human soul has a tendency towards the Angelic world. All this is quite in accordance with the idea that, according to a regular order, all the categories of existences in the universe are in mutual contact by means of their faculties and on account of their nature.

The souls of men may be divided into three classes. The first kind of soul is too feeble by nature to attain to a perception of the spiritual; it has to content itself with moving in the region of sense and imagination. Thus it can understand concepts and affirmations. It can raise itself high in its own category, but cannot pass its limit.

The souls of the second class are carried by a reflective movement and a natural disposition towards a spiritual intelligence. They can enter into a state of contemplation which results in ecstasy. This is the intuition of the Saints (Auliya)² to whom God has given this divine knowledge.

The souls of the third class are created with the power of disengaging themselves altogether from their human bodies in order that they may rise to the Angelic state where they become like Angels. In a moment of time such a soul per-

¹ *Prolegomènes D'Ibn Khaldoun*, vol. i. pp. 196-205.

² That the "Auliya" are distinguished above ordinary mortals is maintained on the authority of—"Are not the friends (Auliya) of God, those on whom no fear shall come, nor shall they be put to grief."—(Sûra x. 63.)

ceives the sublime company (of Angels) in the sphere which contains them. It, there and then, hears the speech of the soul and the divine voice. Such are the souls of the prophets. God has given to these souls the power of leaving the human body. Whilst thus separate from it God gives to them His revelation. The prophets are endowed by God with such a purity of disposition, such an instinct of uprightness that they are naturally inclined to the spiritual world. They are animated by ardour quite peculiar to their order. When they return from the Angelic state they deliver to men the revelations they have received. Sometimes the revelation comes to the prophet as the humming of confused discourse. He grasps the ideas, and as soon as the humming ceases he comprehends the message; sometimes an Angel in human form communicates the revelation, and what he says the prophet learns by heart. The journey to, the return from, the Angelic state, and the comprehension of the revelation received there occupy less time than the twinkling of an eye. So rapidly do the souls of prophets move. So instantaneously do they receive and understand God's revelations. This is why inspiration is called *wahí*, a word which in Arabic means to make haste.

The first way of delivering a message is adopted when he who receives is only a Nabi (Prophet), and not a Rasúl (Apostle or Messenger). The second mode is employed towards a Rasúl, who, on the principle that the greater contains the less, is also a Nabi. A Hadís records that Muhammad said, "Revelation came to me sometimes like the ticking of a clock and fatigued me much. When it stopped I learnt the meaning of what had been delivered to me. Sometimes an Angel in human form spoke to me, and whilst he was speaking I learnt what was said." That a prophet should feel oppressed on such occasions is hinted at in "We shall devolve on thee mighty words."—(Súra lxxiii. 5.)

A Nabi (who must be a wise and a free man, that is, one who is not a slave of another, and one also who is free from imperfection either of body or mind), receives *wahí*, but has not necessarily to deliver to men the orders of God. A Rasúl who must possess the same qualifications as a Nabi is one who is commanded to deliver God's message to men, though he

does not necessarily abrogate what preceding Rasúls have delivered. Neither is it necessary that he should bring a book or even a new law. Some Rasúls do so, but the distinguishing mark of the Rasúl is that he delivers to men commands direct from God, and is specially commissioned so to do. Thus every Rasúl is a Nabi, whilst every Nabi is not a Rasúl.

The question of the sinlessness of the prophets is one to which considerable attention has been paid by Muslim theologians. The orthodox belief is that they are free from sin. Some think that their freedom from sin is because, the grace of God being ever in them in the richest fulness, they are kept in the right path. The Ash'arians believe that the power of sinning is not created in them.¹ The Mutazilites deny this, but admit the existence of some quality which keeps them from evil. These theories do not agree with actual facts. Prophets like other men commit faults, but here comes in the Muslim distinction of sins into *gunáh-i-kabíra*, "great sins," and *gunáh-i-saghíra*, "little sins." The *gunáh-i-kabíra* are, murder, adultery, disobedience to God and to parents, robbing of orphans, to accuse others of adultery, to avoid fighting against Infidels, drunkenness, to give or to take usury, to neglect the Friday prayers and the Ramazán fast, tyranny, backbiting, untrustworthiness, forgetting the Qurán after reading it, to avoid giving true or to give false witness, lying without sufficient reason,² to swear falsely, or to swear by any other than God, flattery of tyrants, false judgments, giving short weight or measure, magic, gambling, approval of the ceremonies of Infidels, boasting of one's piety, calling on the names of deceased persons, and beating the breast at such times,³ dancing, music, neglect when opportunity offers of warning other persons with regard to the "commands and prohibitions" of God, disrespect to a Háfiz, to shave the beard, to omit saying the "*darúd*" (on whom and on whose family be the peace and mercy of God) whenever the name of Muhammad is mentioned.⁴ These are all "great sins," and

¹ *Sharh-i-Aqá'id-i-Jámi*, p. 125.

² *Sirát-ul-Islám*, p. 18.

³ This is an orthodox blow at the Shí'ah practices in the month of Muharram. Shí'ahs consider this a good act.

⁴ *Takmil-ul-Imán*, p. 18.

can only be forgiven after due repentance: the "little sins" are forgiven if some good actions are done. "Observe prayer at early morning, at the close of day, and at the approach of night; for *good deeds drive away evils*."—(Súra xi. 116.)

Men may commit sin wittingly or unwittingly. It is the universal belief that a prophet never commits the greater sins in either way; but there is a difference of opinion with regard to the lesser sins. Some hold that they can do them unwittingly, though even then it is not in anything connected with their office. Others again limit even this frailty to the period before "wahi" (inspiration) comes upon them. The general opinion, however, is that they are free from all sin, whether great or small. The frailties which they show are merely reckoned as faults and slight imperfections not amounting to sin.

This, to the Muslim mind, at once disposes of a difficulty the Qurán itself raises on this point. With the exception of Jesus Christ, the Anbiya-ulul-'Azam are spoken of as doing what every one except an orthodox Muslim would call sin. Adam's transgression¹ is referred to in Súra ii. 29-37, and in Súra vii. 10-24. We quote only one verse, "They said, 'O our Lord! with ourselves have we dealt unjustly; if Thou forgive us not, and have not pity on us, we shall surely be of those that perish.'" The sin of Noah is not specified in the Qurán, yet it is plainly hinted at. "To Thee verily, O my Lord, do I repair, lest I ask that of Thee wherein I have no knowledge: unless Thou forgive me, and be merciful to me, I shall be one of the lost."—(Súra xi. 49.) There is also a similar request in Súra lxxi. 29. Abraham is represented as saying to his people, "They whom ye worship, ye and your fathers of early days, are my foes; but not so the Lord of the worlds, who hath created me, and guideth me, who giveth me food and drink; and when I am sick, he healeth me, and who will cause me to die, and again quicken me, and who, I hope, will forgive me my sins in the day of reckoning."—(Súra xxvi. 75-82.) Moses is described as having done "a work of

¹ It is said Adam's sin was a mere slip, but it brought good to the world. Had he remained in Paradise the world would not have been peopled; and the word of God, "I have not created men and Jinns, except for worship," would not have been fulfilled.

Satan" in killing a man, and as saying, "'O my Lord, I have sinned to my own hurt; forgive me.' So God forgave him; for He is the forgiving, the merciful. He said, 'Lord, because thou hast showed me this grace, I will never again be the helper of the wicked.'"—(Súra xxviii. 15, 16.)

The following passages refer to Muhammad. "Be thou steadfast and patient; for true is the promise of God; and seek pardon for thy fault."¹—(Súra xl. 57.) "Ask pardon for thy sin, and for believers, both men and women."—(Súra xlvii. v. 21.) The scandal caused by the Prophet's conduct with the wife of Zeid, and with the Egyptian slave Mary, necessitated a pretended revelation of God's will in reference to these events. The circumstance will be found fully detailed in Súra xxxiii. 36-38 and in Súra lxvi. 1-5.

One of the most important verses is "Verily, we have won for thee an undoubted victory, in token that God forgiveth thy earlier and later fault."—(Súra xlviii. 1-2.) It is not quite clear what victory is here referred to. According to the *Tafsír-i-Husaini*, some commentators add that it is the taking of Mecca, the past tense being prophetically used for the future. The following explanations are given of the expression "earlier and later fault":—(1.) God has forgiven thy sin committed before and after the descent of wahi; (2.) before and after the taking of Mecca; or (3.) before the descent of this Súra; (4.) The commentator Salmi says: "The earlier sin refers to the sin of Adam committed when Muhammad was in the loins of his great ancestor and thus connected with him; the later sin refers to the followers of the Prophet and in that way is connected with him, just as the sin of Adam was the predecessor and the cause of their sin;" (5.) Imám Ab-ul-Lais says: "The words refer to the sin of Adam, and to those of the followers of the Prophet. Both are connected with Muhammad, because the former is forgiven by the blessing and the latter by the intercession of Muhammad."²

From these extracts from the Qurán it appears that sin is imputed to prophets, though Muslims evade the charge by the casuistry we have already referred to. Be that as it may, it is

¹ That is, according to the Commentator Beidawi, "Thy remissness in propagating Islam."

² *Tafsír-i-Husaini*, p. 332.

a striking fact that the one sinless member of the Anbiya-ulul-'Azam, the one sinless prophet of Islám, is none other than Jesus Christ. There is no passage in the Qurán which hints at sin, even in the modified form in which Muslims attribute it to other prophets, being committed by Him: no passage which speaks of His seeking for pardon.

It is the universal belief that prophets work miracles (*mu'jizát*). A miracle is defined to be "*Kharq-i-'ádat*," that is, something contrary to the usual course of nature. The object must be a moral one and chiefly to attest the truth of the statements made by the prophet. Although Muhammad makes, in the Qurán, no distinct claim to the power of working miracles,¹ his followers maintain that in this, as in all other respects he was equal to all and superior to some prophets, and produce various passages of the Qurán in support of their view. Thus, according to Shaikh Jelál-ud-dín Syuti, if to Adam was given the power of naming everything, Muhammad also possessed the same power. Enoch was exalted on high, but Muhammad was taken to the "*Baqáb-i-qausain*," the "two bows' length," where Gabriel, "one mighty in power," appeared to him.—(*Súra* liii. 5-9). Ishmael was ready to be sacrificed, but Muhammad endured the splitting of his chest;² Joseph was to some extent handsome, but Muhammad was the very perfection of beauty; Moses brought water from the rock, but Muhammad produced it from his fingers. The sun was stayed on its course by Joshua, and so it was by Muhammad. Solomon had a great kingdom, Muhammad a greater, for he possessed the keys of the treasuries of the earth. Wisdom was given to John the Baptist whilst yet a child, so also were wisdom and understanding granted to Muhammad at an early

¹ On the contrary, he seems to disclaim such a power. Thus the Quraish said, "By no means will we believe on thee till thou cause a fountain to gush forth for us from the earth; or, till thou have a garden of palm-trees and grapes, and thou cause forth-gushing rivers to gush forth in its midst; or thou make the heaven to fall on us, as thou hast given out, in pieces; or thou bring God and the Angels to vouch for thee, etc. Say: Am I more than a man, an Apostle?"—(*Súra* xvii. 92-95.) Former prophets, Muhammad used to say, were sent to their own sect, but he was sent for all. Their miracles were confined to their own times. The Qurán, the great miracle of of Islam, was for all ages. He needed no other sign than this.

² "Have we not opened thy breast."—(*Súra* xciv. 1.) Tradition relates that when young, two Angels cut open his breast, and took out a black drop; many other marvels are also connected with this event.

period of his life. Jesus could raise the dead, so also could Muhammad. In addition to all these, the special miracles of the prophet are the splitting of the moon asunder, the Mi'rāj, the coming of a tree into his presence, and above all the wonderful miracle of the Qurán.¹

The splitting of the moon in sunder is referred to in "The hour of judgment approacheth; and the moon hath been split in sunder."—(Súra liv. 1.) Imám Záhíd says that Abu Jahl and a Jew visited the Prophet, and demanded a sign from him on pain of death. The Prophet made a sign with his little finger, and at once the moon separated into two parts: one of which remained in the sky, the other went off to a long distance. The Jew believed in Islám forthwith. Abu Jahl ascribed the affair to magic, but on making inquiry from various travellers ascertained that they on this very night distinctly saw the moon in two parts.² Some, however, refer the passage to the future, as they consider the splitting of the moon to be one of the signs of the last day.

The Mi'rāj, or night ascent, is mentioned in "Glory be to Him who carried His servant by night from the sacred temple (of Mecca) to the temple that is more remote, whose precinct we have blessed, that we might show him of our signs."—(Súra xvii. 1.) Muslim writers, who are fond of the marvellous, narrate at length the wonderful things the Prophet saw and did on this eventful night;³ but some maintain that it was only a vision, and quote the words, "We ordained the vision which we showed thee," (Súra lxvii. 62) in proof of this assertion.⁴ Be that as it may, all orthodox Muslims maintain the superiority of Muhammad, as a worker of miracles, over all other prophets.

¹ *Shark-i-'Aqáid-i-Jámi.*

² *Tafsir-i-Husaini*, p. 362.

³ For a graphic account of these events see *Literary Remains of Enanuel Deutsch*, pp. 99-102.

⁴ "All that the Muhammadans must believe respecting the Mi'rāj is that the Prophet saw himself, in a vision, transported from Mecca to Jerusalem, and that in such a vision he really beheld some of the greatest signs of his Lord."—(Essays by Syed Ahmad, Essay xi. p. 34.) This, though a legitimate, is not, however, an orthodox opinion; which is, that he who denies an actual bodily migration from Mecca to Jerusalem is a Káfir (infidel), as he denies the statement of a "nass" or plain text of the Qurán. He who denies the ascension to heaven, and the wonderful account of the night's proceedings preserved in the Traditions is a "fásiq" (sinner), though he remains a Muslim.

V. THE RESURRECTION AND THE LAST DAY.

We may consider these two articles of the faith together. The following is a summary of the remarks of Muhammad Al Berkevi on this point. It is necessary to acknowledge—

- “(1.) That the torments of the tomb are real and certain, and that Munkar and Nakir will come and interrogate the dead person concerning his God, his Prophet, his faith, and his Qibla. The faithful will reply, Our God is God; our Prophet is Muhammad; our religion, Islam; our Qibla, the Ka’ba.

“(2.) That all the signs of the last day mentioned by the Prophet will come to pass; such as the appearance of *Dajjal*, or Antichrist; the descent of Jesus from heaven; the appearance of Imām Mahdi and of Gog and Magog; the rising of the sun from the west, etc.

“(3.) That all living things will die; that the mountains will fly in the air like birds; that the heavens will melt away; that after some time has thus passed, God most High will set the earth in order and raise the dead; that Prophets, Saints, doctors of the law, and the faithful will find near them the robes and the horses of Paradise. They will put on the robes, and mount the horses and go into the shade of the throne of God. Other men, hungry, thirsty, and naked will go on foot. The Faithful will go to the right, the Infidels to the left.

“(4.) That there will be a balance, in which the good and bad actions of men will be weighed. Those whose good deeds outweigh the bad will go to Paradise, if the bad predominate they will go into the fire, unless God has mercy on them, or the Prophets or Saints intercede for them. If, however, they were not Muslims there will be no intercession for them, nor will they come out from the fire. The Muslims who enter the fire will, after having purged their crimes, enter Paradise.

“(5.) That the bridge Sirát, which is sharper than a sword, is raised above the fire; that all men must pass over this. Some will pass over with the speed of lightning, some like a horse that runs, some, their backs laden with their sins, will go very slowly over; others will fall and certainly enter into the fire.

“(6.) That each prophet has a pool where he, with his people, will quench their thirst before entering Paradise; that the pool of Muhammad is the largest of all, for it is a month’s march from one side thereof to the other. Its water is sweeter than honey, whiter than milk.

“(7.) That Paradise and Hell actually exist; that the chosen remain for ever in the former; they neither die nor grow aged. They experience no kind of change. The Houris and the females are exempted from the infirmities of their sex. They will no longer bear children. The elect will find there the meat and the drink they require without taking upon themselves any trouble. The ground of Paradise is of musk; the bricks of its edifices are of gold and of silver.

“The unbelievers and the demons will remain for ever in hell, tormented

by serpents as thick as the neck of a camel, by scorpions as large as mules, by fire and by scalding water. Their bodies will burn, till they become reduced to a coal, when God will revive them so that they may endure fresh torments. This will last for ever."

The following additional remarks are based on the *Sharh-i-'Aqáid-i-Jámi*. They fall under four heads.

(1.) The sounding of the trumpets (*Nafkhatain-i-Súr*). This will not take place until wickedness spreads over all the earth. The Prophet said:—"The last hour will not be till no one is found who calls on God." Then, "There shall be a blast on the trumpet, and all who are in the heavens and all who are in the earth shall expire, save those whom God shall vouchsafe to live. There shall be another blast on it, and lo! arising they shall gaze around them."—(*Súra xxxix. 68.*) Abu Huraira, a Companion, relates, that the Prophet speaking of the trumpet stated as follows:—"After the creation of the heavens and the earth God created the trumpet and gave it to Isráfíl who, with his mouth placed to it, is ever looking up and waiting for the order to blow it. He will blow three times.¹ The first time, the blast of consternation, to terrify; the second, the blast of exanimation, to slay; the third, the blast of resurrection, to quicken the dead." Most persons believe that everything, save God and His attributes, will perish. The Karamians and some other sects deny this. The resurrection of the body is clearly proved by the Qurán. Thus, "They say, 'Who will bring us back?' Say, He who created you at first."—(*Súra xvii. 53.*) "Who shall give life to bones when they are rotten? Say, He shall give life to them who gave them being at first, for in all creation is he skilled.—(*Súra xxxvi. 79.*) "Man saith, 'What! after I am dead, shall I in the end be brought forth alive?' Doth not man bear in mind that we made him at first, when he was nought."—(*Súra xix. 68.*) "The infidels will say, 'Shall we indeed be restored as at first? What! When we have become rotten bones?' 'This then,' say they, 'will be a return to loss.' Verily, it will be but a single blast, and lo! they are on the surface of the earth."—(*Súra lxxix. 10-14.*) "Is He not powerful enough to quicken the dead?"—(*Súra lxxv. 40.*) This resurrection will be to

¹ Some commentators make no distinction between the first and second blast, as only two are distinctly mentioned in the Qurán.

judgment. "'Never,' say the unbelievers, 'will the Hour come upon us.' Say: Yea, by my Lord who knoweth the unseen, it will surely come upon you, . . . to the intent that God may reward those who have believed, . . . but as for those who aim to invalidate our signs, a chastisement of painful torment awaiteth them."—(Súra xxxiv. 3, 4.) "A terrible chastisement doth await them *on the Day* when faces shall turn white, and faces shall turn black, 'What! after your belief have ye become infidels? Taste, then, the chastisement for that ye have been unbelievers.' And as to those whose faces shall have become white, they shall be within the mercy of God."—(Súra iii. 102.) These and similar texts show the certainty of the resurrection. According to the *Ijmā'* of the Faithful, he who has any doubts on this article of the faith is an infidel. The Mutazilites show from reason that a resurrection of the body is necessary in order that rewards and punishment may be bestowed. The Orthodox agree with the conclusion, but hesitate to base it on reason.¹

The Karamians hold that the different parts of the body will not cease to be, but that at the last God will gather them together. "Thinketh man that we shall not re-unite his bones? Ay! his very finger-tips we are able evenly to replace."—(Súra lxxi. 3, 4.) The orthodox, however, hold that this verse does not disprove the fact of previous annihilation, a belief supported by the Prophet's saying, "All the sons of men will be annihilated." It will be a re-creation, though the body will return to its former state.

The learned are not agreed as to the state of the soul during this period of the death of the body, and therefore disagree with regard to its revival. Some assert that it is wrong to speak of a resurrection of the soul, for it exists in the body as "fire in coal," hence its revival is included in the resurrection of the body; others maintain that as it is a distinct entity, it is not annihilated with the body. The scholastics favour the first idea. Practically the result seems the same in both cases. The resurrection body has a soul. Wise and foolish, devils and beasts, insects and birds—all will rise at the last day. Muhammad will come first in order and be the first to enter Paradise.

¹ *Sharh-i-'Aqā'id-i-Jāmi*, p. 183.

(2.) The descent of the Books (*Tatátr-i-sahá,tf*). After the resurrection, men will wander about for forty years, during which time the "Books of Actions" will be given to them. These books contain the record kept by the Kirám-ul-Katibín.¹ A tradition recorded by Abu Huraira states: "Men will rise up naked, and confused; some will walk about, some stand for forty years. All will be constantly looking up toward the heavens (*i.e.* expecting the books). They will perspire profusely through excess of sorrow.² Then God will say to Abraham, 'Put on clothes.' He will put on a robe of Paradise. Then He will call Muhammad, for whose benefit a fountain will flow forth not far from Mecca. The people, too, shall thirst no more. The Prophet said, 'I will also put on a dress and will stand near the throne, where no one else will be allowed to stand, and God will say, Ask and it shall be granted to thee; intercede, thy intercession shall be accepted.'" Each book flies from the treasury under the throne and is given to its proper owner. "On the day of resurrection will we bring forth to him (every man) a book which shall be proffered to him wide open: 'Read thy book, there needeth none but thyself to make out an account against thee this day.'"—(Súra xvii. 15). "He into whose *right* hand his book shall be given, shall be reckoned, with an easy reckoning, and shall turn, rejoicing, to his kindred. But he whose book shall be given behind his back (*i.e.* into his *left* hand) shall invoke destruction."—(Súra lxxxiv. 8-11.) "He who shall have his book into his *left* hand will say, 'O that my book had never been given me! and that I had not known my reckoning.'"—(Súra lxix. 25). Wicked Musalmáns are seized by the *right* hand before they are cast into the fire, which is a proof that they are not always to remain there. Some hold that the expression, "Read thy book," implies a literal reading; others that it is a metaphorical expression which simply means that all the past actions will be known. Those who believe in a literal reading say that each believer will read the account of his faults only, and that other persons will read that of his good deeds. The

¹ See *ante*, vol. xxix, p. 783.

² According to Bukhári and to Muslim, this perspiration will flow to a distance of seventy-five yards from, and reach up to the lobe of the ears of, those who perspire.

face of the believer as he reads will shine resplendently, but black will be the face of the infidel.

(3.) The Balances (*Mizán*). This belief is based on the authority of the Qurán, Sunnat, and the Ijmá';¹ no Muslim, therefore, can have any doubt about it. Thus, "They whose balances shall be heavy, shall be the blest; but they whose balances shall be light,—they are these who shall lose their souls, abiding in hell for ever."—(Súra xxiii. 104.) "As to him whose balances are heavy, his shall be a life that shall please him well; and as to him whose balances are light, his dwelling-place shall be the pit. And who shall teach thee what the pit (*Al-Hawíya*) is? A raging fire!"—(Súra ci. 5-8. The traditions on this point are very numerous. The Ijmá' is also strong on the reality, the objective existence, of a balance with scales, etc., complete. They also state that the books of actions (*Saháf-i-A'mál*) will be weighed. From the *Sahíf-i-Bukhári* we learn that the believers will not be weighed in the balances; for "God will say, 'O Muhammad, make those of thy people from whom no account is taken enter into Paradise.'" Prophets and angels will also be exempt. Such a test also is not required for the unbelievers, for their state is very evident; "By their tokens shall the sinners be known, and they shall be seized by their forelocks and their feet."—(Súra lv. 41.) Thus it is evident that, with regard to true believers and unbelievers, the works of such only as God may choose need be weighed. Some, however, maintain that no unbeliever will have this test applied to his case, and quote: "Vain, therefore, are their works; and no weight will we allow them on the day of the resurrection."—(Súra xviii. 105.) To this it is answered, that all that is here denied is the fact of "a weighing in their favour." The place where the weighing will take place is situated midway between heaven and hell. Gabriel standing by watches the movement of the Scales and Michael guards the Balance. The orthodox are not agreed as to whether there will be a separate balance for each tribe of men, and also for each of the "good works" of the believers. Those who hold that there will be a balance for prayer, another for fasting, and so on, adduce the use of the plural form—balances

For an account of the foundations of dogma, vide No. civ. of this Review, article "Church of Islám."

(Muwázín)—in proof of their statement. There is also a difference of opinion as to whether the “works” themselves, or the books (Saháf) will be weighed. The latter opinion is supported by a tradition recorded by Tirmízi. “The prophet said, ‘Ninety-nine registers will be distributed. Each register will extend as far as the eye can reach. God will say, ‘What, dost thou deny this, or have the recording angels treated thee unjustly?’ Each will say: ‘No! O Lord.’ ‘Hast thou then any excuse?’ ‘No! O Lord.’ Then God will display a cloth on which the Kalima is written. This will be put into one scale, and God will say: ‘To thee will be no evil if thou hast a register in this scale, and this cloth in the other, for the first scale will be light.’” This is considered conclusive testimony with regard to the weighing of the Saháf. The Mutazilites said, “actions are accidents, and the qualities of lightness and heaviness cannot be attributed to accidents.” They explained the verses of the Qurán and the statements of the traditions on this point, as being a figurative way of saying that perfect justice will be done to all in the Day of Judgment.

(4.) The Bridge (*Sirát*). The meaning of the word *Sirát* is a road, a way. It is so used in the Qurán. In connection with the Day of Judgment it is said, “If we pleased we would surely put out their eyes: yet even then would they speed on with rivalry in their path (*Sirát*).”—(Súra xxxvi. 66.) “Gather together those who have acted unjustly, and their consorts (demons), and the gods whom they have adored beside God; and guide them to the road (*Sirát*) for hell.”—(Súra xxxvii. 23.) It is nowhere in the Qurán called a bridge, but Tradition is very clear on this point. The Prophet said:—“There will be a bridge sharper than the edge of a sword, finer than a hair, suspended over hell. Iron spikes on it will pierce those whom God wills. Some will pass over it in the twinkling of an eye, some like a flash of lightning, others with the speed of a swift horse. The Angels will call out, ‘O Lord! save and protect.’ Some Muslims will be saved, some will fall headlong into hell.” Bukhári relates a similar Tradition. The Infidels will all fall into hell and there remain for ever. Muslims will be released after a while.

The Mutazilites deny the existence of such a bridge. “If we admit it,” say they, “it would be a trouble for the Believers,

and such there is not for them in the Day of Judgment." To this the orthodox reply that the Believers pass over it to show how they are saved from fire, and that thus they may be delighted with Paradise, and also that the Infidels may feel chagrin at those who were with them on the bridge being now safe for ever.

Al A'ráf is situated between heaven and hell. It is described thus: "On (the wall) Al A'ráf shall be men who know all, by their tokens,¹ and they shall cry to the inhabitants of Paradise, 'Peace be on you!' but they shall not yet enter it, although they long to do so. And when their eyes are turned towards the inmates of the fire, they shall say, "O our Lord! place us not with offending people, etc.'"—(Súra vii. 44, 45.) Sale's summary of the opinions regarding Al A'ráf in his Preliminary Discourse is exceedingly good. It is as follows:—

"They call it Al Orf, and more frequently in the plural, Al Aráf, a word derived from the verb *Arafa*, which signifies to distinguish between things, or to part them; though some commentators give another reason for the imposition of this name, because, say they, those who stand on this partition will *know* and *distinguish* the blessed from the damned, by their respective marks or characteristics: and others say the word properly intends anything that is *high raised* or *elevated*, as such a wall of separation must be supposed to be. Some imagine it to be a sort of *limbo* for the patriarchs and Prophets, or for the martyrs and those who have been most eminent for sanctity. Others place here such whose good and evil works are so equal that they exactly counterpoise each other, and therefore deserve neither reward nor punishment; and these, say they, will on the last day be admitted into Paradise, after they shall have performed an act of adoration, which will be imputed to them as a merit, and will make the scale of their good works to overbalance. Others suppose this intermediate space will be a receptacle for those who have gone to war without their parents' leave, and therein suffered martyrdom; being excluded from Paradise for their disobedience, and escaping hell because they are martyrs."

There is also an interval, between the death of the body in this world and the Last Day, called Al-Barzakh. "Behind them shall be a barrier (barzakh), until the day when they shall be raised again."—(Súra xxiii. 102.) When death takes place, the soul is separated from the body by the Angel of

¹ "That is, they will know the inhabitants of Paradise by their whiteness, and the people of Hell by the blackness of their faces."

death; in the case of the good with ease, in that of the wicked with violence. It then enters into Al-Barzakh.¹

It is a doctrine founded on *Ijmā'*, that God will not pardon *Shirk*, that is, the ascribing plurality to the Divine Being. The *Mushrik*, one who does so, will remain in hell for ever, for as *Kufr*, infidelity, is an eternal crime, its punishment must also be eternal. "The unbelievers among the people of the Book, and among the Polytheists, shall go into the fire of Gehenna to abide therein for aye."—(Súra xcvi. 5.)²

Muslims who commit great (*Kabíra*) sins, though they die unrepentant, will not remain in hell for ever, for, "whosoever shall have wrought an atom's weight of good shall behold it."—(Súra xcix. 7.) It is asserted that the fact of believing in Islám is a good work and merits a reward: this cannot be given before the man enters hell to be punished for his sins, and therefore he must be, after a while, released from punishment. "Perfect faith (*Imán-i-Kámil*) consists in believing with sincerity of heart and acting in accordance thereto, but the actions are not the faith itself. Great sins, therefore, prevent a man from having "perfect faith," but do not destroy faith (*Imán*), nor make the Muslim an infidel, but only a sinner."³

The Mutazilites teach that the Muslim who enters hell will remain there for ever. They maintain that the person who, having committed great sins, dies unrepentant, though not an infidel, ceases to be a Believer, and hence suffers as the infidels do.

The orthodox belief is that Muhammad is now an Intercessor and will be so at the Last Day. The intercession then is of several kinds. There is the "great intercession" to which the words, "it may be that thy Lord will raise thee to a glorious station" (Súra xvii. 81), are supposed to refer. The *Maqám-i-Mahmúd* (glorious station) is said to be the place of intercession in which all persons will praise the Prophet.⁴ In the *Zád-ul-Masír* it is said that the *Maqám-i-Mahmúd* refers to the fact that God will place the Prophet on His throne. Others say that it is a place in which a Standard

¹ For some curious opinions with regard to the state of the soul there see Sale's *Korán*, section iv. p. 55.

² See also Súra l. 26-30.

³ *Takmil-ul-Imán*, p. 47.

⁴ *Tafsír-i-Husaini*, vol. i. p. 397.

will be given to the Prophet, around whom all the other prophets will then gather to do him honour. The first interpretation is, however, the ordinary one. The people will be in great fear. Muhammad will say, "O my people! I am appointed for intercession." Their fear will then pass away. The second intercession is made so that they may enter into Paradise without rendering an account. The authorities differ with regard to this. The third intercession is on behalf of those Muslims who ought to go to hell. The fourth for those who are already there. No one but the Prophet can make these intercessions. The fifth intercession is for an increase of rank to those who are in Paradise.

The Mutazilites maintained that there would be no intercession for Muslims guilty of great sins, and adduced in favour of their opinion the verse: "Fear ye the day when soul shall not satisfy for soul at all, nor shall any intercession be accepted from them, nor shall any ransom be taken, neither shall they be helped."—(Súra ii. 45.) The orthodox bring in reply this Hadís-i-Sahíh: "The Prophet said, 'My intercession is for the men of my following who have committed great sins.'" If this Tradition is disputed, they then say that the verse in the Qurán just quoted does not refer to Muslims at all, but to the Infidels.¹

It is necessary to believe in the Pond of the Prophet called *Kausar*. This faith is founded on the verse: "Truly we have given thee an abundance."—(Súra cviii. 1.) Bukhári says: "The meaning of *Kausar* is the 'abundance of good' which God gives to the Prophet. Abu Bash said to one Sa'id, 'The people think that *Kausar* is a river of Paradise.' Sa'id replied, '*Kausar* is a river in which there is abundance of good.'" According to the same authority Muhammad said: "My Pond is square: its water is whiter than milk: its perfume better than that of musk: whosoever drinks thereof will thirst no more."

There are in heaven, to which the Believers were admitted, many degrees of felicity. The Prophet, according to Tirmízi, said there were one hundred. Some of these may possibly be meant by the eight names they give to Paradise. (1.) *Jannat-ul-Khuld*. "Say: Is this, or the Garden of Eternity which was

¹ *Tafsír-i-Faiz-ul-Karím*, p. 25.

promised to the God-fearing, best?"—(Súra xxv. 16). (2.) *Jannat-us-Salám*, "For them is a Dwelling of Peace with their Lord."—(Súra vi. 127.) (3.) *Dár-ul-Qarár*. "The life to come is the Mansion which abideth."—(Súra xl. 42.) (4.) *Jannat-i-Adan*. "To the Faithful, both men and women, God promiseth gardens and goodly mansions in the Garden of Eden."—(Súra ix. 73.) (5.) *Jannat-ul-Mawá*. "Near which is the Garden of Repose."—(Súra liii. 15.) (6.) *Jannat-un-Na'im*. "Amid delights shall the righteous dwell."—(Súra lxxxii. 13.) (7.) *Jannat-ul-Illiyyín*. "The register of the righteous is in Illiyyín."—(Súra lxiii. 18.) (8.) *Jannat-ul-Firdaus*. "Those who believe and do the things that are right, they shall have the Gardens of Paradise for their abode."—(Súra xviii. 107.)

Hell is said to have seven divisions. The Qurán, though it mentions the names of these divisions, does not state what classes of persons will be sent to each; but Muslim Commentators have supplied the needed information. They classify them thus:—(1.) *Jahannam*, for sinners who die without repentance. (2.) *Lazwá*, for the Infidels (i.e., Christians). (3.) *Hutama*, a fire for Jews, and according to some for Christians. (4.) *Sa'ir*, for devils, the descendants of Iblis. (5.) *Sagar*, for the magians: also for those who neglect prayer. (6.) *Jahím*, a boiling caldron for idolaters; also for Gog and Magog. (7.) *Háwíá*, a bottomless pit for hypocrites. It is said that heaven has one division more than hell, to show that God's mercy exceeds His justice.

The Muhammadan writers give very full and minute accounts of the events connected with the resurrection, judgment, and future state of those who are lost and of those who are saved. Sale gives such an excellent summary of these opinions, that we may now leave this subject. The orthodox belief is that the statements in the Qurán and the traditions regarding the pleasures of Paradise are to be taken literally. From knowledge gained by long intercourse with Muslims, we fully indorse Sale's statement on this point to the effect—

"That although some Mohammadans, whose understandings are too refined to admit such gross conceptions, look on their Prophet's descriptions as parabolical, and are willing to receive them in an allegorical or spiritual acceptance, yet the general and orthodox doctrine is, that the whole is to be strictly believed in the obvious and literal acceptance."

VI. THE PREDESTINATION OF GOOD AND EVIL.

We have already, in the section in which the attribute "will" is described (vol. xxix. p. 778), given some account of the dogmatic statements concerning the doctrine of predestination; but as it always forms a distinct chapter in Musalmán books, we treat it separately here. Having, however, in the passage referred to, given Al Berkevi's words on the attribute "will," it is only necessary to make a short extract from his dogmatic statement concerning Predestination. He says—

"It is necessary to confess that good and evil take place by the predestination and predetermination of God, and that all that has been and all that will be was decreed in eternity, and written on the *preserved table*;¹ that the faith of the believer, the piety of the pious, and good actions are foreseen, willed, predestinated, decreed by the writing on the *preserved table*, produced and approved by God; that the unbelief of the unbeliever, the impiety of the impious, and bad actions come to pass with the foreknowledge, will, predestination and decree of God, but not with his satisfaction and approval. Should any ask why God willeth and produceth evil, we can only reply that He may have wise ends in view which we cannot comprehend."

There are three well-defined schools of thought on the subject:—

First.—The Jabarians, so called from the word "*jabr*," compulsion, deny all free agency in man, and say that man is necessarily constrained, by the force of God's eternal and immutable decree, to act as he does.² They hold that as God is

¹ This, the *Lauh-ul-Mahfúz*, is referred to in the Súra lxxxv. 22, as that on which the Qurán is written. In Súra xxxvi. 11, the actions of men are said to be written in "the clear book of our decrees." This is called the *Imám-ul-Mubín*, the clear prototype.

Another Confession of Faith has:—

"Whosoever shall say that God is not delighted with virtue and faith, and is not wroth with vice and infidelity, or that God has decreed good and evil with equal complacency, is an infidel."

² "The Prophet of God said that Adam and Moses (in the world of Spirits) maintained a debate before God, and Adam got the better of Moses, who said, 'Thou art that Adam, whom God created and breathed into thee His own Spirit, and made the Angels bow down before thee, and placed thee in Paradise; after which, thou threwest man upon the earth, from the fault which thou didst commit.' Adam replied, 'Thou art that Moses, whom God selected for His prophecy and to converse with, and He gave thee twelve tables, in which are explained everything, and He made thee His confidant

the absolute Lord, He can, if He so wills, admit all men into paradise, or cast all into hell. This sect is one of the branches of the Ash'arians, with whom on most points they agree.

Secondly.—The Kadarians, who deny *Al-Kadr*, or God's absolute decree, say that evil and injustice ought not to be attributed to God but to man, who is altogether a free agent. God has given him the power to do or not to do an act. This sect is generally considered to be a branch of the Mutazilite body, though in reality it existed before Wasal quitted the school of his master Hasan (vol. xxix. p. 771). As Wasal, however, followed the opinions of Mábad-al-Johni, the leading Kadarian divine, the Mutazilites and Kadarians are practically one and the same.

Thirdly.—The Ash'arians, of whom we have already given some account, maintain that God has one eternal will which is applied to whatsoever He willeth both of His own actions and those of men; that He willeth that which He knoweth and what is written on the *preserved table*; that He willeth both good and evil. So far they agree with the Jabarians; but then they seem to allow some power to man, a tenet we have already explained when describing their idea of "*Kasb*" (vol. xxix. p. 775). The orthodox or Sunni belief is theoretically Ash'arian, but practically the Sunnis are confirmed Jabarians. The Mutazilite doctrines are looked upon as quite heretical.

No subject has been more warmly discussed in Islám than this. The following abstract of some lengthy discussions will present the points of difference.

The Ash'arians, who in this matter represent in the main orthodox views, formulate their objections to the Mutazilite system thus:—

1. If man is the causer of an action by the force of his own will, then he should also have the power of controlling the result of that action.

2. If it be granted that man has the power to *originate* an act, it is necessary that he should know all acts, because a creator should be independent in act and choice. Intention

and the bearer of His secrets; then how long was the Bible written before I was created?' Moses said, 'Forty years.' Then said Adam, 'Didst thou see in the Bible that Adam disobeyed God?' 'Yes.' 'Dost thou reproach me on a matter which God wrote in the Bible forty years before creating me?'"

must be conditioned by knowledge. To this the Mutazilites well reply that a man need not know the length of a road before he walks, or the structure of the throat before he talks.

3. Suppose a man wills to move his body, and God at the same time wills it to be steady, then if both intentions come to pass there will be a collection of opposites; if neither, a removal of opposites; if the exaltation of the first, an unreasonable preference.

4. If man can create an act, some of his works will be better than some of the works of God; *e.g.* a man determines to have faith: now faith is a better thing than reptiles, which are created by God.

5. If man is free to act, why can he not make at once a human body? why does he need to thank God for grace and faith?

6. But better far than all argument, the orthodox say, is the testimony of the Book. "All things have we created under a fixed degree."—(Súra liv. 49.) "When God created you and *all that ye make*."—(Súra xxxvii. 94.) "Some of them there were whom God guided, and there were others decreed to err."—(Súra xvi. 38.) As God decrees faith and obedience He must be the causer of it, for "on the hearts of these hath God graven the Faith."—(Súra lviii. 22.) "It is He who causeth you to laugh and weep, to die and make alive."—(Súra lii. 44.) "If God pleased He would surely bring them, one and all, to the guidance."—(Súra vi. 36.) "Had God pleased, they had not joined other gods with him."—(Súra vi. 147.) "Had the Lord pleased, He would have made mankind of one religion."—(Súra xi. 120.) "God will mislead whom He pleaseth, and whom He pleaseth He will place upon the straight path."—(Súra vi. 38.) Tradition records that the Prophet said, "God is the maker of all makers and of their actions."

The Mutazilites took up the opposite side of this great question, and said:—

1. If man has no power to will or to do, then what is the difference between praising God and in sinning against Him; between faith and infidelity; good and evil; what is the use of commands and prohibitions; rewards and punishments; promises and threats; what the use of prophets, books, etc.?

2. Some acts of men are bad, such as tyranny and polytheism. If these are created by God, it follows that to tyrannise and to ascribe plurality to the Deity is to render obedience. To this the Ash'arians reply that orders are of two kinds, immediate and mediate. The former, which they call "*Amr-i-takwîti*," is the order, "Be and it was." This comprehends all existences, and according to it whatever is ordered must come to pass. The latter they call "*Amr-i-tashrî'i*," an order given in the Law. This comes to men through prophets, and thus is to be obeyed. True obedience is to act according to that which is revealed, not according to the secret intentions of God, for that we know not.

3. If God decrees the acts of men, He should bear the name of that which he decrees. Thus the causer of infidelity is an Infidel; of tyranny a Tyrant, and so on; but to speak thus of God is blasphemy.

4. If infidelity is decreed by God he must wish it; but a prophet desires faith and obedience, and so is opposed to God. To this the orthodox reply, that God knows by His eternal knowledge that such a man will die an infidel. If a prophet intends by bringing the message of salvation to such an one to make God's knowledge become ignorance, he would be doing wrong; but as he does not know the secret decrees of God, his duty is to deliver his message, according to the Hadîs: "A prophet has only to deliver the clear message."

5. The Mutazilites claimed, as on their side, all verses of the Qurân, in which the words to do, to construct, to renew, to create, etc., are applied to men. Such are the verses: "Whatever is in the earth is God's that He may reward those who *do* evil according to their deeds: and those who *do* good will He reward with good things."—(Súra liii. 32.) "Whoso shall have *wrought* evil shall not be recompensed but with its like: but whoso shall have *done* the things that are right, whether male or female, and is a believer, these shall enter Paradise."—(Súra xl. 43.) "Say: the truth is from the Lord; let him then who will, believe; and let him who will, be an infidel."—(Súra xviii. 28.)¹ "Those who add gods to God will say: 'If God had

¹ The orthodox Commentator 'Abbás says: "This verse refers to the decree, *c. g.* 'He whom God wills to believe certainly will do so, and whom he wills to be an infidel will be one,' and not at all to man's free will."—*Tafsîr-Husaini*, vol. ii. p. 9.

pleased, neither we nor our fathers had given Him companions.' Say : ' Verily ye follow only a conceit, ye utter lies.' "—(Súra vi. 149.) The Hadís is also very plain : " All good is in Thy hands and evil is not to Thee." (Al-khair kuluhu fí yadaika wa-l-sharu laisa ilaik.)

The Ash'arians have one famous text which they bring to bear against all this reasoning and evidence. It is, " This truly is a warning ; and whoso willeth, taketh the way of his Lord ; but *will it ye shall not*, unless God will it, for God is knowing, wise.—(Súra lxxvi. 29, 30.) To the Hadís they reply (1) that there is a difference between acquiescence in evil and in decreeing it. Thus the expression, " God willeth not tyranny for His servants," does not mean that God hath not decreed it, but that tyranny is not one of His attributes : so " evil is not to Thee " means it is not an attribute of God ; and (2) the Hadís must be explained in accordance with the teaching of the Qurán.

The subject of *'Ilm-i-'Aqáid*, or the Science of Dogma, properly ends here, but most Muslim treatises include in this branch of the subject a few practical remarks. We therefore add a summary of them here. The believer who commits murder, fornication, etc., does not cease to be a Muslim, provided that he does not say that these are allowed ; should he die unrepentant, God can punish him for a while in hell or forgive him without punishment. God does not pardon polytheism and infidelity ; but He can, if He willeth, pardon all other crimes. If any one is asked, " Dost thou believe ? " he should reply, " I am truly a believer," and not say " If God willeth."¹ If any one says to him, " Wilt thou die in the faith ? " he should reply, " I do not know, God knows." Except when speaking of prophets, or of those of whom the prophets have spoken, such as Abu Bekr, Umar, Osmán, and 'Ali, it must not be said of any one, " he is gone to Paradise," for God only knows his state. Prayer should be made for a deceased Muslim whether he was a good or bad man. To give alms, to read the Qurán, to perform other good works, and to apply the merit thus gained to the souls of the dead, is a pious and beneficial act.

EDWARD SELL.

¹ This is the Sháfa'ite form which the Hanífites consider wrong.

ART. XL.—*Current Literature.*

IN the present agitation concerning the age and authorship of the Books of Scripture, an agitation which has resulted from the popular presentation of views long held by rationalistic critics in Germany, it is very desirable that works of a popular character should give, in reasonable compass, the data upon which sound opinions may be based, and, whilst occupying the platform of Christian truth, should critically weigh antagonistic theories. This book of Mr. Boyce's (1) supplies such a need. It is at once a history and an examination of what has been called by its own advocates "the higher criticism of the Bible." The book is professedly written for students. It does not pretend to compete with the more elaborate treatises upon Biblical Introduction such as Wellhausen's recent edition of Bleek, or Reuss's invaluable *Geschichte der heiligen Schriften neuen Testaments*. Indeed, Mr. Boyce's book may be called an introduction to one branch of Biblical Introduction, presenting, as it does, in a handy form, a statement and a criticism of the views of rationalistic exegetes upon the authority of the several books of Scripture. Perhaps we cannot explain the purpose of the work better than by repeating the author's own words. "The present work," he says, "is an attempt to select from all sources a series of facts exhibiting briefly, yet comprehensively, the controversies arising out of the conclusions of the higher criticism in its application to the books of the Old and New Testament. Such a compilation may be useful to the educated youth of our churches, as introductory to the study of the Biblical questions of the present century especially: for those who desire a fuller and more minute acquaintance with the great points at issue in these discussions, the most important and available helps will be found in the various English and continental authorities quoted or referred to in the following pages." It will be immediately seen that the work covers much ground, and the same fact becomes evident from an analysis of the contents.

(1) *The Higher Criticism and the Bible: a Manual for Students*, by William B. Boyce, Wesleyan Conference Office, 1881.

A glimpse into the historical course of criticism having been afforded in the two opening chapters, nine chapters are then devoted to critical views upon the Pentateuch, one chapter is given to the critical interpretation of Prophecy, and separate chapters are successively bestowed upon the critical questions connected with Isaiah, Zechariah, and Ezekiel. Then follows the consideration of the New Testament writings; where a preliminary chapter having treated of the canon, four chapters are devoted to the critical theories of the Gospels, and a chapter apiece is bestowed upon the critical assaults upon the Acts, upon the Pauline Epistles, and upon the Catholic Epistles, together with the Apocalypse. The treatment is somewhat unequal, the strength of the writer, however, being wisely concentrated upon the books of Moses and the Gospels. Perhaps also there is a little too much declamation, and an absence of a just valuation of the authors cited. Still, the book will be of considerable service to beginners in these thorny fields, and is fairly accurate as far as it goes. It shows signs of a long hoarding of relative literature, of the lighter as well as the more solid kinds, and there is scarcely a modern English writer, even in quarterly reviews and monthly magazines, who is not mentioned at more or less length. We say English writers intentionally, because, frequently as foreign scholars are quoted, Mr. Boyce's acquaintance with them has been made apparently by the agency of translations and citations only. His statements therefore incompletely represent the more recent phases of the great controversies with which he deals. Nevertheless, we give the book our cordial recommendation, and could wish it were not marred by so many carelessnesses of the printer and reviser. We are sorry to be unable to concur with Mr. Boyce's remark in his brief list of errata that there may be other errors than those given, but "none but which the context itself will help to correct." From our own reading we give an additional list, which is by no means complete. We have found Delitzsch for Delitzsch, Verb Mirificum for Verbum Mirificum, Herbert for Herbart, etendu for étendu, Theile for Thiele, Wegscheider for Wegscheider, Griesback for Griesbach, Hupfield for Hupfeld, Gorhard for Gerhard, Hartman for Hartmann, Bruno Baur for Bruno Bauer, Hilgenfield for Hilgenfeld, Grundschrift for Grundschrift, Gueriche for Guericke, Ritsch for Ritschl, Stendel

for Steudel, Van Bohler for Van Bohlen, Chaldec for Chaldee, Hoffman for Hofmann, Havernick for Hävernick, Stanley Leathe's for Stanley Leathes, Abott for Abbott, Chaggigal for Chaggigah. There are also numerous lapses in Hebrew words.

Able as is Mr. Boyce's book, it has to deal with opinions which are apt to vary with the mental prepossessions of their advocates, and it treats of a realm where psychological and philosophical considerations blend with questions of documentary evidence. It is inevitable, therefore, that in such a case a demonstrative disproof should be impossible. Hence it is refreshing to be able to turn from these questions of what is called *internal* evidence to such a work as this of Professor Charteris's (2), occupied as it is with the *external* or *literary* evidence for the Canon of the New Testament. As the title-page declares, the aim of the work, unlike Credner's *Geschichte des Neutest. Canon*, or Reuss's *Histoire du Canon des Écritures*, or Westcott's *General Survey of the Canon of the New Testament*, is not to present a reasoned, historical, and balanced exposition of the formation and course of the Canon in the light of the latest controversy, but it simply attempts to collect and classify the various passages from the original sources to which all controversialists must appeal. Two notable essays in this direction had been previously made. First came that monument of learning and zeal, the immortal *Credibility of the Gospel History* of Nathaniel Lardner, which has left unsearched no single writer quoted in the equally monumental *Biographia Litteraria* of Dr. William Cave. Next came the well-known *Quellensammlung* of Kirchhofer, who verified, emendated, rearranged, and corrected to date, the voluminous excerpts of Lardner, in the interests of a different age and for the solution of other problems. What Kirchhofer did for Lardner, Dr. Charteris has done for Kirchhofer. In the three dozen years which have elapsed since the publication of the great work of the Schaffhausen professor, neither sacred criticism nor research has stood still. New manuscripts have been discovered, new

(2) *Canonicity: a collection of early testimonies to the Canonical Books of the New Testament*, based on Kirchhofer's *Quellensammlung*. By A. H. Charteris, D.D., Professor of Biblical Criticism in the University of Edinburgh. William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh and London.

editions of a more scholarly and accurate character have been issued, and the patristic writings have been unwearyingly explored and severely weighed with the help of modern appliances, an immense impetus to this thorough investigation having been imparted by the theories of the Tübingen school, and the prolonged assault upon the traditional dates for the composition of the books of the New Testament. It would be disingenuous not to confess that these assaults, from Baur to Hilgenfeld, have tended to a more precise estimation of the text and meaning of the extant writings of the early centuries, so vital in discussions upon the Canon. Now Professor Charteris writes in perfect consciousness of the most recent utterances of all kinds. He has not disdained to learn from the acute author of *Supernatural Religion*, to say nothing of Renan and Davidson. In this spirit he has taken the valuable collections of Kirchhofer, confined to the times prior to Jerome, he has verified every excerpt, he has corrected every word according to the light afforded by the latest criticism, he has added most useful footnotes on matters biographical, bibliographical, and linguistic, he has supplemented where possible and omitted where necessary. The book is a fine testimony to the patience and thoroughness of its compiler; and although very different theories will be drawn, from the data here afforded, by thinkers of various schools, for some years to come the book must be invaluable to every student of the early testimonies to the canonical books. Like all useful books, this work upon Canonicity will enable its possessor to dispense with consulting many volumes, and will abbreviate study. And a few words ought to be given to its arrangement. After an introduction, which is both able and lucid, despite the difficulties of the subject, and in which the principal writers whose labours are connected with the question of the Canon are treated, the oldest testimonies are first given to the existence of a collection of sacred books, beginning with the Peshito and ending with Athanasius. Then follow the testimonies of a later date to the same theme, from the Laodicene Council to the Westminster Confession. Subsequently, in regular order, come the successive testimonies to the New Testament as a whole, to the Gospels as a whole, to the Synoptic Gospels, and to each book of the New Testament. Nor must a very useful analytical

and chronological table of the most important witnesses to the time of Jerome be forgotten, itself an expansion and adaptation of the careful table given by Dr. Sanday in his erudite and popular *Gospels in the Second Century*. Altogether, this book must be indispensable to all who would have well-grounded opinions upon the authenticity of the books of the New Testament.

Two commentaries (3), one on *Ephesians and Philemon*, the other on *Thessalonians*, form the fifteenth and sixteenth volumes of the "Meyer" series. With the former of the two the translation of Meyer's exegetical work proper comes to a close, and the occasion is a fit one for congratulating the English-speaking world on the ample boon thus conferred upon it, through the sustained enterprise of the Messrs. Clark, and for thanking Professor Dickson and his able coadjutors for their careful and lengthened labours. The issue must be justly gratifying to all concerned. It would be late in the day to speak of the quality of Meyer's exegesis. In this series the English student has had good opportunity, in the excellent translations furnished, of judging of the fulness of learning, scholarly accuracy, good sense, and spiritual insight attributed to it in so eminent a degree. The expositions of individual passages, such as that about the "prince of the power of the air," may not all be satisfactory; but Dr. Dickson has undoubtedly done well in giving us Meyer as he is, and not following the example of Schmidt and Weiss, which he very properly reprobates, who have altered, more or less according to their own notions, those works of Meyer, new editions of which they professed to send forth.

The commentary on the two Epistles to the Thessalonians, while issued as part of the series bearing his name, is not by Meyer himself, but by Dr. Gottlieb Lünemann of Göttingen. The volume is worthy of the position which it takes on the study-shelf next to the last of Meyer's. Dr. Gloag, who has translated the work with clearness and fidelity, will be borne out in his judgment when he says of it: "Its inferiority to the writings of Meyer is not very sensibly felt; there

(3) *Meyer's Commentary on the New Testament. Ephesians and Philemon—Meyer. Thessalonians—Lünemann.* Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1880.

is here ample evidence of profound learning, sound exegesis, sober reasoning, and a power of discrimination among various opinions."

The Messrs. Clark state that they "purpose to continue the 'Meyer' series by completing the New Testament, with the exception (probably) of the Revelation." This announcement is gratifying, except in so far as it hints a possibility of the work failing to be crowned by a fit exposition of the Apocalypse.

Dreary and unprofitable work it would be to read a history of the doctrines of physical science previous to the use of the Baconian method of inquiry. We do not much care to learn what Thales thought about water, or what even Aristotle had to say about physics. Such knowledge would be little better than "curious." But it is different with a history of the doctrines of religion. There is much to be learned from the way in which, down from the earliest times, successive minds have grasped what they could of the vast revelations of God given in Scripture. We are in this regard the "heirs of all the ages" of the church. In this department of inquiry there is no better help than Hagenbach (4), as it appears in this translation "from the fifth and last German edition, with additions from other sources." The present volume covers four great periods according to the author's arrangement, carrying the history on from the death of Origen in A.D. 254, to the rise of the philosophy of Leibnitz and Wolf in Germany about 1720.

With such exegesis as we have in the Meyer series, and such a history of doctrines as Hagenbach's, there may well be built up in these days a system of doctrine somewhat worthy of being called theological science. The task is in noble hands in having been undertaken by the author (5) of the *History of Protestant Theology* and the great work on *The Person of Christ*. The translator, in his exceedingly well-written Preface, says: "Large as are the merits of Dr. Dorner's previous labours, the

(4) *History of Doctrines*. Hagenbach. T. and T. Clark, 1880.

(5) *A System of Christian Doctrine*. By Dr. J. A. Dorner. Vol. I.; translated by Alfred Cave, B.A. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1880.

System of Christian Doctrine, to judge from the twelve hundred pages already issued, is distinctly his masterpiece, the ripe fruit of a long and thoughtful life." Dr. Dorner's conception of the work which he has taken in hand is expressed in such words as the following, from his Introduction:—"This problem, to mentally master Christian truth as truth,—that is, to apprehend the same both according to its inner coherence and its foundation, must be regarded as a standing problem for the Church, which has to consciously and experimentally propagate the contents of the Christian faith as *truth*. No age can undertake the task for another age; each must perform the work anew for itself, however valuable may be the aid of the past, and however assured the continuity which exists. . . . Now, this purpose the ecclesiastical science of faith and morals, or *Thetic* (systematic) *Theology*, endeavours to serve." Dr. Dorner's work is thus, like all true science, which implicitly sets aside the false and presents the truth, apologetic as well as synthetic. It shows the structure of Christianity, as that of a true and living existence, not as that of a mastodon which is extinct, or of a griffin which is imaginary.

We welcome with special cordiality a new book from the pen of Ernest Naville. The title of this work is *The Christ* (6), and the style will recall the deep impression made some years ago by a former production of M. Naville. It is brilliant; indeed, we have seldom read any series of Lectures upon the character and work of Christ which has so fascinated us. The author's plan is to set his subject before the reader in a succession of pictures, one chapter being devoted to the study of "Christ the Teacher," another "Christ the Comforter," another "Christ the Redeemer," and so on. The first of these is devoted chiefly to the enforcement of the thesis that "Monotheism in a pure state, and as a doctrine generally taught, *does not exist in the world save under the influence of Christian preaching.*" This thesis is defended with great ability, and then some of its issues are looked at, the dawn of modern science, the growth of industries, and the spread of modern civilisation generally being traced to this source.

(6) *The Christ: Seven Lectures* by Ernest Naville, translated by the Rev. T. J. Després. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

The chapter upon "Christ the Comforter" opens still tenderer springs: it first treats of the kind of consolations which arose from Epicureanism and Stoicism, and then shows how the Cross of Christ, by teaching us not only to accept suffering, but to welcome it, lifts us into infinitely higher regions of consolation. The subject of "Christ the Redeemer" leads the lecturer to show the vanity of all attempts which have been made to eliminate such mysterious doctrines as that of the cross from religion, and bears eloquent and, in these days, much-needed testimony to the influence of preaching "a God that justifies sinners." Not to speak further of the lectures, we must commend the idea of adding a chapter of "questions and answers." These questions were put after the preceding lectures in order to elicit more special information upon one or two points of more fundamental character, and these are answered with great frankness and precision. Altogether, another eloquent witness for the Christ of the Gospels.

Contemporary Portraits, by Dr. E. de Pressensé (7), is a book which our readers will thank us for introducing to them. The author is so well known as a graceful and eloquent writer, as well as one who has been not a small part himself in the recent history of France, that a series of portraiture from his pen cannot fail to be interesting. His subjects are very varied,—Thiers, Dupanloup, Strauss, Voltaire, Adolphe Monod, Vinet, Verny, and Robertson, being among the number. The last three will probably interest readers on this side of the Channel most. For ourselves, we have been peculiarly struck with Dr. Pressensé's estimate of Robertson of Brighton: it is evidently based upon a very thorough study of his life and sermons, and it is alike profoundly appreciative and keenly discriminating. Possibly his view of the work of Christ was never better put than in these few words: "Robertson represents the work of Christ as the initiation of a course of reparative effort rather than as the one unique work which it is ours simply to assimilate by living faith:" and he goes even more to the root of the matter by saying that in Robertson "the idea of moral perfection throws into the background the idea of

pardon." Still no one could write with more warmth and even enthusiasm of the manly and robust Christian teaching which marked all this great preacher's utterances than does Dr. Pressensé. Altogether, and in short, he gives us *Frederick Robertson* in his portraiture, one who, as a theologian, was erratic, and given to the exaltation of certain aspects of Christianity so much as to neglect, rather than deny, other profoundly important aspects; but as a man full of ardent love for Christ, and burning to make others love Him. The parallelism with Verny is very happy, and the little of this latter which is here given makes us desire to know more of him. The tenderly appreciative sketch of Adolphe Monod,—a soul less robust it may be, but more mellow and tender than these,—will call up feelings not of interest only, but almost of affection; while the great broad individuality of Vinet is sketched for us most sympathetically, and the sketch is placed between that of Monod and that of Verny and Robertson, as if to give a point of unity to these closing sketches. Upon the others we cannot dwell: many of them are more slight,—that of Thiers, for instance, which is so interesting as to suggest a desire for a greater fulness. But we must not complain of any lack in a book which gives us so much, and all in such delightful form.

Mr. Edward White has published a remarkable little volume entitled *On Certainty in Religion* (8). It contains a series of four addresses given by him recently in connection with the "Merchant's Lecture,"—addresses which were certainly worthy of being printed and read again and again. Mr. White, as everybody knows, has his own way of looking at things, and his way is in some things certainly not ours; but here his habitual independence in the choice of a point of view gives him an almost unique place as a defender of the Christian religion. He takes his ground upon the word "certainty," and shows successively the attitude of certainty maintained by the New Testament—first, in religion generally; second, in the matter of miracle; third, in doctrine; and fourth, in reference to personal salvation. The language is terse and the style

(8) *On Certainty in Religion*. By the Rev. Edward White. London: Elliot Stock.

vigorous; Mr. White speaks throughout with the business tone of the market-place rather than the softer accent of the schools; and his words will gain a hearing and make an impression just where a Bampton Lecture would fail.

It cannot be said that what we may call anti-Prophetic views of Prophecy are having it all their own way so long as one year brings to us two such books as Professor Delitzsch's *Messianic Prophecies* (9), and Professor Stanley Leathes's *Old Testament Prophecy* (10). The former of these, as its title indicates, concerns one special circle of prophecies, viz., those touching our Lord, His Person, and Work, and it may be characterised as rather expository than controversial in its character. Its primary use will be for the student, and it will serve—probably better than any other handbook yet published—in helping him to trace through its gradual up-growth to clearness and definiteness the “blessed hope” of the Old Testament Church. We should have said, even without opening this volume, that few men could do this work so well as Delitzsch; we say it still more emphatically with the book open before us. We find in it that same inner-sightedness which gives all his work its special value, and we discover traces of that *Hebraic* cast of mind which makes him so peculiarly helpful in Old Testament studies. The work begins with some important chapters upon prophecy in general, and here the very fundamental point of the distinction between a prophet and a priest is indicated. He says, “While the calling of the priest seeks to realise the letter of the law, that of the prophet endeavours to realise its spirit,” and in connection with this he notes Malachi's reference to breaches of the sacrificial Tora as a solitary instance of the kind. We remark upon this position because of the light which it throws upon the modern theory of our indebtedness to prophetic codifiers for the Mosaic law. The second part, which forms the body of this work, deals with the history of the Messianic prophecy and hope. Here, in the earlier stages of the prophecy, Delitzsch holds

(9) *Messianic Prophecies*. Lectures by Franz Delitzsch, translated from the ms. by Samuel Ives Curtis. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

(10) *Old Testament Prophecy; the Warburton Lectures for 1879-1880*. By the Rev. Stanley Leathes. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

that we have in the words of Balaam a very distinct mark of progress; in his mouth the prospect of a victorious race develops into that of an ideal king. In the earlier chapters of Isaiah the Coming One is more clearly defined, and His supernatural side more clearly revealed, while in the latter portion (xl.-lxvi.) new Messianic characteristics, and specially that of the "Servant of Jehovah," with its endless suggestiveness, appear. We have not space to dwell upon the leading points even of this admirable book; enough to reiterate our opinion of its unique excellence, and to commend it especially for the use of classes.

Dr. Stanley Leathes's book deals with a wider subject, viz., that of Old Testament Prophecy, and its purpose is mainly apologetic; indeed, it almost throughout takes the form of an answer to Kuenen. If we were to express an opinion of the book as a whole, we should do so by saying that we should readily give up much that is in the lectures if only we were allowed to keep the notes. By saying this, however, we are not to be understood for a moment as treating the former lightly, for they are both able and eloquent; but there is a certain intricacy of sentence and a general involution of expression which is apt to make the reader miss the point at times. The careful student will, however, feel that much light has been thrown upon the evidence of Divine foreknowledge which is afforded by the prophecies which are discussed, and the contention of Dr. Leathes that, shift the dates of such promises as those to Abraham and David, and such prophecies as those of Jeremiah and Daniel as we may, we cannot shift them late enough to invalidate their witness to Divine foreknowledge, is at the present time specially valuable. Of the notes it is impossible to speak too highly: they are terse, compact, and conclusive. Note B, upon the "seventy weeks" of Daniel's prophecy, meets Kuenen's criticism with the force of an argument calm and clear, and leaves us with the impression that such criticism is at least more tender towards gaps in its own theories than of chinks in that which it endeavours to supersede. Best of all, Dr. Leathes conducts his argument always in the most liberal tone, never trying to bring down the other side by mere denunciations or bitterness.

We say at once of Professor Baird's book on *The Rise of the Huguenots* (11), that it is bound to take its place in the first rank among works upon the history of French Protestantism. It is the work of a historian, and not of a mere writer upon Church history, and it shows traces everywhere of the widest research, and the most careful sifting of records. The author does not allow himself to fall into traditional ways of looking at things, and he has kept himself open to what light the study of recondite documents might bring. The result is a *new* history of the Huguenots, from the rise of the Reformation to the death of Charles the Ninth. What strikes us forcibly is the heroic resistance which the author has offered to the temptation to be pictorial, for there is something about the story of French Protestantism, at times so bright, at other times, alas ! so tragic, that the historian is apt to become a scene-painter in spite of himself. Professor Baird has been too much bent upon marshalling his facts to fall into this snare: none the less, however, the interest of his story never flags, and altogether we doubt whether this wonderful history has ever been told so well. It would manifestly be impossible for us to enter into detail with regard to this book of 1200 pages and more; otherwise there are several points upon which we might touch. It is important to find Professor Baird vindicating Calvin against the charge that he "burned Servetus," while frankly admitting that there was little question with him or with the Reformers generally as to the lawfulness of putting heretics to death. He says expressly: "As it is thus in evidence not only that Calvin did not burn Servetus, but desired him not to be burned, and made an ineffectual attempt to rescue him from the flames, we might anticipate for the stale calumny a speedy end, were not the tenacity of life characterising such inventions so notorious as to have passed into a proverb." We were specially curious to see what view the author would take upon the source of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew—the fact which is at the centre of French Protestant history; and we must give him credit for the determination which he shows not to over-estimate the atrocity, and accurately to assign the guilt. If his theory be correct, the

(11) *The History of the Rise of the Huguenots*, by Henry M. Baird. In two volumes. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

loathsome and hideous crime was not the issue of long pre-meditation, and its immediate cause was jealousy of Coligny. Even upon this supposition, it may have been that the Roman Catholic Church has so taught its disciples as that they went into the work of the massacre "with a light heart," but the spite and jealousy of that worse-than-Jezebel, Catherine de Medici, must remain directly responsible for it. So Professor Baird clearly holds, and he is also inclined to think, that had the first attempt upon Coligny's life succeeded, the Huguenots would have been spared. But we must not dwell further upon this subject; and we pass from this book with the expression of a hope that the same able pen may do more work for us in illustrating the surely not less stirring times of Henry III. and "Henri Quatre."

Two recent works from the pen of Principal Dawson, of Montreal, claim a word of notice,—the one a new edition of *The Story of the Earth and of Man* (12), the other entitled *Fossil Men and their Modern Representatives* (13). The former is already too well known through earlier editions to need much introduction. Its purpose is to read in rock and plant and animal the story of the earth from its genesis onwards. The earlier part of the book gives a singularly clear sketch of the different "ages," with their rock formations, and the traces which they show of manifold forms of life; while the latter deals with the still more interesting subject of the advent and primitive condition of man. Principal Dawson indicates his decided opinion that we cannot postulate the appearance of man earlier than the close of the post-pliocene period. As to the origin of man, he goes strongly against Evolution on *scientific* grounds, and he shows with abundant clearness the assumptions which its disciples are forced to fall back upon continually, notably to fill up the "gaps" in life. As against this assumption-loving theory, he vindicates the doctrine of a creation, and his way of putting the latter is worth quoting; he defines it thus :—"That all things have been produced by the Supreme Creative Will,

(12) *The Story of the Earth and of Man*. By Principal Dawson of Montreal. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

(13) *Fossil Men and their Modern Representatives*. By the same. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

acting either directly or through the agency of the forces and materials of His own production." *Fossil Men* takes up the subject of Anthropology at a different point, and claims an interest all its own. Principal Dawson's idea here is to compare what we know of the aborigines of America with the remains of earlier races in Europe, and the comparison is very far-reaching in its bearings. For if our author's comparisons are to stand, then the fact that the aboriginal races of America and the far earlier races of Europe were so similar in character and culture, is calculated to throw much light upon man's origin and antiquity. Before it the continual talk of development *upwards* begins to grow doubtful, and we see before us a picture rather of ebb and flow in human thought and life, with hints even, as Dr. Dawson shows, of lost arts and later deteriorations. Over and above the controversial value of this book, however, it must be commended as a work of surpassing interest. The picture which is here given us of Hochelaga, the old Montreal of Canada, is unique and fascinating; as we read of the old weapons so long disused, old utensils so long forgotten, and arts which have left traces where we fancied no art had been, the old town seems peopled again as in old days, and men go to and fro before our eyes. The later chapters of the book lead us to a still deeper realisation of that old life, as they point to the distinct traces of a belief in one God, and turn our attention to tender relics which bespeak a hope of immortality. Principal Dawson's claim is not merely that these ancient men were Theists, but *Monotheists* (a position which, by the way, M. Naville in his excellent book, which is noticed in these pages, does not seem to maintain, for he attributes Monotheism to Jewish and Christian teaching); and whether we go so far as this with him or not, we at least have enough to point to the *scientific* conclusion that religion is an essential part of our nature, and not one imported at a certain stage of development. We have thus tried to give the reader a taste of this book; but we can do no more. We must add that it is a joy to find such a beautiful combination of Christian faith with manly devotion to scientific inquiry as we find in these two books. Principal Dawson is forming through them, and like productions of his pen, fresh outworks for the defence of our Christian faith.

It is certainly reassuring that, notwithstanding the present strange diffusion of doubts and disbeliefs, the writings of Dr. Saphir (14) are in such large demand that new editions continue to be issued by the publishers from year to year. Our readers do not need to be told that these volumes are richly fraught with truths of a most positive or dogmatic character, and that they are thoroughly evangelical and scriptural in doctrine. While it would be foolish to forget that there is a very widespread indifference, if not antagonism, to the Gospel, it is wise to remember that there has never been a more ready and extensive welcome given to thoughtful and vital teaching than at the present hour. All Dr. Saphir's books are pre-eminently edifying. His mind is thoroughly engrossed with christological facts and inferences. Not a ripple of doubt ruffles the calmness of communion, which, like a glassy sea, reflects the Sun of Righteousness. And although this saintly separation from the stir and speculation of present controversies may seem to brand these books as "born out of due time;" yet we are persuaded, and their growing circulation confirms us in our opinion, that their very unconsciousness of questionings and strifes is not the least of their recommendations to thousands who have been seeking rest and finding none. Restlessness is not restful. Souls cannot thrive in an atmosphere of doubt.

For the unconverted no books known to us are more likely to prove useful than *Jesus and the Sinner* and *From Death to Life*. In these strictly Biblical expositions of the process of conversion the truth and the power of the Gospel are abundantly illustrated. In *Christ Crucified* and *The Lord's Prayer*, which we would not place second to any of the other volumes, there are devout and *decisive* disclosures of the object and operations of faith; while in the *Lectures on the Hebrews*, which are by no means wanting in exegetical skill and scholarship, we have a commentary on this bridge-book of Scripture en-

(14) *The Lord's Prayer*, by Adolph Saphir, D.D. Seventh edition. London: J. Nisbet and Co.

Christ Crucified, by Adolph Saphir, D.D. Third edition. London: J. Nisbet and Co.

The Hidden Life, by Adolph Saphir, D.D. London: J. F. Shaw and Co.

Expository Lectures on the Hebrews, 2 vols., by Adolph Saphir, D.D. London: J. F. Shaw and Co.

From Death to Life, by Adolph Saphir, D.D. London: J. F. Shaw and Co.

Jesus and the Sinner, by Adolph Saphir, D.D. London: J. F. Shaw and Co.

titled to take the first rank among interpretations because of its spiritual intuition and unction. We thank Dr. Saphir for his contributions to Christian theology; but most of all for his contributions to the sustenance of "the Hidden Life."

Three handsome volumes (15), specially designed for lightening the labours of Christian Preachers, come to us from the publishing house of C. Kegan Paul and Co. They have been prepared somewhat on the lines of Lange's Commentaries, giving however the greatest prominence to what most preachers find to be ultimately the most urgent and useful department—the homiletical.

When we mention the names of the authors associated with the editors in this laborious undertaking, it will appear at once that the execution of the plan must be of varied excellence. To the volume on *Genesis*, Introductions are contributed by Canon Farrar, Dr. Cotterill, and the Rev. Thomas Whitelaw, M.A.; the exposition and homiletics have been assigned to Mr. Whitelaw; and numerous homilies have been furnished by Dr. Montgomery, Rev. W. Roberts, M.A., Professor Redford, and Rev. F. Hastings. The volume on *First Samuel* contains an exposition by the Dean of Canterbury; homiletics by Professor Chapman; and homilies by Dr. Fraser and Rev. B. Dall, M.A. The volume on *Ezra*, etc. (which appeared first in order of time), contains an exposition by Canon Rawlinson; homiletics by Rev. W. S. Lewis, M.A.; and homilies by Rev. J. A. Macdonald, Rev. W. Clarkson, B.A., Rev. A. Mackennal, B.A., and Rev. J. S. Exell. Speaking generally, we have no hesitation in saying that the plan is excellent, and that on the whole it has been admirably carried out. In the statements of writers representing so many sections of the Church, it would not be difficult to find sentences to which we might fairly take grave exception. But the sterling value of the volumes inclines us rather to indicate their excellencies. We have read with very great pleasure and satisfaction Mr. Whitelaw's essay on the *Authorship of the Pentateuch*. It is written with full knowledge of the controversy, and it is reverent, cautious, and judicious. Canon Rawlinson's special studies in ancient history

(15) *The Pulpit Commentary*. Vol. i. *Genesis*; vol. ii. *1 Samuel*; vol. iii. *Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther*. Edited by Canon Spence and Rev. Joseph S. Exell. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co.

enable him to throw a flood of light on the books of Ezra, Nehemiah, and Esther; and his learning and candour encourage us to follow his guidance with confidence. The Dean of Canterbury is equally at home in all questions raised by the book, which opens up to us the beginnings of the Prophetic School in Israel.

The homiletic discussions are, of course, of unequal merit. Some of them are rather commonplace, and perhaps could not very well be otherwise; others are good and suggestive; while a very large number are happy and striking in a remarkable degree.

Apart from all questions as to the desirableness of "homiletic aids," we have no hesitation in saying that the *Pulpit Commentary* stands first in its own department.

We think that the teaching of Scripture concerning the Lord's Supper is clear and explicit enough. The contents of two large volumes (16), in which the opinions of uninspired men on the nature and significance of this ordinance are collated, increase our gratitude for the simplicity and straightforwardness of Revelation.

Dr. Hebert has, most painstakingly, arranged in chronological order the sayings of noteworthy teachers on this subject, from Clement of Rome to Canon Liddon of London! For many purposes this collection of opinions is of great and permanent value. As an index to the fullest study of the subject it can hardly be surpassed. But to us it is mainly of interest as proving that when men add to or alter the plain declarations of the Word, they immediately begin to darken counsel by words without knowledge.

Mr. Bowes, who has already given many useful hints to preachers and teachers by his *Illustrative Gatherings*, has published another volume of analyses, arguments, applications, counsels cautions, etc. (17). Here we have such subjects as Comfort, Duty, Hope, the Incarnation, Growth in Grace, Spiritual

(16) *The Lord's Supper: Uninspired Teaching*, by Charles Hebert, D.D. London: Seeley, Jackson, and Halliday.

(17) *In Prospect of Sunday*, by the Rev. E. S. Bowes, B.A. London: James Nisbet and Co.

Peace, Prayer, etc., etc., annotated and applied copiously and to edification. This little volume has our heartiest commendation.

Professor Blaikie's life of Livingstone (18) is worthy of our great missionary explorer. Its composition shows great care to secure throughout accuracy of statement. Details of various explorations, given fully in other works, are referred to only so far as to give vivid interest to the continuity of the narrative. The inner life of Dr. Livingstone, and particularly the warmth of his domestic affections, are illustrated by extracts from his journals and letters. Misconceptions of motive are cleared away. It is shown that he never lost the spirit and aim of the missionary in his work as an explorer. He lived, toiled, and died for the wronged in Africa. And to him this was not so much a sacrifice as a privilege. His lofty and steadfast purpose, his Christian tenderness in dealing with the ignorant and uncivilised, his untiring endeavours for the suppression of the slave-trade, and his child-like trust in the heavenly Father, are all brought most impressively before us by this sympathetic and well-written narrative.

The Human Body and its Functions. By the Rev. H. SINCLAIR
PATERSON, M.D.

In my lectures to the people I have often had the pleasure of recommending this most useful little work. Of the part of it which bears on theology I am not competent to treat, but of that which is physiological, and which makes up the chief part of the volume, I can speak with unqualified praise. The facts are carefully selected, the setting out is clear, the argument or statement is well sustained, and the style is so easy that he who runs may read. Dr. Paterson's treatise would form an excellent reading-book in schools for scholars who have advanced into the science classes, and as a *reading* book it would be much better than the mere technical lesson-books with the

(18) *The Personal Life of David Livingstone*, LL.D., by William Garden Blaikie, D.D., LL.D. London: John Murray.

use of which, were it employed only for reading, it would not in any way clash.

The name of the author of this book, and his peculiar qualifications for writing it, are as well as widely known. He is like one of the old schoolmen who, up to the age of Linacre, combined the offices of the minister with those of the physician. I am glad through this work to welcome my old friend so far back into the pale in which he was nurtured, and which it is quite certain he has never altogether forsaken.

B. W. RICHARDSON, M.D., F.R.S.

A good book for reading with the children is always welcome, and here are two volumes worthy of a place in our Sunday libraries. The first (19) especially is written in a loving and captivating style, and abounds in stories of the "Gentle Heart," which are both pleasant and profitable. Dr. Macleod is so well known as a master in the art of "talking to the children" that we need not say more to commend his book to our readers. The second (20) is full of gospel truth, conveyed in simple and attractive form.

This volume (21), says the author, is a contribution to the religious literature of the day, in the hope that "it may give a deeper insight into the meaning of Holy Writ, and perhaps teach its readers to look for more in its pages than they have hitherto been accustomed to expect." It will be a welcome addition to the library of the Bible student, conveying, as its title imports, in a brief and readable form, information on many points which are usually "Unnoticed" by commentators.

The readers of *Steps through the Stream* will be pleased to have this companion volume of evening readings for a month (22).

(19) *The Gentle Heart*, a second series of *Talking to the Children*, by Alexander Macleod, D.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

(20) *Sermons for Boys and Girls*; containing twenty-five by the author of *Outlines of Sermons on Miracles and Parables of the New Testament*, twenty-five by Rev. W. Newton and Rev. G. Wood; together with fifteen ten-minute Sermons to Children.

(21) *The Unnoticed Things of Scripture*, by the Right Rev. Wm. Ingraham Kip, D.D., Bishop of California. London: Charles Higham, 1880.

(22) *Beautiful upon the Mountains, Evening Readings for a Month*, by Margaret S. Simpson, author of "Steps through the Stream." London: Nisbet.

The author indicates her aim in the preface thus :—" In the following pages we only tempt our readers to begin an ascent for themselves, in which they will soon outstrip us ; for all will find in the simplest Bible study an exercise so captivating that the healthful air, the ever-widening prospect, and the new discoveries have so beguiled us that, before we are aware, the hour is gone." And she more than fulfils the purpose thus modestly stated.

This is the last of the series, of which *Self Help* was the first, and the highest praise we can bestow upon it is to say that it is worthy of, and likely to be as useful as, its predecessors (23). The numerous sketches of "the best and bravest men and women in the career of well-doing" are most interesting, and can hardly fail to stimulate readers, especially the young, to a high and noble aim in life.

These volumes (24) become more attractive year by year. With their beautiful illustrations, filled with reading suited for every class, they occupy a place almost unique in what may be called fireside literature. *The Sunday at Home* contains some capital biographies, and two or three serial tales of more than average merit. *The Leisure Hour*, as usual, has something to say upon almost every subject, grave or gay, with which we may wish to occupy our spare moments. Both are beautifully got up, and the coloured pictures are especially attractive.

The Holy Bible, containing the Old and New Testaments, to which are appended notes Analytical, Chronological, Historical, and Geographical ; a Biblical Index, Concordance, Dictionary of Scripture Proper Names, and Maps, and a Compendium of Scripture Natural History. Oxford, Printed at the University Press. London : Henry Frowde.

The Memorial Edition of the Oxford Bible was printed for the Sunday School Centenary Celebration, and within almost the compass of an ordinary Pocket Bible, and at a very moderate price we have a fund of information which must prove invaluable to all students of Scripture, and especially to Sunday School Teachers. The type is clear and good.

(23) *Duty, with illustrations of Courage, Patience, and Endurance* ; by Samuel Smiles, LL.D., author of " *Self Help*," etc. London : John Murray.

(24) *Sunday at Home and Leisure Hour*. Religious Tract Society, London.

A Memoir of the Rev. Henry Watson Fox, B.A., of Wadham College, Oxford, Missionary to the Telugu people, South India. By the Rev. GEORGE T. FOX, M.A. London: Religious Tract Society.

This memoir of a devoted missionary was written many years ago. It has passed through several editions; the latest has been published chiefly for the sake of the boys of Rugby School, to continue their interest in one of their number whose memory is perpetuated there by the "Rugby Fox Mastership," and an annual missionary sermon. It is the record of a truly consecrated life; the letters and diary written during his school and college life are most interesting as well as the history of his few years of missionary work, before he was called to his rest at the early age of thirty-one. We do not wonder that, as stated in the preface, the perusal of this book gave the first impulse to several persons, and amongst others to one who is now a bishop, to enter into the missionary field.

The Authorship of the Fourth Gospel: External Evidences. By EZRA ABBOTT, D.D., LL.D. London: Trübner and Co.

A very masterly argument in defence of the position that the Gospel of John was recognised as genuine and authoritative previous to the year 130 A.D. The author follows consecutively four lines of proof. First, he shows *ex abundanti* that the Four Gospels were received as genuine among Christians in the last quarter of the second century. Second, he adduces strong reasons for believing that this Gospel formed part of the *Apostolical Memoirs* appealed to by Justin Martyn. Third, he points to the significant fact that it was in use, although perverted by forced interpretations, among the various Gnostic sects. And lastly, he adverts to the import and value of the attestation appended to the Gospel itself. In the course of his argument he exposes briefly, but clearly and conclusively, the baseless assumptions on which much of the criticism in *Supernatural Religion* depends, and with singular patience and pertinacity he rebuts one by one the exceptions taken to Justin Martyr's quotations, and establishes their positive relevancy and value.

Good Thoughts in Bad Times, and other Papers. By THOMAS FULLER, D.D.
London: Hodder and Stoughton.

This is an edition *de luxe*, printed on hand-made paper in old style, of one of the most characteristic books of quaint Thomas Fuller. To the mere student of English this volume appeals as an excellent specimen of a style peculiarly racy and graphic; but to the Christian it will commend itself even more by the practicalness of its purpose and the fragrantcy of its devotion.

The Land and the Book: Southern Palestine and Jerusalem. By WILLIAM M. THOMSON, D.D. London: T. Nelson and Sons.

The Land and the Book has occupied a place on our reference-shelf for many years. We have frequently turned to it with confidence, and turned from it with satisfaction. There is no other book on the subject so intelligible and interesting. A single sentence may explain the secret of its success. The author is at once thoroughly familiar with the Land and with the Book, so that he presents both in their intricate and minute relations with exquisite appositeness, and without the least confusion. This new edition, limited to Southern Palestine and Jerusalem, appears in an enlarged and beautifully illustrated form, that, while increasing its serviceableness, cannot fail to commend it to a larger circle of readers.

In Christo: or, The Monogram of St. Paul. By J. R. MACDUFF, D.D.
London: Nisbet and Co.

In thirty-one chapters (are they designed as readings for a month?) Dr. Macduff discusses the significance of the phrase *In Christ*, so frequently and emphatically used by the Apostle of the Gentiles. We do not doubt that this volume on such an interesting subject, and characterised by the author's well-known gracefulness of style, will attain the same popularity which his other writings have reached. It is scriptural, thoughtful, devout: but perhaps the most marked feature it presents—a feature common to all the works of its distinguished and deservedly popular author—is a certain genial gentleness of tone and treatment.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

APRIL 1881.

ART. I.—*On some outstanding Features of the
Gospel History.*

THE sceptical spirit which at present taints the air of Christendom covers the whole field of Divine truth, going down to the roots both of all supernatural Christianity and of all proper Theism. Whatever can be explained upon natural principles it readily admits. Viewed in this light, Christianity is regarded as a great advance in religious thought and ethical principle. But as soon as its supernatural features come into view, the spirit of scepticism meets it with suspicion and ultimate denial. In the present paper I propose to address myself to this sceptical spirit as it deals with the Christianity of the Gospel History. By the admission alike of friends and foes, that History is the citadel of Christianity. If it stands in its integrity as true history, Christianity, considered as a supernatural provision for a perishing world, also stands; whereas, if this must be surrendered to a destructive criticism, working in the interest of anti-supernaturalism, all that is of most value in Christianity goes down with it. A few men of refined culture and high moral feeling may flatter themselves that even after eliminating all its supernatural features, its great essential principles, as an ethical

and religious system, will still remain; but they will find that even here their footing waxes less and less secure, that they have got upon an inclined plane, and that unless their religious instincts, or their early training, or some special religious experiences of their own, prove stronger than remorseless logic, it is only a question of time when they will reach the bottom, and land in the dismal abyss of absolute religious negation.

How the spirit of scepticism will deal with the Gospel History in any given age depends very much on the reigning school of thought at the time. At present I confine myself to that form of it which seems to be carrying before it all that is unsteady in the faith of many fine and noble minds. The Gospel History is viewed simply as a collection of historical traditions put together by three compilers in the early part of the second century; the Fourth Gospel being regarded by the critics to whom I now refer as neither a genuine production of the Apostle John, nor, according to most of them, even as a professed history at all, but rather as an idealised conception or apotheosis of the Jesus of history, cast in a historical mould. The first three Gospels are regarded as the only historical remains of the life of Christ, with the exception of some grains of truth in the Apocryphal Gospels; but being drawn up from floating traditions or fragmentary digests, varying according to the skill or opportunities of the writers of them, these three productions are but partially accurate, and in many respects consistent neither with one another nor with themselves; and it is the part of a true critical insight, after putting aside the inaccuracies, to exhibit the grains of genuine historic truth which lie imbedded in them. I am not going to examine this theory. Of the Fourth Gospel, I will only say that he who, after reading all the extant productions of the first half of the second century, can believe that it possessed an author capable of constructing, in the form of a historical romance, that Gospel whose lofty idealism is not more the wonder of the thoughtful than that exquisite realism which rivets the very children who read it—he who can believe that this wonderful pseudo-John contrived so successfully to hide his real personality, that his name never saw the light; and, more singular still, who can believe that this

historical romance so imposed upon the whole Christian Church, that it was at once and without question received as a genuine production of the youngest and last surviving apostle; that all antiquity accepted this judgment, but yet that it was an entire mistake, its real character being quite a recent discovery—he, I say, who can believe all this must have shut his eyes to all the conditions of real history, not to speak of his utter want of spiritual apprehension. As to the first three Gospels, the theory that they were compiled nearly a century after the events which they profess to record, and yet that they should be what they are, besides being in the face of all the earliest testimony, creates difficulties a thousand times greater than those which it professes to solve. But, instead of discussing this theory, what I now propose is to touch upon certain features of this History, in which all the Gospels are at one—the Fourth not excepted—and from these to shew that, even when the destructive criticism has done its worst, it does not succeed in distorting one essential feature in the life, the character, the teaching, and the work of our Lord Jesus Christ, or impairing the evidence which this History affords of what He is, whence He came, what He did for men, and what His claims upon them are.

Christ's *stainless life* is a fact which the sceptical critics have not been able to eliminate from the Gospels, even as viewed by themselves, and which their anti-supernatural theories utterly fail to explain. Faultless characters have often enough been drawn, and nothing is easier than the drawing of such portraits. But the conditions of the present case are absolutely unique. Here are three histories of a Man who appeared in a quite new character, advancing claims never advanced by man, either before or since; not shunning publicity, but, on the contrary, moving about continually for a period of three years, coming in contact with all classes of society, the highest and the lowest, ecclesiastical and political, jealously watched during the most of that time, while towards the end of it every art was tried which cunning could devise to entangle Him in His talk and entrap Him into matter of public complaint. All this is related by three biographers, not in a strain of studied encomium, but in the style of naked record and simple matter of fact, with just such diversities as different witnesses of the

same transactions are wont to shew amongst ourselves—one omitting what another notices, and each giving that particular aspect of the scenes and sayings recorded which struck the witness from whom he had it. In what light, then, does Jesus of Nazareth appear in each and all of these Records? They do not tell us expressly, as the Fourth Gospel does, that He challenged the most captious to convict Him of sin; but no one who reads the first three Gospels can doubt His right to throw out that remarkable challenge. They do not tell as, as the Fourth Gospel does, that He said to His disciples within a few hours of His apprehension, "The prince of this world cometh, and hath nothing in me;" but no one who observes how faultless a life, according to all the first three Gospels, He passed through, in the most complicated, trying, and novel circumstances, can fail to draw some such inference for himself, or to conclude that there must have been something about His whole connection with humanity altogether different from that of other men. I do not refer here to the fact, attested by all the three, that at His formal trial the utmost efforts of malice failed to substantiate aught against Him. What passes all explanation, save that the facts are as these three Records give them, is, that—all unskilled as the writers must have been—they never in any instance make Him speak or act out of character with the absolutely new and extraordinary claims which He advanced; that while these narratives have been subjected to the severest criticism, with the view of detecting such incongruities, it has been done in vain, by the admission of all competent judges; and that we have thus three independent narratives of a life such as never man led before or since. But who can rest here? The claim of Jesus was to be nothing less than the Saviour of sinners; and to mark that was the intent of the name JESUS, given to Him before His birth. But since a sinner cannot save sinners, it was of necessity that this man, if a Saviour, should be Himself sinless. Well, all the three Narratives of His life are just a historical proof that such He was, and yet to prove this was not at all the *object* of the narrators. There is not the slightest evidence that they wrote to establish this or any other doctrinal position. The Gospels are not *preaching* histories, but unvarnished narratives of facts. It is the facts themselves that

preach the sinlessness of the man Christ Jesus, and they do it more effectually than any assertions of the narrators themselves could possibly have done. But can we rest here? *How came this man*, surrounded by erring and sinful men, *to be the one exception* of all the human race? But for the first and third Gospels we should have no answer to this question, at least only a conjectural one. But in these two Gospels the secret is disclosed to us. The accounts there given of our Lord's miraculous conception I here refer to, not as parts of an authentic history, to be received on the evidence of the books that contain them: I wish them at present to be looked at simply on their own internal evidence, and as an explanation of our Lord's whole subsequent life. The legendary biographies of all great heroes throw an air of marvel and miracle around their birth; and the Apocryphal Gospels with which the second century swarmed, and some of which are happily extant, in whole or in part, surrounded the birth of our Lord with marvels enough. But these serve only as a foil to set off the unique and self-evidencing character of this narrative. The place where it stands is one of the most remarkable features of it. It is recorded simply as one of the historical incidents of His birth, and never once is it again alluded to. Evidently the fact was unknown to the generality of Christ's followers, and even in the innermost circle of them hardly any, I think, were in the knowledge of it. Certainly it was never openly announced, much less appealed to, in connection with His claims. For obvious reasons, it could not well be. Well, what are we to infer from this? Clearly that men's convictions of the sinlessness of Jesus were to be the result, in the first instance, of their own acquaintance with the patent facts of His life, His teaching, and His works; and that, when, on further investigation, they learned in what manner He came into the world, they should see in that only a confirmation of their own previous conclusions, the true *key* to what would otherwise have baffled all explanation, and the high and unique sense in which He was "holy, harmless, undefiled, *separate from sinners*," while yet truly partaking of their nature. Nor ought we to overlook the lofty and delicate simplicity of the language in which the Incarnation is expressed—too lofty and delicate, I think, to admit of its being shaped out by the

evangelist's or his reporter's unaided pen—very different from the coarse language of the Apocryphal Gospels. And though the Fourth Gospel records the event, he does it only in these few august terms, "The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory," while the writer of that Gospel must have had full before his view the way of that Incarnation, communicated afresh to himself by her who knew it best. And what a high sense does this give to the challenge, "Which of you convicteth me of sin?" and what wonderful verisimilitude does it impart to those mysterious words, "The prince of this world cometh, and *hath nothing in me*"! Yes, the Fourth Gospel does differ from all the others, both in matter and style; but rather as Plato's account of Socrates differs from Xenophon's. The one is Jesus as seen from the outer world; the other the same Jesus from the inner; the one from the terrestrial point of view, the other from the celestial. But indeed this unique and absolute sinlessness of Christ was the faith of all the apostolic churches, probably long before the Fourth Gospel saw the light. Peter speaks of His "precious blood as that of a lamb without blemish and without spot;" the Epistle to the Hebrews says that in His death He "offered Himself to God without spot;" and the Second Epistle to the Corinthians (the genuineness of which the most sceptical have not questioned) says, "He hath made Him to be sin for us who *knew no sin*"—an expression which can have no adequate sense short of a nature spotless even from birth.

But enough on this first point—in which my object has been to shew that in any way in which even the ablest destructive criticism has handled the Gospel History, we have enough to present to us a problem which itself is unable to solve, and that the sceptical criticism is baffled even by its own materials. "What think ye of Christ"—the Christ of your own Gospel? I ask. Their answer, if they would face their own admitted facts, would suffice for me; but not one of them will grapple with these facts in their conjunct import. They spend their great critical strength in anatomising the several narratives, making chemical compounds of their detached sections and their phraseology, and then exhibiting the poor precipitate resulting from this process; while the glorious Personality which, in spite of all their laborious processes, stands out to the view of others, seems

never to be seen by these burrowers amongst critical materials, save in such broken lights and distorted aspects as reduce Him to the dimensions of a rare ethical and religious teacher.

But *the teaching* of Christ, even as they themselves accept it, presents a problem which the negative critics never fairly grapple with. Nor are they alone here, for a large and I fear increasing number of so-called Christians, who cannot dispense with so much of our Lord's teaching as commends itself to the natural conscience, studiously ignore whatever goes beyond that. Now, this is not honest. Let them fairly meet the conditions of the question, 'What think ye of the Christ of the Gospels, in the light of *His whole teaching*, as you yourselves receive it?' and I am content. Let us look at some features of that teaching, not in isolated and picked sentences, but as conveyed in places either common to all the Gospels or as sustained in the spirit and strain of it by what runs through them all. I open the Gospels at that stage in the life of Jesus when, emerging from obscurity, He first presented Himself as a teacher come from God. And the first thing we observe is, that he frequents the Synagogue, and enters into its periodical services like any other devout Jew. In everything Jewish He shewed Himself a Jew, but at the same time a determined enemy of that traditional, formalistic, sacerdotal Judaism which was but a perversion of the Divine idea of it. While, for example, He would not suffer the sanctity of the Temple to be desecrated by a profane traffic within its precincts, He inveighed severely against that factitious sanctity which was attached to the rest of the Sabbath, and wrought some of His noblest miracles on that day, expressly to teach the true way of keeping it. It was for this stern opposition to Pharisaic Judaism that the wrath of the ecclesiastics was roused and deepened, till it compassed His death. Beyond all doubt, He saw and counted from the first the cost of this unswerving fidelity to the true Jewish Faith. It has been pretended that He did not at once perceive the right position to take—that He had to shape His course and feel His way, through circumstances and His own development, to the attitude He ought to assume. The reverse of this is everywhere apparent. Once and again when the storm of opposition threatened to wax so hot as to precipitate a crisis before He had completed His

testimony, we find Him—in the first three Gospels as well as in the fourth—quietly retiring until the storm should blow over. The perfect calmness of a fixed character, the noiseless progress of a definite purpose, are everywhere observable—and no trace is to be seen of haste or vacillation. Re-adjust the materials if you will—even dislocate them if you please; but in vain will you by this process impair the evidence of a steady and lofty character, the sublime development of the highest aims, shining through these marvellous documents. I have said that Jesus was a perfect Jew, but in the most catholic sense. Even in the first, peculiarly Jewish, Gospel we find Him teaching and acting out that great principle—telling His Jewish hearers that the faith of a Gentile centurion had outstripped all that He had found in Israel, and that many would come from the east and west and sit down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in the kingdom of God, and at the close of His ministry boldly telling His bitterest enemies that the kingdom of God was going to be taken from them, and given to a nation (meaning the Gentiles) who should bring forth the fruits thereof. But more remarkable was His love, as a devout Jew, of the Scriptures, His perfect familiarity with them, His explicit recognition of their Divine authority, and His constant reference to them as the one fountain of revealed truth; insomuch that he who rejects this view of the Old Testament must reject *Him* too, for His whole teaching is bound up with it; and be it remembered that He gave Himself forth as a Teacher come from God, and that everything He uttered was given forth *authoritatively*. In fact, *what* He taught was less startling to His hearers than the *air of authority* with which He spake. Moses and the prophets gave forth their messages as from God, saying “Thus saith the Lord.” Such language Jesus studiously avoided; and just where in the Old Testament we expect, after the utterance of any Divine law, the words “I am the Lord,” to intimate to us *from* whom it came, and *by* whom the breach of it would be avenged, just there it is that we find Jesus assuming an air of Personal authority never before or since claimed, “Verily, verily, *I say* unto you,” as Himself the authoritative Interpreter, the rightful Guardian, and the great Avenger of the Divine law. Viewed in this light, what are we to think of those who, professing to regard our Lord as the greatest and best of teachers,

yet venture to say that His view of the Old Testament Scriptures was one of those Jewish prejudices which He was not able to shake off? Reject Christianity out and out, if you will—throw off the yoke of Christ altogether, if you will. That is a course which I can understand; but do not take of Him just what suits you, and reject the rest. It is not manly; it is not honest. “I would thou wert cold or hot.”—But I am far from having done with the teaching of Christ—its peculiar features are, in fact, inexhaustible. Does the Fourth Gospel tell us the amazing words which He addressed to the woman of Samaria, “Every one that drinketh of this water shall thirst again, but whosoever drinketh of the water that I will give him shall never thirst, but the water that I will give him shall be in him a well of water, springing up into eternal life;” and how, in the streets of Jerusalem, He stood and cried, “If any man thirst, let him come unto me and drink”? What less than this (I had almost said more) do we read in the First Gospel, “Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest”? What voice is this that I hear? Did ever human lips venture to come within any measurable approach to such language? It is not, Come, and I will shew you where rest is to be found—any one might say that, and many rejoice to do it—but it is, ‘Come to Me, and I will give it you.’ To give repose to even one weary, burdened soul—much more, to do this for all of every age, in every land—what mortal ever pretended? He who could warrantably say this, as Christ said it, must have the attributes, first, of omniscience, and next of omnipotence. As the voice of a human being merely, I should deem it the siren voice of the tempter trying to steal away our hearts from the living God. But as the voice of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth, seeking to woo us back to His blessed bosom, I can understand it; otherwise, not at all. Such thoughts seem to have possessed the mind of the mighty Augustin, who, after long mental and moral entanglement, at length found rest in Christ for his tossed and weary spirit, and who, speaking of the Platonic writings, exclaims, “*Nemo ibi audit vocantem*, ‘Venite ad me, qui laboratis,’” etc.¹

May I not, then, demand of our negative critics to put us

¹ “No one hears there one calling ‘Come unto me, ye that labour,’” etc.—*Confess.* vii. 21. 2, 3.

through this incomparable invitation? Is it the language of one out of his senses, or is it *Divinity in our nature* that speaks it? Perhaps they will take refuge in this, that we have no certain evidence of its being accurately reported. Why, then, the penning of it will have to be accounted for, and they will find that as hard to explain as any other of the hard problems they create for themselves. But the words which precede this matchless invitation are quite as hard to solve on their principles. "No one fully knoweth the Son (*ἐπιγινώσκει*) save the Father; neither doth any one fully know the Father (*ἐπιγινώσκει* again) save the Son, and He to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him." Is there anything in the Fourth Gospel more transcendental than this in the First? Well, tell me what we are to make of it. From creature lips would it not be intolerable? But, if uttered at all by Jesus of Nazareth, you must either reject Him out-and-out, or bow the knee to Him. Be consistent. Again, "I would thou wert *cold* or *hot*." Nor is this a solitary strain. Such lofty self-assertion meets you everywhere in the Gospels. You cannot get rid of it without throwing *them* away. "The men of Nineveh (He said) shall rise up in the judgment against this generation, and shall condemn it, for they repented at the preaching of Jonah; and behold, more than Jonah is here" (the word is emphatically *neuter* here—*πλείον*). The queen of the south shall do the same, "for she came from the ends of the earth to hear the wisdom of the wisest of men; and behold, more than Solomon is here." This unparalleled style of self-assertion, which nobody could hear from creature lips without disgust, is the wonted manner of Jesus of Nazareth; and somehow it seems to become Him. It comes quite naturally to Him, and seems to grace the lips that employ it. He forgives sins, too; and when this is counted blasphemy in one who in all other respects was just like themselves, He asks if it was less easy to do that than to tell a helpless paralytic to rise up and walk at His bidding, and then makes the man at once do so.

But this leads me to say a word on *the miracles* of Christ—miracles of every sort—which stud the Gospels. These are so implicated with the text and the teaching in which they lie imbedded, that you cannot tear out the one without destroying

the other. He, then, who on some anti-supernatural theory repudiates the miracles, should, if he would deal honestly, reject the Gospels themselves. We *must* be either cold or hot. This was the course taken by poor Francis Newman—for whom, with his many fine qualities, I am heartily sorry. And it was the course taken by a quondam minister of the Church of England whom I met lately, who found no rest for the soles of his feet after rejecting the miracles, without rejecting the teaching of Christ, and after that sinking into blank Atheism. "The Son of Man (said Jesus) came to seek and to save that which was lost;" and He gave a specimen of it in Zaccheus the publican, saying as He went home with the newly transformed man, "To-day is salvation come to this house." And who will not worship Him who is able to save his soul? I will and do worship Him, and myriads along with me. And if these should hold their peace, the stones would cry out.

But I have now reached the climax of the claims of Jesus of Nazareth—to be *the final Judge of men*. At the close of that most marvellous self-asserting discourse in the First Gospel, He says that at that day He will tear off, on the one hand, the mask of professed attachment to Himself, by which hypocrites will hope for His favourable award, and on the other, will own every one that heareth those sayings of His and doeth them. Startled at this, we look on a little in the narrative to see if we have not misapprehended His meaning; but we soon find we have made no mistake, for ere it closes we hear Him presenting the same scene yet more nakedly. "When the Son of man shall come in His glory, and all the holy angels with Him, then shall He sit upon the throne of His glory, and before Him shall be gathered all nations." "Then shall the King say unto them on His right hand, Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom. . . . For I was an hungered and ye gave me meat," and so on: "Verily I say unto you, inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these least of my brethren, ye did it unto me. Then shall He say also unto them on the left hand, Depart from me, ye accursed ones, into the eternal fire, prepared for the devil and his angels; for I was an hungered and ye gave Me no meat," and so on: "Inasmuch as ye did it not unto one of these least, ye did it not unto me. And these shall go away

into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life." Who is this that claims to execute, as His own, the whole judicial prerogatives of the Godhead at the final day, and not only so, but tells us He will make that judgment to hinge upon the treatment which men have given to *Himself* here below—announcing that a blest or a blighted eternity awaits all that have ever heard His message of love or salvation, according to the value which they have put upon *Him*? "Ye did thus and thus to ME—Come, ye blessed! Ye did it not to ME—Depart, accursed ones!" Who could endure this from mere creature lips?

But, leaving the exhaustless subject of His *teaching*, and the bright evidence it affords of His Divine Personality in our nature—or else of that blasphemy for which He was condemned to death—let me say a word or two, in conclusion, on His *Death* and *Resurrection*. That scene of the Agony in the Garden is studiously evaded by nearly all the negative critics; not that they take no notice of it at all, but that they avoid facing the questions which it suggests, and even forces upon the thoughtful reader. It cannot be got rid of by any criticism which recognises the Gospels, even in the loosest sense, as historical. The scene is recorded in all the three first Gospels, and with such vividness and minuteness of detail as if the writers had themselves felt what holy ground they were there treading. We seem ourselves, indeed, to be eye and ear-witness of the whole transaction; and no one who has had it fully brought before him can ever again have it effaced from his mind. It is not recorded in the Fourth Gospel; but, singularly enough, we have there what may be called a *prelude* to Gethsemane, when the visit of the Greeks to Jesus, a day or two before His apprehension, made the whole scene of the Cross flash so vividly before Him, that the feeling which it occasioned forced itself out into audible expression: "Father, save me from this hour; but for this cause came I unto this hour." Well, I say, this scene of the Agony in the Garden is one which, to have been *written*, must have been *real*. Had the three who recorded it wished to glorify their Master in the eyes of their readers, we may be pretty sure they would have omitted what could not fail to repel many well-inclined readers, to stagger for a time even attached disciples, and occasion

perplexity among the most established in the faith. We know it did trouble not a few, for we gather from one of the Apocryphal Gospels that in the very next age some apology for it was thought to be necessary; we know how in that century Celsus, and two centuries after, Julian the Apostate, held it up to contempt for the pusillanimity with which it shews that Jesus met death in contrast with the magnanimity of dying pagans. In the days of Henry IV. of France, we read of a wretch who went to execution, jeering at our Lord for the bloody sweat which the prospect of death drew from Him, while he himself was going to death unmoved. Even some modern defences of it have been so lame as to lay themselves open to the hostile criticism of Strauss. Come, then, and let us reason together. Ye that see in Christ's death only the injustice of it, the severity of it, the uncomplaining submission of the innocent victim, and the beautiful example of self-sacrifice for the truth—come, put me through this scene of agonies and cries at the near approach of it. You know how willingly, for His sake, thousands of the martyrs of Jesus have gone to the rack or the flames, and some even rejoicing that they were counted worthy to suffer for His name. Are you prepared, then, to exalt the servants above their Master? and, if not, can you give any decent explanation of the amazing difference to *His* advantage? You cannot—on your principles it is impossible. Yet which of these dear servants of Jesus would not have shuddered at the thought of comparing themselves with Him? O yes, the secret of His mysterious revulsion from the Cross, at the very moment when He was saying, "O my Father, if this cup may not pass from me, except I drink it, Thy will be done," lies far deeper than mere Example. His own words give it, not in the Fourth Gospel, but in the First: "The Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give *His life a ransom*" ἀντὶ πολλῶν—not for the behoof merely, but "*in the stead of many.*" Yes, in the language of the Apostle, "He was made *sin for us*, who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him." Nor if this should be rejected, will any other even plausible account of that death be ever given.

Of the *resurrection* of Christ I will say but a word or two. If anti-supernatural theories are to have a hearing at all, this

must be got rid of at all hazards. Accordingly, the witnesses of the resurrection are put upon their trial afresh, and those ingenuities by which the Deists of last century were wont to shew that they are hopelessly contradictory, and so Christianity must be false, are revived and re-urged by rationalistic so-called Christians, to make out that the witnesses, from a variety of causes, were themselves deceived—that the resurrection was not a reality, but, notwithstanding, that Christ was no deceiver, but the greatest and best of teachers! ‘Oh, but we believe that He *rose in spirit*’ (you say)—for which I care not one farthing. In that sense, Socrates rose in spirit, and Howard the philanthropist rose in spirit, and every man who, by his writings or his actings, has proved a permanent blessing to mankind has risen in spirit, and “being dead yet speaketh.” Such eviscerated Christianity melts away in the hand that holds it as a mere piece of religious refinement, which can never quicken the soul or cheer the heart. “But now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first-fruits of them that sleep.” Nor will all the anti-supernaturalism in the world despoil us of this jewel of all our hopes, and of those priceless documents which record it. Those biographies called Gospels, which may each of them be read through in a few hours, have wrought a greater change upon the world than all other writings taken together. Little, indeed, is known about their external history. The precise date of none of them can be determined with certainty, and the order in which they appeared is matter of dispute to this day. Of the primary causes of their publication, and the objects immediately in view by them, we know next to nothing. Of the personal history of the writers, too, we know very little. Their whole power, therefore, must lie in their *contents*. Even as to these there have arisen perplexing questions not yet quite satisfactorily settled. But the efficacy of the life of Jesus, so conveyed to us, is no more affected by all this than if it did not exist. Thousands of copies of these documents were quickly made and dispersed through all lands; translations of them have been made and still continue to be made; nor will there exist a tribe, however remote and insignificant, in whose tongue they will not soon tell their marvellous tale. Nothing in the least like this can be said of any other ancient work,

nor of all works, ancient and modern, put together. Well, how is all this to be accounted for? What is there in the *life* here recorded that has the matchless virtue of attracting the homage of myriads of minds and ravishing hearts unnumbered, from age to age? How comes *He* to command what no human being ever claimed or ever received—the *trust*, the *love*, the humble *imitation* of the most advanced and enlightened portion of mankind? What spell is there about that dear Object which makes the best of men feel more deeply wounded by slights cast upon *Him* than by any affronts put upon themselves? Whence is it that they are ready any day to die for Him? What is it that draws them into ennobling communion with Him, though never yet seen, makes them look forward with rapture to the hope of seeing Him, and persuades them that, in the world to come, there will be no higher bliss than to be ever with Him? It is this, and this only, that they irresistibly feel and know the Gospel history to be true, and the Christianity which lies in the bosom of it to be God's sovereign balm for the maladies of our nature, in which all preceding revelations, and all preparatory Divine institutions, find their designed and appropriate completion. And that song of the whole ransomed Church, which fills the choir of the risen and enthroned Redeemer, will never be drowned by all the anti-supernatural voices in the world:—"Unto Him that loved us, and washed us from our sins in His own blood, and made us kings and priests to God and His Father, to Him be glory and dominion for ever and ever. Amen!"

D. BROWN.

ART. II.—*The Divine Names in Genesis.*

ONE of the earliest discoveries which the higher criticism boasts is that of the fragmentary character of the book of Genesis. But like many more of its results this has disdained to wear any permanent form. To each investigator the subject seems to have worn a new aspect; and the story of the flux and reflux of opinion on this point is not without instruction for the critics of to-day. Vitranga had suggested that

Moses had made use of pre-existing documents in the composition of the book. The suggestion seems harmless enough, but the seed dropped by the great Dutch theologian fell at last into kindly soil, and produced long afterwards unexpected fruit. The most cursory reader of Genesis must have been struck by the exclusive use in some sections of the name God (*Elohim*), and the equally exclusive use in others of the name LORD (*Jehovah*). Upon this fact Astruc, physician to Louis xv., founded the new theory in 1753. To him these names clearly indicated that the book had been mainly compiled from two original documents, and that the retention of the names, like unobliterated private marks on lost or stolen goods, enabled us to separate and apportion what had belonged to each. In addition to the two main documents, Astruc believed there had been other ten, and that the book, originally written in twelve columns, was afterwards written out in continuous form by some transcriber. This last feature of the theory proved to be very convenient, as some difficulties received a short and easy explanation by supposing that the transcriber had occasionally put the matter in the wrong place. In 1798 Ilgen went still further. He professed to have discovered traces of no less than *seventeen* original documents, and attempted to show what parts of the book pertained to each. It was felt, however, that matters might be pushed too far, and the theory has since been considerably modified. Though the old orthodox position has not been resumed, it has certainly been approached. De Wette believed Genesis to be mainly one document interspersed here and there with extracts from others. Ewald began by maintaining the unity of the book, and contended that the choice of the names *Jehovah* and *Elohim* was determined by rules based upon the usages of the Hebrew tongue. That explanation, as might have been foreseen, broke down, and his later opinion is that the names indicate the additions made to the original text by various editors.

Meanwhile, however, the theory is clung to under one form or another, and is evidently regarded as being as well established and as unassailable as the theory of gravitation. In his paper on the Deluge, in *The Contemporary*, November 1879, Lenormant, who has laid the Christian world under so great

obligation by his Assyrian researches, treats it as an undoubted fact that Genesis gives us *two* accounts of the flood, the one by an Elohist writer (Gen. vi. 9-22), the other by a Jehovist (Gen. vii.). Is there nothing left us then but to accept this theory with what resignation we can muster, and to admit that Genesis is mosaic in quite another sense than we have hitherto believed it to be? In the conviction that it is not even now too late to move for an arrest of judgment, I submit that the foundations of the fragmentary hypothesis are by no means so sound as they are supposed to be by many. I believe that it can be shown that we have here simply another illustration of how the difficulties of the critic may be solved by the patience of the expositor, and (let it be fully admitted) an illustration also of the service sometimes rendered by criticism in persistently fixing attention upon points which exposition in its indulgence would willingly leave alone.

It must be admitted that in one place at least appearances are greatly in favour of the fragmentary theory. The story of the creation is carried on continuously throughout the whole of the first chapter and up to the fourth verse of the second. But there the thread is suddenly broken. With the fourth verse another beginning is made, and the story of the creation is briefly told again with new and striking details. Now this of itself is quite enough to provoke inquiry and to suggest hypotheses, but when it is observed that the sections differ as to the name applied to God, *Elohim* being exclusively used in the first (i. 1-ii. 3), and *Jehovah-Elohim* in the second (ii. 4-7), it would seem as if nothing more were needed to prove them of different authorship. There can be little doubt that this instance, and the alternation of the Divine names in the account of the deluge, have been the means of securing almost all the adherence the theory has received; and yet we are convinced that the book itself will show that the conclusions drawn have been premature and fallacious.

The point to which we ask special attention is the alternation in the names of God; and what we are about to submit to the reader will, we trust, show that one at least of the two grand pillars which uphold what we may call (we trust without offence) the patchwork theory is resting upon thin air. But before we pass on, let us glance for a moment or two

at the foundation which lies beneath the other. The repetitions are as characteristic a feature of the book as the variation in the names: can they then in any fair and honest way be reconciled with oneness of authorship?

The manifest purpose of the book is to trace back all things to their origin. It sheds light upon the darkness which even tradition has not pretended to illumine, and shows us the places and the homes whence the nations of the earth passed out upon their primeval wanderings; it lifts the veil, too, from God's connection with the universe, with man, and with the fortunes of His people. We are first of all told how "in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth," and then the book is divided into sections, each containing a genealogy. We have, to begin with, "the generations of the heavens and the earth," which extends from the fourth verse of the second chapter to the twenty-sixth of the fourth; and then, in regular succession, "the generations of Adam," of Noah, of the sons of Noah, of Shem, of Terah, of Abraham, the whole closing with "the generations of Jacob," which brings down the story to the settlement of the Israelites in Egypt, and the death of Joseph. The branchings out of the human family into races and nations are carefully marked, but the reader's attention is notwithstanding kept firmly fixed upon that path of history along which God's great purpose is steadily advancing to its fulfilment. It will be seen, therefore, that there was in the writer's mind a clearly conceived purpose, and one which has been accomplished in a really masterly manner. If anything, indeed, in plan and execution can prove oneness of authorship, the integrity of Genesis will find its best defence in the book itself. But when this division into genealogies is observed, the repetition in the story of creation is explained at once. It belongs to the very plan of the book that there should be repetitions. Generally the end of one genealogy is the beginning of that which follows; and the last link of the former takes its place again as the first link of the latter. The repeated matter belongs to both accounts; it is the natural ending of the first and the equally natural beginning of the second. We have been told, for example, about Isaac's birth, his early history, and even his marriage, in the genealogy of Abraham. But in xxv. 19 we are told: "And these are the generations of

Isaac, Abraham's son : Abraham begat Isaac. And Isaac was forty years old when he took Rebekah to wife." The story of Isaac's earlier years is here the common link, and though given before, is briefly detailed again in entering upon the following section of the history. We have another instance in the same chapter. Part of Ishmael's story, like Isaac's, has been already narrated in "the generations of Abraham;" but in verse 12 we read : "These are the generations of Ishmael, Abraham's son, whom Hagar the Egyptian, Sarah's handmaid, bare unto Abraham." Again, "the generations of Shem" ends with the words : "And Terah lived seventy years and begat Abram, Nahor, and Haran" (xi. 26); but in the verse immediately following a new starting-point is reached in "the generations of Terah," and we are told again "Terah begat Abram, Nahor, and Haran." It is the same with "the generations of Noah." His immediate descendants and his finding favour with God have been already recorded, but these with other details are again narrated. In chap. v. 1, 2, which begins "the book of the generations of Adam," the creation of mankind is briefly referred to, though it has been fully detailed in the previous chapters. We have now only to observe that Gen. ii. 4 begins a new section. It opens : "These are the generations of the heavens and the earth," and proceeds with the story of what this creation led to. The section extends to the end of the fourth chapter, and embraces the story of God's care for the man He had created, of the fall and its fruit, in the loss of Eden and the dark crime of Cain. The so-called second account of creation (which, it will be observed, is contained within the small compass of four verses), is therefore only the customary recapitulation at the opening of a new section, with the addition of details which show how God had been preparing the earth for the habitation of man, and which thus admirably pave the way for the story that follows. So far, then, from this being any proof of the fragmentary theory, it is evidence rather that the opening chapters are from the same hand as the rest of the book. Would it not have been strange indeed had we missed there what is so marked a feature of the book everywhere besides ?

We now turn to the argument for the theory which is based upon the use of the Divine names. In the opening account of

creation *Elohim* alone occurs. Throughout the second section, on the other hand, it is *Jehovah-Elohim* (the LORD-God), and the whole book is characterised by the alternation of these names *Elohim* and *Jehovah*.¹ Few indeed will be satisfied with the explanation that the change is made on merely rhetorical grounds, and is nothing more than a device to avoid the too frequent repetition of the same word. In the opening section (i. 1-ii. 3), *Elohim* occurs thirty-five times, and in the beginning of the second section (ii. 4-iii. 1), *Jehovah-Elohim* eleven times, without the slightest variation in either case. It is clear, therefore, that the change is made from some other cause than a fear of repetition. But what are we to think of the criticism that rushes to the conclusion that this cause can only be a difference in authorship, and that begins forthwith to speak of "the Elohist" and "the Jehovist"? Opening the first volume of Disraeli's *Charles I.*, at page 444, I find "Charles" twice in succession, and immediately afterwards, upon the same page, that monarch is referred to three times in succession as "the king." Elsewhere in the volume he is spoken of as "Charles the first," and probably also as "King Charles the first." Suppose now that the book survives a thousand years, and that Lord Macaulay's New-Zealander unearths and decipheres a copy. It might show the acuteness of the higher criticism of that time to mark the alternation of the names, but what would be said of its wisdom in concluding that their use pointed to different authors or editors, and that, say, the more familiar epithet of "Charles" clearly indicated one of republican sympathies! It would certainly show truer wisdom to inquire whether the change in the name was not after all consistent with oneness of authorship, and was not occasioned, sometimes at least, by the matter with which the writer was dealing. In the criticism of such a book I do not know that anything would be put in peril save the critic's reputation. The decision would change little in heaven or earth for any one. But if patient inquiry would be demanded there, how much more loudly is it called for here, where rashness and self-sufficiency may rob thousands of peace and hope and spiritual power!

¹ The reader of the English version may be reminded that *Jehovah* is invariably rendered by "LORD" (in capitals), and *Elohim* by "God."

It will be acknowledged at the outset that the explanation *may* lie in the direction now indicated: namely, that the choice of the names is determined by the context. We ourselves apply epithets and phrases to express the special aspect of the divine nature to which our attention is for the time directed. We sometimes discriminate also in our use of the Saxon terms Lord and God. Should we speak of Him as our highest good, we should use the latter of the two, and if of His right to our life's devotion and service, we should feel that the former was more appropriately applied. It is evident, however, that the distinction we make in the use of the names will depend upon our perception of their meaning; for, just as the signification of each is clear and distinct, it will be correspondingly impossible to apply them recklessly. Now, it is of the utmost moment in any right consideration of this question that one fact should be fully noticed. It is that a clear perception of the meaning of names, what indeed we may call a *name-consciousness*, is one of the most marked characteristics of the book of Genesis. Scarcely a name is introduced without its meaning being given, and the circumstances narrated in which it was first bestowed. Attention is directed, for example, to the meaning of the names Eve, Cain, Seth, Noah, Peleg, Abram and Abraham, Sarai and Sarah, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob and Israel, Esau and Edom, Reuben, Simeon, Levi, Judah, Dan, Naphtali, Gad, Asher, Issachar, Zebulun, Joseph, Benoni and Benjamin, Pharez, Manasseh and Ephraim. A similar list might be made of the names of places, the meaning of which is also given. But there is another fact which has a still closer bearing upon our argument. I refer to the change of names. Abram's name is changed to Abraham, Sarai's to Sarah, Jacob's to Israel. In the first two instances the change is made once for all; the old name is dropped, the new alone retained. But in Jacob's case both names are used. Now here we have a parallel to the use of the Divine names *Jehovah* and *Elohim*; and, in one instance at least, it must be acknowledged that they are used with discrimination. Jacob's sons have returned the second time from Egypt. Joseph has at last revealed himself to them, and they have come back with the great tidings that their father's favoured son "is yet alive and is governor over all the land of Egypt." The historian continues: "And Jacob's heart

fainted, for he believed them not. And they told him all the words of Joseph which he had said unto them : and when he saw the waggons which Joseph had sent to carry him, the spirit of *Jacob* their father revived, and *Israel* said, It is enough, Joseph my son is yet alive : I will go and see him before I die " (Gen. xlv. 26-28). The sudden transition from "*Jacob*" to "*Israel*" will be noted. Is it possible to believe that the change is made without a purpose? Can its significance be missed if it be remembered that the name "*Israel*" was bestowed when, after the long night-wrestling with the angel, he at last prevailed, and the assurance of God's favour broke like sunshine upon his inner darkness? It was his name of triumph ; and in that very hour another long-protracted struggle had come to an end. He had refused to take the heavy judgments which fell upon him as proofs of God's final rejection of him. In his deepest darkness he clung to God, and refused to let Him go till He should bless him. With strong crying and tears he had doubtless sought for some token of God's returning favour, and once more he had prevailed. In the unlooked-for tidings of Joseph's well-being, the day broke upon him, and God's blessing crowned him. "*Jacob's* heart fainted," but "*Israel* said, It is enough ; Joseph my son is yet alive : I will go and see him before I die."

I have no wish to build upon these facts more than they will bear. Still clearer evidence will be adduced that the Divine names are used with as evident discrimination, but meanwhile I ask that this only be admitted : that so far is this supposition from being a violent one, that there is already a strong presumption in its favour. Two questions now remain—(1) Is there any broad distinction in the meaning of the words? and (2) Can it be shown that this distinction has guided the writer in the use he made of them? The first question admits of but one reply. *Elohim* had a signification which no one acquainted with the Hebrew tongue could have lost sight of. It comes from a root which means *to be strong*, and which gives us three names of God : *El*, the Strong, Mighty One (which appears in so many names in the Old Testament, *Eliezer*, *Elimelech*, *Elijah*, *Elisha*, etc.), *Eloah*, and its plural *Elohim*. It may at first sight seem strange that a distinctly plural form is used as a name of God, and wild enough theories have been

built upon the fact; but quite sufficient light is shed upon this point in Proverbs ix. 1, where we meet with the same peculiarity. *Wisdom* occurs there in the plural form, and is coupled, just as *Elohim* is, with a singular verb. The intention in both cases is manifestly the same—to intimate that the wisdom and the strength are endless and inexhaustible. We acquaint ourselves with them on this side and on that, but we are only passing as from a centre into infinite depths. Each word is applied to what in its nature is one but is nevertheless infinite; and, therefore, while the oneness of each is clearly indicated by the construction of the sentence, they are notwithstanding named *Wisdoms* and *Strengths*. *Elohim*, in short, expresses what is occasionally rendered more emphatically by the two words *El Shaddai*, God Almighty.

To the meaning of *Jehovah* the attention of Moses had been called by God Himself: "God spake unto Moses and said unto him, I am *Jehovah*, and I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob by the name of God Almighty (*El Shaddai*), but by my name *Jehovah* was I not known to them" (Exod. vi. 2, 3). This might mean that the word had not belonged to their vocabulary as a name of God, and that it was now so applied for the first time. Even on this supposition its appearance in Genesis would generally be intelligible enough, it would be put wherever the writer felt that God had already been proving Himself to be *Jehovah*. But the words are capable of yielding quite another sense. It will be observed that God speaks of Himself as *having the two names* ("my name *Jehovah*"), but asserts that while the fathers had known the import of one, that of the other had been hid from them. How had they known the meaning of the first but by the revelation He had given of His *power* in the world around them, and in the mighty help they had ever found in Him? And if *Jehovah* had already been applied as a name of God, would not the intimation to Moses that it had never yet been understood, be all the more significant, and give birth to the expectation that God was about to do a new thing in the earth? There cannot indeed be the slightest doubt that the use of the word as a Divine name is much earlier than Moses. Moses changed the name of his successor from Oshea (salvation) to Joshua (whose salvation is *Jehovah*), but in this he was simply following an

early custom, for the same Divine name appears in that of his own mother Jochebed (whose glory is Jehovah). Quite as decisive a proof of its still earlier use is the name which Abraham gave to the place where the ram was caught in the thicket—he called it *Jehovah-jireh* (Jehovah will see). The words are to be understood then in a still richer sense than that God was to take to Himself an absolutely new name. They mean rather that He was to justify an old name and fill it so full of significance that its future would be to its past what the mid-day splendour is to the early dawn. One who had seen the first grey light break upon the eastern sky, may have had his heart touched and thrilled, and have hailed the vanquisher of night by the name “Day;” but if he had seen no more than that, though he had used the name, he did not know what the “Day” meant. The revelation which God was now about to give of Himself not only eclipsed all that had been given in the past—it stood alone in its splendour throughout all that dispensation. When the Israelite would know what this name Jehovah covered, he looked back not to the times of patriarchs or of kings, but to the days of Moses, when Egypt’s yoke was broken, and “JEHOVAH brought” His people “forth out of Egypt with a mighty hand, and with an outstretched arm, and with great terribleness, and with signs, and with wonders.” Of those days all the institutions of Israel were the continued commemoration. God had announced Himself to Abraham and Isaac and Jacob as *El Shaddai*, the Almighty: for men were to know him first of all as the living God, able to do exceeding abundantly above all that they asked or thought. They had called upon Him also as *Jehovah*, for they had learned something besides God’s powerfulness. But in announcing Himself to Moses not as *El Shaddai* but as *Jehovah*, God intimated that He should now do a new thing in the earth. What men had already dimly discerned and owned was to be brought out into the light and made manifest for ever—and whether a new thing was done the story of those wonders will declare.

What then did the name *Jehovah* mean? The word was already in the time of Moses an ancient form of part of the Hebrew verb *to be*. It seems highly probable that it is the third singular future of the Hiphil, or causative, conjugation,

and means "he will cause (it) to be." This accords fully with the interpretation given in Exod. iii. 14. Moses had represented the people as likely to ask him the name of the God whose message he conveyed to them; and God said unto Moses: "I am that (or what) I am." This reply threw Israel back upon the promises which had been handed down from sire to son. It quickened, if anything might quicken, their slumbering faith. The words "I am what I am" are not rightly interpreted by saying they mean "the Existent" or "the Self-existent One." They point rather to *unbroken continuity of character and of purpose*, to unvarying constancy, to unswerving faithfulness. The words told them that the promises of God were not forgotten, that His design was not laid aside, and that they had not, in short, in any sense a different God from Him who had spoken to their fathers. What He had been in the past, the present and the future would still reveal Him to be. His deeds write all along the ages: "I am what I am," He is "the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever," "the Father of lights . . . with whom there is no variableness neither shadow of turning." It may be remarked that the paraphrase which the Targums give of this passage affords a striking confirmation of the causative sense here claimed for *Jehovah*. They simply import into their explanation a literal rendering of the Divine name. The Targum Jonathan says, "He who spoke and the world was; He who spoke and the universe was;" and the Targum Jerusalem, "He who said to the world Exist! and it was, and who will say to it Exist! and it will be." *Jehovah* is He who shall cause it to be, and whose every word shall be fulfilled. In these two names therefore of *Elohim* and *Jehovah* we have a twofold representation of God as the Almighty and the Changeless, the infinitely strong and the ever faithful One. They conveyed the twofold assurance that God *can* help and that he *will*. Other distinctions have been drawn between the words. It has been said, for example, that *Jehovah* is used in passages which speak of God's covenant relation to His people, and *Elohim* where His relation to the race is referred to. So narrow and mechanical a view must inevitably break down in the most cursory reading of Genesis. This covenant relation was certainly the greatest exhibition of God's oneness of purpose, but there were other exhibitions of

it as well ; it comes under the broad meaning of the word, but does not exhaust it.

There is then a broad and clear distinction in the meaning of the words. They express two of the most important attributes of God—attributes the recognition of which lies at the root of all reverence and trust. God might be all-powerful and yet not changeless : what was His earnest purpose in one age might be modified or abandoned in the next. Or, He might be constant in purpose and endeavour, but not almighty : there might be opposition and difficulties which even His power could not overcome. In either case the calm assurance of trust would be broken ; but these names *Elohim*, *Jehovah*, were the soul's answer to the one fear and the other. He was almighty and He was changeless. Our first question is therefore answered : there is a distinction in the meaning of the words. It now only remains that we look at the second : is the distinction observed in the book, or is it a mere etymological fancy ? To this question the following will be a sufficient reply :—

The faithfulness of God has terror as well as joy in it ; for it speaks of judgment as well as of mercy. In chapter xx. *Jehovah* occurs once only, but then as the sender of judgment upon the house of Abimelech (ver. 18). The following chapter would be pronounced Elohist, but in the opening verse *Jehovah* occurs twice just where emphasis is laid upon His having remembered and fulfilled a promise : “and *Jehovah* visited Sarah as He had said, and *Jehovah* did unto Sarah as He had spoken.” It is *Jehovah* who punishes Er and Onan (xxxviii. 7-10), and who is with Joseph in the house of bondage, and “who made all that he did to prosper in his hand” (xxxix. 2, 3), and who showed him mercy in the prison (xxxix. 21, 23). In chapter xxxi. *Elohim* is used sixteen times and *Jehovah* twice only, but in both instances emphasis is laid upon God's faithfulness : it is *Jehovah* who calls back Jacob to the land of his fathers, giving him the assurance “I will be with thee” (ver. 3) ; and again it is *Jehovah* (who remembers and avenges) whom Laban invokes at the heap of witness (ver. 49). The same predominance of *Elohim* marks chapter xxxii. *Jehovah* is employed once only, but then in a way which of itself would go far to establish this distinction. Dreading

the meeting with Esau upon the morrow, "Jacob said, 'O God of my father Abraham, and God of my father Isaac, *JEHOVAH, who saidst unto me*, Return unto thy country and to thy kindred and I will deal well with thee'" (xxxii. 9). The force of the plea embodied in the name *Jehovah* will be felt at once. He casts himself upon the Divine faithfulness. God was not only the *Elohim*, the mighty helper, of his fathers, but also the Faithful One whose promise had brought him hither and who would not fail or deceive him now. The almost exclusive use of *Jehovah* in the account of the calling and the early wanderings of Abraham (xii.-xvi.) is very marked, and little reflection is needed to find an explanation. Not only was the separating of Abraham the first great step which had been taken towards the fulfilling of the promise of the world's salvation; but Abraham while resigning country, possessions, kindred, had only promises given him, and this attribute of God's faithfulness was therefore that on which Abraham's trust specially rested. In the blessing which Noah pronounced upon his sons we have a remarkable illustration of the discrimination which was made in the use of the names. "And he said, 'Blessed be the LORD-God (*Jehovah-Elohim*) of Shem. . . . God (*Elohim*) shall enlarge Japheth and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem'" (ix. 26, 27). God, both in His faithfulness and in His might, is to be revealed to the race of Shem as to no other. The nations shall know Him as the *Jehovah-Elohim*, the ever-faithful almighty one, of Shem. God will enlarge Japheth so that he shall spread over and possess the earth, but for the better than the earthly portion he must seek to the tabernacles of his brother. Before referring to the accounts of the deluge and the creation we notice one or two other passages. In chapter v. God is spoken of as *Elohim* except in one instance—that, namely, in which Lamech speaks of "the ground which *Jehovah* hath cursed" (29). The reason of this deviation is evident. The land is cursed because God said it should be so on account of man's sin. It is the act of *Jehovah*, all whose threatenings find their fulfilment. In iv. i, Eve exclaims "I have gotten a man from *Jehovah*," and here God's faithfulness in the supposed gift of the promised seed explains the choice of the name. It is to *Jehovah* again, who in His faithfulness has given fruitfulness to the soil, and increase

to the flock, that Cain and Abel bring their sacrifices (iv. 3, 4); and it is *Jehovah* also who inquires into and avenges the shedding of Abel's blood (iv. 9-15).

In the account of the deluge we meet with simply this same variation in the use of the Divine names. In chapter vi., wherever the coming judgment is indicated, the historian passes from the name *Elohim* to that of *Jehovah*: "*Jehovah* said, 'My spirit shall not always strive with man,' . . . and *Elohim* saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth . . . and it repented *Jehovah* that he had made man on the earth" (verses 3, 5-7). In the rest of the chapter, in which God directs Noah in regard to the building of the ark and the preserving of animal life, *Elohim* is used, but when the long interval of warning and preparation had come to an end, and promise and threatening were at last to be fulfilled, *Elohim* is exchanged for *Jehovah*: "and *Jehovah* said unto Noah, 'Come thou, and all thy house, into the ark'" (verse 1), "and they went in unto Noah into the ark, two and two, of all flesh wherein is the breath of life. And they that went in went in male and female, of all flesh, as God had commanded him, and THE LORD shut him in" (verses 15, 16). Noah had done all he was able to do in making the ark a secure refuge for the life of which, during those terrible coming days, it was to be the sole hope, and God, in His faithfulness, now completed the work: Noah did "as *Elohim* had commanded him, and *Jehovah* shut him in." Could a stronger proof of the distinction between the names be desired than this? In viii. 1, 2, we read: "*Elohim* remembered Noah, and every living thing, and all the cattle that was with him in the ark, and *Elohim* made a wind to pass over the earth, and the waters assuaged, the fountains also of the deep and the windows of heaven were stopped, and the rain from heaven was restrained." God's power in curbing the forces of nature and sweeping back the deluge from the earth is here minutely dwelt upon, and the appropriateness of *Elohim* is abundantly evident. On the other hand, when Noah builds his altar and offers sacrifice, it is to *Jehovah*. The promise of safety and the threatenings of judgment had alike been marvellously fulfilled. In the so-called second account of creation we have only an additional

proof of this discrimination in the use of the Divine names. In the first acts of creation God is displayed in the fulness of His power, and *Elohim* is therefore used throughout (i. 1-ii. 3). But in the following section (ii. 4, etc.), which not only recounts the creation of man, but relates also how God dealt with him in judgment and mercy, there is not only a continued display of the divine might, but also a revelation of the Divine faithfulness, and there the name is used which denotes both, *Jehovah-Elohim*. There is one exception to this, but it is an exception to which we would point as one of the most signal proofs of the correctness of the view now maintained. When the serpent speaks with the woman, God's faithfulness is kept out of sight; He is only *Elohim*. But when the sinful are again with God He is *Jehovah-Elohim*, the Mighty One, at the remembrance of whose faithfulness the sinful are afraid, and hide themselves.

The distinction between the names is not confined to Genesis; it runs through the whole of the Old Testament. We have already seen it in Exodus, and there, it may be remarked, there is one passage which, it seems to us, can be explained by our interpretation alone: "And I will bring you in unto the land concerning the which I did swear to give it to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob; and I will give it to you for an heritage: I am *Jehovah*" (vi. 8). Here the only meaning we can assign to the words "I am *Jehovah*," is that God is solemnly asserting His faithfulness. The distinction is very marked even in the book of Job. Job and his friends speak of "God" and the "Almighty," but it is *Jehovah*, the Faithful One, who will not suffer us to be tempted beyond that we are able to bear, who allows stroke after stroke to fall upon him (i. 12, ii. 6); and it is *Jehovah* who "blessed the latter end of Job more than his beginning." The name *Jehovah* predominates in the prophets and in the historical books, so far as they partake of the prophetic character; for there God's faithfulness, both in its severity and goodness, is the aspect of the Divine character to which attention is specially directed. In Proverbs and Ecclesiastes we have two books, both imparting the lessons of wisdom, but from entirely different standpoints. Ecclesiastes gathers up the teachings of human experience; Proverbs speaks from

the light of God's presence, He reigns in the earth, and good and evil are from His hand alone. Ecclesiastes speaks, therefore, only of *Elohim*, the Mighty One, but Proverbs of *Jehovah*, the Faithful One. In the Psalms, too, not only in the book as a whole, but in individual psalms as well, the variation is as marked as it is in Genesis. It is found even in the so-called Elohist psalms. For example: "Yet the LORD (the faithful one) will command His loving-kindness in the day-time, and in the night His song shall be with me, and my prayer unto the God of my life" (xlii. 8); "As for me, I will call upon God, and the LORD shall save me; . . . cast thy burden upon the LORD, and He shall sustain thee" (lv. 16, 22). In Ps. cxlvi. 7-9, "The LORD looseth the prisoners, the LORD openeth the eyes of the blind, the LORD raiseth them that are bowed down, the LORD loveth the righteous, the LORD preserveth the strangers," *Jehovah* recurs so frequently as to become monotonous. For the LORD read "the Faithful One," and the Psalmist's purpose is at once revealed. Every repetition is an added power, and opens the heart to receive as choicest treasure each assurance. The truth is, that the very name by which the Israelite named God had significance and pathos in it. It was no unmeaning sound. It was the outstretching rather of a divine hand which touched a chord in the breast of the worshipper, and filled it with holy awe, or woke within it the voice of joy and praise. When, realising the words we speak, we bow down and say "Our Father," there is deliverance in the very cry, and so, breathing out those names of God, the Israelite passed out of the straitness of his need, the darkness of his thought, into the light and joy of the Divine Presence. And if the theories of rationalism have left this fact more prominent for us than it was before, their results have not been wholly evil.

JOHN URQUHART.

ART. III.—*Christian Morality, Expediency, and Liberty.*¹

THERE is an expediency which is the handmaid of rectitude. There is another which usurps its place and tramples it in the dust. When the high priest Caiaphas said, referring to Christ, "It is expedient for us that one man die for the people, and that the whole nation perish not" (John xi. 50), this is the climacteric instance of the latter kind. Without inquiry or concern in regard to his guilt or innocence, it was made the ethical basis of the crime of crimes, the crucifixion of the Lord of glory. Such expediency has been the great justification of the slaughter of the innocents in all ages. It was this that drenched Paris in blood in the days of the Revolution and the Commune. But the former kind of expediency has a rightful and necessary place in sound ethics. That place is carefully and even philosophically defined in the New Testament by one justly styled the "philosophic apostle."

In 1 Corinthians x. 23, Paul declares to us, "All things are lawful for me, but all things are not expedient: all things are lawful for me, but all things edify not." In chapter vi. 12, we find the same words with a change of the last clause: in place of "all things edify not," it reads, "but I will not be brought under the power of any." It is hardly necessary to say that the "all things" mentioned as being "lawful" do not mean "all things" in the most absolute sense of all beings or acts in the universe, actual or possible, but all things of the class of which he was speaking; i.e. all actions which in themselves are morally indifferent. The actions that in this sense are permissible, or lawful in themselves to be done or abstained from, according as they are or are not for edification, are innumerable. They become right or wrong according as circumstances do or do not render them conducive to edification, to the glory of God, the advancement of his church, and the welfare of man. To this class belong the species of actions which the apostle has in view in his ethical discussions in Romans xiv. and 1 Corinthians viii., ix., and x. They are such as eating herbs or meat that had been offered in sacrifice to idols; keeping days and

¹ From *The Princeton Review*.

rites prescribed in the Jewish ceremonial. As concerns actions of this kind, "All things are lawful, but all things are not expedient, because they edify not." There is another class of actions that fall not under this category, which are never lawful and may never be done. Such is everything prohibited in the decalogue. Otherwise, what is lawful is not lawful. Paul never meant such an absurdity. Contrariwise, in the practical parts of his epistles he is constantly reaffirming them, and putting them not only on the ground of natural, but of Christian obligation as well, and this alike with regard to the God-ward and man-ward part of the decalogue. Witness his injunctions of piety towards God, insomuch that he insists that all things be done as to the Lord and to his glory, while he enjoins, in forms the most varied and explicit, parental fidelity and love; filial obedience and reverence; regard for the sacredness of life; chastity, industry, honesty, veracity, fidelity; avoidance of all acts or feelings antagonistic to other men's just rights, privileges, and possessions. The actions thus respectively commanded and forbidden are morally good or evil in themselves. No circumstances can alter their nature or annul the obligation to do the one and shun the other. Not only does this stand in all its force as an original law of nature, written alike on tables of stone and in the natural conscience, but its obligation is enhanced by every new relation and motive of the Gospel. That there is such a thing as intrinsic moral good and evil, which no circumstances of supposed expediency can make otherwise, which cannot be set aside by any alleged tendency to promote good arising from their violation, he clearly teaches when he repels, with indignant denunciation of its authors, the charge that Christians act upon the abominable maxim of "doing evil that good may come," and declares their "damnation just" (Rom. iii. 8). There is moral evil then, that remains immutably such, no matter what good may be effected or intended by doing it. When any principle of truth or righteousness was involved, the apostle was the last man to countenance the remotest deviation from, or shortcoming in adhering to it. When piety, veracity, profaneness, or fraud are involved, one might as well measure them by the yardstick, or seek their market value, as ask, Are they expedient? Paul rarely rises to a more superlative intensity of expression than in the out-

burst, "Though we or an angel from heaven preach any other gospel unto you than that we have preached unto you, let him be accursed" (Gal. i. 8). Though persecutions unto death awaited him for his fidelity to truth as it is in Jesus, yet when this was at stake he was inflexible, and, in the face of terrors which stagger humanity, he could say, with a heart dauntless and serene, "None of these things move me."

Now, of the things lawful in the sense of being morally indifferent *per se*, he says, all are not expedient, which raises the question, mooted from the very beginnings of ethical science and controversy, What is the place of expediency as in any way the foundation of morality, of moral obligation, and as a guide to moral action? On a right adjustment of its true sphere, beyond all doubt, depends the possibility of a true theory of ethics, or a true code of practical morals. In answer, it is quite safe to say that true principles on this subject are as rational as they are Scriptural. They are as adequately set forth and reasoned out by Paul, in the places already indicated, as if he were giving us a complete chapter on the right use of things indifferent, in a formal treatise on Christian ethics.

Before proceeding further, it is to be observed that this inquiry covers the whole distinction between positive and moral laws. Positive law cannot go beyond the domain of expediency. It is applicable only to actions to which expediency is applicable; *i.e.* to actions *per se* indifferent. No positive law can annul a moral law. It can, however, make actions not in themselves morally binding, become so, when enacted by a competent lawgiver. It is not within the prerogative of positive law to authorise worship of more gods than one, or the practice of blasphemy or perjury. Nor is a positive law enjoining acts adiaphorous in their own nature, rightfully enacted unless, in the circumstances, the performance of such actions tends to good.

So, as moral laws are immutable and irrevocable, positive laws admit of repeal, suspension, or modification, when required by the interests to promote which they were enacted. Of this character are the police laws and regulations, indeed the larger part of all the legislation of States. When warrantable, they must be adopted for the promotion of righteous ends; but changing circumstances require a constant change of laws for

the most effectual furtherance of the same ends. Nearly all have recognised the positive character of the Jewish ceremonial laws in contrast to the Decalogue—the former being liable to abrogation, and actually vanishing away at the coming of Christ ; the latter so perfect and immutable, that sooner shall the heavens pass away than one jot or tittle thereof shall fail. The moral and religious truths and interests subserved by these ceremonies abide. The means of promoting them are changed with changing circumstances. Circumcision and the passover give way to the Christian sacraments, all being alike “ signs and seals of the righteousness of faith.” The hard ritual observance of the Jewish Sabbath disappears with the other ceremonial regimen of that economy. The true rest from worldly distractions by a joyous rest in God, under an economy of greater liberty, is best attained by sloughing off integuments which once protected, but, longer continued, would hamper, its power for good. It would sacrifice the true well-being of man to a stiff outward ceremony, the very end of the Sabbath to a mere outward form, so reversing the law that “ the Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath.”

The subjects of the controversies and divisions which led Paul to make his deliverances to the Roman and Corinthian Christians had reference in part to the sacred days of the Jews, regarded as still being such by some Jewish Christians, while not so in fact, nor so regarded by the more enlightened converts. But these days having been constituted sacred by positive statute, ceased to be such with the cessation of the law and the reasons for it—*cessante ratione cessat lex*.

Many persons confound the positive with the moral law, and argue as if each were equally subject to revocation or exception; not merely by the mere fiat of the lawgiver, but at the behest of strong personal sentiment. As if a ruler could be equally entitled to obedience in enjoining idolatry, imposing an income-tax, or making a police regulation. Something of this sort displays itself in that passionate but brilliant outburst of Jacobi in his letter to Fichte, which seems to sink ordinary morality in a super-sublimated sentimentality :

“ Yea, I am that atheist, and that godless person who, contrary to the will which wills nothing, will lie like the dying Desdemona ; will lie and deceive like Pylades representing himself as Orestes ; will murder like

Timoleon ; will be a law and oath breaker like Epaminondas and John de Witt ; will resolve on suicide like Otho ; rob the temple like David—yea, will pluck ears of corn on the Sabbath for this reason only, that I am hungry, and the law was made for man and not man for the law. I am that godless person, and despise the philosophy which therefore calls me godless, despise it and its very essence ; for with the holiest certainty of my soul I know that the *privilegium aggratiandi* for such offences against the simple letter of the absolute universal law of reason is the peculiar prerogative of man, the seal of his dignity and of his divine nature.”—*Jacobi's Letter to Fichte*, Hamburg ed. pp. 32, 33.

The confusion of moral with positive law here is manifest. The shew-bread acquired its sanctity solely from positive institution. No moral principle was violated when its necessary use for ends higher than any mere outward ceremonial was tolerated. The same is true of the relation of plucking corn on the Sabbath, to appease hunger and preserve health, to the charge of Sabbath-breaking. The Lord of the Sabbath makes a very summary disposition of it—which is comprehended under a broader principle respecting the immolation of piety, morality, and humanity on those altars of external rites which are ordained only in furtherance of them—“I will have mercy and not sacrifice.” “The Sabbath,” says our Lord, “was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath.” While this shows that no such rigour of outward Sabbath observance is to be insisted on as to make man a victim of such rigid formality, nevertheless it does not annul the sacredness of the day, or the duty of abstinence from all worldly labours and recreations not demanded by necessity and mercy. But Jacobi treats this positive and dispensable element in the Sabbath as if it were on the same footing as absolutely moral laws, grounded in the nature of things, and beyond all suspension or repeal ; as if the obligations to abstain from idolatry, profaneness, murder, adultery, theft, and lying, were on no higher ground, and it could be properly said of these in relation to man, “They were made for him, not he for them.” The reverse of this is true of the moral law, whether as emanent in express statute, or immanent in God's perfect nature and will. It is not *made* in the sense of being capable of non-existence, so long as God and his accountable creatures exist. It is not *made* for them in the sense of being subordinate to them or their interests, if these could properly be conceived to be in conflict with it ; or

capable of annulment if found in real or supposed conflict with them. Conformity to this law, which is perfect, does indeed make man perfect in character and condition. But this goes to prove that man is made for it, and must make it his supreme standard ; not that it was made for man, and must be flexible to his vacillations. Is it not a sheer solecism to say that the law of truth is a mere arbitrary enactment, made for the benefit of man, and revocable at pleasure when it goes athwart man's pleasure or interest ? Is it not the case, rather, that man, by virtue of his moral and rational nature, is made to love, maintain, speak, and act the truth, and every other part of that perfect and immutable law, no iota of which shall ever fail ? It is the province of human legislatures to protect and enforce truth by punishing perjury, libel, and fraud. What would be thought of their affixing pains and penalties to the utterance of truth or the practice of honesty ?

There is indeed a border-land here, as nearly everywhere outside of pure *a priori* sciences, in which the two kinds, however distinct, still overlap and interpenetrate. The moral law, though not any creation of mere arbitrary will, in which *stat pro ratione voluntas*, is nevertheless what God wills, and in this sense is binding because divinely commanded. Positive precepts of religion, though only obligatory because positively instituted, are nevertheless so instituted of God because, for the time being, they serve moral ends. Sometimes these so interblend that it is not easy to find the precise boundary-line between them. This is peculiarly true of the Christian Sabbath, which, as to the nature and ends of the sacred rest it provides and enjoins, is moral, and in its own nature obligatory. But as to the precise day, its order and frequency of recurrence, and the external form and rigour of observance—this is matter of positive enactment, and depends upon it. It would be safe to say that he is no Christian who observes no days or times of sacred rest. But it would be quite aside of the mark to say that one who, lost in the forests or on a desert island, or through mistaken calculations, fixes on the wrong day as a Sabbath, is therefore any the less a Christian. Something of this kind must be conceded to different persuasions as to the required form and manner of its observance. But because modern life

is so conditioned upon facilities for public travel that even church-going may require forms of public carriage not formerly needed, it does not follow that there should be no restriction of railway travel or transportation on the Sabbath, or that these agencies of locomotion should promote its desecration by excursions for pleasure and revelry on that day. Because it is right to take the first rope or boat one can lay hold of to save a drowning man, it does not follow that St. Crispin was right in stealing leather for purposes of charity to the poor. The difficulty here, however, respects the application of principles, more than the principles themselves. There is always less difficulty with principles in the abstract, as such. The chief perplexity and controversy arise as to their application to concrete cases. To render to creatures the homage due to the Creator, or worship them as God, would be unquestioned idolatry; but some Romanists, admitting this, insist that in kneeling before images of Christ and the saints, or literal figures or emblems suggesting the Trinity, they are not bowing down to these, but to the divinity they symbolise. A lie is a false representation made with intent to deceive, when the circumstances imply at least a promise to utter truth. But in regard to how many cases may questions arise, whether there is a misrepresentation in fact or intention, or whether a promise is fairly implied to make accurate statements? It would be agreed that feints and stratagems in war, made with the design of mystifying or misleading the opposing general, involve no promise, implied or otherwise, to give him light, or not to mislead him. But communications made under a flag of truce involve a recognised pledge to utter the truth. The violation of this would make the offender an outlaw. It would hardly be said that a mother using every deception to hide her child from the murderer or kidnapper was under any implied promise to enlighten, or not to mislead him in her communications. But go a step further. Suppose it were to save her property from robbery, spoliation, confiscation, extortion. Do we not soon reach a point where false representations with intent to deceive do break the implied understandings amongst men, and incur the guilt of lying, unless all falsehoods to protect one's interests are to be taken out of the category of lying and approved as guiltless? And

then what faith can remain in the word, promise, or honour of men? The very bonds of society are thus sundered, and all men become Ishmaelites to each other. Yet while this is so, it is impossible to formulate rules to meet every case which will not become a snare by being made, without much stretching, to cover cases which admit of no justification that would not be a defence for lying in general. The only safe course in respect to this, as to all moral precepts, is to proceed on the assumption that they form the only rule of conduct, and to provide no rules for anomalous cases. Abnormities require no norm. Each case has its own peculiarities. If eccentric to all general laws, it has its own line of deflection not described by any other. If it justifies any apparent transgression of the moral rule, it will furnish its own reasons and motives of sufficient strength and urgency. There is no danger that he who recognises no law in his utterances and promises but that "putting away all lying, every man speak truth with his neighbour," will not be likely enough to feel and act upon the reasons which *in extremis* may palliate or justify partial, ambiguous, or misleading answers to robbers, murderers, or simply impudent inquisitors trying to extort what no duty requires to be disclosed to them, without attempting to formulate rules and make out hairbreadth casuistical distinctions and formulas defining when false statements will be admissible. The moment we begin this we enter the confines of Jesuitism. There is no surer way of dulling the moral sense, and paralysing the mainsprings of morality, than the process of finding or inventing reasons and occasions for being excused from it. It is not the way to grow truthful to become an expert in ways, means, and opportunities for evading or denying the truth. It is like the attempts to cultivate Christian feeling and enthusiasm by a morbid introversion of the mind on itself to see whether it possesses or is destitute of them, instead of contemplating the objects fitted to excite them. It is like vitalising the body by practising anatomy and vivisection upon it. But we must now consider more positively and fully the relation of duty and expediency to things adiaphorous.

In approaching this, it is to be observed that, as in the seeming exceptional cases just noticed, each specific instance

of action is quite beyond all general rules applicable to all its details. It is thrown back upon the individual conscience and judgment to make a candid and right decision, when perhaps a great complexity of considerations comes in. It is very different from the categorical yes or no, which may be the easy and unmistakable answer to such questions involving veracity as—"Are you a Presbyterian, an Episcopalian, a Methodist?" or, "What ought you to do about refunding borrowed money which you have promised to pay?" The question how much pocket-money ought you to allow a spend-thrift, or an economical son, is one which you alone can decide, which brings an individualising of duty, and of the determination of it to yourself, as a far more formidable personal problem than the question of keeping an oath or paying a debt.

1. This class of actions, though in themselves neither binding nor prohibited, is nevertheless not in such a sense extra-moral, or beyond the scope of conscientious oversight and direction, that we are not amenable to conscience and to God for our course in respect to each and all of them. From our very constitution as free, voluntary, accountable agents, we are responsible for each and every voluntary act. We are bound, not only to do acts intrinsically good, and avoid those intrinsically bad, but in respect to those not such, the obligation holds, to do or refrain from doing them according as they, apparently to the doer, in the exercise of his candid judgment, and in view of the best light he can get, tend to the furtherance of that which is morally, religiously, Christianly, good or evil. Herein each one is responsible for the exercise of due diligence and candour in seeking the truth. Thus, what food, dress, furniture, equipage one shall have, is in itself a thing indifferent; but if it be noxious to health of ourselves or others; if it be beyond our means of honest payment; if it tend to tempt others to an extravagance of ostentatious expenditure that works evil, and evil only, in the Church and society; if, from unsuitableness to our position, it curtails our influence for good; in short, not to go into further detail, if the visible consequences be evil only, or evil with no compensating good; or if, upon ourselves, the effect be to inflame evil

lusts—anything but for edification,—then there is a clear obligation to abstain from it. Yet, on the other hand, it will never do to say that we must deny ourselves all of what are called luxuries, because life and efficiency in the service of Christ could be sustained without them; to rule out all that ministers to the temperate gratification of the tastes which God has given us, physical, artistic, intellectual—in short, the appetencies, “whether of the palate or of the soul.” To proscribe refinement and culture, and relapse into the privations of asceticism, barbarism, or semi-civilisation—this is not Christianity, though sometimes mistaken for it. There is little danger in this direction. It is mostly the other way in this day of abounding self-indulgence, pampered by superabounding material wealth. The poor, too, are far better supported by industry in ministering to the wants of those able to employ them, than by charity so bestowed as to support idleness and vagrancy. Still, men are accountable for every free act in respect to things indifferent. They are bound, while “free from all men and the servants of none,” in all things to seek their own and others’ welfare, and the honour of God; or, as Paul sums up all his teachings on this subject in the all-inclusive charge: “Let every one please his neighbour to edification” (Rom. xv. 2). “Whether ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God” (1 Cor. x. 31).

2. We are thus finding our way to the true scope of Christian liberty in such matters. For there is beyond doubt a liberty in these things that has no application to lying, stealing, licentiousness, profaneness, idolatry, or atheism. We are bound to do that which appears to be for the highest good. But who shall judge and determine this question? Each one clearly, getting the best light he can, must judge for himself. “Let each one,” says Paul, “be fully persuaded in his own mind” (Rom. xiv. 5). He is bound, indeed, to judge candidly and carefully, but still he must judge for himself. Others may not usurp the prerogative of judging him, or judging for him. In such matters he is not a law to other men’s consciences, nor they to his. “Who art thou that judgest another man’s servant? To his own master he stands or falls” (Rom. xiv. 4). In respect to other men, therefore, in things indif-

ferent, he is not in bondage. He is in the sphere of liberty which, in all proper ways, and on all suitable occasions, he is to maintain in the fear of God, indeed in the face of, and, if need be, against all men. But—

3. How is he to use this liberty? This depends on circumstances, one thing alone being invariable—that he is always responsible to God for the right use of it. At the threshold, too, it may be further added negatively, that he is not to use it for selfish gratification when this conflicts with the spiritual good of the subject of it, of his brethren; in a word, the blessing of man and the glory of God. In the Epistle to the Galatians (v. 13) the apostle tells them, “For, brethren, ye have been called unto liberty; only use not your liberty as an occasion to the flesh, but by love serve one another.” So his uniform charge, however varied in form, in treating of these subjects, is to “follow the things which make for peace, and things wherewith one may edify another” (Rom. xiv. 19); since “none of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself. For whether we live, we live unto the Lord; and whether we die, we die unto the Lord” (Rom. xiv. 7, 8).

So the use of this liberty is to be governed by charity, not only in the general sense of using it for the edification of others; of doing good unto all men as we have opportunity, especially unto the household of faith (Gal. vi. 10); but in a charitable consideration and treatment of one another's infirmities, or differing judgments and practices in respect to the right use of things indifferent in themselves. This, indeed, is the great stress of the apostle's elaborate exposition of this subject in the parts of his letters referred to. He treats of the observance or non-observance of certain days which in the eyes of some were sacred, so that to them their non-observance was a sin, while others knew them to have no sanctity above other days. In the same way some abstained from meats as having been polluted by being offered to idols; others knew that there was no sin in eating these things, and accordingly indulged in them, disregarding the scruples of their weaker brethren. Thus, on the one hand, they wounded their weak brethren's conscience by doing that which in their eyes was sin. But while thus grieving, they also tempted these weaker ones to sin, by follow-

ing the example of the more enlightened, in doing what in the eyes of the latter, and in itself, was not sinful, but became sinful when done by the less enlightened, because the latter believed it so. For though in these matters indifferent, as the apostle declares, "all things are pure," yet "it is evil for that man that eateth with offence" (Rom. xiv. 20). That is to say, if a man, in whatever he is doing, believes he sins, and intends to sin, he does thereby sin. Whatever be the nature of the act, there is the sin of evil intent. In Paul's expressive words, "Happy is he that condemneth not himself in that which he alloweth; and he that doubteth is damned [condemned] if he eat, because he eateth not of faith. And whatsoever is not of faith is sin" (Rom. xiv. 22, 23). Irrespective of all questions about any other faith, whatsoever a man does without any faith in its being what, according to his best light and judgment, is pleasing to God, is sin.

Now, instead of acting in the pride of a "knowledge that puffeth up," rather than the "charity which edifieth" (1 Cor. viii. 1), and thus speeding weak Christians on to destruction, we should sacrifice our own pleasure and emolument, when we can do so without moral compromise to their spiritual welfare, in a charitable estimate of their scruples and judgments, however groundless, if yet they be conscientious. What can surpass the conclusiveness of the apostle's argument, or the urgency of his appeal? Speaking in reference to the treatment of those who felt that in eating meat which had been offered in sacrifice to idols, they were incurring the guilt of idolatry, he says, "But meat commendeth us not to God: for neither, if we eat, are we the better; neither, if we eat not, are we the worse. But take heed lest by any means this liberty of yours become a stumbling-block to them that are weak. For if any one see thee which hast knowledge sit at meat in the idol's temple, shall not the conscience of him which is weak be emboldened to eat those things which are offered to idols; and through thy knowledge shall the weak brother perish, for whom Christ died? But when ye sin so against the brethren, and wound their weak conscience, ye sin against Christ" (1 Cor. viii. 8-12).

4. The grand conclusion of the whole matter is then reached by the apostle, in which we would approach the practical out-

come of this discussion : " Wherefore, if meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no flesh while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend " (1 Cor. viii. 13). A conclusion somewhat amplified in the correspondent part of his letter to the Romans, when he declares : " It is good neither to eat flesh nor drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak " (Rom. xiv. 21). This is only a segment in the grander sweep of that all-inclusive practical and theoretical law of the Christian life already emphasised, in which his treatment of this subject culminates—" Whether ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God."

A man may be a Christian without being a Christian gentleman, and this too without being amenable to church discipline for being rough, coarse, boastful, self-asserting, and regardless of the just feelings and claims of others. But, it hardly need be said, this is a most unseemly and unedifying assertion of Christian liberty. How much finer and nobler is that exercise of it enjoined by the apostle—" Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are of good report ; if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, think on these things " (Phil. iv. 8). No wonder at the eulogium attributed to the infidel Bolingbroke, who is reputed to have declared his admiration of the apostle Paul " because he was so perfect a gentleman."

But the law of charity is not one-sided. If they who have knowledge that some things are sinless, which their weaker brother deems sinful, may not use their knowledge uncharitably in a haughty or uncaring contempt of his ignorant scruples, or in tempting him to commit that which, though no sin to an enlightened Christian, is a sin to him from his narrow standpoint; neither, on the other hand, may the weaker brother judge and condemn one who differs from him in his views and practice respecting these non-essential and indifferent matters. He is to presume that his brother acts in the case according to his best light, and in all good conscience. Most flagrant breaches of charity tending to hurtful, and even fatal, strifes and divisions, have often resulted from the fanatical and bigoted anathematising of practices innocent in themselves, by ultraists,

by one-idea reformers, by those "righteous overmuch" in single lines of self-denial, who make abundant amends for this by swinging over to heedless and even foul self-indulgence elsewhere; who are monomaniacs in some one reform, and licentious in general living; whose prototypes were depicted once for all by our Saviour as those who pay "tithe of mint, anise, and cummin, and have omitted the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and faith" (Matt. xxiii. 23). From all such uncharitableness, good Lord, deliver us. Says Paul: "Let not him that eateth despise him that eateth not; and let not him that eateth not judge him that eateth: for God hath received him" (Rom. xiv. 3).

And further, it may sometimes happen that when narrow, ignorant, and fanatical people undertake to enforce, as a matter of absolute, universal, and intrinsic obligation, what, after all, falls under the category of things indifferent, and is to be determined by each one's conscientious judgment as to its expediency and propriety in the circumstances, it may be a duty to say so, and act accordingly. A principle may be involved in yielding to demands that we treat that as a sin, in its own nature and in all circumstances, which is only so by accident and in some circumstances, of which circumstances and their moral bearings each one, in all candour, must judge for himself; herein being subject to no man, and not at liberty to allow himself to be subject to any other. It may sometimes be a duty to do what otherwise would be better refrained from, for the simple purpose of asserting and vindicating a liberty unwarrantably threatened or invaded. Even in cases in which Paul exhorts to abstinence from things offered to idols, for the sake of the weak believer who protests against it as partaking of idolatry, he says: "Eat not, for his sake that shewed it; and for conscience' sake: conscience, I say, NOT THINE OWN, BUT OF THE OTHER: FOR WHY IS MY LIBERTY JUDGED OF ANOTHER MAN'S CONSCIENCE?" (1 Cor. x. 27-29.)

So, while he declares, "All things are lawful for me; but all things are not expedient," he adds, "I will not be brought under the power of any." He charges us to "stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage" (Gal. v. 1). Because,

of itself, external circumcision is neither morally good nor evil, in peculiar circumstances Paul circumcised Timothy, so as to avoid exciting the prejudices of the Jews against Christianity, and thus hindering his access to them for good. But when this concession came to be perverted so that Jews and Judaising converts insisted on the circumcision of the Gentiles as essential to their salvation and recognition as Christians, and when Peter was giving some countenance to the demand, he discarded and denounced it utterly, because, practised in compliance with such a demand, it amounted to a sacrifice of principle and a surrender of the Gospel. Therefore he declares that Titus, who was with him, being a Greek, was not "compelled" to be circumcised; and this, because false brethren "came in privily to spy out our liberty which we have in Christ Jesus, that they might bring us into bondage" (Gal. ii. 3, 4). And herein he declares he "withstood Peter to the face, because he was to be blamed."

It is obviously a chief problem of the Christian life, and of common morality as well, rightly to adjust the true maintenance and use of liberty in things indifferent, so as not virtually to sacrifice it and fall into a bondage, galling, ensnaring, debilitating, on the one hand; yet so as to promote the honour of Christ in our own and others' edification on the other. We are not to allow others to impose on us super-scriptural standards of morality and conditions of salvation, on the one hand; or, on the other, to use our liberty in things indifferent so as to turn it into licentiousness, or to sacrifice or subordinate the spiritual welfare of others to our own self-indulgence. While "free, yet not using our liberty for a cloak of maliciousness" (1 Pet. ii. 16). Charity, love, in every aspect and outworking of it, is to be the grand overmastering impulse of the Christian life. With tireless assiduity, with a heavenly tact and wisdom, we are to aim to adapt ourselves to all; to come into sympathetic, winsome communication with all, that so we may be in the best position to do them good; to gain them to Christ, holiness, and salvation. So the practical conclusion of the whole matter is, that each one for himself, and especially all who would be wise to win souls, should make the great apostle's line of conduct their own, in due adaptation

to time, place, and circumstance. "For though I be free from all men, yet have I made myself servant unto all, that I might gain the more. And unto the Jews I became as a Jew, that I might gain the Jews; to them that are under the law as under the law, that I might gain them that are under the law; to them that are without law as without law (being not without law to God, but under law to Christ), that I might gain them that are without law. To the weak became I as weak, that I might gain the weak: I am made all things to all men, if by any means I might save some" (1 Cor. ix. 19-22).

But here we must mark the boundary between Christian and Jesuitical expediency, wisdom, and prudence in upholding and propagating the Church and Gospel. Within the sphere of things lawful, *i.e.* not sinful, all the resources of Christian ingenuity, benignity, fidelity, should be exhausted to devise ways and find media of successful approach to the souls of men, "if by any means we may save some;" if we may allure them away from sin, vice, evil, to Christ and clean Christian living. In things non-essential and indifferent we must accommodate ourselves to their prejudices, and infirmities even; yea, with sweetest persuasion and gentlest insinuation go down into their hearts, and draw them as with the cords of a man and the bands of love; or if they be defiant and presumptuous in their wickedness and irreligion, it may be expedient to awe them with the Divine threatenings; by the terrors of the Lord to persuade them, and to pierce their self-inflation by the sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God. It is our opinion that the Protestant and evangelical ministry fail far more grievously here than in regard to preaching the substance and marrow of Christian truth. They may often fail of due earnestness, which is very much like want of blood in the body. But they fail still more, we apprehend, in that ineffable tact which rightly divides the word of truth, so timing, proportioning, adapting it that it shall stand forth, not in dead heartless abstractions, often abstractions of abstractions; but in living concrete forms, so that men shall behold themselves in it as in a glass, and, with their needs, shall behold "Him that liveth, and was dead; and is alive for evermore, and hath the keys of death and hell."

If the weakness of the pulpit lies largely here, much more, unless we mistake, does great weakness out of the pulpit lie in just this region : in the want of heart, zeal, tact, to bear the heavenly message from house to house, and from heart to heart, with the kindling warmth of love, and the aptness of a heaven-inspired wisdom. We are sure that many pastorates now fearfully barren would be more fruitful, if this vacuum of kind face-to-face dealing with souls were properly filled. This is not the duty of the pastor only. It is the province of all Christians, especially office-bearers in the Church. And no service is more rich in blessings to its doers, its objects, and the whole Church. But it can scarcely be expected that others will be very efficient in this work, however much exhorted to it, with no stimulus and guidance of pastoral example. There have been pastors utterly refraining from such service, almost as much as if it were a *malum prohibitum*, who contented themselves with publicly scourging their people for not doing it, or into doing it—a process very impotent and unsatisfying to all parties, so long as the minister does not himself thus “allure to brighter worlds and lead the way.”

But while they are, within the limits prescribed, “to become all things to all men, if by any means they may save some,” they are not to go the length of doing evil that good may come, or of the Jesuitical maxim that “the end sanctifies the means.” They are indeed to be “wise as serpents,” but “harmless as doves.” We are to “seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness.” “Other things shall be added” unto us in due order. But we are not to commit unrighteousness as a means of promoting righteousness, much less for the sake of decoying people into the Church, which, so far as built up in this way, is a very fabric of iniquity, not the temple of God. A fatal error is the subordination of other, even moral, obligations to that of promoting and enlarging the Church. Pre-eminent is that doctrine concerning veracity which requires or permits the confessor to deny his knowledge of what is told him at the confessional, because he does not know, with a communicable knowledge—*scientia communicabile*. This is one form of the doctrine of mental reservation in our affirmations; *i.e.* making them according to truth, save wherein the mind secretly

reserves the privilege of having it otherwise—a principle which, carried out, undermines all confidence between man and man, and disorganises society.

The other bad maxim, once, if not now, in vogue with Jesuits and others, is found in Probabilism, so named. That is, as duty is often doubtful, according to some almost always so, probability may be our guide. This probability may pertain to the nature of the act, or the opinions of casuists about it; and since these opinions often differ, thus leaving pure probability for our guide, this will be followed if we take the less, or least probable authority. For even then we shall be following probability, which is our lawful guide. It is obvious that such a principle of duty undermines all foundations. There is no standard of right. Right may be the most, or least, probably right. We can never know what or whom to trust. Probability in any form never applies, more than expediency, to actions in themselves moral. It is only applicable, where expediency is, to things morally indifferent; and then only in reference to their most probable bearings or tendencies. But even here the doctrine that the least probability may overbear a greater and predominating one is itself monstrous, and subverts all ethical standards. It installs mere caprice as the guide of the vast majority of human actions. It is only matched by that climacteric proverb of unscrupulous greed and ambition—"Nothing succeeds like success."

In close neighbourhood to this lies the application of the principle of expediency to the times, ways, degrees of fulness, of communicating truth by those who possess it, not only to other classes, but to those in a state of mind incapable of appreciating or not perverting it. This includes also the case of those who consider themselves to have reached views of truth and degrees of knowledge beyond their generation or church. In respect to this general subject certain principles are beyond dispute. (1.) No one can innocently proclaim as true what he knows or believes to be untrue; or that as certain which to his own mind is doubtful. (2.) No man may from selfish or worldly motives hold back truths or portions of truth known to himself, which appear suited to the wants of those whom he addresses; or when the non-avowal of them amounts

to a failure to make a good confession before many witnesses, a "shunning to declare the whole counsel of God" (Acts xx. 27). But within these limits there is a certain liberty, which often becomes a duty, of reserve in the communication of truth or portions of truth, because, for one reason or another, those addressed are incapable of not perverting or abusing it. This is determined very largely by the knowledge or ignorance, the maturity or immaturity, the candour or obduracy, of those with whom we have to deal. We are not to cast pearls before swine. Babes in Christ must be fed with milk, the rudiments of truth, not with meat, or with truth in forms more advanced, abstract, or methodical, because they are as yet unable to bear it. It is beyond their powers of digestion and assimilation. It would therefore minister not strength, but debility. The Great Teacher thus held back important teachings until his disciples should come under fit conditions of training and discipline to receive profit and not harm from them. He told them, "I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now" (John xvi. 12). Yet there are limits to all this. It is easy to stretch it so as to make it a pretext for unfaithfulness and time-serving, rather than a principle of wise and conscientious discretion in "becoming all things to all men for the sake of saving some." It would be absurd in itself, and a gross breach of trust, to always be withholding what the souls of the people need, because some are confounded by it, while others wrest it to their own destruction. It would be like keeping the sane in ignorance or error on account of the whims of the insane; like refusing to make the Scriptures profitable for "reproof and correction" to the great mass who need it, because it might still further distress some wretched victim of religious melancholy; like keeping the well on a starveling diet in order to avoid overloading spiritual dyspeptics. To withhold saving or edifying truth because it will be so misapplied by some as to become unprofitable and injurious to them, would amount to withholding it altogether. To some the preacher must be "a savour of life unto life;" to others, "of death unto death" (2 Cor. ii. 16). Each new case presents its own peculiarities. None can be fully provided for by any minute, cast-iron rule. The heavenly wisdom, zeal, and love of the preacher are

brought into constant requisition. He must do his best, without treason to truth and God, "if by any means he may save some."

The esoteric and exoteric, the progressive and conservative, and the obligation to publish or keep silent in regard to supposed discoveries in advance of standing beliefs, come under similar methods of adjudication, subject to one special qualification. While one who supposes himself illuminated beyond his brethren, or his time, is to judge before God whether the present voluntary promulgation of his views is, in the present condition and temper of those affected by them, likely to be for edification; and while he is never to deny or disguise them if called in providence to declare himself; he may justly feel bound to keep silence until he is sure they have passed beyond their crude and immature state to that ripeness which comes of long study, reflection, and experience. Nay, he ought to feel bound to this, rather than cause disturbance and convulsions by that very rawness which time will defecate from them. That brilliant genius, Horace Bushnell, late in life, characterised those works which thirty years ago convulsed the Congregational churches of Connecticut as "green."¹ Perhaps, had he waited till his views ripened before promulgating them, much sad agitation would have been spared himself and his communion. But it must never be assumed that any man, body of men, churches, are infallible, or that they have mastered the *omne scibile*, or that the whole meaning of the Scriptures has been evolved, or that no new light will come forth from them, and upon them, through diligent study, and the illumination of God's Providence and Spirit. All plausible claims to new light should be candidly considered and weighed. The most charitable construction should be put even upon apparent aberrations. But if they strike at fundamentals, upon what within the pale of the Christian Church has, not in the speculations of theorists and dogmatists, but in the faith, life, prayers, and hymns of Christian people, been accepted *semper, ubique, ab omnibus*, then we may conclude that, if the Church has not found the substance of the Bible's teaching so far, it is undiscoverable. The Bible has then failed as a revelation to man. Infidelity is the true creed. This will not do. Our

¹ *Life and Letters of Horace Bushnell*, p. 553.

course is plain here. Accept whatever real light comes to us. "Prove all things. Hold fast that which is good" (1 Thess. v. 21). "If there come any unto you and bring not this doctrine, receive him not into your house, neither bid him God speed" (2 John 10). The charity that beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, is a charity that rejoiceth in the truth. Indeed, the whole matter of liberty, duty, and charity, in the manner of mutual dealing between those who suppose themselves more enlightened in doctrine and those whom they deem less so, is closely akin to the case of those who have more or less light in regard to the right or wrong of using things indifferent. To find the point of practical junction or reconciliation of the two principles—"If thy brother be grieved with thy meat, now walkest thou not charitably," and "Why is my liberty judged of another man's conscience?"—is one of the chief problems of Christian life.

The application of the principles thus conspicuous and unmistakable in Paul's treatment of this great subject, which touches life at nearly all points and all times, must be left very much to each one's individual judgment and conscience. It is eminently the sphere of personal liberty and responsibility combined. Here we call no man Lord. One is our Master, even Christ. Questions of practice incessantly controverted—games, amusements, indulgences that have been and are sharply debated—find here the principle by which they must be tried. Are they, in a given case, for edification? Do they promote the moral and religious welfare of men? Are they conducive to good, all things considered?

It seems to us a beneficent use of Christian liberty to abstain from intoxicating beverages, not because all use of them is *per se* a sin, but because, while no duty requires them to be taken, except in special cases for medicinal or hygienic uses, such abstinence promotes their disuse, and so lessens great perils to ourselves, to others, to society. The evils averted by their universal disuse in our view surpass all calculation. But this does not justify us in making such abstinence a test of virtue, uprightness, or religion, or the want of it an iniquity to be visited with social ostracism, civil penalties, or church excommunication. Different views of expediency and obligation may and do obtain here, and the liberty of each is not to be

judged by "other men's consciences." Much less may we do evil that good may come, or maintain unscriptural doctrine in order to raise the supposed stringency of the obligation of abstinence above the plane of expediency to that of intrinsic and immutable obligation, like the duty of abstaining from poisoning wells. Such we esteem the doctrine, maintained by some, that all the wines, any use of which is permitted in Scripture, were unfermented and non-alcoholic. If the cause of temperance, as dependent on abstinence, can be placed on no stronger basis than this, it cannot stand or prevail. Not only so. But the system of torturing the Scriptures out of their obvious meaning, in the supposed interest of so excellent a cause, is capable of wide application, and may easily be made effective for emasculating them of whatever clashes with the baldest rationalism, or "the desires of the flesh and the mind;" in a word, for undermining the authority of that on which every good cause must find its firmest foundation. What higher ground of appeal do we want than that of Christian expediency—the duty of so using our liberty that it may offer no stumbling-block or occasion to fall to others? "It is good neither to eat flesh, nor drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak" (Rom. xiv. 21). So says Paul. So say we. If this does not suffice, what will? When ceremonies indifferent in themselves were demanded of, and enforced upon, the reformers as a condition of unity, they deemed it the time not to yield even in things indifferent, if the demand was enforced by persecution. Says the Formula of Concord, *de cæremoniis ecclesiasticis*: "Credimus, decemus et confitemur, quod temporibus persecutionum, quando perspicua et constans confessio a nobis exigitur, hostibus evangelii in rebus adiaphoris non sit cedendum" (Art. x. 4).

We say this not only in interest of truth as such, but because we believe the cause of total abstinence itself, in all its most benignant influence, will, on the true basis, have a far wider prevalence than on that which many, as we think, in this respect, injudicious friends of it, have so long been attempting to substitute for it.

LYMAN H. ATWATER.

ART. IV.—*The Incarnation.*

WE are not left to speculate what is the fundamental truth of faith—the article of a standing or falling Christianity. According to the Apostle John, it is that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh (1 John iv. 2, 3), and whosoever confesses it is of God. Other truths may be vital, but this is the most vital of all. It is the one fact from which all the distinctive doctrines of Christianity spring. Christianity is the whole, and the Incarnation is the centre. Or it may be compared to the root, and the attaching doctrines to the stem and branches. Destroy the root and the tree decays ; take away the Incarnation, and Christianity is gone. He that stumbles here, stumbles at the threshold of the faith.

The source of our information regarding this supreme fact is the Gospel records. The material is not dogmatic, but historical. The writers do not hint theories, or draw metaphysical distinctions, but confine themselves to historic narration. They quietly relate great events, but tender no explanations. They troubled themselves with no such questions as afterwards arose, but framed their accounts of what they saw and heard, unconscious how these might bear on this theory or on that. How the divinity or humanity of Christ would respectively be affected or compromised by the phrases they employed and certain of the events they described, were considerations that never came into view ; for the Gospels were written in the interests of no dogma, but to portray in clearest outline the life of Him who was full of grace and truth.

The modest and unpretentious character of the history of the Advent is a feature of great significance. The severest plainness of speech is employed. There is no surrounding of the child with mystery, no effusive utterances about His person ; a few graphic sections describe His childhood and youth, free alike from exaggeration and panegyric.

The tendency of the human to magnify is notorious. Compare for instance, the clear, brief, and simple Scriptural narrative of man unfallen, with the glowing pictures and elaborate representations to be found in books of divinity on his original

state. As with the lucid and unadorned statement of the creation of the first man, so with the statement of the Incarnation of the Second Adam. Parallel with "So God created man in his own image" (Gen. i. 27), is "Jesus was born in Bethlehem" (Matt. ii. 1). The very modesty of the record attests its truth—bespeaks its unfictional and unmythical character. Passing from it to those of an unquestionable mythological type, we feel we are passing from what is heavenly to what is earthly—from what is divine to what is human—a phase of experience similar to what we share when we pass from the sublime writings of the New Testament to the perusal of the dreamy and discursive Christian writings of the second century,—the difference is so obvious, so immense, and so impressive. In Roman mythology, Jupiter is the greatest of the gods, and the story told of him is, that his father Saturn, having received the kingdom of the world from his elder brother Titan on condition that he would destroy his children, devoured them as soon as born; but that Jupiter was concealed by the goddess of earth, who gave Saturn a stone to devour, which he did, thinking it was his son! There is the width of the universe between the majestic account of the Gospels and such a fable as this.

The classical text of John i. 14 defines generally the Incarnation: "The Word was made flesh." Our Lord assumed human nature. He who was God entered to the uttermost into human conditions. He who was in the beginning, who was with God, and was God, was made of a woman, and partook of flesh and blood. The divine person of the Son became man—entered into union with humanity—and possessed a body that was not a mere form or appearance, but real, veritable, corporeal. The divine and human natures, however, though united, were not blended, but remained properly and permanently distinct. Each nature retained its own attributes and characteristics, and in their unity constituted one person. The union was absolute and real, and not temporary or nominal; and it was not the man Christ Jesus who slept, or suffered, or hungered, or died, but the God-man. His Deity remained as pure and unmodified as if it had never condescended to the human estate, and his humanity remained as genuine and unchanged as if no superior nature had been in connection with it.

Such is a brief statement of Scripture doctrine on the sub-

ject, but it will be apparent that, approached in an interrogative mood, it will yield profound and endless questions. And in point of fact, no subject has proved more fruitful of discussion than the compound person of our Lord. A large class of the questions raised, however, have been more speculative than legitimate. The Scripture method of revelation is not analytic, and therefore questions of a purely theological or metaphysical character are never directly considered. It is accordingly more by general considerations than by positive statement that their decision can be reached.

The theory of an Incarnation is that which the Christian Church has always held best to explain the facts of the life of Christ. On perusing the Gospels we feel we are in contact with a life purer, higher, greater than ours ; a life of noble beneficence and mighty deeds ; a life which exceeds human dimensions, and surpasses ordinary human conditions. Who then was He whose biography the Gospels furnish ? To what is His superiority of character and fulness of power to be traced ? What view of His person do the facts of His life suggest and support ? How is the mystery of His consciousness of God to be solved ? His vivid conception of the Father ? It is a simple question of induction : given so many particulars, what is the general principle you conclude ? Apply the Baconian method to the Gospels as is done to the phenomena of nature, and what doctrine respecting Christ do you frame ? What is the theory which gathers the whole facts of the case into unity—which is so comprehensive as to cover every incident and aspect of His life—which does full and adequate justice to His superhuman birth, His wondrous miracles, His heavenly teaching, His lofty claims, His matchless character ? Accepting the Gospels as we have them, there is but one conclusion to which we can come, and that is, that Christ was a Divine person in human form : in other words, that there was an Incarnation.

The event of the Incarnation occurred in historic time, and is attested by satisfactory evidence. It was not a legend which had been floating about for centuries, and ultimately committed to writing by those who had no means of ascertaining its truth, and who wrote not as eye-witnesses, but as recorders. There is no fact more certain than that Jesus appeared in the flesh ; the early opponents of Christianity, for

instance, whether Jews or Pagans, never questioned His historical reality, but only the prerogatives ascribed to Him. He cannot be reduced to a myth or abstraction, however this may be attempted with regard to gospel details. Had it been a prehistoric period in which His appearance took place, doubt might reasonably have gathered round His story; but so manifold, so credible, and so competent is the testimony borne concerning Him, that if it be discredited, every event of history, however affirmed and verified, must become a matter of uncertainty. The Gospels were written, not among a remote and barbarous nationality, but in the midst of a people who were intelligent, civilised, and orderly; and they were published not in a period of inactive thought and dull commonplace, but in an age that was literary, philosophical, and sceptical. And therefore, if not disproved, convicted of imposition, demonstrated as fraudulent on their publication, they are never likely to be in succeeding centuries. It is the peculiar characteristic of Christianity that it emerged from no benighted land where all was dark, mythological, superstitious; in this respect resembling the Jewish nation, which of all the nations of antiquity, is the only one the story of whose origin is historic and not lost in dim traditionalism and childish fable; there played upon it from the first the fiercest light, which was so searching, penetrating, and revealing, that no fraud could escape detection, or falsehood pass for truth. The great question of the historic truth of its records was fought, not indeed formally but really, in its initial stages, and surviving the attacks then made, the efforts of later assailants are vain. Had Christianity appeared among a people of primitive and uncivilised condition, it doubtless would have escaped the ordeal of intelligent and sifting criticism for centuries after its inauguration; but, appearing when and where it did, it was no sooner promulgated than its credentials had to be produced, and its claims established against an opposition that was learned and relentless, and intellectually and socially powerful.

Had faith been dependent on a single testimony for the knowledge of Christ, the proof of the Christian position would not have been so strong; but in the overruling Providence of God, we have not one but four separate accounts of His person and life—accounts written much about the same time, clearly

independent in their authorship of one another, completing and not merely reproducing each other, revealing their writers' individual characteristics, presenting the life of Christ from different points of view, abounding in coincidences, and naturally also not free from seeming discrepancies,—such are the accounts we have, unusual in number and unique in character. No other in history has had his life thus recorded by eye-witnesses. Homer had no biographer; Socrates had Plato and Xenophon; but Christ had Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John.

From a study of the Gospels, it is evident that faith in Christ as the Incarnate One was a growth—that when first the disciples attached themselves to Him, they cherished no such view of His person, but were conducted to it by a more intimate acquaintance with His life and thoughts and ways. Personal knowledge and daily contact with Him impressed them with the mystery of His being and the beauty of His character. The value of this consideration is very great. None knew Him better than they—their converse with Him was familiar and constant—they were closely associated with Him through every phase of His trying experience, but no weaknesses were discovered—the confidential intercourse of three years disclosed no imperfections; and instead of their faith retrogressing or remaining stationary, it advanced and ascended from esteeming Him as the Messiah to revering Him as the Incarnate God. The change of view was slow, and it was doubtless reached through many an inward struggle, for the conception it involved was not merely foreign, but alien to their Jewish habits of thought; but all the more satisfactory and convincing is the homage they finally yielded to Christ as their Lord and their God. Their study of Him conquered their prejudices and revolutionised their faith, and we therefore rightly regard His life and personality as forming a powerful argument for His superhuman origin.

The Gospel record appropriately begins with the miraculous conception. Peculiar in nature, it is not surprising Christ is described as peculiar in generation. The Incarnation necessarily presupposes a manner of entrance into human life special and unusual. It would have been indefensible apart from an extraordinary conception, for his derivation must correspond with His superior personality. Ordinary generation

and an Incarnation are conditions that cannot combine, for the Incarnate One must be of God and the subject of a unique creative act. The historical account satisfies all requirements on the matter, and strikingly elucidates what to us would have been a grave problem to solve. Christ was conceived of the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin Mary : having been thus conceived, He was sinless, and having been thus born, He was human.

It is common on the part of the rationalistic school to treat this account as an invention, but far fewer difficulties attend its acceptance as true than its rejection as false. It is a connected, plausible, harmonious story ; dignified, chaste, and in completest accord with the life that follows. It cannot be alleged that such a beginning is discrepant with the personality the Gospels depict. Besides, if an invention, it was a dexterous and unparalleled one, and having nothing of the clearly fabulous character of mythological legends. To class it with the accounts given us of the Pagan gods is to betray an incapacity for discriminating between the frivolous and the grave, the puerile, and the sublime.

But the question arises, Considering the character of Jewish hopes and thoughts, was such an invention likely or possible ? Neander ably argues that it was not :—

“ The Hindoo mind might have originated a fable of this character, though in a different form from that in which the account of the Evangelists is given : but the Jewish had totally different tendencies. Such a fable as the birth of the Messiah from a virgin could have arisen anywhere else easier than among the Jews ; their doctrine of the Divine unity which placed an impassable gulf between God and the world ; their high regard for the marriage relation which led them to abhor unwedded life : and above all, their full persuasion that the Messiah was to be an ordinary man, undistinguished by anything supernatural, and not to be endowed with Divine power before the time of his solemn consecration to the Messiahship, all conspired to render such an invention impossible among them.”¹

In point of method, therefore, the Incarnation was suitable and superior, yielding a true and yet a sinless humanity from the first.

When we pass to the consideration of His life, we are struck with its natural development and unapproached character. The opening scene is not that of a mature man, suddenly descending from heaven, but of a child born—born of poorest

¹ *Life of Christ*, Bohn's edition, p. 15.

parents, born in an inn, wrapped in swaddling-clothes, laid in a manger : touching picture of humble infancy. He grew in stature, wisdom, grace : passed from childhood into boyhood, from boyhood into youth, and from youth into manhood. He lived quietly, laboured diligently, and was known not as the village prodigy, but as the carpenter's son. He was treated as no hero, but shared in the lot of common life. He moved in the humblest sphere, engaging in its toils, and was familiar with its associations. He slept as we sleep, He hungered as we hunger, and was nourished and supported like us. His humanity lacked no properties which ours has, and possessed none which ours has not. The leading characteristics of human nature were exhibited by Him in situations which tested their reality. Had He failed to display some of these, had He not been born, for instance, or wearied, or longed for sympathy, we should have doubted whether He were human all round. But the Gospels prove how complete was His Incarnation, how unreserved His alliance with humanity. The objection (utterly groundless as it would be easy to show) has been raised against the Gospel of John that the Christ it pictures is one removed from human conditions and life ; but combining the evangelical narratives together, and weaving their accounts into one, we behold a Saviour who was born and developed, who was baptized and tempted, who ate and drank, who loved and comforted, who suffered and died. It cannot be alleged that the humanity of Christ was passionless or abstract, that He never shared in our experiences or needs, or that He never passed through life's phases from infancy to mature age ; for He possessed in unexceeded measure those qualities and features which constitute a brother.

With exactest truth, accordingly, John declares the Word was made flesh—that He was clothed with a mortal, corporeal, finite, sensuous body. And with legitimate propriety does our Lord employ in reference to Himself, so frequently, the expressive title—the Son of man. He was a true and perfect man, as completely formed after the human pattern as any other ; and hence the prominence He gave this designation.

But the clear revelation of our Lord's humanity surrounds with the greater significance the higher claims He made, and the superhuman character He displayed, just as the dark background of the picture imparts more definite form to the

bright figure painted on it. The problem of our Lord's language arises from His unhesitating, simultaneous, thoughtful description of Himself as Son of man and Son of God. Our interpretation of these titles must be consistent; and if the one signifies true man, the other must signify true God. In the line of these titles we find a twofold type of utterance. He that said, "My soul is exceeding sorrowful unto death" (Mark xiv. 34), said also, "I am the light of the world" (John viii. 12). He that asked the woman of Samaria, "Give me to drink" (John iv. 7), declared, "If thou knewest the gift of God, and who it is that saith to thee, Give me to drink; thou wouldest have asked of him, and he would have given thee living water" (John iv. 10). He that said, "The Son of man hath not where to lay his head" (Matt. viii. 20), also said, "I give unto them eternal life: and they shall never perish, neither shall any pluck them out of my hand" (John x. 28). His utterances are inexplicable apart from His oneness with God and His brotherhood with man. A sense of the Divine and human never seems absent from Him. His greatness He distinctly avows. He spoke as one enjoying the closest personal relationship with God. His sayings reveal the consciousness of an Incarnate One.

The qualities of His character, likewise, clearly surpass the normal human type. No age or civilisation has produced a personality equal to His. Had he been no more than an ordinary member of the race, He would long ere this have had His rivals in moral excellence. But whether we search among patriarchs, prophets, or apostles, or the poets or philosophers of Greece, or the illustrious for worth in mere recent times, we find none whom we can regard as Christ's equals or superiors. His holiness was without an alloy. He appears clothed with humility, majesty, compassion, unselfishness, gentleness, charity. We see in him all that is purest and loveliest—a heart that was never soured with envy, a brow that never frowned with malice. He lived a perfect and faultless life, and is the ideal pattern for men, whatever their nationality or stage of culture. All great characters in the past have had their individual weaknesses, but Christ had none. No blemish, no indiscretion, no aberration, no hasty word, no unworthy action, no mean servility can we charge against Him. He is peerless among the sons of men—towering high above the human family.

The conclusion to which the consideration of His character conducts us is, that He was more than man. He conspicuously transcended all realised excellence. "I know men," said Napoleon, "and Jesus Christ is not a man." The force of this argument, however, is sought to be evaded by alleging that His character was an invention, and copied, not from a historic original, but outlined from the imagination. Few assumptions could be more reckless or desperate than this. It ascribes to the Evangelists immense inventive power—in fact, an order of dramatic genius far surpassing Shakespeare's. It credits them with an amazing moral superiority above the prevailing conceptions of their age. It takes for granted the most cordial agreement between four independent writers, in the same lines and after the same standard, to personify an idea. It seems to represent the task of constructing such a character as that of Christ's as easy, and requiring no special competence of culture or conception—a view in which there is as much truth as in saying any one could write *Paradise Lost* or *In Memoriam*. Every candid mind must acquiesce in the judgment of Rousseau: "Such things cannot be invented. Never could Jewish writers have fabricated discourses and moral teachings such as these. The gospel contains so great, so astonishing, and perfectly inimitable traits of truth that its inventor would be even more wonderful than its hero." We cannot, therefore, conceive His character to have been an intellectual creation of the Evangelists—a spiritual ideal which four conspired to portray. Its super-human grandeur and unapproached majesty forbids every such supposition. The Olympian deities, with their vices and weaknesses, illustrate the manner of gods the human intellect fabricates when it addresses itself to original theistic conceptions.

But, driven from arguing against His sayings, and harassed with the evidence of His character, the final and philosophical ground is assumed that an Incarnation is impossible. This is essentially the anti-supernatural position. Whatever involves the contact or action of God in relation to the world or men is pronounced impossible. Hence Providence, inspiration, miracles, are no more credible or possible than an Incarnation. But (1.) this is a settlement of a grave question apart from and independent of a consideration of facts. Sweeping negatives are easily framed. It is easy to pronounce the revolution of

the earth impossible, and there is much in our feelings and consciousness to favour it; but what of the fact of night and day? And it is easy to pronounce the Incarnation impossible; but what of the stupendous, impressive, indestructible fact of Jesus Christ? (2.) The Incarnation is no more impossible than the creation. It is easier to conceive God becoming man than a world produced from nothing. If we are entitled to describe anything as impossible, it is surely creation; yet how is the world to be accounted for? It is strange philosophy to accept the greater and reject the less. (3.) This is a formula without warrant. Given appropriate moral conditions, from whence can the impossibility arise? If God be void of personality—a mere diffused immensity—we can understand the impossibility; but, granting His essential, self-existing Being, it is proceeding further than our knowledge justifies eternally to restrict Him to a specific mode. It seems reasonable to argue that, if it were impossible God could become man, it were equally impossible He could make man in His own image.

But with the view of depreciating the Christian conception of the God-man, the allegation is made that it is borrowed from other religions. Its uniqueness and originality are denied, and heathenism it is asserted furnishes not merely approaches but rivals to it. A few observations, however, will suffice to demonstrate that in the subject of the relation of the divine and human the Christian line of thought has differentiating features and principles.

The two leading types of thought, either of which must have been the source of the Christian doctrine if it be a mere reflection or plagiarism, are the Aryan and Semitic. The Aryan or Indo-European group of the human family occupied a religious standpoint which was more favourable to such an Incarnation as Christianity taught being conceived, than the Semitic or Hebrew branch.

Though from a racial point of view one, the members of the Aryan family, with Eastern and Western divisions, are, from a religious point of view, different. In the Eastern or Indian division, we find a religion pervaded with the idea of an Incarnation. Hinduism has its Triad or Trinity of gods, the second member of which—Vishnu—appears in manifold incarnations. He is said to have had ten incarnations, although in some accounts

this number is exceeded. The reason of his several appearances was to save individuals, or deliver the world when threatened with danger or destruction. His forms were various : at one time he became a fish, at another a boar, at another he became half man and half lion : and at another he entered the person of Krishna. These several incarnations are not surprising since the transmigration of souls was a doctrine recognised. But there is no resemblance to the Christian Incarnation, for while Vishnu has many, Christ has only one : his assumptions of natures are temporary, but Christ's assumption of human nature is eternal. Krishna moreover bore a reproachable character, but Christ was holy, harmless, and undefiled. In the one case, the union between the divine and human is a mere form, in the other it is a permanent reality. The incarnations of the one are derogatory and ignoble, that of the other is dignified and worthy. Besides, the ethical conceptions underlying them are altogether different.

When we turn to the European or Western division, as represented by the Germanic or Grecian nations, as little ground do we discover for tracing the origin of the Christian doctrine to it. The religions of the West rise from man to God, and therefore deify him, whereas in Christianity God condescends to man. The Hellenic theology, though primarily springing from the East, yet widely differed from Hinduism in its conception of Deity. The human and divine were in the Greek mind more closely allied. It was an anthropomorphic religion, and hence most inferior in its deism. (1.) Its gods had a beginning. Even its essential gods, those who were gods from the first and not merely heroes deified, were finite and not absolute existences. (2.) Its gods only possessed relative power—they were as subject to Fate as men and as helpless in regard to its decrees. (3.) Its gods were natural and local—departments of life and nature were assigned for their superintendence—universal sovereignty belonged to none. Between a theology of this character and the Incarnation of Christ, there is no relation whatever. It is no more the genesis of the Christian doctrine of Christ than the Christian doctrine of God.

That the educated of Jewish society were familiar with the characteristic ideas of the Indian and Hellenic religions seems probable. The conquest of Alexander the Great developed

intercourse between the East and West not only in commerce, but also in thought. We may allow therefore the prevalence of foreign religious conceptions in Palestine in the time of our Lord, but that the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation is a refinement, modification, or improvement of them there is no consideration to warrant believing. No teaching could be more revolting to a Jew than the Vishnu appearances or the Grecian pluralities.

But Hebraism as little as heathenism suggested the God-man. In the mind of the Hebrew, God was a distant, ineffable, unapproachable Being : infinite, immaterial, eternal : the Great I AM. Between him and man there was an impassable gulf. To think of bridging it over was blasphemy. Christ's claim of doing this was answered with the declaration, "For a good work we stone thee not; but for blasphemy; and because that thou, being a man, makest thyself God" (John x. 33). The idea of an incarnation was so hateful to the Jews that they did not attach Godhead to the person of their Messiah. This feeling found expression in the Jewish-Christian sect of the Ebionites, who, while believing in Jesus as a man, repudiated the view that He was also God. It was their Jewish prejudices unquestionably which moulded their belief. These considerations prove the impossibility of grafting the Incarnation on the Semitic conception of God. We witness this conception remarkably emphasised in Mohammedanism. The unity, the oneness, the sovereignty of God is the ground-idea of that religion. God-condescending or God-becoming-incarnate is the heresy of heresies. Mohammedanism moves in a totally different line from Christianity, arising from the intensity of its monotheism.

The Incarnation of Christ is thus distinctive, unparalleled, and underived. It was too surpassing a conception for heathen religions to reach. In Him, deity is not lost in humanity, nor humanity in deity. The union between the divine and human is realised in personal form. Jesus is the brightness of the Father's glory and the express image of His person.

The specific features of the Christian Incarnation which mark it off from erroneous ideas and loose perversions honoured with its name, admit of being briefly indicated.

It was an immediate Incarnation. Divine powers, prerogatives, and influences, were not gradually communicated to Jesus

until at length in the course of His opening manhood and at the period of His baptism a divine person inhabited Him, but He was the God-man from the beginning, as truly in Bethlehem as on the Mount of Transfiguration.

It was a personal Incarnation. According to pantheism God is in everything, but according to Christianity God is only in Christ. Pantheism extends the incarnation to all times and to all humanity, Christ only in a large measure focussing the divinity which in others is more diffused. This view clearly obliterates the distinction between the world and God. But the Christian doctrine constitutes a complete negative. The Incarnation is personal: it took place at a definite time: and was without antecedent or succession.

It was a single Incarnation. Hinduism announces repeated incarnations, Gnosticism endless incarnations, and Pantheism a universal incarnation, but the Christian idea is—a single incarnation, and that in human form in Christ. He is the only personal expression of God which has been vouchsafed to the world.

It was an eternal Incarnation. Vishnu entering into Krishna was no proper incarnation, for the garb of humanity was but temporarily assumed. But Christ's humanity became part of Himself—an essential constituent of His person—and hence he remains the God-man for ever. Combining these characteristics together, must it not be confessed that there is a fundamental diversity between the Incarnation of Christ and those recognised in the world's false faiths?

The importance of the Incarnation admits of considerable illustration, but we shall limit ourselves to a few particulars, sufficient to elucidate its significance.

1. The Incarnation is the key of the Gospels. It is the great explanatory principle necessary for their interpretation. Ignoring the Incarnation in the study of the Gospels is like ignoring the Creator in the study of the phenomena of the world. By adopting it we can accept the Gospels as they are, without requiring to take from or add to them, or manipulate their material in any way; but by rejecting it we are compelled to adjust their records in the interests of the theory we substitute. The first duty to which the anti-supernaturalist addresses himself is to discredit some portion of their contents, and the

various schools impressed with this complexion of thought, while differing in their several hypotheses respecting the narratives, agree in repudiating them largely. Their unreserved acceptance is impossible unless we believe in Christ as the Incarnate Son.

2. The Incarnation is a religious necessity. All religions have their doctrine of an Incarnation, and while the forms of embodiment are various the root idea is the same. Buddhism is sometimes referred to as a religion without a Deity and therefore without an Incarnation; but whatever its negative character as originally expounded, it has become a religion having both a worship and a god, that god being no other than Buddha himself. Starting as an atheistic system, its history and development prove the necessity of all religions, if they are to justify their name and perpetuate their existence, having a personal and objective Being of some kind for purposes of meditation, reverence, and obedience. Mankind in no age or circumstances are ever so severely intellectual as to be able to do homage to abstract principles. Brahmanism, though fundamentally pantheistic, has personified Deity, and more, has even clothed a god with incarnate form. Had it done otherwise, it might have survived as a philosophy, but it would have decayed as a religion. It is a profoundly suggestive fact in the history of religious thought, that a pantheistic system became idolatrous.

The necessity of an Incarnation arises from our need of having God embodied and brought nigh. A vast impersonal, ineffable, absolute essence, we cannot worship, or realise sufficiently to trust and love. A distant, unknown, unrevealed God, is for us really no God: he is a mere vocable, and no inner power over our hearts and lives. God for us must be detached from the abstract, otherwise we can have no consciousness of him and hold with him no fellowship. But the Incarnation of Christ supplies us with a personal realisation of God such as satisfies our cravings, commands our reverence, evokes our trust. Christ reproduces in character, sympathy, grace, and likeness, the Father in heaven. Apart from Him we never could have known God, so high, so infinite, so excelling; and however much might have been revealed by precept, symbol, statement, yet all such knowledge would have been cold and unimpressive, and have lacked the vitalising

element,—the absence of which nothing can compensate,—a living personality.

The relation of the Incarnation to spiritual life is obvious. The object of piety must be a Person. An abstraction exercises no ennobling influence on the soul. We cannot dedicate ourselves to, or place our faith in, a dim shadowy essence. The apprehension of infinite power begets no affection and kindles no enthusiasm. It is not God's attributes, but God himself, that satisfies our spiritual needs. The works of creation amply evidence the former, but Christ alone shows us the latter. Having, therefore, such a Being as Christ, the necessities of spiritual life are provided for. It is matter of observation and experience that the purest in heart and holiest in feeling are those whose attachment to Christ is most sincere.

3. The Incarnation is a valuable apologetic fact. It does not burden Christianity or detract from its credibility. It is neither an encumbrance nor a non-essential in its system. Christianity is Christianity because of the Incarnation. Had it been wanting, the claim could not have been advanced on behalf of Christianity that it fulfilled ethnic aspirations. The universal tendency and instinct of all religions has been towards an Incarnate form, and it is the glory of Christianity that it reveals the true. Their failure to realise what they groped after constituted a preparation for the great gospel truth. An Incarnation is therefore not alien to the genius of universal religion, and Christianity meets a distinct and deep world-wide longing. The ideas of the ancient world in the religious sphere pointed to the God-man. We are entitled, accordingly, to conclude that the conception of the Incarnation is inseparable from the absolute religion, and that it is a necessary factor of Christianity in substantiation of this claim.

4. The Incarnation determines the nature of Christianity. It is not a philosophy or deduction: it is a fact. It is not a logical elaboration, but a historical reality. It is not a question of reason, but a question of evidence. Its genesis is neither poetic fable nor *a priori* principle, but the attested fact of the advent of the Divine Son. This fact unreservedly accepted commits us to the whole range of Christian belief. Neither the miracles, nor the resurrection, nor allied matters of faith, will need much defence or explanation for him who starts from

this as his foundation. The key of the Christian position; therefore, is not inspiration, nor prophecy, but Christ. All questions subordinate themselves to this: Was He the Word made flesh? Guided by the Spirit of God to the conviction that He was, the supernatural is cordially accepted, and every page of the Gospels is seen to reflect His glory, grace, and truth.

5. The Incarnation is essential to the doctrine of the atonement. The efficacy of the Redeemer's sufferings is accounted for by the dignity of His person. A profound sense of the expiatory value of His sacrifice is always associated with an adoration of Him as the God-man. On the other hand, where He is viewed as only human, His death is not regarded as in any proper sense a propitiation. Is there glad tidings for sinners? is therefore a question which, considering the infinite demerit of sin, turns on—Was God incarnate in Christ? On no other principle than that He was the Incarnate One can we believe that sin was atoned for by His death, and that the shedding of His blood was the redemption of the world. The Word being made flesh is the foundation-postulate of the Gospel for the weary and heavy-laden. He that renounces the former cannot preach the latter.

JOHN BAIRD.

ART. V.—*A Basis of Theism.*

WHY dost thou wonder, O man, at the height of the stars, or the depth of the sea? enter into thine own soul and wonder there"—is a passage from the writings of Isidore which seems to point to the neglected truth that the conditions of our own being afford presumptions of Theism more convincing than the external world can ever give us, that there lies the stronghold of the opponents of Agnosticism, and that modern inquirers have looked too long, and too intently, upon physical phenomena, forgetting that other department of existence, which though immaterial is equally real.

We know that unless the argument be placed upon firm and coherent ground, it is valueless. We do not propose to adduce any subjective hopes or desires as affording grounds for trust

that corresponding objective realities exist. Man, we readily grant, may have hoped for Immortality and craved for a Personal God as long and as vainly as he has believed in the flatness of the earth, the movement of the sun, or the influence of the stars. But we shall attempt to show that if those who bear the new torches of science are unable to find an Eternal Father in nature, they may still trace His work in the constitution of the human intellect and soul; and in the framework of man's reasoning powers and emotions find some tokens of "*NON OMNIS MORIAR.*"

According to the old view of Nature, man was the pivot upon which the whole system of creation turned. The physical world was created for his benefit, the forms of material things were cast in the moulds they wear in order to give him instruction and to train his faculties. The difficulties and dangers surrounding life were designed to sharpen his inventive powers. The beauty of the external world was to gratify his senses. For him the caoutchouc tree exuded its gum, for him the oyster secreted its pearl. "Why," says an old Latin Grammar, "are beasts created devoid of reasoning powers? Because they are more useful to man without them." Not only did the system of Nature thus minister to his direct wants, but it also gave him moral instruction. If he would read, he would there learn lessons of foresight, economy, industry, and contentment. The peace of mind and the purity induced by rural scenes and associations have been themes in literature since the days of the ancients.

It is not too much to say that the nineteenth century has seen this view swept away, entirely banished, and another substituted in its place. Nature to the modern physicist is cruel and remorseless. Her dominions are the scene of the "struggle for existence," and all living beings pass their lives in mutual destruction. "How," says one writer, "can you bid me find a God of Love in a world where creatures are perpetually devouring each other." The individual is transitory, and the slave of Force. Waters, plants, living beings themselves, teem with myriads of creatures all passing through their cycle of existence and vanishing. Man is of small account in this vortex, and subject to the same inexorable laws. Everywhere the innocent suffer, the strong survive, the weak perish.

Without staying to question whether this view of nature be just, we affirm that Man, though physically linked to the organic creation, is, in regard to his mental powers, and his actions, standing abnormally outside of it. His physical life runs in a cycle like that of other living things. Examine his biological formation and you find that it is constituted to go through a course of growth, maturity, reproduction, and decay, and that death is not a faulty accident in the process of life, but a conclusion as legitimate as the commencement,—birth. But in other respects than his mere animal existence man is conspicuously *not* adapted to his environments.

In the first place, instead of being in harmony with nature, he everywhere overturns, subverts, and destroys her works. He changes the surface of the earth, and he alters the fauna and the flora of its regions. He searches out hidden and dormant forces, electricity, magnetism, heat and light, and uses them for his own ends. He erects structures which withstand the elements through centuries, and he invents signs which transmit his thoughts to after nations. He overrules entirely the principle of natural selection, he preserves the weak and the feeble of his race, he remedies abnormal defects,—lameness, deafness, dumbness,—and he invents artificial means of extending the powers of his senses, as the telescope, microscope, audiophone, etc. Can this intelligence, which sways nature, and overmasters it, and which is only prevented from achieving greater results by the shortness of life and the limitation of the senses, be a product of matter? Can the infinitely less produce the greater, nay, produce a thing of a capacity and a potentiality much more powerful than can be made use of in this life?

In the second place, no attempts succeed in connecting mind with matter. Between the two there is always a link wanting. Movements in the brain may correspond to states of thought, but they are not the thoughts themselves. Mind may be traced existent in all degrees, from the reasoning powers of animals, who argue from particulars to particulars, to that of man, but mind cannot be transmuted into matter. A nerve transmits an impression to Consciousness, but the thought itself is enveloped in mystery. The physicists are as unable now as in the dawn of science to connect it with material phenomena.

Again, the emotions are to a great extent, as far as this life

is concerned, useless and unpractical. Why does not human love for offspring cease when there is no further need for protection? Why does it survive and increase with time, when, in the cases of death and absence, it only brings anguish and sorrow to parent or child? Man, already liable to all the vicissitudes of fortune, is further endowed with feelings which add poignancy to his calamities,—the love of country, of kindred, of friends, hopes, fears, and regrets. It is a law of nature that he must colonise, then why is he framed with that attachment to his native land which tinges with a certain sadness all the prosperity gained on foreign shores? Death is a law of nature: why is he framed capable of affection so that one loss may overshadow a whole life? Illness and suffering are inevitable, and how much misery is felt by those around as well as by the actual sufferer? Viewed as a being destined only for this limited physical existence, viewed as an outcome of material forces like the chemical substances or the plants around him, man's endowment with these sensibilities, sensibilities which in reality make up the most potential part of his life, is inexplicable.

The mind perceives vistas of regions which it cannot hope to reach. The intelligence, caged as it were in the corporeal frame, is fully sensible of the imperfection of the reports of consciousness. It sees that its knowledge is limited, and is never absolute, that all things are known only as they relate to or affect it, that it knows nothing of the nature of things in themselves. The senses make their reports of the external world; but the senses are limited in number. We see living beings possessing fewer senses than ourselves, and we argue that there are probably things in the universe of which we have no senses to inform us. We are continually stopped in our investigations by the limited range of our senses. There is a boundary beyond which we cannot see, or hear, or trace scent, but that boundary is the limit of our perception, and not the ultimatum of what is to be heard or seen.

The mind is also cognisant of the limits of its own working powers. The logician sees that he can only think in sequence, that he cannot grasp a large co-ordination of propositions, or hold at once the mutual interdependencies of things. A mind may be imagined which should be capable of at once appre-

hending the whole complex array of concomitant causes which lead to an effect, in their proper degrees of relativity, and *vice versa* of apprehending the sum-total of effects following a cause. In the same way as the syllogism is an immense step beyond reasoning from particulars to particulars (as animals do), so there may be yet to find a form of reasoning which shall equally transcend the syllogism. All logicians are divided as to whether the three laws of thought are ultimate laws of things, or merely the limitations of our reasoning powers. Some say they are unthinkable and devoid of meaning. Others, that they are the prior necessities of all thought. A third party consider them as generalised experiences. The very existence of this controversy shows how uncertain we are concerning our intellectual instrument, how far removed from thinking that there is nothing beyond it.

This plain perception that more might be known and that higher reasoning might be attained is not adaptation to our environment. Syllogism and induction are quite sufficient for our existence here, yet every scholar who penetrates the higher logic has glimpses of processes beyond them, and discovers imperfections and problems to be solved. If the intellect becomes extinct when physical life is over, what is the use of this perception, accompanied, as it is, with the conviction that these things are hopelessly unattainable in our present constitution? What is the use of that fascination with which problems abstract and purely intellectual hold so many minds enslaved?

But the mind does not seem confined, like biological growth, to a cycle. Organisms contain in their very formation provisions for their dissolution. But the mind seems capable of indefinite duration, expansion, and growth.

Again, on the æsthetic side of things, how much can it pur-
pose, how little can it effect! What artist or sculptor ever realised his idea? What poet ever adequately clothed his verse in words? The music, the cathedral, or the statue is always below the ideal that the genius of its author mentally formed. The mind can image higher things than there is any potentiality of executing.

There is *no possibility* of those things being attained, otherwise the perception of them might be regarded as indicative of the future development of the race. But these barriers no

lapse of ages can remove so long as the human mind and body are constituted and connected as they are. Here, then, is the mind plainly transcending the sense-cycle.

Lastly, justice, righteousness, and truth were never evolved from anything material. Whence do such ideas take their rise? They are in direct antagonism to ease, comfort, present enjoyment, and the power of might and strength. They do not favour the accumulation of riches, the lust of power, the pleasures of luxury, all the things that mankind generally esteem desirable. They involve hardships, self-repression, labour, painful struggles, and sorrow. And yet in all ages every race has held them the highest good. The most depraved have admired and revered them, however little they have followed their dictates. Take a multitude, of which the individuals shall be degraded, self-indulgent, and mean, let a heroic deed be done in its sight or told in its hearing, and the universal conscience of humanity will respond with a shout of applause. Why is it that self-sacrifice, patriotism, and devotion in a hopeless cause never fail to rouse sentiments of admiration and approval? Why do not mankind regard such things as irrational folly? Why, on the contrary, do they make those that hold to them their leaders and guides?

Justice and righteousness are not, according to the showing of the scientists, to be found in nature, nor in the apparent interests of humanity. It is idle to argue that they are ultimately more beneficial than self-interest, and that mankind, having so calculated, therefore approve of them. There is always an instant and universal approval of them by the untutored mind anterior to calculation. Moreover there are innumerable cases in which justice and righteousness are *not* expedient or beneficial if we look to this life only,—when following their dictates seems to lead us through a dreary wilderness. But men in all ages have been patriots and martyrs, have thrown away their lives for each other, have embarked in toilsome enterprises, and pursued them without faltering or misgiving, if they thought the cause noble and worthy. Why should this be, but that there is a spark of a higher nature in the human soul, a nature which can recognise moral perfection, and is dimly conscious that there is a Right and Wrong eternal and immutable beyond the world of sense? Physical science cannot explain the

genesis of moral ideas. Yet we find them universal, prevalent, and inalienable. Mankind in all times have always meant one thing by Righteousness and Justice. Wickedness and despotism have never been so called. In the broad moral landmarks Wrong has always been Wrong, and Right Right since the dawn of history.

Whence came these ideas? Here is a being with that which really makes up his existence, with that which gives it colouring and reality, all *outside* of physical life, his emotions, his intellect, his moral sense. These things are alien from material nature, they have no community with it. Never is this more strongly apparent than at the obsequies of any of the world's heroes. All the cluster of thoughts, of deeds, of sentiments which make up the glories of an illustrious statesman, or warrior, or author, those glories that thrill the hearts of the mourning crowd, how entirely are they one thing, and the coffin of dust laid in the Abbey another,—how the one survives and the other perishes!

On the one hand, then, we have the world of matter, self-repeating under its apparent variety, and always running the same course. "Science is quantified knowledge," and the precision and certainty of our calculations regarding material and biological forces is co-ordinate with the extent of our investigations. On the other hand we have the world of mind, infinite in its diversity, unmeasurable, not to be formulated. How is this second world to be accounted for? Our souls are not a product of matter, nor are they created by ourselves. What *can* we do but infer some objective cause or creator, nor consistently can we esteem this creator *lower* in intelligence or moral sense than the beings he has made. Again, our souls are *not* adapted, *not* co-ordinate with the short cycle of physical life, therefore there is a probability that He has purposes for them beyond it.

Unless we wilfully choose to resist, making an assumption which in every analogical case we should unhesitatingly make, we are led, after a survey of the mental world, to the projection of a creator, or, to speak more plainly, of a Personal God.

This is no more than we do when we assume a Permanent Ego, an Alter, *i.e.* the existence of other beings similar to ourselves, an External World, Force, or The Past. These are all

inferences. The only belief which is not an inference is any consciousness which I at this moment experience. The truth is, that the moment we go beyond this we rest, not on immediate certainty, but on mediate probability, more or less strong. Among all the phantasms of life, and its fleeting varieties, we feel sure that there is a Permanent Something which I call "myself;" it changes mentally, physically; waves of feeling pass over it; it varies in every way, but, by the help of memory, I feel convinced that there is a Permanent Something. So with other men. Their minds are never known to me. I only infer by their words and actions that they have feelings and an existence similar to my own. Speech, gesture, expression, these are the things which I decipher. So with the external world. I have no positive proof of its reality, and yet I have a strong presumption. Its phenomena come and go not at my will, so I can scarcely consider them the creations of my fancy, and the calculations which I make that such and such things will take place prove correct. These calculations themselves are based upon the assumption of the Uniformity of Nature, that what has been in the past will be in the future, and for that assumption I have no certainty. Seeing, then, that our belief in our own existence, and in the existence of the world and of our fellow-men, is relative and not absolute knowledge, how can we demand an absolute knowledge of God? It is not possible in the nature of thought and things. Nor would a sense-perception of God add any logical certainty to a mental conviction of His existence. My belief in the existence of A is not based upon my sense-perception of him, but upon the inferences I draw from these perceptions. My knowledge of A may be more full than my knowledge of Socrates, but the existence of the one is as logically certain to me as that of the other.

But we said a Personal God. "I had rather," writes Bacon, "believe all the fables in the Legend, and the Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this universal frame is without a mind." There are many who will assent to this saying, who allow that there is a Creator, but who hesitate to place belief in a Personal God. To them the vaguer phrases of an Infinite Power, a Creative Intelligence, or Mr. Arnold's Power that makes for Righteousness, seem more accordant with the darkness that

surrounds our inquiries. They fear that if we advance to anything more definite than this, anything more outlined and more realistic, that Imagination will step in; that we shall believe more than we have warrant for believing; that we shall be placing confidence and trust in what is, in reality, the picturings of our own fancy; and that, instead of holding to the small amount of truth which we are justified in resting upon, we shall be erecting a mental idol which is nothing but an idealised transcript of humanity.

It is true that this is a danger into which we are very prone to run, but our view of the danger may become too one-sided. The converse truth must also be considered, that the only way in which we can know God at all is in a manner *intelligible to our faculties*, and therefore in a limited measure. We cannot reasonably consider Him below the human beings he has created in moral excellence or mental power, and we have no means of apprehending Him as higher except by thinking of Him as invested with the attributes, which we understand, in perfection. Thinking of Him as the Unknowable is, in reality, not thinking of Him at all. We may be fully conscious that our ideas of Him are inadequate, but they are the only ideas which in our present state of being we can have of Him, and though imperfect, not erroneous. We are shut up to the choice of believing that there is a Being, an embodiment of justice, holiness, power, and love, who has created us with a nature akin to His own, or that Something has created a universe in which humanity, as far as mental things go, stands abnormally. The Something is but another name for utter ignorance, and binds us to more darkness than is necessary. You cannot believe in this abstract God as a blank form of being like a logical P or Q, or an algebraical X, because as soon as you believe in Him you invest Him with at least one attribute, that of having created the world and the human race. And if you admit His existence, if you advance beyond atheism, personality must follow, because from His workmanship we trace His character.

And from personality follows prayer.

If the Being is existent, and if He is Creator, He is probably cognisant of human thoughts. How do I know that He can hear me? I answer, How do I know that He cannot? The

burden of proof lies with the questioner. The presumption is strongly that He can. All that you can adduce in disproof is that He has been asked in vain to control mundane events. This may be. Whether He interferes or not in human affairs is a vexed question, but allowing, for the sake of argument, that He does not, this is no proof that He does not hear. His purposes we do not know. But then, it is said, prayer is useless. Have you shown that He will not bestow mental blessings? Are they nothing? Is not the greater half of our existence the mental one? Does not Poverty take its sting, and Death its terror, from the mind? I wish to attain to greater holiness, justice, benevolence. I ask this Being who has created me to infuse more of these qualities into my nature, to help me in a struggle towards a higher mental existence. Why should it be a visionary dream to believe that He will respond? If He can create, He can direct. Our hesitation in believing arises from the fact that prayer is an immaterial proceeding. Communion with the Deity is wholly mental. And we are so bound to what is tangible and sense-evident that we fear to realise that there is anything beyond.

We have now reached the limits of our basis for Theism, and have seen how much it can give us. At this point we may consider that Religions present themselves to us. They affirm that the Deity has revealed Himself to mankind, that the human race has had intercourse with Him, and that He has told them of His purposes and of their destiny. This is the assertion of Buddhist, Mohammedan, Jew, and Christian, and when we consider our position in the universe, and our relations to it, there is nothing *a priori* incredible in the fact that there should be a revelation.

Christianity claims to bring (1) full historical evidence that the revelation she details took place; (2) to show that it, and it only, meets the wants of man's mental nature; and (3) she points to the testimony of a countless and diverse multitude throughout the centuries, Greek, Roman, Teuton, and Celt, that in this revelation they have found a guide in life and a support in death. He who is standing in the temple of Theism cannot refuse to investigate such claims, and if the investigation be pursued with but a tithe of the dispassionate patience men devote to scientific problems, we have no fears for the result.

ART. VI.—*Joyous Spirituality of Christian Pilgrimage ;
or, Pilgrimage—not Penance.*

GENUINE admiration of the Cross of Christ,—imbuing a man with that *evangelical spirituality* which is the want of the age, and which alone has been found powerful enough to alienate us from the world at every point—makes him, there can be no reason to doubt, what the psalmist calls himself, “a stranger on the earth” (Ps. cxix. 19). Living by that faith which does not, and from the nature of things *cannot*, in this life “receive the promises, but sees them afar off, and is persuaded of them and embraces them,” and realises the splendidly dominating power of them, the man wakens up to the clear consciousness, and sees no reason for withholding the confession : “I am a stranger and a pilgrim in the earth” (Heb. xi. 13) ; “a stranger and a sojourner as all my fathers were” (Ps. xxxix. 12).

It is of some importance to vindicate this aspect of the Christian life from those objections which intelligent and averagely healthy-minded men of the world are not unnaturally apt to raise against it, as abnormal, melancholy, ascetic, adverse to the cultivation of friendship, and to such interest in the affairs of our own age as that religion must be false which would forbid.

There can be no doubt that the protestation, “I am a stranger on the earth,” or “I am a stranger and a sojourner as all my fathers were,” has a certain air of melancholy about it, a quiet tone of loneliness. The very reference to the “fathers” gives it an air of the antique or the archaic. It has a little in it, one would say, of the ring of a voice grown old before its time. It is the utterance of a man longing for sympathy and finding little ; a man occupied with interests and prospects and desires which obtain no favour in the eyes of those around him. He descends into himself, and discovers there matters of trial and sorrow, which the world in its levity is ignorant of ; and he looks forth into futurity, and there he apprehends materials of anxiety and hope to which the world is content to close its eyes. He looks upward to the throne of the Majesty in the heavens,

and as one who has been awakened to the knowledge of his responsibility to the King, he realises that he has business in the court of heaven that the world knoweth not of. And looking round upon the very world itself, and appreciating its condition of wretchedness and danger as itself seeth it not, his feelings towards that world are unintelligible and unacceptable to it. Whether he look within or around, whether he look forward or upward, he is sensible of emotions in which the thoughtless and ungodly world cannot sympathise; and quietly and with something no doubt of mournfulness in his heart, realising that he is separated in spirit from the vast mass of his fellow-men, he gives expression to the fact in the somewhat pathetic protestation: "Well, well, I am a stranger now, and a sojourner as all my fathers were."

It is not that he regrets it. This is not the language of querulousness or of discontent. The fact of his separation and estrangement from the world is not unwelcome to him. It is his deliberate choice that it should be so. Or rather it is the inevitable result of a choice that he has deliberately made already, and which he is not repenting of, but repeating. Be the issue what it may, this at least is certain, "I am a stranger on the earth." I have come forth and am separate: and "I am a stranger on the earth." My chiefest desires and my chiefest distresses alike tell me that I have lost the sympathy of the world. My deepest sorrows arise from sin; from finding that I am myself so unlike to God; from so frequently displeasing God; from having so little heart to seek or to enjoy fellowship with God; from having so little ability to worship and love and serve God; from beholding so little of the light of his countenance, and seeing so seldom his glorious goings in the sanctuary. My deepest desires are for glorious views of the Son of Man, whom the Holy One of Israel hath made strong for himself and for me—strong for the magnifying and manifesting of the glory of God—and for the justifying and renewing of me, a sinner. My peace and joy now are when Messiah, in his infinitely precious righteousness, rises to my view as my shield and hiding-place; my refuge and my deliverer; when in spiritual faith I see the Father reconciling me unto himself, searching all my heart and meeting all my case; telling me that he can be righteous in freely loving me, a lost,

rebellious, polluted sinner ; and that I can be safe and blessed in fully trusting him, the Just and Holy One. My heart is then opened to its depths, and the light of grace and glory passes through it. And though that light reveals my heart's wickedness, it testifies also its free salvation in the love and righteousness of God my Saviour: though it discloses deep springs of evil and depravity, thus humbling me more and more, it yet gives me a relief from the anguish which the shutting in of that depravity upon the soul to fester there, never fails to create. But this is a light which the world knoweth not of: the things which it discloses both in me and in my God ; in me, the sinner, unrighteous and depraved ; in God, the Just and Holy One of Israel ; are things which the world seeth not, and will by no means believe though a man declare it unto them: the distressing exhibitions of sin and bondage and death in me, which the searching light of the Lord affords; and the disclosures of righteousness, liberty, and life in Christ, my living head and treasure, which the same light reveals ;—of these things the world is ignorant,—they are “foolishness unto them, neither can *they* know them, for they are spiritually discerned” (1 Cor. ii. 14).

But the world's joys and distresses are as much foolishness to me. To mourn, as they mourn, the loss of some perishing portion ; to joy, as they joy, in the obtaining of some fleeting idol ; I now regard as foolishness indeed. I am crucified to the world, and the world to me. Our judgment and our desire are at variance ; and that on no secondary or subordinate themes of interest. On the vital and primary objects of desire, or matters of distinguishing and fundamental interest, we are at variance. The shadow with them is the substance with me ; and the shadow with me is the substance with them. They behold me pursuing something which they do not see at all ; and little wonder—(I excuse them),—though that seems to them absurd enough : while I see them following what I know to be a phantom and a dream. Little wonder, then, if a deep and very practical alienation has arisen between us, a separation realised and ratified on both sides. We are fatally and for ever strangers ; “I am a stranger on the earth.”

Let any man read the Psalms of David deliberately, let him look upon them as the honest expression of the writer's actual

state of feeling: apart from the credit which he has been taught from his youth to assign to the Scriptures as inspired by the Holy Ghost, so as to form, simply and literally, the Word of God; let him simply contemplate with something like deliberation the state of heart, the character, the principle of conduct, the secret experiences which find vent in these wondrous compositions: and whether he has sympathy with the writer or not, he must come to the conclusion, "Assuredly this man was a stranger on the earth." The very revolt which the worldly mind feels from the sanctity and searching holiness of these spiritual songs is an involuntary confession that the writer of them must have been "a stranger on the earth:" and the very reason why the ungodly man revolts and recoils from them, and never by any chance turns voluntarily to their pages with desire to meditate upon them, and be imbued with their spirit, is because, on the one hand, he is not prepared to be "a stranger on the earth," and, on the other hand, cannot but shrewdly know that the actual moulding of his heart and character by these Psalms—the admission of their sentiments into any place of vital love in his heart, and of their principles to any place of influential government over his character and conduct in life, would inevitably make him what, from his love and friendship to the world, he is not prepared to be—"a stranger on the earth."

But what the world recoils from, the Christian heart desires. Nor will the believer claim for his personal piety any sincerity and progress, except in so far as his heart has been moulded into conformity with the Word of God and the experience of God's people as there recorded. Though it be in every case by a gracious and omnipotent operation of the Divine Spirit that the heart is renewed into the saving faith of Jesus Christ, and brought under the influence of the fear and love of God, the change thus produced is not of such a nature that no account and no explanation can be given of it. Though accomplished by a secret and sovereign energy, it is accommodated to a most express and definite rule. It is achieved by the Spirit, but it is accommodated to the Word. And though the baptism of the Spirit and of fire, under which the heart is melted into self-abasement and kindled into the growing appreciation of the beauty of holiness be beyond our finite comprehension, yet the

mould into which the heart thus melted is, so to speak, poured—the impress which it now assumes—is brought most tangibly and fully within the sphere of notice; for it is formed and framed into harmony with that potent Word of God, which he has been pleased to place into our hands, and condescend to entreat us to search : and if a heart, professedly changed by the Spirit of God, whose working we cannot trace, be not in harmony with the Word whose principles we can and may trace, the change professed has not really been undergone.

It follows that if we are true Christians and growing Christians, we will enter with true and growing sympathy into the protestation which the Word of God makes in the name of every Christian of being a stranger and a sojourner on the earth. In proportion as the depth and decision of our personal piety are enhanced, will this sentiment gain ground. As the Word of God dwells in us more richly ; as we increase in the study and knowledge of the believing heart, and increase in sympathy with it, in its joys and sorrows, its responsibilities and privileges, its burdens and reliefs, its blessings and hopes, as these are opened up to us in the Scriptures ; we will feel more and more alienated from a sinful and unsatisfying, and really very shallow world, and more and more satisfied with our position as “strangers on the earth.” We will pronounce no censorious and indiscriminate condemnation on those from whom in spirit the grace of God has separated us. We will even watch against giving them unnecessary offence. We will remember, from our own experience, that true spiritual Christianity is sufficiently obnoxious to the dislike of the carnal mind to render it other than highly criminal in the Christian to present it to the unconverted in any additional and unnecessary offensiveness, or shorn of those features of acceptableness of which, even with all its sin-repelling integrity and purity, it is very far from being destitute. And whatever the world is really right in counting excellent and loveable, we will feel bound to show that living Christianity, instead of repudiating, rather sanctions and embraces, and is indeed alone capable of ripening into full maturity. But still we will never fail to see, if living in habits of reverential and lively fellowship with God, that the whole world of unconverted men is one wide waste of utter ungodliness, to which it is no sad doom but a saving

grace to be "a stranger." The unconverted world seeketh not the glory of God ; it acteth not on the principle of fearing and pleasing God ; its affairs are conducted with no reference to the will of God ; in that world our Father's word, and will, and presence, and claims are habitually, coolly, continually set aside. How then can we ever be other than strangers on the earth ?

The secret of maintaining this trying position towards the world in all honour and truth of spirit, to the glory of God, to the promotion of our own spiritual interests and comfort, and to the benefit even of the world itself—the secret of being truly, and comfortably, and usefully "strangers in the earth," lies in our being no strangers to God. It is well to give diligent heed to this. It is well to give heed to the process and principle whereby the believer is really enabled to take up and sustain this particular relation to the world. To the worldly man himself it appears exceedingly unnatural and incomprehensible how any human being can have his heart so removed from all that is usually accounted interesting and desirable here below, as to be passing through the world in the real character of a stranger and pilgrim. But if he would attend to the principle on which the Christian acts—if he would but deliberately judge of the process whereby the Christian has become, and still continues to be, a "stranger on the earth," he might come to admit, if he be at all ingenuous, that there is nothing unnatural, nothing certainly irrational, and nothing in the nature of things inaccessible or unattainable, in a man even of an active disposition and a social, and sympathising, and affectionate heart, aspiring to be as the man after God's own heart was, a "stranger in the earth."

Let us glance at the principle and process as they were seen operating in Abraham, the father of the faithful.

A more decided instance of the believer's relation towards the world, in this aspect of it, cannot be found than in Abraham. The very platform and tenor of his outward life were constructed so as visibly to indicate his spiritual separation from the world. He was not more truly the "father of the faithful" than he was obviously the Pattern of Pilgrims—the very model of a stranger on the earth. "By faith Abram, when he was called to go out into a place which he should after receive for

an inheritance, obeyed ; and he went out, not knowing whither he went. By faith he sojourned in the land of promise, as in a strange country, dwelling in tabernacles with Isaac and Jacob, the heirs with him of the same promise. For he looked for a city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God." And associating with their father all the ancients like-minded with him, the apostle adds—"These all died in faith, not having received the promises, but having seen them afar off, and were persuaded of them, and embraced them, and confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims on the earth."

Now, what could have prevailed with our father Abraham to assume the pilgrim's staff and the stranger's fare and garb ? He had a land that he called his own. He had a kindred. He had a father's house. Doubtless he looked for dying in his nest, his destiny little shaken save by those usual events that gradually change if they do not mar the face of all things in all the homes of earth. Why should Abraham not live, as he has hitherto done, at home among the friends of his youth, the associates of his more active days ? What could possibly induce him at one decisive stroke—by one fell swoop—to tear himself away from all that he has counted desirable or dear, and be henceforth a "stranger on the earth" ?

"The God of glory," says Stephen, "the God of glory appeared unto our father Abraham when he was in Mesopotamia, before he dwelt in Charran, and said unto him, 'Get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and from thy father's house, unto a land that I will show thee : and I will make of thee a great nation, and I will bless thee.'" What could make him a stranger on the earth ? "The God of glory appeared unto him." *That* would do it. From that moment he was alienated from the world.

Formerly he had been at home in the world and a stranger to God. Now he is at home with God and a stranger on the earth. Formerly the world had "*appeared*" to him—and God was not in all his thoughts. Now "the God of glory" has *appeared* unto him, and the world *disappears* and fades from view. The "appearance" of God he beholds as real and glorious. The "appearance" which the world put on, while it beguiled and occupied all his heart, he now discovers to have been false and delusive. He is in circumstances now to choose.

The world has appeared unto him with its ease and gifts, its indolent sufficiency lulling his highest faculties asleep, or with its trials and hardships fretting his patience and crossing his aims. And in the counter-revelations of the world's offer and his Maker's glory—with which shall he now consent to be at home? to which shall he now resolve to be a stranger? Ah! but he is not left to weigh his scruples and balance probabilities. He not only sees the glory of God, but he also hears his call; and it is indeed in his call, in the revelation of his character as given in his call—that Abram really sees the glory of God. The word of absolute, supreme authority commands obedience. The word of infinite love commends itself to his acceptance. "Get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and from thy father's house." Never was Abram so dealt with before. It is the voice of the *King*. It is the glory of sovereign majesty. And its effect is immediate and irresistible. Is Abraham dwelling indolently in the world's good,—the spell of its contentment withering his energy of purpose? The voice awakens him:—he starts to his feet. Is he eagerly running his own errand in the world—the strain of covetousness tasking all his effort? The voice arrests him: he stands still to listen. And clear and commanding, as of one having authority, having infinite sovereign right and power, that voice penetrates a secret ear in his heart, and quickens and kindles there a feeling altogether new,—the sharp resistless sense of responsibility—responsibility to One with whom Abram now discovers for the first time that he really has to do. Ah! it is a voice that will brook no disobedience, no gainsaying, no delay. It is the voice of the King,—the King Eternal and Invisible. It is the voice of the King at last: "Get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and from thy father's house." No more is Abram's lot in his own hand. "Get thee out into a land that I will show thee." 'Tis the voice of the Sovereign Disposer. Abram's all is in the hand of "the God of glory," and he knows it.

But it is the voice of sovereign mercy also. "I will make of thee a great nation, and I will bless thee." I will bless thee: I who have the same authoritative right and power to bless that I have to command and to dispose. I will bless thee,—I whose blessing maketh rich and addeth no sorrow with it—

whose blessing is effectual, all-reaching, all-sufficient, eternal : —I will bless thee." Get thee out, therefore, unto where my blessing shall for ever follow.

Thus did the God of glory *appear* unto our father Abram ; in sovereign majesty, demanding his unreserved unconditional allegiance ; in sovereign mercy, conferring an unlimited and unconditional blessing. And Abram beholds the glory of God : in the new keen sense of adoring loyalty Abraham welcomes and obeys his King : in the new sweet sense of filial confidence and final and eternal security, Abraham welcomes and puts trust in his reconciled Father which is in heaven.

From that moment he is a stranger on the earth. He has believed God, and parted with the world. He has believed God, and it is imputed to him for righteousness, and the Scripture is fulfilled which saith, "He was called the friend of God." But the friend of God is a stranger on the earth : "By faith therefore he goes out, not knowing whither he goes. By faith he sojourns in the land of promise, as in a strange country."

In the usual administration of the grace of his kingdom, the King of Zion is not wont to call for a local transference of our persons from one land to another, or away from the society of our relatives into seclusion or to the companionship of those unknown to us. But as to the spirit of our minds, as to the principles which shall govern our hearts and habits, as to the change of purpose and procedure which the sinner undergoes when he returns unto the Lord, and the Lord hath mercy upon him and doth abundantly pardon, there is a transference, a translation, an exchange from one system of feelings and principles, and desires and hopes and efforts to another, as complete, as sweeping, as decisive, as thoroughly producing a revolution upon his nature and character, as the call to Abraham to get him out from his country, and his kindred, and his father's house. Is it not as a pre-eminent example and model in this respect that Abraham is uniformly set forth to us as "the father of the faithful" ?—that we are called upon to walk "in the steps of our father Abraham" ?—that "they which be of faith are blessed with faithful Abraham" ? (Gal. iii. 9)—and that "if we are Christ's, then are we Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise" ? (Gal. iii. 29.)

To us, therefore, as to him, if indeed we be of the seed of Abraham, God's friend, the God of Glory hath appeared; to us the word of God hath come. We have seen the glory, and heard the call, of God. And his glory hath appeared to us pre-eminently in the power and privileges of the call. It is indeed in our seeing glory in the call, a glory which the carnal mind never sees, that we realise the call as effectual, or rather that the call realises itself as effectual upon us. The glory of the Sovereign Lord we see in his assertion of his claims over us, his right to command us at his pleasure, his right to dispose of us at his will. "Get thee up, O slumberer, and flee from the wrath to come. Away to the refuge set before thee! Repent, arise, and flee for thy life." The glory also of a Sovereign Father we see in his most merciful and most majestic offer and determination in Christ to bless us—to bless us freely, to justify us fully and gratuitously, to reconcile and adopt us in his own Son's righteousness and titles, freely, finally, and for evermore. No longer do we cling to our olden views of God,—our dim and doubtful, hazy and suspicious, and half-slumbering views of the glory of God. No more do we dally,—dreamily tampering,—with the call of God. His majestic and unreserved command, Get thee up and away from the lake of fire—away from thy wicked companions—away from thy worldly idols that are thy gods, thy all:—this unconditional command deals mightily with all that is within thee. And his merciful and unconditional determination, "I will bless thee,"—bless thee with a free and full forgiveness, if, being guilty, thou needest that,—bless thee with an omnipotent regeneration of thy soul, if being depraved and under Satan's bondage thou needest *that*; this sovereign, immediate, unconditional, free and all-sufficient grace deals not only mightily, but deals bountifully with thee. The Eternal King, in short, hath come. He demands thy allegiance: "Come forth from among them and be thou separate:" but he charges himself with thy lot and thy blessedness for ever: "I will bless thee, and be a Father unto thee." And believing his testimony and acquiescing in his proposal,—seeing his glory and hearing his call,—by faith you arise obedient to your Lord, justified by faith, and having peace with God; your faith working by love and overcoming the

world : you arise, for this is no more your rest : the Lord is your friend ; he is your strength and your song ; he also is become our salvation. Your treasure, your citizenship, your home is in heaven. And reconciled to God, and obedient to him, and glad to be so, you are a "stranger on the earth."

It cannot, I trust, be warrantably inferred from anything that has now been said, that we could mean to represent the believer as a miserable recluse or a moping solitaire,—as uncompanionable,—not formed for or aiming at the duties and enjoyments of friendship. Any such inference would be alike unjust and untrue, alike false and calumnious. The man who is scripturally and spiritually "a stranger on the earth" has assumed this relation and disposition towards the world, as we have seen, by becoming a friend of God ; and that *he* should, and should *therefore*, be indifferent to the sacred claims and the frank and joyous privilege of friendship, is altogether incredible. It is frequently the estimate entertained by the world no doubt concerning the living Christian, that he is of a sullen and morose disposition, looking coldly on the innocent joys of life, and refusing all genial and gladsome association with his fellows. But it is one of many misapprehensions and misrepresentations which the Christian must be content that his character in the eyes of the world should suffer ;—one of those many proofs that he cannot expect to be sympathised with or even understood by the world,—that he is, in short, a stranger to the earth. There are those, however, who will deal out to him another measure, and do him justice. They will understand from their own experience how the case really stands.

For it is a grievous misunderstanding. The believer in reality is the only man who has thoroughly fathomed the nature and claims of true and incorruptible friendship. In his friendship with God he has had the glorious opportunity of learning them. And the lessons, which on that high field he learns, he will be prepared and desirous to bring into exercise in those lower spheres of friendship which he may be privileged to occupy among his fellow-men. Nor will he want opportunity for doing so. In this sense he is indeed no more a stranger and a foreigner, but a fellow-citizen with the saints and of the household of God, admitted to a brotherhood of the widest

extent and of the most intimate kind. Can it be forgotten that the David who gave utterance to the sentiment we have so often quoted, "I am a stranger on the earth," was the friend of JONATHAN; and that it was precisely when realising most intensely that he was a stranger on the earth, hunted even as a partridge on its mountains, that he enjoyed most intensely the sweetness and privilege of that most passionate and honourable attachment?

Friendship, indeed, recruits its ranks from the kingdom of grace. The Christian, though separated from the world, is not isolated on a platform by himself, on which he can find none to share or sympathise with him. Unforgiven sin may constitute such a platform—yea, a prison—for the soul. But the fellowship of God is a large and wealthy place, in which all the faithful dwell together in unity. "Bring my soul out of prison, that I may praise thy name; the righteous shall compass me about, when thou hast dealt bountifully with me" (Ps. cxlii. 7).

Indeed, no man knows the calm, quiet, and confiding joy of true friendship, but he who is a friend of God and a stranger on the earth. For, when once he finds his deepest anxieties settled, and his deepest longings satisfied, in God, so that he needs no more to depend or draw upon created friends for his chief good; he returns now to find in them what it really is in them to yield—not a primary and supreme, but a secondary and subordinate enjoyment. *That* he does find them capable of yielding. He finds them capable now of yielding what he now seeks,—an accession, namely, a supplement, to a happiness already in the main secure. He found them incapable of yielding what he formerly sought,—when he vainly assayed to make them, or any created good, his "all in all,"—his satisfying portion. Now, therefore, for the first time, he has in the fellowships and friendships of brethren a quietness of enjoyment, a real and full meeting of his expectations, which he never had before. And being now, even if alone in the world and friendless, *not* friendless and alone, because the Father is with him, he finds, if surrounded by friends, enjoyment in them for the Father's sake.

You are not at liberty merely, it is your imperative duty, to cultivate Christian friendship. Concerning each of his friends

alternately, Jesus says to all, "He that receiveth you, receiveth me."

One of the first effects, indeed, of living Christianity is seen in those of its disciples who once were, naturally, morose and isolated. Of such, the world will witness with astonishment, and the Church with delight, the expansion which their affections undergo, the enlarged sympathies and genial sensibilities which they display, when grace has *effectually loved on* to its own delighted enthronement ("Grace reigns"). And why should not Christian men, and women too (women perhaps we should say, especially), be the very patterns of all that is lovely, and honourable, and frank, and open, and heartfelt, and mutually trustful, and helpful in their friendships with one another? Yea, in point of fact, it is really so. None so joyous and genial as they: and so much the more, as they feel that they are strangers on the earth: and so much the more, as they see the day approaching. Conscious thereby the more truly that all their real treasure is safe; with their relation to the living God settled on his own infinitely holy, infinitely gracious terms, on his own infinitely glorious, and absolutely and eternally sure foundations; with their natures placed under the renewing and disciplinary influence of the Spirit and word and Providence of an Almighty Father; and the continuance and ultimate perfection of that process of renewal secured and guaranteed by an everlasting covenant ordered in all things, and sure: who can afford in an hour of recreation,—when soul and body and spirit, after faithful duty, need to be relaxed,—who can afford, as they can, to unbend and enjoy a brother's society and fellowship,—ay, and with a zest, a cordiality, a quiet, calm, and deep pleasurable-ness, of which the worldling can form no conception, and compared with which the world's noisy and most excited mirth is unnatural and hollow. "Rejoice in the Lord, and be glad, ye righteous: and shout for joy, all ye that are upright in heart."

Equally groundless is another objection that has often been brought against a style of piety so decided as to make a man a stranger on the earth, and to beget the evangelical spirituality of character which we have been describing. It is said that he will be thereby unfitted for discharging his duties in the world.

It were useless to enter seriously on the refutation of this objection. It may be sufficient to reply that it cannot possibly be so, inasmuch as it is precisely *duty*, and not desire, which dictates the entire intercourse which such an one maintains with the world. That the man whose whole *desire* is set upon the world should thereby be greatly disqualified for *HIS duty*, is natural enough. But that the man, who, by his supreme desire being turned away from earthly things, is thereby left free and unprejudiced to move among them at the dictates, not of inordinate *desire*, but simple *duty*,—that *he* should be unfitted, and even thereby unfitted, for his *duties* in the world, is inconceivable. It is really *he*, and he only, with whom duty is always constraining, and in whom responsibility is really awake.

Be not afraid, O believing reader, to be a stranger in the earth. Be assured your spiritual safety, comfort, and usefulness are all bound up with your really being so. “Know ye not that the friendship of the world is enmity to God? whosoever, therefore, will be a friend of the world is an enemy to God.” Whosoever is at home in the earth is a stranger to God. But the more you are alienated in spirit from a passing, shallow, heartless, ungodly world, the more will you feel constrained to apply in livelier faith and prayer to your heavenly Father for friendship and fellowship with Him.

It was thus that the Psalmist pleaded his separation from the world as a reason for his obtaining clearer insight into the gracious purposes and holy will of God: “Open mine eyes that I may behold the wonders that are in thy law. I am a stranger in the earth, hide not thy commandments from me” (Ps. cxix. 12). The more, also, will you love the worship, the house, the cause and kingdom of Christ upon the earth; and the more liberally, joyfully, and prayerfully will you give for the support and propagation of his gospel. For thus again spake this same stranger on the earth, Israel’s sweet psalmist and king: “For who am I, and what is my people, that we should be able to offer so willingly after this sort? for all things come of thee, and of thine own have we given thee. For we are strangers before thee and sojourners, as were all our fathers; our days on the earth are as a shadow, and there is none abiding” (1 Chron. xxix. 14, 15).

Nor will this be wanting to you in the hour of sorrow and anxiety, to plead with God as a reason for his hearing and answering your cry, when, as a stranger in the earth for his sake, you cast yourself upon his help and faithfulness: "Hear my prayer, O Lord, and give ear unto my cry; hold not thy peace at my tears; for I am a stranger with thee, and a sojourner, as all my fathers were." The appeal is one of inexpressible power with God. His heart warms towards the stranger. He hath most solemnly assured us that he is the stranger's shield. He hath forbidden us, under pain of his especial displeasure, to vex or oppress the stranger. He hath in the most simple and affecting language commanded us to be kind unto the stranger. He hath allured us to the duty of entertaining strangers by beautifully reminding us that some have thereby entertained angels unawares. His dear Son—in whose name we pray, and in whose sympathy we may continually rejoice and enrich ourselves—was pre-eminently a stranger on the earth, and knoweth more than any man the heart of a stranger. In his members, and in his cause, he is a stranger still: and so highly does he estimate the entertaining of the stranger that, on the great day of accounts, one of his tenderest and most affecting commendations of his people's faithfulness will be in these terms, "I was a stranger, and ye took me in."

With such affections on the part of the Most High as is thus indicated towards the stranger, let me only be able honestly to plead at his throne, that "I am a stranger on the earth," and how can I doubt that in my every need and in my darkest hour he will hear my cry, and not be silent at my tears? Rather,—may I not assure myself?—when poor and needy, when pursued by evil and by fear, when perplexed with guilt and with Satan,—when ready to sink under trial and temptation, I flee to his door, he will give me invariable ground to bear this testimony to his grace and faithfulness: "I was a stranger, and the Lord took me in"? μ

ART. VII.—*Hymnology: The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the Hymns of the Church.*

THERE is a certain measure of sadness in the fact that when we study the doctrine of the Holy Spirit through the channel, let us say, of the Creeds or the Fathers, we must make our way through endless arguments, such as that concerning the *Filioque*, which seem to obscure the great central truth. And, indeed, one is struck with the comparative fewness of great works upon this theme, except in connection with such a controversial aspect of it as that which we have indicated. This may be partly explained by the fact that the Holy Spirit has been mainly viewed in relation to questions such as regeneration or the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures; but we think it is largely due to the consideration that human thought concerning the Holy Spirit in His Personality does not bear translation into the language of the schools: it carries us away beyond and within, and utters itself rather in hymns of praise than in systems of theology. In this connection it is curious to notice that in the "Apostles' Creed," while the statements of faith in the Father and the Son are amplified, the words, "I believe in the Holy Ghost" stand alone; and so also in the earliest form of the Nicene Creed they stood, "I believe in the Holy Ghost." But by and by this formal expression had imparted to it greater fulness, and the addition which is made in the Constantinopolitan form of the latter creed is quite rhythmical in its form, "the Lord, and Giver of life, who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified, who spake by the prophets."

We are emboldened, then, to ask the reader to turn aside from the path of formal, dogmatical expression, and to study with us for a little some phases of the Church's faith in the Holy Spirit as seen in her songs; and that we may do this the more clearly and methodically, we shall try to follow the chronological order so far as we may. It will be a joy to the writer if he can paint even in faintest outline this flower of passing sweetness, springing up in darkness "in the lower parts of the earth," spreading its roots in hidden ways, appearing

above the ground with leaves delicate and diverse in hue, a plant which cannot die, because the drops of heaven come to moisten it, and the "breath from the four winds" is ever ready to vitalise and nourish it.

We wish, as far as possible, to avoid reference to the praise of the Holy Spirit in hymns to the Trinity, but nevertheless it is here that we must begin. In those dark days of persecution, which include within them the first two centuries, were born the doxologies, as if amid their fiery trials the ultimate consolation of the Christian confessors and martyrs lay in the mystery of the Trinity; and hence we find here many of the earliest ascriptions of praise to the Holy Ghost. The voice which comes to us from the caverns of the catacombs; the melody which intermingles so strangely with the roar of lions and the shout of spectacle-loving men; the song at the stake which explains the sufferer's patience, is mostly this:—"Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost." But while we speak of this, we may not forget the following early reminiscence, which seems to prove that hymns directly testifying to the Holy Spirit's influence were also sung. Basil the Great tells us of one Athenagenes, a martyr of still earlier days than his own (probably of the latter part of the second century), who, as he hastened through the trial of fire to his home beneath the altar on high, left a hymn as a legacy to his disciples; and Basil adds that those who know it will know what he thought regarding the Holy Spirit. What this hymn was we do not know, nor do we wish much to know; we are content with the picture as it stands, that of a martyr sustained amid his last agonies by the thought of the Divine Comforter.

Mainly, however, in these earliest centuries testimonies to the Holy Spirit, His Person and work, are to be looked for in hymns to the Trinity: in the *Gloria in Excelsis*, for instance, and in that very early hymn, *Ὡς ἱλαρὸν*, which utters without qualification the singer's belief in the divinity of the Holy Spirit—

"We hymn Father, Son, and Holy Spirit Divine."

Few hymns, so far as we know, were addressed to Him directly and alone, although, perhaps, in the great anthology

of Greek hymns some such may be found. But what is more clear than this, that lack of definite testimony often argues only lack of necessity for it? The Church indeed came to an *objective realisation* of her faith part by part, and beliefs long implicitly held came but gradually into the region of clear and definite apprehension. God's way with His Church has been, as we noticed in a former paper, to vouchsafe clear doctrinal vision along the line of warfare and of victory—a historical truth this worthy the consideration of those who keep telling us that "the heresy of one age becomes the orthodoxy of the next." In battling with the Arians the Church established its faith in the Trinity and in the Divinity of our Lord; and from this vantage-ground it proceeded to give to the doctrine of the atonement, for instance, a firmer foundation for all coming time. The Personality and Divinity of the Holy Spirit seem to have been less prominently impugned, yet it was probably out of some Arian or semi-Arian denial that the need arose for such a work as that of Basil (*De Spiritu Sancto*). From about this time, in any case, we may date more clear and definite reference to the Holy Spirit, and probably about this time also the stream of Christian song began to flow in broader channels. It may have been now that the old hymn arose which Mrs. Charles¹ gives us in her "Voice of Christian Life in Song," and which leads us to make the remark, that even as very early Christians loved to find in the Incarnation an assurance of union between God and man, so very early Christians rejoiced to find in the thought of the Holy Spirit's descent upon the Church an assurance of union between man and man in God. This is the hymn :—

- " When descending He confused the tongues,
- The Highest scattered the nations ;
- When He distributed the tongues of fire,
- He called all to unity.
- Thus, with one voice, we glorify the All-holy Spirit."

We are eager, however, to move onward to the great hymn which has specially attracted us to this subject, the *Veni Creator Spiritus*, a song of songs whose author and whose date (which

¹ We must here, once for all, express our indebtedness to Mrs. Charles for the help we have received from her delightful book, which is too little known.

was certainly very early) we do not know. Speaking of the unknown hymn of Athenagenes, we said that we felt no deep sorrow that it had been lost, while the knowledge remained of this martyr-soul gladdening his last hours with a song of the Comforter: now we are almost tempted to say that we do not much regret in this case the loss of the author's name, while we have the hymn itself. Many think that it was written by Charlemagne, but for this opinion we can find no confirmation: nor is there much ground for assigning the authorship to a contemporary of Charlemagne, Rabanus Maurus. Internal evidence seems to point more convincingly to Gregory as the author, and if so we shall have to place the hymn as early as the sixth century. But all is conjecture. Perchance even as the author of that hymn which speaks to the heart of English men and children as few others do, "All hail, the power of Jesus' name," was at his death preaching to a congregation so small that he could gather it in his modest home, so this great hymn, which kings have sung, as it were, upon their thrones, and countless clergy hymned under cathedral-arches on days of ordination, and lonely hearts have uttered to cheer them on life's weary way, was first the utterance of some lonely monk or some quiet heart whose influence did not lie beyond its lowly dwelling. But if we are to understand this hymn at all in its relation to the Church's faith, we must regard it mainly as a growth, just as there seems strong reason to believe the *Te Deum* to have been. Through long years before its final utterance in fine metric form this hymn may have existed in essence: changing, widening, deepening with the generations. It may have begun with the early hymn spoken of by Basil, and then as Christians began to realise more fully not merely the personality of the Holy Spirit but His manifold influence, new tones would enter into its melody. Figures please us, and in this spiritual kingdom they are helpful: let us use one yet again. It rose like the great Nile river in a spot which through the centuries remained unknown, away perchance in some desert-tract of the spiritual realm, with no eye but God's to see, and no breath of wind but the breath of the Spirit to move its waters; it wandered its long way, gathering breadth and volume as it went: by and by overflowing its banks to spread fertility on every side; at last

a great father of spiritual streams, poured itself through diverse channels into the great and wide sea of a Church's universal devotion. And if we consider that from the time of Charlemagne, when it was in use, by whomsoever written, on till latest times, devout souls have again and again made it the model for new songs, we shall be the better able to appreciate this view. For Luther it formed the foundation of his Pentecostal hymn, "Komm, Gott-Schöpfer, Heiliger Geist:" for the Church of England it took the form which Bishop Cosin gave it in his *Meditations*, beginning with the well-known lines:—

"Come, Holy Ghost, our souls inspire,¹
And lighten with celestial fire:
Thou the anointing Spirit art,
Who dost Thy sevenfold gifts impart."

In the walks of English literature we meet with it again in far different form in the hymn of the poet Dryden—

"Creator Spirit, by whose aid
The world's foundations first were laid ;"

while in the body of Wesleyan song it breathes in hymn after hymn.

We do not apologise at all for dwelling at length upon this one hymn, because it tells us that at a point not midway between the day when the "promise of the Father" was given and this latter day in which we are living, the Christian heart rose to such a blessed realisation of the Holy Spirit's power and influence that modern Christians turn still to her utterance of it in song, and make it their own. For mark you what this hymn says of the Spirit:—

It owns Him Creator and Paraclete, man's Maker and his daily Counsellor: it calls Him a living fountain and a fire; it characterises Him as Love and heavenly unction, and thus owns Him in these four phrases, source of life and purity, of love and heavenly wisdom. Notably, He is the "Finger of God's right hand," a figure borrowed from our Lord's words, "If I by the finger of God cast out devils," etc., and already familiar as indicative of various functions fulfilled by the Holy Spirit, Augustine, for instance, finding in it a reference to the fact

¹ We quote from Cosin's translation, which is sufficiently close to the original in these lines for our purpose.

that in the Old Testament dispensation the Law was given by the Divine Finger. He is addressed as able to give light and courage ; His aid is sought to drive away our foes, and to give us peace—

“ Keep far our foes, give peace at home :
For where Thou art no ill can come.”

And the old controversy about the *Filioque* is glanced at in the lines—

“ Give us to know the Father, Son,
And Thee, of both, to be but one,”

a knowledge which to the singer seems to be the sum of all. We shall not need to dwell at such length upon any other hymn, but this we take as the centre around which all poetic meditations on the Holy Spirit may be said to revolve. And yet it is strange to think that the Church had scarce learned its sweet cadence before it entered upon its history of error and declension ; ere long it was sung at the election of many an unworthy Pope—for it became part of the Order for pontifical elections—by cardinals of probably equal unworthiness, and at the consecration of many a bishop who sought little of the “wisdom which cometh from above.” It may have been designed to shine as a “light in a dark place,” or, if you will, to be a fitting casket in which to enclose this simple and broad faith in the Spirit’s person till the Dayspring from on high should anew visit the earth.

But we pass on now to a certainly later hymn, and one of less doubtful authorship, the “Veni Sancte Spiritus” of King Robert II. of France. The elder hymn of which we have said so much was strong rather than sweet, compact rather than fine and delicate ; it was the stem indeed, and is stem-like in character. But King Robert’s hymn is the tender and fair leaf of praise : a song most delicate in its beauty. Let us take a line or two of it, using Dr. Macgill’s translation, which has the great gift of sympathy in *spirit and tone* with the original:—

“ Holy Spirit, God of Light !
Come, and on our inner sight
Pour Thy bright and heavenly ray.

Father of the lowly ! Come ;
Here, great Giver, be Thy home,
Sunshine of our hearts for aye.

Inmost Comforter and best !
Of our souls the dearest Guest !
Sweetly all their thirst allay.

In our toils be our retreat :
Be our shadow in the heat ;
Come and wipe our tears away."

This was written by a king, and by a king who flourished in the eleventh century. Already the Church was wandering far away from a divine simplicity ; the doctrine of the Real Presence in the Eucharist had, as we saw in a former paper, come into general acceptance : and we might suppose that the high faith in the promise of the Spirit had died out in minds which believed that the Incarnate God was present on every altar in the transubstantiated elements. But such materialising views were powerless to overthrow this faith in spirits finely touched ; and such seems to have been " Robert the Sage and the Devout." Moreover, though he was a king, he was far more a student and a believer than a king, and above all kingly things he esteemed the praise of the King of Heaven, doing much, we are told, to improve the psalmody of those days, and himself inditing hymns not a few.

We cannot bring ourselves to regard these two hymns as entirely independent of each other ; and we conjecture that the *Veni Creator* was familiar to Robert, and that his was added as a kind of " Antiphon." It is much more subjective than the other, and contemplates less the " Creator Spirit " than the " Indwelling Comforter." Between the two we have a strikingly comprehensive view of the relations of the Spirit to the Church of Christ,—a defence without, a presence within,—" a wall of fire round about her, and the glory in the midst of her."

We are eager to hasten on, however, to the Churches of the Reformation, and we must bridge over the interval with a somewhat narrow span. The strain of song moves on, and we hear new voices, as we come to the twelfth century, which Mrs. Charles calls " the harvest-field of mediæval hymns." Amongst others, there was the German Abbess Hildegarde, known chiefly to the Church historian as a centre of legends about visions, but to the hymn-lover as the reputed author of a " sequence " or prose poem of great sweetness, beginning " O Ignis Spiritus Paracleti." We cannot forbear quoting a few lines, and the

reader will not fail to notice the growing tendency toward the use of very material images, which was so characteristic of the age:—

“O sweetest taste within the breast! O grace upon us pour’d,
That saintly hearts may give again their perfume to the Lord.
O purest Fountain, we can see clear mirror’d in thy streams
That God brings home the wanderers, that God the lost redeems.

O Breastplate strong to guard our life! O bond of unity!
O dwelling-place of righteousness! save all who trust in Thee;
Defend those who in dungeons dark are prison’d by the foe,
And for Thy will is aye to save, let Thou the captive go.”¹

In these lines is re-echoed the faith in the One Spirit as the bond of unity, and to “unitas” is now joined “libertas,” and the Spirit is He who can bring home wanderers, redeem the lost, deliver the captive:—“Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.” In this same century lived Adam of St. Victor, of whom we may say broadly that we know nothing of him save from his hymns, but they form such a rich anthology that if we were to dwell upon them we should exhaust all our space and more. In one of these, that beginning “Lux Jucunda, lux Insignis,” the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration seems to be alluded to as already currently believed, and the parallel is drawn—a favourite one, as it appears—between the Spirit at the first creation moving upon the face of the deep, and the same Spirit hovering over the waters of baptism. But let us pass now from these old Latin hymns, much though they have to tell us. It is worthy of remark that beyond the question of *Procession*, there seems to have been little tendency to *define* this article of faith; and a mere reference to the so-called Athanasian Creed, which is more of a sequence than a creed, will be enough to indicate that such attempts would have probably proved unhappy. The desire of devout souls was rather to meditate on the blessed truth of God’s Presence and Influence within the spirit, and of His power to defend us from all evil, and to give this truth room to deepen and to expand. Thus it would seem that this part of the old faith was subjected to less corruption in essence throughout the

¹ The translation is that given in *The Library of Religious Poetry* (Messrs. Sampson Low and Co.), the newest and incomparably the best English “*Liederschatz*.”

Dark Ages than some others. And as of old, so at this time : those who claimed to be God's Israel might transgress : they might bow before graven images : their leaders might fall into grievous sin : rebuke and blasphemy might make the spiritual night hideous ; but " the fire was continually burning before the altar ; it never went out." This fact perhaps is one which has a deeper significance than may at first appear. Romanism has never been a denial of the invisible and supernatural side of our holy religion, but wherever that has taken to itself material expression, Romanism has set itself to cultivate the material expression, until it succeeds in drowning the still small voice within. Jesus is " born of a virgin," and she must needs call attention away from the holy beauty of the thought to dogmas of Immaculate Conception. Jesus bids His disciples keep the Sacrament according to His institution, that they may see in Him their bread and wine : Romanism instead bids her disciples see Him in their bread and wine. He dies that His blood, shed once for all, may be man's redemption : Romanism hangs crucifixes over her altars, and materialises the Atonement. But the doctrine of the Trinity has remained, as well as the doctrine of the proper Divinity of our Lord, and the doctrine of the Holy Spirit working upon the hearts of men. What the Reformation had chiefly to do was to reassert the truth within this sphere, and to make it supreme ; for, though it had not been denied, the growth of a material worship and an external religion, even when it begins by claiming only to *represent* spiritual things, must eventuate in the subordination first, the subjection next, and the subversion last — of the inward and Divine. We turn now to the Reformation Churches, and to Churches and Christians of every name since Reformation days, to learn from their songs how they have " honoured the Spirit ;" and instinctively we turn to Germany first and to Luther. As everybody knows, his thoughts were mainly concerned about salvation through Jesus Christ, and not through the Church ; but a movement which was to re-establish unfettered relationship between the soul and God was not likely to be heedless about vindicating sanctification through the Spirit. And it is singularly refreshing to find in his great war-song the lines—

“ The word of God they shall not touch,
 Yet have no thanks therefor ;
 God by His Spirit and His gifts
 Is with us in the war.”¹

It was not enough, however, to claim the Spirit as theirs for this great Reformation day, and Luther set himself to prepare Pentecostal chorales which the Church should use in her days of common need. What he did was to take the old hymns and give them a new setting; and in this way especially he framed his three great Whitsuntide hymns, “Komm, Gott-Schöpfer, Heiliger Geist,” “Komm, Heiliger Geist! Herre Gott!” and “Nun bitten wir den Heiligen Geist.” The first was a rendering of the *Veni Creator*, and whilst it adheres with faithfulness to the old original, there is a German forcefulness about it in part to be accounted for by the fact that the hymn seems already in a vernacular version to have made a home for itself on German soil. The second is a form of *Veni Sancte Spiritus*, but when we compare it with King Robert’s hymn we discern comparatively little resemblance in detail; it has less of fineness, more of solidity; and here it seems probable that he had before him an old German fragment in the Latin tongue, the burden of which was different from that of Robert. This was as follows:—

“Veni Sancte Spiritus;
 Reple tuorum corda fidelium
 Et tui amoris in eis ignem accende,
 Qui per diversitatem linguarum cunctarum
 Gentes in unitate fidei congregasti
 Allelujah! Allelujah!”

The note of this old hymn or sequence, which is, we think, ascribed to the time of Notker, the great composer of sequences, who lived about the year 900, was unity, as we see. Early Christians had loved to dwell upon this thought, and to associate it with their highest conceptions of the spiritual kingdom; and Luther, by taking up this old hymn, and expanding it, may be taken as showing that, in turning away from the erring catholicism of Rome, he sought to turn towards the true catholicity, the “unity of the Spirit.”

His third Pentecostal hymn also took its rise in an old

¹ Miss Winkworth’s version. The phrase is, “Mit seinem Geist und Gaben.”

fragment, in this case a hymn German in tongue as well as in history. We give the latter as it has been translated by Miss Winkworth in her *Christian Singers of Germany* :—

“ Now let us pray the Holy Ghost
For that true Faith we need the most,
And that He may keep us when death shall come,
And from this ill world we travel home,
Kyrie eleison.”

Luther retained this verse, and added other three, which we shall try to give to the reader in simple English form :—

“ Thou blessed Light ! to us make known
Our Saviour, Jesus Christ, alone ;
That we may steadfast aye to Him remain
Who brings us to our Fatherland again.
Kyrie eleison.

Thou sweetest Love ! Thy grace reveal,
And from its Fount may Love distil ;
So with true brother-love our hearts shall swell,
And all in peace and blissful concord dwell.
Kyrie eleison.

Thou best Consoler in all need !
Grant us nor shame nor death to heed :
So may our souls stand firm against despair,
E'en should the foe to claim our life prepare.
Kyrie eleison.”

A softer hymn than the other two, breathing more of patience and loving-kindness, of peace and comfort. The first of the three was a song for his Church at all times and at large ; the second a song for the robuster spirits and for the expression of the Christian's hope in the “ fight of faith ; ” the third imported gentler tones to make an utterance for gentler hearts, as well as to supply the Church with a song in the night of weariness.

Pass we now homewards, and let us at once confess that our English muse has at this period no such triad of holy song to offer. And yet it also must have had, like Germany, old hymnic fragments out of which new hymns might grow : it had, we know, one rich inheritance in that sweet Antiphon—how old we cannot tell—which had been handed down from the deathbed of the Venerable Bede :—

"He also sang Antiphons," says St. Cuthbert, "according to our custom and his own, one of which is, 'O glorious King, Lord of all power, who triumphing this day [Ascension-day, on which he died] didst ascend above all the heavens: do not forsake us orphans: but send down upon us the Spirit of Truth which was promised to us by the Father. Hallelujah!'"

This precious treasure, which constituted the "swan-song" of the monk of Jarrow—and so moved him while he sang, that at the words, "Do not forsake us orphans," he burst into tears—has been preserved by the Episcopal Church in the collect for Ascension-day, but we do not know that it has ever been turned to account in hymnic form, although we seem to hear an echo of it in lines which are very dear to those who know them :—

"Thou art gone up on high
To mansions in the skies,
And round Thy throne unceasingly
The songs of praise arise ;
But we are lingering here,
With sin and care oppressed ;
Lord, send Thy promised Comforter,
And lead us to Thy rest."

But to return. The Reformation in England was not productive, we have said, of any great hymn such as those of Luther; but we must not omit to refer to one song of those days which is worthy of quotation for its own sake, and still more as being the work of Miles Coverdale. This also is a translation, and a translation of that hymn of Luther's, which again sprang out of a Latin one, the *Veni Sancte Spiritus*. We quote two verses :—

"Come, Holy Spirit, most blessed Lorde,
Fulfyl our hearts now with Thy grace ;
And make our myndes of one accorde,
Kyndle them with love in every place.
O Lorde, Thou forgevest our trespass,
And callest the folke of every countre
To Thy ryght faith and truste of Thy grace,
That they may geve thanks and singe to Thee.
Alleluya, Alleluya !

O holy Lighte, moste principall,
The worde of Lyfe shewe unto us ;
And cause us to knowe God over all,
For our owne Father moste gracious

Lorde, kepe us from lernyng venymous
That we folowe no masters but Christe.
He is the Verite, His worde sayeth thus :
Cause us to set in Hym our truste.
Alleluya, Alleluya ! ”

This hymn notwithstanding, it cannot be said that the English Reformation opened its heart in new song on any theme of the spiritual kingdom ; and hence we may not draw too decided a conclusion from its comparative silence here. Nevertheless, we seem only too surely borne out by the religious history of the last three centuries in Great Britain, when we say that Evangelical Christians have been, with manifest exceptions in individuals and in movements, open to the charge of giving to the doctrine of the Spirit a subordinate place, and even to-day men are almost regarded as “suspected persons” who exalt into prominence a belief in the daily and direct influence of the indwelling Spirit. It may be that we find the explanation of this in nowise salutary condition of things in the fact that movements which have arisen towards a more vivid realisation of the Spirit’s influence have been so often side-eddies, rather than great and broad currents. The unseen and spiritual side of our faith is necessarily of peculiar attractiveness to emotional and mystical minds ; and thus the great doctrine of the Holy Spirit’s power not to regenerate only, not even to regenerate and sanctify only, but to teach and guide, opening up to the individual soul to-day “treasures of darkness and hidden riches of secret places,” has been too much left to those who, through extreme subjectivity, have been apt to express it in a form—to say the least—not suited to all. So it has gained one characteristic expression in Quakerism ; another perhaps in Quietism ; and so on, till through fear of being associated with some special and undesirable “ism,” men have been ready not only to “stand in the old paths,” but to let the grass grow upon them. We need not therefore be surprised to find that, at least in our own land, great modern hymns of the Holy Spirit are few. In the century following the Reformation however, we find some well worthy of special mention. Of these we speak first of one to which incidental reference has already been made, Bishop Cosin’s translation of the *Veni Creator*, beginning—

"Come, Holy Ghost, our souls inspire,
And lighten with celestial fire."

The compilers of the Book of Common Prayer showed their sense of its value by inserting it in the Orders for Ordination and Consecration, and, for ourselves, we could wish that it had a wider recognition and acceptance. It is a great hymn, almost courting comparison with its Latin original. Its beauty lies, like that of the tune to which it is wedded, and which is of almost prehistoric age, in its grand simplicity. It is not one of those sweet and delicate lyrics which please you in some mood by a happy turn of expression; nor is it one of those hymns which are dependent for impressiveness upon the thunder of the organ-peal or the rendering of accomplished choirs; its holy aspiration will lift up true hearts wherever it is sung, in cathedral or church, amid the pomps of choral service, or in the more welcome simplicity of unadorned worship.

Side by side with this we set another, very different in character, and written by a very different author. It is called a "Litany of the Holy Spirit," and its author was Robert Herrick,—a man of quick genius, of strong passion, of, alas! too broad humour and licence, yet marked by such finer qualities as to win from Mr. George Mac Donald the epithet, "the very lovable Robert Herrick." This "litany" is notable for qualities less transcendent than those of Bishop Cosin's hymn: it is soft, low, sweet—and withal so quaint in parts, that as a whole it scarcely admits of being used in public worship. Indeed, altogether it is rather fitted for private than public use, and herein lies its claim to a place in this sketch. It represents so well that immediacy of communion which is the grand distinction of Protestant faith: it is *my* spirit communing with the Holy Spirit, with no church or priest between. Let us take a verse or two:

"In the hour of my distress,
When temptations me oppress,
And when I my sins confess,
Sweet Spirit, comfort me.

When I lie upon my bed,
Sick in heart and sick in head,
And with doubts discomforted,
Sweet Spirit, comfort me.

When the house doth sigh and weep,
And the world is drown'd in sleep,
Yet mine eyes the watch do keep,
Sweet Spirit, comfort me.

When the judgment is reveal'd,
And that open'd which was seal'd,
When to Thee I have appeal'd,
Sweet Spirit, comfort me."

Here you feel that you are in a new region, breathing a new atmosphere : the Holy Spirit is addressed not as One afar off, but as One of whom it has been said, "He dwelleth with you, and shall be in you." We mourn over the manner of life of poor Herrick, so inconsistent, to all outward appearance, not only with his sacred calling, but with the high feeling of these verses ; but all the while we feel that he who thus sang must have had in him "some good thing toward the Lord God of Israel." We sum up what we think of the verses themselves, by saying that we wish we could believe that they were, in their holy boldness, representative of general Christian feeling in his day—or in ours.

One hymn more, and one only, we quote from this century. It is a hymn of John Mason, a man of holy life and high devotion, who was born early in the seventeenth century, and died toward its close. His songs have received but scant justice in an age which, with all its boasted love of naturalness, is yet rather jealous of hymns that are not mellifluous : and few who know and sing the lines beginning—

"A living stream, as crystal clear,
Welling from out the throne
Of God and of the Lamb on high,
The Lord to man hath shewn,"

know that these are a more modern and melodious rendering of homely John Mason's "Song of praise for joy in the Holy Ghost." In this there is much which Keble's version does not give us ; and though we own a master-hand in the alteration, we prefer the original, plain and homely as it is. We cannot stay upon it ; but let us say that we find here also that realisation of the Holy Spirit as *already given*, which we miss in still greater hymns—

“ Down from above the Blessed Dove
 Is come into my Breast,
 To witness God’s eternal Love ;
 This is my heavenly Feast.

This makes me *Abba Father* cry
 With confidence of Soul ;
 It makes me cry, My Lord, my God,
 And that without Controul.

Eye hath not seen, nor Ear hath heard,
 From Fancy ’tis conceal’d
 What Thou, Lord, hast laid up for thine,
 And hast to me reveal’d.”

In this we see the truth which the old Latin hymns expressed, but upon another side ; indeed, we have got beyond translations here, and are dealing, as in Herrick’s hymn, with a new aspect of faith—new, and yet as old as the Bible. For we live within the folds of a paradox ; and while we can truly pray, “ Come, Holy Ghost,” we can yet, with equal truth, give thanks for the “ Holy Ghost, who is given unto us.” It is much as when we speak of the sun having risen on the earth, while yet the sun is ever shining, and his “ rising ” means that we have turned toward his light. Amongst our many hymns, it seems to have been generally the habit to look at the relation of the Spirit to the soul in the former way : John Mason, with a soul looking intensely *inward*, a man of whom an impartial contemporary wrote—“ He was a person of as great devotion as ever I met with,” saw the inner side of this great truth, and cried,

“ My sighs are turned into songs,
 The Comforter is come.”

Space will not allow us to say more than a few words of the hymns of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries ; nor indeed do we regret the need of passing over these lightly, for they afford us comparatively little evidence of increased spiritual intelligence in regard to the faith of the Holy Ghost. In the eighteenth century we can recall no English hymn on this theme which rises very high ; for we can scarcely set a lofty estimate upon Dryden’s “ Creator Spirit ! by whose aid.” It has been popular, as many another not very lofty hymn has

been, and will be again : it is, moreover, fine in some of its expressions, and, did it not suggest comparison with its great Latin original, and with Cosin's version, it might even be highly regarded ; as it is, we are inclined to set it among secondary songs. We fear we shall be considered unduly bold in adding that we do not think Charles Wesley added any absolutely great song of the Spirit to our collections ; but we give this as our impression, and give it all the more readily, that we have not the slightest sympathy with the current tendency to depreciate the value of Wesleyan hymnology. There is one hymn, however, of Wesley's, the influence of which it would be uncandid to refuse to recognise—"Come, Holy Ghost, our hearts inspire." Viewed in itself, it is not a great hymn, although there is much beauty in the lines,

"Expand Thy wings, prolific Dove,
Brood o'er our nature's night :
On our disorder'd spirits move,
And let there now be light."

But, apart from all question of intrinsic merit, it has caught the heart of Methodism, and set it on fire : and the Methodist who does not know it would be as little worthy of his spiritual heritage as the Scotchman who does not know "The Lord's my Shepherd." It has been sung before the sermon in the Methodist societies all the world over for the last century ; it has helped to maintain among them the great faith in the Spirit's power which lies at the very root of Methodism : and, we doubt not, it has been answered in showers of blessing again and again. Nor must we neglect to add that George Whitefield showed the value which he put upon this hymn by giving it a place in his collections. We happen to possess two of these : one bearing the date 1758, and entitled "A Communion Morning's Companion:" the other a "Collection of Hymns for Social Worship," of date 1760 : and in both this hymn occurs, in the latter the words "Before Sermon" having been written in. We are told that to-day Wesleyans are beginning to dispense with this hymn before the sermon ; we do not wonder to hear at the same time that Wesleyanism is not what it has been. This is the case of a song not absolutely great, yet truly mighty, whose history is the history of a great movement, whose melody has risen sweetly on the clear voice of childhood, swelled and

heaved through the great congregation, and passed tremblingly again to heaven upon the lips of age.

In all this we have but a reflection of the Wesleyan society throughout: it has not been a great intellectual force: it has been a great spiritual power. It has done, perhaps, more in leading men to "honour the Spirit"—and this not only within the limits of its own organisation but far beyond—than any other body of evangelical believers.

Coming to the nineteenth century, we find in it one hymn of superlative excellence, so good as to throw all others into the shade. Of these latter some are of considerable power: as Montgomery's "Lord God the Holy Ghost, in this accepted hour," "O Spirit of the living God!" Lynch's "Gracious Spirit, dwell with me," Keble's "When God of old came down from Heaven," and others which might be named. But does not Harriet Auber's hymn rise high above them all? What hymn indeed have we, leaving out always Cosin's hymn, in English, which sings of the Holy Spirit with equal sweetness and equal poetic beauty? We know of none. It makes us almost recant what we have said of the lack of great contemporary hymns on this theme: for the age which has afforded us this cannot surely be called poor. Here again we have utterance given to the presence and aid of the Comforter, not as a blessed hope only, but as a blessed reality: resting in humble hearts, speaking with voice gentle and soft as the evening breeze, checking our faults, smoothing the ruffled breast of fear, pointing to day beyond. The fellowship of the Spirit is seen as the secret spring of the inward life; it is from Him who is within us that all goodness springs: and virtue and victory over sin, holiness, and aught of purity that we can claim, are in their root not ours, but His. A truth this which we daily profess to believe, and many times a day forget, and which comes to us here in words simple as those of a child—

"Our blest Redeemer, ere He breathed
His tender, last farewell,
A Guide, a Comforter bequeathed
With us to dwell."

Why should we quote it further? every hymn-lover knows it well: and we can but say once more what we said of Herrick's hymn: Would that it might be accounted the average expression of a living Christian faith!

But here we must set our study aside. We have traced our way down the centuries with this doctrine as our chart, and as we have gone on our pilgrimage we have been face to face with most diverse men and women. Now we have dreamed of the old martyr and his unknown hymn, and wondered what he sang; and now we have caught sounds of holy voices singing *Veni Creator Spiritus*, and have mused over its unknown authorship, finding in this perhaps another instance of the hidden ways of Him who "buries His workmen, and carries on His work." We have been admitted into the chamber of a king, and seen him bowing before Him in whose hands are the hearts of kings, that He may turn them whithersoever He wills; we have listened to the voice of an ancient abbess, and caught notes of most womanly tenderness; we have wandered to the deathbed of an Anglo-Saxon seer, whose name all England even yet, under so much purer light than he enjoyed, honours itself by honouring—the Venerable Bede; we have listened to the uncouth yet touching strains of Miles Coverdale, who, living long centuries afterwards, may be said to have in his Bible entered into the labours of Bede. Like every pilgrim in the ways of sacred song, we have been with Martin Luther, and caught the fire of his chorales, and then we have turned again homeward to follow the path of English song. We have passed many singers unnoted by the way, but we have rejoiced in those we have seen; we have watched the fire of a holy devotion as it burned in the heart of an Anglican bishop; we have mourned and rejoiced together in the song of one who was so much of kin with Burns, Robert Herrick; and we have sat and communed with plain, holy John Mason. We have been with Wesley, and joined in the song of Methodism, and have been welcomed at last to the beautiful gate of the temple by Harriet Auber. Here we stand, and thank God for this way of holy song, dreaming the while how infinitely more blessed His Presence is than these songs have pictured it, and turning to Himself to say,

"They are but broken lights of Thee,
And Thou, O Lord, art more than they."

ANDREW CARTER.

ART. VIII.—*The Persistence of Force ; a Point in the Argument of Natural Theology.*

THE doctrine of the Persistence of Force, as it is among the latest, so it is considered among the surest and the most important of the results of modern science. Like every other advance in truth, it must needs have interest to the theologian ; but, in the absorbing attention given to its physical relations, its theological bearings have not yet been sufficiently considered.

A certain vague recognition of the constancy of force, of a relation between the different physical forces, and, specifically, a suspicion, at least, that heat is "a mode of motion" among the particles of matter, may be found occasionally among the older philosophers. With them it was but a vague guess, like many others, which, in the minds of those familiar with nature, often become prophecies of future discovery. The matter was first brought to definite experimental test by Count Rumford at the close of the last century. He established the convertibility of mechanical motion into heat, and even determined, with a fair approximation to accuracy, the mechanical equivalent of heat. A little later these conclusions were confirmed by the experiments of Davy ; but after this the subject was suffered to rest for nearly half a century. The crucial and fundamental fact had been ascertained, but the scientific world was not yet prepared to avail itself of the fruits. Soon after 1840 the matter was taken up anew by many able investigators, and has since been pursued in different countries with great skill and zeal. Séguin of France, Grove and Joule of England, Mayer of Germany, Colding of Denmark, were prominent among those who first established the general doctrine of the mutual relations of the natural forces, and the subject has been closely pursued by Helmholtz, Holtzman, Faraday, Thomson, Tyndall, and many others. For the last quarter of a century it has been an established doctrine of science, and has been largely discussed theoretically and mathematically as well as experimentally.

The cardinal point of the theory is the relation of heat to

mechanical motion. A definite quantitative relation between natural forces was here first established. It is a matter of sufficiently common observation that arrested, or partially arrested, motion produces heat. The leaden bullet may even melt on striking the iron target; the anvil is warmed by the repeated blows of the hammer; the journals of machinery grow hot by friction; and the hardest steel may be cut by a rapidly revolving disc of sheet-iron which, pressed against it, melts its pathway through. By carefully conducted and often repeated experiments it has been shown that one pound let fall from a height of 772 feet will develop sufficient heat on striking the ground to raise one pound of water 1° F.; and this is known as the mechanical equivalent of heat. It is well ascertained that motion may be wholly converted into heat; but the process cannot be reversed with the same completeness. The *a priori* presumption would be, of course, that when motion has been converted into heat, and that heat converted back again into motion, precisely the original amount of motion would be reproduced; but practically it is found that this cannot be realised.

Electricity, magnetism, chemical action, heat, mechanical motion, are all convertible terms in the sense that any one of them may be converted into any other, and this still into another throughout the circle, although their reconvertibility is not in all cases fully practicable. To this circle (as has been shown by Le Conte and others) the animal forces also belong. Muscular action and nerve force have been abundantly proved to be correlated with the ordinary natural forces as far as it is possible to establish experimental proof in the case of a problem so complicated and encumbered with conditions of such delicacy and difficulty. By many quantitative experiments the human body has been brought into the category of mechanical engines, more exquisitely wrought, indeed, and more perfectly adjusted than any other, but still an engine, in which food is the fuel and work the result. The attempt has also been made to correlate mental action with the same natural forces, but has signally failed, because it is impossible to identify the mind with the brain, the extremest point of which natural science can take cognisance. In regard to the brain, as the especial organ of the mind's action, sufficient progress

has been made, in the opinion of many physicists (though this is by no means to be considered yet as an established truth), to justify the assumption that with the development of each sensation, thought, and emotion, there must be a corresponding change and expenditure of substance of the brain or nerves.

This brief summary has been presented in order that the doctrine of the correlation of forces may be clearly in view while some thoughts in regard to it are suggested which have a theological, and especially an apologetic, interest. The name now preferred for the doctrine is the "persistence," rather than the "correlation" of force, the one being an obvious deduction from the other ; for if no force is annihilated but when it disappears from view is simply transformed into correlated force, then the expression "persistence of force," or "of energy," becomes a neat summary of the whole matter. In how far and in what sense this is to be considered as strictly true will be considered in the sequel.

In the meantime it may be said that nothing has contributed more to the wide diffusion and the firm tenure of the belief in a fixed order of nature than this recognition of the persistence of force. The two truths are so mutually interdependent that neither can be fully accepted apart from the other. A great step was gained when it was shown that matter was persistent : that when the oil was burned in the lamp its elements merely changed their combinations, while all continued to exist that had existed before ; nothing was annihilated and nothing was created. But a far greater step was taken with the announcement of the correlative doctrine of the persistence of force ; greater, not only because, as an addition to what had been taken before, it opened out a still wider view of truth, but also because it had to do with a region not so immediately under the cognisance of the senses. The general reception of these doctrines has greatly enlarged our conceptions of the unity of nature and of its fixed order—of what is commonly described as natural law ; and this conception is a very fundamental one in any just theology.

But there always remains this difficulty with the enunciation of a general law from a small number of instances of its operation : we cannot doubt that these instances, however few they may be, if really understood in all their bearings, are sufficient

proof of the law, for we believe in the uniformity of natural law—in other words, in the unchangeableness of the Divine will,—and hence that what is true in one case will be true, under precisely the same circumstances and conditions, in any other ; but when the instances are few, it is always difficult to be sure that in the examples before us we have only the effects of the law of which we are in search. The effects attributed to it may possibly have been modified by the action of other laws not taken into account ; or, in other words, the law in question may not, in the particular cases examined, have fully worked out its legitimate and proper results. In every really scientific investigation this danger is appreciated, and the utmost care is taken to guard against this source of error, and to isolate as perfectly as possible the phenomena to be examined ; but the difficulties of thorough scientific experiment are great, and our knowledge even of familiar things is limited. Hence it happens that almost every result needs to be tested under diverse circumstances and by different investigators, and confidence is not established in the conclusions reached until this has been done. When this has been accomplished, as it has been to a good degree in the case of the persistence of force, the establishment of a general law is recognised ; but even then it is hazardous to assume too soon or too positively that this law is fully understood in all its completeness. Disagreements, more or less important, always exist between theory and experiment ; and when the mean of a large number of observations accords with the theory, these differences are fairly attributed to the unavoidable errors of observation. But confidence in this explanation must be in proportion to the number of observations, the breadth of their scope, and the length of time in which they have been subjected to the questionings of scientific reasoners. For example : the Ptolemaic system did very well for astronomy, and there was reason for thinking it the true account of the relations of the heavenly bodies until observations had been greatly multiplied ; so, too, the phlogiston theory held its place in chemistry until experiments had become too numerous to admit of explanation by its means. The evidence of truths in natural science is thus assimilated in character to moral rather than to demonstrative evidence, in that it consists for the most part of

an accumulation of probabilities ; but with this important difference, that when certain facts have once been sufficiently established by observation, they may become the basis of mathematical reasoning to others. The foundation of all, however, is in observation, and these observations are trustworthy in proportion to their number and the care with which they have been made. The basis for mathematical reasoning from them cannot be perfect until the observations themselves have not only become perfectly accurate, but have embraced absolutely all the facts entering into the calculation. Thus it comes about that while many natural laws have been established beyond peradventure, it has yet been well said even of these that they are, in a certain sense, *inexact* ;¹ they form a general statement, as it were, of the norm of nature's action, but they are never found to correspond precisely with the actual phenomena of the world. The want of correspondence is due only to our insufficient knowledge, and every advance in knowledge and every wider generalisation brings the law and the fact into closer harmony. Still, even of a law as long and as thoroughly investigated as that of gravity, it remains true that there are certain residual phenomena left unexplained. Uranus did not move in its orbit as it should have done until Neptune was discovered ; even now Mercury, in its transit, does not make contact at precisely the appointed second. The supposed discovery of intra-Mercurial planets, if confirmed by further researches of astronomers, will introduce fresh elements into their calculations. It cannot be hoped that difficulties will be entirely removed until knowledge is made perfect.

These facts have been called to mind in this connection because such difficulties must press particularly upon the treatment of those laws which have been most recently discovered, and the phenomena of which have been therefore subjected to the least perfect and continuous investigation under varying aspects. It is not very long since La Place established upon a mathematical basis the permanence of the solar system ; more recently Le Verrier, by using some terms of a higher order which had been neglected in the equations of La Place, demonstrated the unreliability of this conclusion. Probably no mathematician would now assume that all the necessary

¹ Cooke's *Chemical Physics*, sec. 165, pp. 300, 301.

data were well enough known to allow of the determination of this question upon mathematical grounds alone. The reasoning might be faultless, but the facts of observation, which must form its basis, are more or less uncertain. If this be true of a question so long and attentively investigated, it must be true *a fortiori* of one of the most recently discovered of all the great laws of nature.

The first and most obvious inference from the doctrine of the correlation of forces was this: Since all force which disappears under one form reappears under another, the sum-total of force in the universe, like the sum-total of matter, is always constant. The doctrine has been, and is still, often stated in precisely this form: there is no creation of force, and there is no annihilation of force, but merely transformations take place which leave the total energy of the universe unchanged. The common effect of this statement upon men's minds is to satisfy them of the permanence of substantially the present state of things in the universe viewed as a whole. There are evidently vast cycles of change in the existing order; but the sum-total of matter and of force being always the same, there is on the whole a perfect balance, and however the pendulum may swing, now to one side and now to the other, it must always return through the centre in its appointed time.

But this inference has been proved to be untrue by a more careful scientific investigation of the facts. Clausius has subjected the theory to a rigid mathematical analysis, and has been led thereby to a different conclusion. He found himself, at the outset, obliged to distinguish between processes which are simply and entirely reversible and those which are in part irreversible. Motion may be wholly converted into heat, but heat cannot be wholly reconverted into motion. In all experiments thus far attempted there is a certain inconvertible residuum, and this having been the case in a great variety of experiments, and under a great variety of circumstances, Clausius and his opponents are alike obliged to accept it as a part of the natural law. Now, since this is the result of the operations of nature, incessantly going on upon a vast scale, there must ensue a disturbance of its existing condition. "A general and prevailing tendency in nature to changes of a certain character is indicated by these principles.

. . . If in the universe cases continually occur, through friction or other similar impediments to motion, of the conversion into heat, that is to say, into molecular motions, of the motions with which large masses are animated, and which are due, either actually or conceivably, to work done by natural forces ; and if, further, heat always strives to alter its distribution, so that existing differences of temperature may be cancelled, then the universe must gradually be approaching more and more to the condition in which forces can produce no further motion, and differences of temperature can no longer exist."¹ It will be observed that this conclusion is a general one, embracing the whole universe in its scope ; all motion in the ordinary sense of that word, that is, all molar motion, tends to be converted into molecular motion, or heat, and heat tends to an equal universal distribution. The tendency, then, not of any part, but of the whole, universe is to a motionless condition of uniform temperature.

To the same purpose he shows in another Memoir, as a necessary deduction from his second fundamental theorem, that "Transformations occurring in nature may take place in a certain direction, which I have assumed as positive, by themselves, that is, without compensation ; but that in the opposite and consequently negative direction, they can only take place in such a manner as to be compensated by simultaneously occurring positive transformations. . . . In fact, if in all the changes of condition occurring in the universe the transformations in one definite direction exceed in magnitude those in the opposite direction, the entire condition of the universe must always continue to change in that first direction, and the universe must consequently approach incessantly to a limiting condition."² Clausius had worked out his theorems mathematically without observing these conclusions resulting from them in regard to the universe ; his attention was first called to them by Sir W. Thomson.³

The conclusions themselves, however, were too important and too obviously at variance with certain popular theories to

¹ *The Mechanical Theory of Heat.* By R. Clausius (Eng. trans.), Eighth Memoir, p. 290.

² *Ibid.*, Ninth Memoir, p. 364. See also p. 365 ; also Sixth Memoir, pp. 224, 245, and note on p. 247.

³ *Phil. Mag.*, S. 4, vol. iv. p. 304, as quoted by Clausius, *ubi sup.*

pass unchallenged. An attempt was made to do away with their effect by Rankine.¹ He fully admitted the mathematical certainty of the process "whereby mechanical energy becomes more and more dissipated," but suggested that there might also be an opposite effect "whereby mechanical energy may be again concentrated and stored up in individual masses." Something will be said further on of the process by which he conceived this might be possible; meantime suffice it to say that Clausius has shown mathematically that it is theoretically impossible.² If the hypothesis be analysed it will be found equivalent to saying that in some part of the universe the laws of nature, as we know them, are reversed.

These conclusions of Clausius are cited, not because they have been proved to be absolutely true (for there may well exist a doubt whether even so eminent a mathematician has succeeded in embracing all the necessary terms in his calculations); but because they show this: that the profoundest mathematical investigations yet made on the subject lead to a very different result from that which is popularly supposed. In so far, however, as these conclusions are reliable—and they are the best yet attained—they go to show that with the gradual transformation of all motion into heat, accompanied with the universal distribution and equalisation of the latter, the universe that now is, is a very different thing from the universe of either the past or the future.

Let us turn now from this mathematical view of the subject to another which has been popularised in the philosophy of Herbert Spencer. All must admit the general truth of his fundamental position, that the universal tendency of nature, so far as it has come under human observation, is to proceed from the general to the special, from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. Whatever may be the true philosophy of this fact, the fact itself is an unquestionable one. In this process, which is a process of integration, there is and must necessarily be always and everywhere (as Mr. Spencer shows) a dissipation of force. Take a particular and obvious illustration of the general principle which, by a change of terms, might be made to apply to any other example. The sun of our system is con-

¹ *Phil. Mag.*, vol. iv. p. 358.

² *Mechanical Theory of Heat*, Eighth Memoir.

tinually radiating into space an enormous amount of energy. The part of this intercepted by the earth is great indeed in its value in the economy of the earth, being the chief—almost the sole—factor in all terrestrial dynamics; but, in comparison to the whole amount radiated, is as small as the section of the earth in comparison with the surface of that vast sphere of which the sun is the centre and the earth's distance from it the radius. The same thing may be said of each of the other planets in proportion to their size and distance. The amount of the sun's energy absorbed by them all is exceedingly small in comparison with the whole amount radiated. It is estimated that only one two-thousand-millionth of the sun's rays is intercepted by the earth, and only twelve times that amount by all the bodies of the solar system taken together; and even of this a fraction is reflected from their surfaces and another portion is radiated off into space. In the same way the fixed stars, the suns of other systems, and the nebulae also, are all radiating into space, hourly and momentarily, amounts of energy which the imagination vainly essays to comprehend. Very little of this is in any case absorbed by any known bodies. What then becomes of it?

Perhaps the most common conception, somewhat vaguely held, is that all space is so filled with celestial bodies that ultimately the whole sphere of radiation is occupied, and thus in the end all radiated energy is absorbed. Although very little of the energy radiated from any particular body is taken up by any other one body, yet the number of bodies is so countless that, taken together, they absorb the whole; and, on the other hand, each single body receives a fraction, however small, of the radiations from all the others. Thus the balance is, on the whole, kept up; nothing is lost, and nothing gained. But the existence of celestial bodies thus covering the whole sphere of radiation is purely imaginary. It is not only destitute of any tittle of evidence; but such facts of astronomy as we know seem to be against it. Every enlargement of the power of the telescope has indeed brought within the range of vision multitudes of new stars, but at such distances that their size, however great absolutely, bears no appreciable proportion to the surface of the sphere in which they lie. Astronomy further indicates that the celestial bodies are not distributed uniformly

through space, but are clustered in certain definite directions. Setting aside, however, all these considerations, a moment's reflection will show the impossibility of the hypothesis. Energy is radiated from all the bodies of the universe in all directions. If the number of bodies in the universe is finite, then some of them must be the outermost, with no others beyond; but from these outermost bodies outward radiations must still go on. They must be the means of conveying away from the universe a certain continual stream of energy, and the sum-total of the remainder must be always diminishing. The suggestions of Rankine to avoid this conclusion will be considered further on.

This conclusion may indeed be avoided by supposing the number of bodies in the universe to be really infinite. In that case, at any point whatever the radiating bodies beyond will be equal to those on this side, the number above will be equal to those below. The equalising tendency of radiating energy could never bring the universe to a state of motionless equilibrium at a uniform temperature, because, the universe being infinite, infinite time would be required to produce the effect, and hence the universe would be eternal. But such a supposition is a mere plunge into that sea of vagueness and uncertainty which always attends the attempt to combine the incommensurable terms of the finite and the infinite. At best it would be a purely imaginary hypothesis, and one of great complexity; but we look upon the bare statement of an absolutely infinite number of finite worlds as a contradiction of terms, not in any wise entitled to enter into the discussion of the subject. The attributes of infinity necessarily belong together, and an enumeration of parts is inconsistent with them; while, on the other hand, limitation is an essential quality of matter, and the inconsistency of this with infinity cannot be removed by mere multiplication.

Infinity, however, is apt to be popularly confounded with indefiniteness; and hence what would be true of a really infinite number—if this were possible—is supposed to be true of an indefinite number. This is far from being the case; for infinity and indefiniteness differ not in degree, but in kind. Now, if the number of worlds be only indefinite, however great, they have a limit. The imagination may become weary

and thought exhausted before that limit is reached ; but radiation is not, and will still go on beyond. The question then recurs : What becomes of the energy radiated out beyond the last celestial body ? Plainly, if it is lost to the universe, the doctrine of the persistence of force, as commonly understood, can no longer be maintained in its absolute sense. The difficulty has forced itself upon the attention of those who have examined the subject, and several hypotheses have been suggested for its solution. Mr. Spencer insists much upon the dissipation of force in a forming world, and he also supposes its ultimate reconcentration upon a dissolving world ; but he gives no hint directly of the way in which this may be accomplished. He tells us that the process of integration and of consequent dissipation of force, when it shall have reached its ultimate result, will in some way, which he does not undertake to explain, be replaced by the opposite process of disintegration and concentration of force. Such a supposition is, as already said, in opposition to the conclusions of Clausius, based upon the mechanical theory of heat. Those conclusions embrace in their nature all material things, and require the equal distribution, and not the reconcentration, of dissipated energy. But, aside from this, the hypothesis of Spencer makes necessary the supposition of some reservoir of force where the dissipated energy may be stored until it can again be returned and be made available. The theory of the existence of more than one universe has been thought to meet this necessity ; different universes being in reciprocal conditions, one receiving what is dissipated from the other. Thus to meet the difficulty we are brought again to an hypothesis which is purely imaginary, which can lay claim to no shadow of evidence in its support, and one which is in itself so complicated as to be extremely suspicious.

But to appreciate fairly this hypothesis there is need of the exercise of a little of that scientific imagination which Mr. Tyndall considers so important. Let it be attempted to realise in thought the position of such universes in space. The notion of the reflection of energy will be considered presently. Setting this aside now, and taking the simplest form of the hypothesis, let it be supposed that there are just two universes, the one radiating energy and the other receiv-

ing the energy radiated. The dissipated force is dissipated equally in all directions, and therefore, if it is to be received by another universe, this second universe must necessarily enclose the dissipating one as an outer shell or sphere. But even this conception does not meet the requirements of the case. The outer universe must also radiate its energy outwardly as well as inwardly, and hence must itself be enclosed by another universe beyond, and so on *ad infinitum*. We have come back again to the old point of an absolute infinity of worlds, and so have no better solution of the difficulty than before.

Another suggestion to meet the difficulty is, that space being infinite, the energy radiated is neither lost nor annihilated, but may go on radiating for ever. However far it has moved in the untold ages of the past, there is still an infinite beyond, the bounds of which it can never reach, for there are no bounds. This is only a solution in words, and is of no real value. As far as the universe, which is subject to our investigation, or even to our speculation, is concerned, it is only another form of saying that the dissipated energy is lost. It is gone from our universe, never to return, and we have merely confessed our ignorance as to what becomes of it. It is not unlike Sam Weller's account of the end of the post-boys and the old donkeys: "They gets on the donkeys and rides off." Seriously, for anything except a mere verbal technicality, this is a denial of the persistence of force. As far as our cosmos is concerned, the energy is gone when it has passed away from it to an infinite distance. Mr. Spencer assures us that the notion of the annihilation of force is unthinkable, and therefore untrue. It has nevertheless been thought by all the past generations of men, and continues to be by the immense mass of the present generation. The notion of infinite space is also "unthinkable" in a certain sense, as everything is unthinkable to the finite mind when attempting to comprehend the infinite. But quite apart from all such considerations, the practical result of this hypothesis must be that the universe with which we have to do is undergoing a gradual but complete transformation by the dissipation of its energy to parts unknown.

There are weightier reasons for believing in the persistence

of force than the assumed unthinkableness of its contradiction ; but none of the theories yet examined can suffice to reconcile our belief with the patent facts of nature. Another hypothesis has been put forth with some pretension, and has gained some currency, based upon the assumption that the material universe is finite and surrounded by absolutely empty space. As this exhausts all the accounts of the matter from the materialistic point of view, it may be well to examine this also.

On this hypothesis all dissipated energy must, sooner or later, reach the bounds of its conducting medium, and then can go no further, for there is nothing into which it can pass; from the surrounding wall of nothingness it will be reflected back. This hypothesis may seem too purely imaginary, and even as an imagination too wonderful to require serious consideration ; nevertheless, since it is the last resort hitherto proposed of materialistic philosophy for dealing with the manifest fact of the dissipation of energy from the known universe, it requires to be examined fairly. It will be found encumbered with difficulties, the statement of which may be a little tedious ; but this is necessary for the appreciation of the hypothesis. It is the hypothesis of Rankine, already referred to, and has apparently formed the basis of much of current philosophical literature. Clausius has already examined it and shown it to be impossible on mathematical grounds ; it is proposed to look at it here from another point of view. To have it clearly before the mind it is stated in Rankine's own words as quoted by Clausius.¹ Rankine had already spoken of the production of heat by the work of natural forces, of the tendency of heat so to distribute itself among bodies as to equalise their temperature, and of the further tendency of all bodies in the universe continually to give off more and more heat to the ether which pervades space; he then continues, "Let it now be supposed that, in all directions around the visible world, the interstellar medium has bounds beyond which there is empty space.

"If this conjecture be true, then on reaching those bounds the radiant heat of the world will be totally reflected, and will ultimately be reconstituted into foci. At each of these foci the

¹ *Mechanical Theory of Heat* (8th Memoir), p. 291.

intensity may be expected to be such that, should a star (being at that period an extinct mass of inert compounds) in the course of its motions arrive at that point of space, it will be vaporised and resolved into its elements, a store of chemical power being thus reproduced at the expense of a corresponding amount of radiant heat.

“Thus it appears that, although from what we can see of the known world, its condition seems to tend continually towards the equable diffusion, in the form of radiant heat, of all physical energy, the extinction of the stars, and the cessation of all phenomena, yet the world, as now created, may possibly be provided within itself with the means of reconcentrating its physical energies and renewing its activity and life.” Rankine having enunciated this hypothesis, Clausius devoted a special memoir to an examination of the concentration of rays of light and heat, and in this, as already said, he has shown that Rankine’s theory is mathematically impossible. Perhaps the same result may be obtained from more general considerations without attempting to follow the equations of Clausius.

In the first place, it is essential to the theory of Rankine that his foci should be limited in number, since otherwise the energy diffused through space could not be effectively concentrated anywhere. This makes necessary the further supposition that the supposed reflecting boundaries of energy have a definite shape relatively to these foci; in fact this would be a part of the definition of the foci themselves. It is further necessary that all the radiating matter of the universe should be in certain definite positions in relation to these bounds, in order that their radiated energy may, by reflection, be reconcentrated in these foci. For all this there is, of course, not only no shadow of evidence, but, in view of the fact that all bodies of which we know are in motion relatively to one another, it is inconceivable. The radiated energy of the solar system, or of any other system, which might conceivably be reflected to a certain focus at one moment, could not be gathered there at another; for the position of the radiating bodies would have changed, and if the foci be supposed infinitely numerous, there will remain no longer a concentration, but only an equal diffusion of the radiated energy.

But time is as important a factor as form in the reconcentration of the radiated energy. Hence these supposed boundaries must be at such an inconceivable distance that the whole duration of the dissipation of energy would only suffice for the journey of light to those boundaries and back again to one of these foci in order to save the earliest dissipated force, and, at the same time, so near that the force last dissipated would only have time to reach the same point. These are manifestly contradictory assumptions, and yet are both necessary to the reconcentration of energy at any point, unless there be always at the focus some body on which that energy can be concentrated. This latter supposition must be dismissed as inconsistent with the high probability, at least, that all bodies in the universe are in motion; but even if it were not so, it would only amount to a perpetual concentration of energy upon those particular bodies which remained permanently at the foci, and in these the whole force of the universe would tend to become permanently absorbed. Bodies so placed, and permanently at rest, would mutually dissipate and mutually receive energy until an equilibrium was reached, and we should then have motionless bodies at the foci of space, having each a permanent totality of energy. This would be a very different universe from anything of which we know, and from anything which the researches of science indicate as probable in the future, and would imply a final condition of the universe in the state of several permanent nebulae. Apart from such suppositions, it is plain that the reflected energy would be continually passing and repassing through the foci, and there could never be a concentration at those points of anything more than the energy which might be, at any particular moment, actually *in transitu*; all the rest would still be in a state of dissipation.

But the element of time comes into the hypothesis also in another way. The theory requires that some star, at a time when it has become "an extinct mass of inert compounds," should pass through the particular point in space occupied by one of the supposed foci. In view of the relative dimensions of the supposed universe and of the stars, it would be difficult to calculate the fraction which should express the probability of such a contingency.

This theory appears, therefore, to be untenable, indepen-

dently of Clausius's demonstration of its mathematical impossibility, and independently also of any particular form which might be assigned to the ether-filled finite universe. Were it worth while, additional evidence might be brought against it by considering the effect of different possible forms; but this is unnecessary. The theory will not enable us to conceive of the persistence of energy for ever, by turns in process of dissipation during the integration of the universe, and of reconcentration during its disintegration. Some form of this theory appears to have been in the mind of Mr. Spencer, but he cannot be charged with it in the absence of any definite reference thereto.

Since, then, we are thus compelled to set aside every materialistic explanation yet offered of the great and patent fact of the dissipation of force, while yet receiving, at least in a general way, the doctrine of the persistence of force, what remains to be said? The fact of the dissipation, and that on an enormous scale, no man can deny; but all the analogies of nature, as well as all confidence in the invariability of natural law, lead us to deny that, if this force is to be considered as an entity, it can ever be annihilated. Is the paradox insoluble? We believe it may be resolved by the same clew which is the ultimate resort in all the other enigmas of our condition, by looking to the Infinite.

Let us take a somewhat parallel difficulty in a matter easily within the scope of our observation and our science. The water is constantly evaporated from the surface of the ocean, lakes, rivers, and land; yet the supply continues on the whole undiminished, and we ask where it comes from. It is traced to its source in the condensation of the same vapours which have come from this evaporation, and which thus returns that which has been taken in endless round. To accomplish the process force is indeed required; but this force too is restored, apparently in full measure, though nothing is hereby learned in regard to the original source either of the matter or of the force by which it is energised. That question, however, presses upon us when we consider the dissipation of force from the universe. Here we are compelled to ask both what can be the source from which this supply of energy proceeds and whither it goes. It does not matter that the amount now stored in the

universe may be diminishing—that the present supply does not equal the expenditure ; it must all ultimately have had a source, and, if it be not annihilated, it must all ultimately be somehow treasured up. Our physics do not solve these questions. Mechanical motion may be transformed into heat, and heat into chemical action, and chemical action into electricity, and electricity into magnetism, and magnetism again, in great part at least, into mechanical motion, in almost endless round, embracing in the circle a much wider range of the forms of force than it is here necessary to name. But the reconvertibility is not perfect. There is a residue in the process, and meantime the energy of the universe is continually passing away. The circle, if it were perfect, could not have been self-evolved, nor, as it is, can it be self-sustaining. If it ever had been exactly balanced, the incessant dissipation of force must have disturbed that balance and have required instant and unending adjustment. The universe, supposing for the moment that it could itself be regarded as eternal, could have been supplied with no finite reservoir of energy which would not, during its eternal existence, have become exhausted ; and if the universe be not eternal then both it and its energy are to be accounted for, since they could not have originated themselves.

Again : the fundamental laws of motion require that a body in motion, free from all external influences, should continue to move on in a straight line for ever ; and that a body at rest, free from external influence, should remain at rest for ever. No doubt it is assumed by some philosophers that motion is an original, inherent property of matter ; but this is an assumption merely, and has no other claim to acceptance than that the two facts, matter and motion, require to be accounted for. It is not to be forgotten that they are *two* facts—that matter may be conceived of as without motion, and that therefore an hypothesis which accounts for matter will not necessarily account for motion. Motion is not a *necessary* property of matter ; if it be an original property, it is because it has been made so by some reason or power external to matter itself. If, then, the statement be true that all forms of energy may be ultimately resolved into modes of motion, it follows that the source of energy must also be external to the material universe. Moreover, neither observation nor speculation give us any intima-

tion of the existence of abstract force apart from anything of which it is a property or from which it proceeds. Thus again it appears that it must have been added to matter from without. Whence, then, in its ultimate origin, does motion or any other form of energy come?

Natural science, in as far as it confines itself to nature, can only answer this question by saying that its source is outside of and beyond nature. So it has been answered. Tyndall and others describe evolution as taking place under "a Power for ever inscrutable to the human intellect." Herbert Spencer bases all his philosophy upon the existence of an "Unknowable." It does not matter how little or how much the philosophy of nescience may undertake to tell us of this unknowable power; it is apt, when its statements are analysed, to tell something more than it intended. But this, for the present purpose, is of no consequence; the point is, that it distinctly recognises the source of all force or energy as outside of that nature which is immediately subject to the scrutiny of human observation. Here is the first step in the true and only solution of the problem: The energy in nature proceeds from a source outside of nature. So far there seems to be a tendency to a general agreement among men of every school of thought, with the exception of the pantheists. The pantheist makes the cosmos itself the source of its own energy; but this is inadmissible in the light of the problem here considered. For, if terms are to be used to which it is hard to attach any definite meaning, and we were to say that the energy of the universe comes from an infinite spirit of the universe which is the universe itself, we should only be involving ourselves in a palpable contradiction, unless we were also to maintain that the universe itself is really infinite. This proposition has already been considered and set aside. For any universe less than one absolutely infinite the law of the dissipation of force requires some higher ultimate source of its energy. Pantheism, therefore, fails to solve the difficulty.

Of the source of energy this much is certainly known: it must be infinite. For, if the universe be eternal, it requires an inexhaustible (which is an infinite) source for its energy. And if the universe be not eternal, then it is a necessity of thought that it should have proceeded from somewhat which,

in its ultimate origin, is self-existent and eternal. It is only necessary to attribute to this eternal source the character of a Being, and we have the final hypothesis which we believe solves, and alone can solve, the difficulties before us. Of course this is not to be understood in the sense that the energy of the universe is itself that Being (which would bring us back again to pantheism), but that it proceeds from him in the sense that he wills it and causes it, and without his will it is not. The facts here considered, taken alone, may not suffice to prove the truth of this hypothesis, but they do furnish two reasons for its probability : first, no other tenable hypothesis is suggested ; and, secondly, it is, by many degrees, the simplest hypothesis, and is therefore entitled to be received until it can be disproved. When associated with such other evidences as that of design, or orderly arrangement of the universe, the proof that this infinite source of energy is a Being becomes very strong ; but the present argument can deal only with the facts of force. The two admitted facts of its persistence and its dissipation, seemingly in contradiction, are not reconciled satisfactorily by the hypothesis of the reflection and reconcentration of energy, nor by any supposition of correlated universes, nor by any other physical theory. Pantheism also fails to afford a solution, because it so identifies the universe with God that it requires the universe itself to be absolutely infinite in order to satisfy the conditions of the problem, and this requirement is inadmissible. The hypothesis of an infinite, self-conscious Being alone meets the difficulty, and this does fully meet it. There can be no exhaustion of energy while he wills that it shall be ; and there can be no question of what becomes of dissipated energy when he wills that it shall not be. In other words, under this hypothesis energy is not to be regarded as an independent entity ; it is simply, always, and instantly an effect of the Divine activity. It is not that activity itself, as the pantheist would have us suppose, but an effect coming into existence with the manifestation of that activity in certain forms, and ceasing whenever and in so far as that manifestation of the Divine activity ceases. Hence it follows that the cause of what we call the persistence of energy is simply that, in the limited range of physical changes which come under our observation, the effects of the

Divine activity are constant. But the constancy of the effect depends upon the constancy of the cause, and we have no power to assert that these particular manifestations will continue unchanged for ever. We have no occasion to determine what becomes of the dissipated energy; when and where the manifestation of Divine activity on material things ceases, then physical energy ceases. It is no longer correlated or transformed; it ceases. It is absolutely dependent upon the Divine will.

This hypothesis is utterly inconsistent with that view of nature which supposes it to have been endued at the start with a given amount of energy, and then allowed to go on under its constant dissipation until the stock shall be exhausted. Such a supposition would again make force something in itself beyond a mere effect, and would renew the question, What becomes of the dissipated energy? It would further require that the universe should tend to exhaustion until the original source of its energy should again interpose. The hypothesis is rather that force or energy itself is, as already said, but an effect of the manifestation of his activity; all things are by him and for him; he is not only before all things, but by him all things consist, and he is all in all.

When we speak of this source of energy as a Being, we do but use a Saxon expression, which in its Latinised form is only existence; and the fact of the existence of a source of energy must be admitted by all but the extremest Pantheist. The Saxon form of the expression, however, is associated in our minds with certain other notions which, for want of any better words, we are fain to express by the terms "self-consciousness" and "personality," and we apply the term to the Source of nature because these things are seen to belong to him by other evidences, of which this is not the place to speak. But even apart from those other evidences, the same truth is really involved in the very facts of the persistence and the dissipation of energy; for we have seen that the only solution of this paradox is in an eternal will, which involves all that we mean by the term Personality.

It is no answer to this argument to say that possibly further investigations may bring to light facts of which we are at present ignorant, to show that nature contains within itself some now unknown provision for the reconcentration of its

dissipated energy. If this could be so, the argument would yet remain valid as far as the present state of knowledge is concerned, and could scarcely be met by the argument *ex ignoto* ; but the attempt has been made to show that it cannot be so. Both the observed facts of nature and the general theory of evolution expressly teach that there is and there must be an absolute dissipation of force from an integrating universe as a whole. The fact is recognised on all sides, alike by scientists and philosophers, and requires to be accounted for. We believe that, in the nature of things, there can be no way of accounting for it on merely materialistic grounds.

At the same time, while the fact must always remain that the ultimate source of all energy is a Divine Being, it remains possible, and even probable, that further knowledge will yet be obtained of its methods. All physical modes of its reconcentration hitherto proposed fail to meet the requirements of the problem ; but some method, nearer the truth, may hereafter come to be known. If so, another step will be gained in the knowledge of the modes of the Divine activity ; but this would not tend to make God a part of nature. The evidence would remain unaffected that the ultimate Source and the Sustainer of all energy must be outside of nature. It would only show more perfectly how nature proceeds from God, and how all its laws are but the expression of his immutable will. When the energy of the universe is thus conceived of, as the effect of the immediate activity of God, the study of nature acquires a new and higher significance, and its importance as an aid in the study of revelation is made clear. The scientist in seeking to discover the laws of nature and the secrets of energy is, consciously or unconsciously, studying the expression of the Almighty Will and the effects of his activity in the visible universe.

It is hardly necessary to add that this conclusion from the consideration of the persistence of force is one which, in some shape or other, lies at the basis of several forms of thought which, at various times and in various lands, have proved attractive to intelligent men. It is the essential truth, the perversion of which is seen in pantheism ; and this truth, therefore, misunderstood, has been the groundwork of all pantheistic religions. Yet it is broadly distinguished from pan-

theism in that it refuses to confound God with nature; but rather, by its fundamental position, requires that he should be apart from and above nature. It is the essential truth which is but dimly groped after in the expression *animus mundi*. Divested of all pantheistic error, it is the foundation of certain higher teaching not of our working out. That teaching has been but imperfectly understood in the past, and can be but imperfectly grasped even now; yet the progress of scientific thought and research is ever helping on to its better understanding. The old rationalistic idea that God constructed the universe as a machine and then left it to itself to work out its own results, is scattered to the winds by such truths as we have been considering. These teach us of the immanence of God in his works, and bring us back from all secondary causes to the conception of the old Hebrew poets and sages, to whom everything was God's doing. They show us that, not by any figure, but in very reality, "in him we live, and move, and have our being." He is above nature and below it, without it and within it, yet never a part of it. He is not nature, but nature is from him and subsists by him.

"Super cuncta, subter cuncta ;
Extra cuncta, intra cuncta ;
Intra cuncta, nec inclusus ;
Extra cuncta, nec exclusus ;
Super cuncta, nec elatus ;
Subter cuncta, nec substratus."

FREDERIC GARDINER.

ART. IX.—*Postulates of Ethics.*¹

IRRELIGIOUS speculators have always had trouble with morals and religion; and never have they been in greater straits than now. In the last century, when one advanced to atheism and fatalism he commonly had the courage of his opinions, and, in theory at least, repudiated religion and morality altogether. There was a certain whole-heartedness

¹ From *Studies in Theism*.

about the old-fashioned atheist which was not without its attraction on the score both of clearness and of honesty. But a change has come over our modern atheists; and the result is a certain inconsistency in dealing with the claims of morals and religion. They are shy of the names of atheist and materialist, and prefer to call themselves agnostics. But agnosticism is only atheism spelled and pronounced in a different way. No sensible atheist claims to prove the negative that God is not; he only claims that experience and the visible universe give no proof of his existence. He does not pretend to know that there is no God; he claims only that he finds no ground for affirming the divine existence. But this position differs in nothing from agnosticism; both allow a possibility, and both deny any ground in experience for regarding the possibility as real. The name materialist, too, is a great offence to our advanced speculators. They do not hesitate to teach that the human mind is only a function of matter in certain combinations, which will certainly perish when the combination breaks up; but when they are charged with materialism, they frequently break out into indignation against the slander. They are not atheists; they are not materialists. Then follow sundry hysterical remarks about flinging dirt, and the *odium theologicum*. It has come to pass that references to the *odium theologicum* are as useful to the irreligious speculator, and are used in much the same way, as the burst of tears with which some women reduce refractory and recalcitrant husbands to obedience and submission. Meanwhile the simple critic, who imagines that the use of words is to denote things, is filled with wonder at this rejection of the word when the thing is retained; and if he be acquainted with Bible history, he will not fail to recall the cursing and swearing of Peter when charged with being a disciple of Christ. It seems to us that atheism and materialism are the very best of *isms*, if true; and we see no reason for being ashamed of them. On the contrary, the enthusiasm of humanity and every instinct of manhood call for a vigorous assertion of the new truths, and a rigid deduction of their consequences. Our friends of the other side have often assured us that truth can never do harm; and hence we are all the more alarmed at this half-heartedness; for thereby humanity suffers loss. A scientific generalisation,

whose consequences are not developed, remains comparatively, if not quite, unfruitful. It is desirable, therefore, that the new truths shall be thoroughly and fearlessly developed; otherwise we shall lose the greater and perhaps the richer part of the blessings contained in them. It is a sad evidence of human frailty, perhaps of the debilitating influence of Christianity, that many gentlemen of the advance seem to lose both heart and head at this point, and make desperate attempts to sew the new cloth on the old garment, with, of course, the usual result of this experiment. This, however, is not true for all. Notably in Germany, where they do nothing by halves, some are beginning to raise their voice in favour of consistency. Having abandoned the postulates of ethics and religion, they demand that ethics and religion be abandoned also. But this meets with no favour from the majority. They speak of the sturdy and honest animalism of their predecessors as "obsolete brutality," and do their best to show that a high type of morality, if not of religion, is compatible with their views.

This inconsistency in irreligious speculation is a sign of moral progress. The obsolete brutalities of Hobbes and D'Holbach would find as little echo among the better class of sceptics to-day as in Christian circles. For somehow the idea has got abroad that moral distinctions are facts which every theory must recognise, and that any theory which has no place for them is thereby condemned. No matter how the notion originated, it is here in power, and speculators have to take account of it. In this way the moral nature is proving itself more and more an embarrassment to advanced speculation. Scarcely a point can be touched concerning which the question does not arise, What about conscience? And worst of all, the sturdy disturber will not be ignored. By consequence we find most atheistic and materialistic speculators making very earnest efforts either to provide some satisfaction for the religious and moral nature, or else to assure the world that in any case morals are safe. The notion that morals, or even religion, depend on a belief in God and freedom is declared to be a mistake. Mill and Comte have sought to provide a religion without a God, collective humanity being the object of worship. Strauss and Clifford exhort us to worship the Cosmos, thus

replacing theism by idolatry. The efforts in this line can hardly be pronounced a success. If there be no God to worship, we can do better than go back to ancestor-worship, especially as we now know that our ancestors were only functions of carbonic acid, water, and ammonia. We propose to inquire whether the assurances that morals are safe have any logical foundation; and our thesis is, that the denial of God, freedom, and immortality, leaves morals without any foundation.

Common sense is the Philistine of philosophy. It is, in the first place, somewhat incredulous of all speculation, and at least takes little interest in it. It is strongly inclined to keep its feet on the solid earth, and it lives mainly by instinct. The speculators rail at it, but none of these things move it. This fact has both a good and a bad side; and the bad side is sometimes unpleasantly prominent. This indifference of daily life to speculation often results in a positive protection of error. A system stands or falls by its logic, and is responsible for whatever is logically contained in it. An inconsistent system is none. But great practical common sense cares nothing for systems, but lives intellectually from hand to mouth; and as long as the upholders of a theory behave themselves, common sense is willing to live and let live. In this way many a theory which, if compelled to be consequent, would perish at once, is enabled to live long, and even to lay claim to recognition and respect. Sensationalism in philosophy and fatalism in morals live only on these conditions. They can always rely on common sense to protect them from themselves, and thus they have all their strength for attack. Another vexation must be mentioned. Certain critics, with eyes only in the back of their heads, seeing that the instincts of common sense commonly serve to correct the aberrations of theory, grow by turns merry and severe over deducing "logical consequences." Dreadful logical consequences, they say, have been deduced from almost everything since the world began, and yet it has contrived to keep going. And this fact they oddly mistake for a proof that life and morals are independent of any belief. That this is the outcome of the instinctive side of man which has counteracted the belief, they cannot see. That a system must be judged by its logic, and that it cannot be saved by the inconsistencies of its holders, is to them an

utterly impossible insight. Accordingly they mistake speculative inconsequence for speculative justification. Meanwhile the philosopher who is so unfortunate as to stand by cannot help recalling Cardinal Wolsey's reflection: "How much, methinks, I could despise this man, but that I am in charity bound against it."

In claiming, however, that morals depend on a belief in God, freedom, and immortality, we do not mean to assert a conscious connection between our sense of duty and any belief whatever. Morals depend on God just as reason depends on God. The connection in both cases is an intricate one, and manifests itself only in the reflective consciousness. We live and act long before we reflect and speculate. Our life at the start is spontaneous and instinctive, and the mind makes just such assumptions as the special case calls for. But when we come to full and reflective self-consciousness, we begin to ask for the foundations of our mental life, and whether its several factors are in harmony. Then the antinomies of reason manifest themselves, and doubts take wing, until at last we are forced to say with Descartes that God is the only foundation of truth and knowledge. In like manner our moral life begins in instinct, and we yield ourselves to the law within us without thought of its authority or of what it is going to do with us. But by and by the restless reason, which questions all things, turns its glance in this direction also, and asks for the authority and foundation of the moral law. And then it appears that God is the postulate and support of conscience, as well as of intelligence. Nor do we mean to say that conscience, as a psychological fact, is dependent on belief, but only that its authority is not a self-centred thing. The sceptic does not deny that we have conceptions of reality, but he insists that they are subjective illusions. They remain just as they were, psychologically, but their significance has gone. The moral sceptic, also, does not question the existence of conscience as a subjective fact; he allows the fact, but regards it as illusive. The question with him is not the existence, but the authority of conscience. Finally, we do not mean to affirm that atheists and fatalists are necessarily bad men. We do not deny that the sense of right and wrong, and of the beauty of right living, may be very strong in men who think themselves atheists

and without any immortal destiny. As Ernest Naville says : " There are men, all of whose convictions have fallen into ruins while their conscience remains standing, sole remaining witness of a demolished building." It would be strange if there were no cases of this kind. God, the eternal Love, is not to be abolished by any one's unbelief. The Holy Spirit, the Light and Life of men, is not extinguished even if man's faith does falter and die. And human love, too, abides in the human heart, burning up baseness and spreading its flaming wings for illimitable flight. It is not strange, then, that a sense of moral beauty and obligation should remain after its rational supports have fallen. Indeed, we should view it as a most atheistic utterance to say that the work of God in the heart and in the world would cease if human faith should falter. The kingdom of righteousness is built on something stronger than man's opinions. Our only claim is, that morality has no rational ground, and that conscience itself abates its high claims when God, freedom, and immortality are denied. Morality may live on, as a blind and irrational instinct, under such circumstances ; but it can offer no rational justification of its existence. Concerning the practical tendency of such denial there is no need to speak. The history of philosophy records the results of many such experiments. Modern speculators, when questioned concerning the effect of their speculations on conduct, assume that conscience is well able to stand alone. They do not know that the experiment has been tried again and again, and invariably the theoretic denial has involved morals in ruin. Whatever else is doubtful, it is better to be noble than base, true than false, loving than selfish. Here, says the speculator, I take my stand. And yet the deepest and most persistent doubt of the human mind has been on just these points. Is it better to be noble than base ? false than true ? loving than selfish ? Is there any difference at bottom ? Are not both sin and righteousness the subjective illusions of a bubble thrown up by the seething aimless tides of the infinite ? With the human mind in general, as judged by its history, these are the points where doubt first manifests itself. Conscience and duty, least of all, can claim exemption from the inroads of scepticism. And if the denials mentioned are maintained, we believe that this practical result admits of theoretic justification.

In examining the assurances of our advanced speculators, that in any case morality is safe, we are struck by a peculiar inconsequence with regard to the moral nature in general. They are, in short, sensational moralists, who are forced, by the straits of their position, into holding the highest type of intuitional ethics. The resulting idol is a very odd compound of gold and clay. When one suggests that atheism or materialism is fatal to rational ethics, we are always treated to a homily conceived in the spirit of the highest intuitional morality. God or no God—we are told—there is an eternal distinction between right and wrong. Whether there be a future life or no, it is still an imperative duty to live nobly here. In particular, the eternal sanctity of truth, and its supreme value for the seeking soul, are largely dwelt upon. The advanced thinker must have no other motto than the heroic words, "I covet truth;" and he must resign all the comforts, all the joys, all the hopes of his heart, if they seem to conflict with the eternal veracities. No illusions, no dreams for him. No belief because it is useful, or because it is pleasant. However bleak and barren it may be, he will know the truth. It may leave him an orphan and hopeless in the universe,—still, he will know the truth. Christians are often twitted with believing immorally,—that is, with preferring the rest and happiness of unfounded beliefs to the heroic and noble disquiet of absolute loyalty to truth. Even the belief in immortality is rejected, not merely as unproved, but as tending, by its selfish hopes, to dim the lustre of absolute loyalty to right and duty. The homily is apt to close with a whispered prayer, just loud enough to be overheard, that he "may join the choir invisible of those immortal dead who live again in souls made better by their presence." By this time the objector is heartily ashamed of himself, and as he gazes on this noble being, in whom self is crucified and duty is all and in all, he wonders how he could ever have made his unfortunate suggestion, that any conceivable change of opinion could remove from duty the seal of inviolable obligation. This moral enthusiasm glows with all the fervour of a Hebrew prophet; but, unfortunately, our satisfaction and appreciation are partly obscured by the fact that when the origin and nature of conscience are in debate, the same eloquent worthies are quite sure to tell us that con-

science has a very earthly origin. Then we learn that there is no absolute right, and that moral opinions depend entirely on custom and circumstance. The moral nature has its roots in physical desire. Love of pleasure, fear of pain, a bit of sympathy, and a large amount of selfish expectation, will produce a conscience, when thrown together in the same being, and worked over by the chemistry of association. Our distinctions of right and wrong rest upon no eternal nature of things, but express merely the way in which we have been brought up. Had the "environment" been different, both truth and righteousness would have been different. Let the theist but construct an argument for the existence of God on the nature of conscience, and he will quickly learn that conscience has little reason to be proud of its pedigree. Now, one cannot help feeling surprise when he learns that the expounder of this doctrine is the same superior being who before made such a glowing and thrilling defence of absolute truth and right. We should be justified in calling a halt right here, and insisting on a choice between these two views. Both cannot be held at once. If conscience have the genesis just described, it is folly to speak of any obligation higher than that of common prudence. What has been put together can be taken apart. It is vain to imagine that conscience could maintain its authority if this view of its origin were fully accepted. Self-respect would not permit us to be ruled by an impostor, and the mob of passions would turn out in wild glee to drag the usurper from power. If this did not happen, it would be because the holy voice of nature secretly condemned the theory, even in the moment of its triumph. The absolute authority of conscience cannot be united with this theory of its origin. To hold now one view and now another, according to the exigencies of the argument, impresses one with the same feeling of awe which invaded the minds of William Nye and Truthful James at the wonderful play of "Ah Sin!" Common honesty, and that supreme truthfulness which has been set up as the chief virtue, demand that a choice be made here. We say it deliberately and with emphasis: this fundamental inconsistency can be rescued from the charge of knavery only by postulating an ignorance alike dense and profound. If truth be so supremely valuable, and if our views lead to the over-

throw of ethics, why not say so? This halting between two opinions, and holding both and neither upon occasion, is not calculated to produce a favourable impression either of one's truthfulness or of one's insight.

We pass to the specific denials mentioned; and, first, we consider the denial of freedom. One point on which advanced speculators seem to be agreed is, that the soul is properly nothing, and that all mental states, feelings, thoughts, aspirations, and volitions, are the necessary outcome of the physiological processes which underlie consciousness. But when we object to this view, that it denies and overturns true morality, the speculator is very fond of using the great Calvinistic theologians to screen himself from attack. When Professor Huxley made his address, "*Are Animals Automata?*" he warned his critics in advance that if he were to be summoned to answer for his doctrine of automatism, he should not appear alone, but should bring Calvin and Edwards with him. This position is partly the confusion of philosophic determinism with physical fatalism, on which we do not now insist, and partly a misrepresentation of Calvinism. Calvinism does not deny freedom, but sets up other doctrines which its opponents regard as incompatible with freedom. The predestination which it affirms is expressly said to be of a kind which does not conflict with, but rather establishes, the freedom of the creature. To the average mind this may not be much of a predestination after all, but it is certainly intolerable to charge the Calvinist with denying freedom. Indeed, it would be much nearer the truth to say that Calvinists were first among modern theologians to affirm a natural freedom in man. But, however this may be, the question before us is not one of great names, but of simple logic. For our own part, we should be quite undismayed if Edwards and Calvin did appear as Mr. Huxley's supporters. The law of identity and non-contradiction cannot be broken by any weight of authority. No more is the question whether theoretic deniers of liberty have practically admitted it. No system can be saved by the inconsistencies of its friends. The great attraction of advanced thought is its claim of consistency. If it is to abandon logic and consistency, and live by instinct, we might as well stay where we are. Christianity suits our instincts as well as physical fatalism; and if the latter can

show no better logic there is no reason for exchange. Inconsistent theology is bad enough, but inconsistent atheology is worse.

Let us, then, deny freedom, what would theoretically follow? The fatalist, appealing this time to Butler, says nothing would follow. If there be any necessity, we are now living under it; and daily life would remain unchanged if we became conscious of that necessity. But, as usual, the fatalist mistakes his authority. He mistakes Butler's *argumentum ad hominem* for a defence of fatalism. Now, the claim that daily life would remain the same applies, at best, only to the external form of action, and not to the inner life. This sameness of external form is, probably, what Professor Huxley means by one of his *symposium* utterances, which says that when it is seen that the consequences of moral law are as inexorable as those of physical law, men will break the one no sooner than they will the other. A fatalist will not put his hand in the fire any sooner than the believer in freedom; and when it is clear that moral law has consequences just as fixed, no theory will seriously affect conduct. In so far as morality is identical with prudence, there is a certain force in this, although even this doctrine tacitly denies physical fatalism. That which can foresee results, and determine itself accordingly—that which can “think twice” before acting—is a person and not a machine. Here again Mr. Huxley confounds philosophic determinism with physical automatism. A machine does not think twice. Consciousness has no power over the mechanism. The outcome is, in every case, but the resultant of mechanical processes which are independent of our imaginary volitions. To advance thus far is pure scepticism; to stop short is to abandon fatalism. Moreover, if we may trust consciousness at all, we know that the resulting action would not remain unchanged. The kind of opinions which our brains grind out depends very largely on the kind already there. Spencer represents reasoning and volition as a conflict between different ideas, which in turn are but the subjective side of nervous action. “Nascent motor excitations” originate in the brain. Subjectively these appear as different ideas. When a nascent motor excitation occurs alone it passes at once into action. Such are instinctive and reflex action. But when two or more arise together there is a

conflict. Subjectively this conflict appears as comparison and reasoning. Finally, the strongest carries the day, and issues in action. Subjectively this appears as volition. But the original and independent fact is the conflicting nascent motor excitations, and volition and reasoning are only the subjective shadow which the objective realities cast. We see, on this theory, how important it is to have the right kind of nascent motor excitations in the brain. Now, as a matter of fact, the nascent motor excitations corresponding to ideas of right, duty, freedom, responsibility, are the great breakwaters which prevent other unpleasant nascent motor excitations from issuing in action, which, on the old theories of ethics, would be decidedly objectionable and blameworthy. We are persuaded, therefore, that the removal of these conservative nascent motor excitations would lead to the appearance of other nascent motor excitations whose result would not be pleasant to contemplate. If, for instance, the lazy and criminal classes were freed from the sense of right and wrong which now turns them into cowards, many social problems would, we doubt not, receive a sudden solution. To the claim, therefore, that action would be unaffected by an acceptance of fatalism and a denial of guilt and responsibility we oppose this most scientific showing, based on the profound doctrine of nascent motor excitations. Indeed, it is a necessary conclusion from physical fatalism that any change of opinion points to a change in the nervous processes, and must, therefore, lead to a change in action. It is, then, highly unscientific to teach that new opinions are compatible with the old forms of action. Poor, pachydermatous common sense is so imbued with the instinct of freedom, that it fails to hold these speculators to their own views, and mistakes the implications of the theory for aberrations of the critic.

But even if we should allow that action would remain unchanged, we have not saved morals. We have no longer a moral system, but only a caricature. What we have, in fact, is a herd of automata who externally mimic the action of moral beings. They reward and punish, praise and blame, just as if good and ill deserts were facts, but in truth they are only "the cunningest of nature's clocks." Now, we are so made that when we fairly grasp this view we can no longer attribute merit or demerit, guilt or innocence, or responsibility of any kind, to

such beings. Sin and righteousness vanish. Remorse and shame fade away, and the sting of sin is drawn. Punishment is not retribution, but self-defence. It has no element of justice in it; it is but the brute struggle for existence. The so-called good man has no claim to approval, and the bad man deserves no blame. Both alike are what their viscera have made them. Healthy viscera give rise to what we call right action; diseased viscera produce wrong action. If there were only some way of making one responsible for his viscera, we might save morals; but, unfortunately, the viscera are too strong for us. The morals of fatalism, then, must be purely external, and the difference of action must be sought in the outcome. There is no moral difference in the actors. But, unfortunately, even this system of external morals is not plainly possible on the principles of fatalism. If there were some one somewhere who was independent of his viscera, and who could, by modifying the conditions, guide the viscera of others to happy external results, there would be some hope. Or if, among these "cunningest of nature's clocks," there were some self-adjusting clock which could also re-adjust the other clocks when they get out of order, the case would not be hopeless. But when all are automata, it seems impossible to change the future. Prudence, and foresight of results, we are told, would avail to prevent immoral action even in a fatalistic world; but, unhappily, foresight of results seems quite useless unless we have some power of acting in accordance with the new knowledge. A foresight of results will not help one out of the current of Niagara. In fact, prudence, and foresight, as controlling factors, are as incompatible with physical fatalism as are merit and demerit. Even determinism has always had difficulty at this point, and has been forced to posit a power of "thinking twice," and of indefinitely postponing action. By skilfully and judiciously overlooking this difficulty one may contrive to give an air of rationality to fatalism; and common sense, the great philosophical pachyderm, will always take the hard-pressed fatalist under its protection because of his inconsistencies. If, after announcing pure automatism and fatalism, the speculator is only careful to say, "Now let us all do our duty," every one is satisfied. If some unhappy bystander should ask how an automaton can have duties, the speculator at once holds him up

as a moral outcast ; and thick-headedness says, "Served him right." But there are previous questions in morals as well as elsewhere ; and when, then, the teachers of physical automatism urge us to do the duty which lies next us, we shall insist on knowing how an automaton can have duties. In the present state of the case an answer to this question is much more important than any amount of moral exhortation. It is also a duty of theists to insist upon consistency or surrender at this point. Gentlemen of the advance, take heart and courage. Remember what you have said about the supreme virtue of truthfulness. Remember, also, your high claims in the matter of logical consistency ; and either abandon the language of morals, which has meaning only in a scheme which you repudiate, or else confess that you dare not and cannot be consistent. In the latter case, reflect on this question : Is illogical atheism in any way superior to illogical Christianity ? The new cloth will not join to the old garment.

Happily, however, these inconsistencies are disappearing. An enthusiastic German evolutionist, F. v. Hellwald, in a work¹ published in 1874, insists upon the struggle for existence, and the right of the stronger, as the only basis of morals. There is neither freedom nor soul, neither absolute truth nor absolute morality. He claims that the word morality should be banished from scientific writings, because it is empty ; and he describes all philanthropic efforts to raise men to ideal manhood as "humanity-hypocrisy" (*humanitäts-heuchelei*). Worst of all, he insists that advanced speculation must come to this. If, now, we ask how to deal with social problems in such a scheme, Professor Tyndall gives us an answer in his address, "Science and Man," before the Birmingham and Midland Institute. He represents himself as arguing the point with a "robber and ravisher," and he gives the conclusion of the whole matter as follows : "You offend, because you cannot help offending, to the public detriment. We punish you, because we cannot help punishing, for the public good." When proposing to put the "robber and ravisher" to death, the Professor says to him : "The public safety is a matter of more importance than the very limited chance of your moral renovation." Of lesser punishment he says : "It will make

¹ *Culturgeschichte in ihrer natürlichen Entwicklung.*

you think twice before venturing on a repetition of your crime." To the robber aforesaid he says: "We entertain no malice or hatred against you, but simply with a view to our own safety and purification, we are determined that you, and such as you, shall not enjoy liberty of evil action in our midst." Now this is something like. The Professor recognises that no one is to blame, and expressly founds the right to punish on public utility. Our only ground of hesitation is that remark about "thinking twice;" for we have seen that thinking twice is incompatible with physical fatalism. A striking peculiarity of advanced speculation is, that a profound and subtle exegesis is commonly required to find what the writers mean; and nothing is more common than charges of misrepresentation, after the critic has done his best. Sometimes, too, the critic is overwhelmed with indignation, and held up as a moral outcast, for doing what he could not help. However, the explosion of wrath is also necessary, although only in unreflecting minds. But in spite of traces of the superstition of freedom, a careful collation of passages indicates that the Professor means to deny all spontaneity, and to base all difference of action on its outcome.

The Professor has done well; but we regret that he has not done better. He has merely made a very feeble beginning, and has quite failed to appreciate the grandeur of the new ethics. Perhaps it would be well to let the doctrine remain an esoteric one, otherwise our reasoning might be retorted upon ourselves. The criminal is no more dangerous to society than society is to the criminal; and he is morally no worse than the best. Which shall be called criminal and which virtuous is only a question of relative frequency, or of majorities. It is quite conceivable that criminals should be in the majority, and should begin to say to us: "We entertain no malice or hatred against you, but simply with a view to our safety and comfort, we are determined that you, and such as you, shall not live in our midst." We experience great enthusiasm for the new ethics, but such is the hardness and uncircumcision of the natural heart, that the coarse fetichisms of Christianity will probably be necessary for the mob for some time to come. But we may suggest, for the inner circle of the initiated, some valuable applications of the new principles. We have got

clear of God and goodness, and have set up utility as the justification of action. Now it is a sad fact that the mass of men do not seem worth keeping. They are without any assignable reason for existence, and they are undoubtedly a great embarrassment both to themselves and to society. Under the old notions of right and wrong and God, such people were a knotty problem for society; but how beautifully simple the question is from the new standpoint! The new principle is in sociology what the law of gravitation is in astronomy. At once the social heavens fall into order. Why should not such people be killed off? Some one will reply that they have done nothing worthy of death; but he is still in the gall of bitterness and the bondage of Christian iniquity. He forgets that there is no longer any crime in the old sense; being a nuisance is the only crime recognised under the new dispensation. Why not, then, abate the nuisance by practical measures? The bondage of the old morality may still be strong, and our feelings may at first be shocked, but that only proves that we are not fully indoctrinated. Advance to new truth is never accomplished without mental friction; and there is always a tendency to import the old into the new. The early Jewish Christians insisted on carrying Judaism into Christianity; and it needed all the logic of Paul and of events to convince them that the day of the old was done. This most paltry and unworthy illustration may serve to show how the traditions of the old gospel will for a time creep in and corrupt the new and most glorious gospel of advanced speculation, unless we resolutely keep watch against them. There is a seduction in all forms of error; and the old gospel is peculiarly seducing. It has little in it fitted for the strong man; but most men are not strong. Human hearts will ache, owing, of course, to maladjustment to the environment; but they ache nevertheless. The cry of the mourner goes up from every quarter under heaven. And the conscience, too, is filled with pain and with gloomy and solemn suspicions. Hence the old faith, with its absurd and degrading doctrines of a Father in heaven, a loving and forgiving God, and a future life, is just fitted to capture the crowd who reason only with their feelings and from their pains and longings. It is a sad fact that Christ, and Moses, and the prophets, seem to the mob

better teachers than the advanced speculators. This makes it necessary always to be on our guard against the poison of the old contagion. So subtle is it and pervasive, that only eternal vigilance will secure immunity. Now in any case there is little hope of the moral improvement of the wretches we have mentioned; and if it should occur, it would only be an improved kind of physiological action. What relief would come to society and to families if tramps and criminals, and sickly, deformed, helpless, and unpromising children, and persons who are hopelessly diseased, or are in their second childhood, could be quietly disposed of; not, indeed, with malice or hatred, but gently, as if we loved them! How many there are also, who have large possessions which they are not using for the public good, but which their heirs are eager to send into the general circulation. Yet these people live on, obstinately, and even maliciously, and apparently with no purpose but to balk the happiness of their friends. What a field for operation in this direction! And not only do public and private interests demand that the classes mentioned be despatched, but philanthropy and the enthusiasm of humanity re-echo the demand. We owe it to the future to root out some of this accursed stock. We who labour for ideal manhood and for ideal society are constantly disheartened by the tremendous force of hereditary evil which works ceaselessly and mightily against us. What solution is there so simple and so thorough as to kill off a million or two of this class every year, until the festering cesspools and miasmatic swamps of humanity shall be freed from their poison and defilement? Such action would probably beget a new set of nascent motor excitations in those who remain, and might result in very general reformation. Hitherto we have kept our hands off these wretches only on account of sundry obsolete notions of God and human rights; but now that we are freed from these whims, can we, as lovers of our race, stand by and see the pestilence threatening posterity without making determined efforts to stamp it out? We avow it: the reigning sentimentality in this matter is the outcome of Christian superstition. The old philosophers knew better. The divine Plato recommended the exposure of infants and the killing off of the helpless. The Fijians, too, with the profound insight of a nature uncorrupted by contact with Christianity, did the same

thing ; but since the advent of the missionaries they have fallen from this high estate. Some of them carried considerations of utility still further, and ate such people as it was found inconvenient to keep ; but this action, though quite allowable on the new principles, and not without its advantages on the score of economy, is hardly in accordance with our present tastes. Perhaps a compromise might be effected on the basis of the opinions of some advocates of cremation, who have dwelt at length on the waste of the present custom of burial. These matters of detail, however, may be left to the progress of opinion ; but, at all events, it is plain that nature is bent on rooting out the unfit ; and both duty and interest call upon us to lend a hand. The mawkish and invertebrate sentimentality of Christian philanthropy is a foul sin against the Cosmos and posterity. Think of the wretches it tolerates and vainly tries to reform. Think of the great army of deaf, and dumb, and blind, and helpless, and idiotic, and insane, which it taxes us to keep. What a blot on the otherwise brilliant universe ! What a trial to our feelings and taste ! Above all, what an expense ! And even Christianity itself, and the whole machinery of religion, what an expense to no purpose ! Heavens and hells have vanished. The fires are out ; and the furnaces are cold ; and the great white throne is a dream. There is large room for killing in this direction. It is not to be thought of that we should leave the weak, and ignorant, and credulous to be preyed upon by these pious swindlers. For a time, perhaps, we may allow it to go on ; but our conscience, our self-respect, and our regard for humanity will not for ever tolerate these mummeries, which merely frighten and deceive, and which serve no purpose except to maintain an army of locusts which eat up every green and good thing. Already we have laws against getting money on false pretences ; it is plain that the whole swarm of ministers come under its operation. Of course we have no feelings of malice or hatred for any one, because no one is blameable. The unhappy Christian or theologian is not responsible for his obsolete notions, but we think that the pointings of utility and duty are very plain in the matter. Perhaps, however, they are not so plain. Upon reflection we find that we have unconsciously been false to our new principle. On the old theory,

the falsehood of religion would warrant our opposing it; but, on the new theory, we may find a use for religion after all. Now these notions of God and duty have an undoubted value for society. The highest and most valuable satisfactions of life depend upon them. Let a man be fully possessed by them, and he will become a better father, or husband, or son, or brother, or citizen, or neighbour. This cannot be doubted; and hence we are thrown into doubt concerning the propriety of clearing out the preachers. On the contrary, since the advanced speculator has done little for science and speculation except to disgrace them; and since his views have no public utility, but great public mischief in them, must we not conclude that the most judicious thing would be to kill off the speculators and leave the preachers? This seems to be a plain pointing of utility.

It is to be regretted that Professor Tyndall did not extend his principle to these cases. Our conclusions seem to us to be the plainest deductions from his premises. Man is a machine, totally without moral character; our moral notions are the product of custom and prejudice; and earthly utility is the foundation of such morals as remain. Perhaps, however, he failed to state them because of their evident truth, deeming it sufficient to lay down the principle, and leave it to others to apply it. It is possible that even the Professor would draw back from some of these deductions, for reformers are seldom conscious of the full results of their principles; but that would only prove a certain mental inertia or ossification which prevents his shaking off all the influences of association and habit. To the pure reason, however, all is clear. Towering above the mists and miasms of custom and superstition, it clearly perceives the goodly land flowing with milk and honey. As a means of helping one to an appreciation of the new ethics we suggest the following problems: Why should we not set up the law of the strongest as the law of life? It is hoped, however, that no advanced speculator will attempt to solve this problem by the method of instincts; for if we are to work out problems by this method, we had better go back to Christianity, as that satisfies the instincts very much better than do materialism and fatalism. The great attraction of the ad-

vanced doctrines is their logical consistency ; if that is abandoned, they have no reason of existence.

Let us pass to the second point,—the denial of a future life. Here, too, the denier takes high ground in favour of intuitional morality, and repeats the common remarks about the absolute sanctities, etc. If there be no life to come, it is a duty to be noble and not base. There is a sublime grandeur in heroic struggle and sacrifice, even if we sink into nothingness the next moment. He is also careful not to miss the opportunity of expressing his scorn for the selfishness of those who look for a future life. But unfortunately, this worthy is commonly entangled in the doctrines concerning conscience and freedom which we have mentioned ; and that leaves us in doubt whether his fine talk is due to ignorance or knavery. There is no noble and no base on his theory, for everything is opinion and prejudice. There is also no noble and no base, for everything is mechanical. What fine strategy this is, to grab up for the sake of a sneer notions which elsewhere he expressly repudiates ! What an instructive illustration of his notions of truthfulness and honesty ! It is possible to raise a very small quibble, and say that there is difference of worth even in mechanisms ; and hence that the mechanical doctrine does not exclude the distinction of noble and base. But the answer is evident. A watch is better than a piece of pig-iron ; and a horse is better than a hog. But the better in these cases has no moral signification ; while the better and worse which we are considering are exclusively moral. But we omit to press these difficulties ; and point out that struggling, agonising, etc., are not heroic in themselves, but only when they have an heroic object. One might struggle, and even agonise mightily, to walk a thousand miles in a thousand hours, but it would not impress any one as especially heroic. To struggle for nothing is the mark of a fool and not of a hero. Hence before we give way to sentiment about self-sacrifice and agonising, reason asks, (1) how an automaton can struggle and sacrifice itself ; and (2) what the self-sacrificing and agonising are for. These are previous questions in moral theory, and demand an answer. The facts on which this seemingly high-toned morality is based are these : The moral law, as revealed in every normal conscience, is not cut out on the pattern of prudence or of self-interest. No more

is it cut out with supreme regard to animal or earthly interests ; on the contrary, it claims to outrank them if they collide with it. Anything may, and must, be sacrificed rather than violate the sanctity of conscience. Thus the moral law appears in our lives as an unconditional imperative, commanding and giving no reasons. It is not based on calculation, but appears as an original instinct of our nature. It is this fact which has led many intuitionists to imagine that the law is self-supporting. But this law, like all other laws, must justify itself to our reason. This instinct, barely as instinct, may rule the life until reason comes ; but then it must give some account of itself. As a simple, opaque fact, disturbing animal happiness and flouting earthly prudence, we want to know its authority and its meaning. No amount of sentiment can avail to answer or resist this rational demand ; and it is one of the great services of the utilitarian moralists so to have forced this point upon the consideration of intuitionists that it is now generally admitted. The law of a being depends on its destiny, and flows from it. There is a distinct absurdity in placing a temporal being under the law of the eternal ; and there is intolerable injustice in placing a being under a law which is hostile to its interests, or which is out of all proportion to its well-being. Any law which any being is under obligation to obey must be a law contrived for its highest good ; and if it appear that any law runs counter to our true good, that law ceases to have any obligation, both reason and conscience being judges. The law of a being, we repeat, must be measured by its nature and destiny. There is nothing unbecoming in an earthly being's living for the earth ; and if the heavenly life is a dream, it is both rational and becoming that we should live for this. It cannot be a duty to live for the unattainable ; the bare notion is an insult to both reason and conscience. The thoughtless intuitionist will be startled at this, and may possibly advance to denial ; but this is due to overlooking our standpoint. We do not mean that, practically, men measure duty by utility, or are constantly asking, What shall we have therefore ? But while we may in practice command obedience without asking reasons, we must in theory always be able to give reasons. Otherwise our command is irrational and arbitrary. Without doubt the standpoint of practical morals is that

of command ; but theoretical morals must furnish some justification of the command. What, then, is the authority and meaning of this moral law, which disturbs our lives, crosses our plans, and mars our peace? Christianity gives an answer. It says that we are under a law too big for the earthly life, because our real life is not measured by our earthly existence. This life is but the beginning, and not the end. It reveals this life as photographing itself indelibly upon the life to come. It tells of moral development and dignity beyond all thought at present. We are called to communion with God. We are called to be like God. We are called to eternal life with God. This is our destiny, and our law is correspondingly great. Whatever conflicts with this destiny must be trodden under foot. Hence when hand or foot offends, we must cut it off and cast it off from us. Hence we are to struggle and agonise to enter into life ; for the gain of the world were nothing if the soul were lost. At once we see the tremendous significance of action, and the baseness of surrender to the brute within us. It is infinitely worse than Prince Hal, if he had preferred to remain among his boon and boozy companions in the Boar's Head at Eastcheap when called to the throne of England. From this standpoint the moral law appears as no wanton or arbitrary impertinence, but as the organic law of the soul's life and peace. But if we reject this view, the law, so far as it transcends earthly prudence, appears as monstrous injustice. The moral nature itself turns against it. The law no longer appears as something godlike, but rather as a demon-hand thrust enviously up to clutch at the little happiness which his short life makes possible. Man is called upon to render justice, and shall the universe be unjust to him ?

Christianity gives a reason for the moral law, and justifies it to our intelligence. Let us abandon the Christian theory and see what rational ground there is for obeying the moral law beyond the limits of earthly prudence. Much sentiment is poured out at once, and in particular the selfishness of our view is dwelt upon. We will not insist on the fact that this decrifier of selfishness is commonly the one who bases the moral nature on the most abject selfishness, and who by his doctrine of fatalism denies and destroys all moral distinctions. For the sake of a sneer he is willing to steal the notions which belong

only to his opponent ; and we are willing to indulge him in it. But we must point out that this attack on selfishness misses its mark. It is not the selfish instincts, but the moral nature, which protests against a law out of all proportion to the good of its subjects. Nor is it the selfish who have insisted upon a future life, but Socrates and Plato, Paul and Christ. Not the brutal, but the spiritual, perceive what a ghastly farce this life is when taken alone. The implied claim of the positivists, that they themselves are the only ones who have emancipated themselves from selfishness, would be infamous if it were not so ludicrous. But, it is urged again, it certainly is selfish to refuse to sacrifice ourselves for the good of others unless we see our own advantage in it. Here, also, the objection fails to touch bottom. There is nothing more abhorrent to the moral nature than just this law of sacrifice, except on one condition. That the one should be essentially and utterly sacrificed to the many is to empty all morality and reason out of the system of things ; and the world becomes the strict parallel of a helpless ship in mid ocean, whose crew, driven to cannibalism by starvation, kill the weaker, one by one, in order to satisfy their horrid hunger. If such were the case, both pity and conscience would command, not that some should submit to be eaten, but that all should stand by and go down together. No amount of sentiment will help us out of this trouble, or make such a universe other than a moral horror. Our atheistic sentimentalists, in their attempts to escape selfishness, constantly undermine their own position. Absolute unselfishness in theory reduces to absolute selfishness in practice. For if one's own happiness ought not to be a good to himself, there is no reason why he should secure happiness in another. If every one should find happiness in another's good, then we can do the best for others by doing the best for ourselves, and letting others know how well off we are. Or instead of living for the future, we should rather live for ourselves, and let the future rejoice in knowing what a good time we had. The general sum of happiness would remain the same ; and a bird in the hand is notoriously worth more than a flock in the bush. No one ought to care for happiness ; hence it can be no duty to produce it. Every one ought to find his happiness in that of others ; hence we can best further the moral welfare of others by letting

them rejoice in our prosperity. Thus the theory passes into its opposite and cancels itself. Of course, men do instinctively recognise the duty of unselfish action; but they do not instinctively recognise the postulates of such a moral community. We look only at the side of the individual, and not at the side of those benefited. We take it for granted that it is quite the noble thing for them to take all they can get. They tell of a Russian woman in a sleigh with her children pursued by wolves. And as the wolves were about to overtake the sleigh, she threw a child to them. This she did again and again, and finally reached the village alone. She told her story; and a peasant, seizing his axe, cleft her head at a blow. She had no right to be saved at such a cost. And that is precisely what the universe is if there be no hereafter in which the interests of the one and the many shall be reconciled. No rational theory of self-sacrifice is possible on the supposition that the one is really and essentially sacrificed to the many. Here is an antinomy of conscience which conscience itself cannot resolve. Intuitional moralists have almost invariably overlooked the dualism of conscience on this subject; for conscience justifies a rational self-love as much as it does self-sacrifice. The New Testament reconciliation is the only possible one: He that saveth his life shall lose it. This is the law of unselfishness. But he that loseth his life the same shall save it. This is the clause which reconciles the law, not to our selfish feelings, but to our conscience, our reason, and our sense of justice. Personal good and the universal good must be at bottom one; and this they cannot be if the individual's faithfulness is to result in his destruction. Without this assumption there is nothing upon which the conscience turns more fiercely than upon this law of sacrifice. If one is unwilling to admit this reconciling thought of a future life, let him at least cease to dwell on the duty of self-sacrifice. Of course if any one finds delight in self-sacrifice, no one objects. As a refined form of egoism, it justifies itself; but it can never be commanded as a duty. Of course the advanced speculator will once more forget his theory that right and wrong are conventional, and that men are only automata, and will swagger out sundry attempts to sneer at this doctrine as base and grovelling; but such an exhibition will merely serve as a standard of his mental power.

Our claim, then, is not merely that selfishness overrides conscience when a future life is denied, but that conscience itself abandons its high claims in that case. Here are the facts: In a few years it will make no difference to me what I have been. In a few centuries it will make no difference to the universe what the human race has been. Whether happy or unhappy, moral or immoral, all will have passed away and left no sign. The difference between right and wrong will have disappeared, and the righteous and the wicked will have reached a common goal. Now the holder of this view attempts to preach morality, and what can he say? Worldly prudence every one can understand, and we need no moralist to teach that. But what room is there for anything more? Of course we do not mean that everybody would plunge into beastliness if the belief in immortality were gone. Differences of taste would still remain, but that is all. Duty would be an empty word, and taste and prudence must give the law of life. But taste has no law, and every one must be left to his own devices. Here it might occur to some enthusiastic moralist to speak of the joy and dignity of right living; but as for the joy, most men find duty a yoke and a burden; and as for the dignity, we now know that it is only an improved kind of physiological action, and nothing to be proud of. Sadly enough, the taste of the masses does not lie in the direction of moral growth and self-development. Men are annoyed and vexed at any apparition of duty, and they would gladly shut it out of both thought and life. Now how could a humane unbeliever in immortality justify himself in disturbing a pleasant worldly life by this nightmare of duty? Even if his fatalism did not make appeals to duty miserably irrelevant, there could be no duty to strive after the unattainable. Whereupon the advanced speculator once more breaks out in his grand way, that there is an essential nobility in duty; but in the assumed circumstances this can only mean that his tastes run in that direction, and that he chooses to stigmatise the tastes of others as base and grovelling. But he has no right to do so. His egoism and self-esteem are satisfied in one way, and he then assumes to lord it over others who differ from him. To increase at once his own glory and the opprobrium of his opponents, he calls his own views noble, dignified, etc., while

those of the other side are called base and brutal. But in all this we detect the influence of heredity and the moral environment. Such notions will disappear when he fairly masters his own principles. Each must be allowed to go his own way, free from all interference, except such as utility may suggest, and from insolent assumption of superiority on the part of others. If the egoism of one man delights in certain psychological fineries, let him choose them, so far as he can choose them. If another is better pleased with the more substantial goods of the senses, let him be equally free, so far as he can be free. Above all, let moral absolutism, which alone is true morality, die the death. The critic must allow that if a future life be denied, the present life would be more comfortable if the sense of duty were toned down. If at any time the advanced speculator should feel tempted to attack these conclusions, let him first of all reflect on his own theory, that right and wrong are purely conventional, and that men are merely machines without any proper moral character. If this does not avail to stop the nuisance of his periodic outcry, let him further reflect whether a theory which he denies every time he opens his mouth, and which in turn denies all those truths by which men and societies live, be not a doubtful one. Or is it, perhaps, the glory of advanced speculation to be received only by pure faith, and in opposition to all the teachings of life and reality?

It is unnecessary to discuss the effects of atheism upon morality, as it implies the difficulties already mentioned. We close this discussion by pointing out that upon any theistic theory it is impossible to justify the ways of God either to conscience or to reason without a future life, and without the Christian theory of that life. God is either the perfect, or he is nothing. His purposes also must be worthy of him, or the mind will deny him outright. To think less than the highest of God will, by an inner dialectic of thought, pass on to his denial. But creation has as yet reached no end which justifies it to our reason. If we think of a period a few thousand years further on, when the present order shall have passed away, and the ancient silence and loneliness of God shall have returned, we cannot help asking the question, What is it all for? This meaningless stir of creation,

which is soon to sink back again into silence, is it worth while? It is at this point that we comprehend the despair of the Indian religions. We Occidentals have had a childish readiness to view God as the creator of the finite order; that is just what the Oriental mind has found impossible. It did not doubt the Infinite, but questioned whether the Infinite could connect itself with such a finite. The finite, as we know it, is unworthy of the Infinite. He cannot descend from his sacred, everlasting calm and silence to found or take part in this stupid, senseless turmoil of the finite. Hence the finite does not exist. It is a dream only, an illusion. God is not in it, for it is unworthy of him. Hence let us also seek to escape from it, and by reflection on the eternal, and by withdrawal from action, let us lose ourselves in the infinite rest and silence. Until very recently, this conception was impossible to Western thought. It was a matter of course that God could not want any better business than to make and maintain our world. As for the world, it was a great success—a little blackened, indeed, by the Bible, but upon the whole a very excellent thing. All this has changed. Pessimism has made mighty advances in science and philosophy. It is becoming fashionable to deride the universe, and the cant of progress is receding. Whoever has the words of eternal life, it is at last settled that science and philosophy have them not. From the Indian standpoint the Indian notion is profoundly true. The finite, as we experience it, is not worthy of God. If the drama of our existence is to end with the earthly act, there is no unity in it, and we cannot ascribe it to a rational being. Conscience and reason are satisfied only as we advance to the Christian doctrine—that the full purpose and magnificence of creation become manifest only in eternity. "It doth not yet appear what we shall be; but when He shall appear, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is." By a necessity of thought, when we abandon this standpoint speculation recedes towards atheism or pantheistic substantialism. All speculation between these extremes is in unstable equilibrium.

We have not sought to prove that our advanced speculators are bad men, but that their doctrines deny morality. Neither sentiment nor personal character is concerned, but simply and solely logic. Hence appeals to sentiment and charges of

misrepresentations are irrelevant in reply. We do not urge the results deduced as any disproof of the premises; we only insist that they flow from the premises. There is no injustice in putting premises and conclusion together. If it be said that the conclusions are insane, we do not deny it; but that does not prove that they do not follow from the premises, but rather that the premises are insane also. And we suggest, as a topic for reflection, whether a doctrine which denies consciousness, conscience, and all the great principles on which life, and society, and government are founded, has not almost reached a *reductio ad absurdum*. But if any will insist on holding the premises, let them be forced to accept the conclusion. We have given the question this prominence because we believe that mischief has been done by ignoring it. The minds of many are confused by the prevailing inconsistency on this point. They are led to assent to much solely by the assurance that morals shall suffer no harm. The critic, of course, cares nothing for consequences, but he must insist on consistency. We might as well fall back on Christianity, if we are to give up logic. The old faith had its Nemesis, according to its critics, and its Nemesis was always logic. If the Nemesis was fatal to the old, why should it show pity on the new? Let, then, the question be dragged into light, and let it be kept there until loose-jointed scepticism shall learn what it is doing, and until speculative trickery shall be forced to be consistent, and to accept the logical outcome of its opinions. The question for our advanced speculators to consider is, whether we shall live by instinct or by logic? If by instinct, then logic has nothing to do with life and practice; and we are left to find that theory of life and the world which shall best satisfy our instincts, and bring most peace and dignity into life. But if we are to live by logic, then let us live by logic, and abandon all views which are not in harmony with our professed opinions.

B. P. BOWNE.

ART. X.—*Current Literature.*

“THE Life of Christ” is of all subjects, perhaps, the most difficult to handle with any measure of adequacy. As it stands in the Gospel History, the Image which it stamps upon the thoughtful mind is such that any attempt to present it afresh in modern forms of thought and speech, either as a whole or in any of its stages, seems to fall hopelessly beneath what the sacred text has already given us. And yet one feels that it ought to be done, and must be done. The preacher who would build up his flock on their most holy faith, must make the exhibition of this life, in all its significance, the central field of his own studies, and the leading feature of his teaching. Nor can the student of Christianity, whether viewed historically or in its own nature, avoid making the Life of Christ the main element of his inquiries. Hence the number and variety of books upon this subject which from time to time appear; few comparatively in periods of religious deadness, but abundant in times of earnest thought, and particularly when attacks on this citadel of all Christianity demand the resources and energies of able Christians in defence of all that is dear to them. That very startling book called *Supernatural Religion*, which first appeared nearly ten years ago, though anonymous and expensive, ran through edition after edition almost monthly, and seemed to be shaking the faith of multitudes, not only in Supernatural Revelation, but in all save the thinnest Deism. But Canon Farrar’s *Life of Christ*, of equal dimensions, appeared opportunely, and its rapid sale made it evident that it had not been issued a day too soon, and that it was to a large extent meeting the felt want; while the crushing exposures of *Supernatural Religion*, the book by Professor (now Bishop) Lightfoot, did much to reassure the anxious Christian mind. But once directed to fresh study of the Gospel History and the Life of Christ, preachers and writers were led to make further efforts to throw light on this grandest of all themes; encouraged by the well-grounded confidence that each from his own point of view might hope to

contribute something towards the fuller appreciation of Him who is the Light and Life of the world.

We have before us three works of this nature. One simply tells the entire tale, *narrates* the Life of Christ—that of Mr. Stalker (1). The two others take up the leading scenes in the Life of Christ, and expatiate upon them, each in its own way. Dr. Fairbairn's volume is well entitled *Studies in the Life of Christ* (2), for it is strictly such. Mr. Nicoll's is in some respects of the same character, and though the first part of the title, *The Incarnate Saviour*, is quite appropriate, the additional title, *A Life of Jesus Christ* (3), is scarcely so, for there is much in the Life of Christ which it does not embrace, though the omission of this, instead of being a defect in the plan, has helped the author to attain his real object better—the concentration of thought upon its leading features, as they bear upon the Incarnation and the Atonement. The plan of Mr. Stalker's book was determined by the object for which it was prepared,—to be one of a series of "Handbooks for Bible Classes." It consists of six chapters, with "Conclusion," and "Hints for Teachers and Questions for Pupils." To any one who has had the least experience in Bible-class work it will be evident at a glance that only a rare aptitude for the communication of Bible truth in its most comprehensive character, and no little experience in the work, could have produced what is there contained. Looking at the smallness of the book and its more immediate object, it might be thought fitted only for Bible classes, not for grown students of the Gospel History; but this would be a great mistake. Though we ourselves have seen a good many years, and read and studied most of the works of any value on the endless theme, besides having done something in the line of the books before us, we are not ashamed to say that we have read this little book of Mr. Stalker's with real profit, as well as, in some places, with admiration. The way in which he vivifies every scene as he comes to it leaves an impression of present *reality* in the events

(1) *The Life of Jesus Christ*, by Rev. James Stalker, M.A. T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh.

(2) *Studies in the Life of Christ*. By Professor A. M. Fairbairn, D.D. Hodder and Stoughton, London.

(3) *The Incarnate Saviour: A Life of Jesus Christ*. By the Rev. W. R. Nicoll, M.A., Kelso. T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh.

themselves which is of the utmost consequence to faith; and the amount of information which he has contrived to weave into his narrative of the successive events, and in a style not only easily followed, but highly graphic, is, we think, deserving of all the commendation we can bestow upon it. Have we then any faults to find with its execution? Yes. We venture to think it defective in the higher features of the Person, the life, and the work of Christ. Theological disquisitions would have been quite out of place in such a book, not to speak of the impossibility, within the given space, of any attempt at teaching doctrine, in any proper sense of the term. But if the impression left upon the mind by a "Life of Christ" is below what we have a right to expect in a reproduction, even for the young, of the Gospel History—viewed, as it ought to be, in the light of all that followed the day of Pentecost, and that development of Christ's Person and Work which we have in the apostolic Epistles—we cannot but feel that it wants one very important element in such a work. The Divine Person of Christ is here, no doubt, and the Atonement too. But there is such a predominating effort at every stage to bring out the reality of the *human* life, in all its natural manifestations, that the effect upon the mind is to throw the other into the shade. The uniqueness of the life is never lost sight of; but this is not enough, and there are passages, which we refrain from specifying, which leave a certain uncomfortable impression, not from their positive inaccuracy, but from the half-timid way in which the points we refer to are touched. But another effect arising from this is, that the *feeling of the heart* towards the Object described is, we think, below that which it ought to be, as the result of a work of this nature. Two objects should be continually in view in any attempt to hold up to view the Christ of the Gospels. Bearing in mind His own words, "They that be whole need not a physician, but they that are sick;" I "came not to call the righteous but sinners to repentance," this primary feature in the errand of Christ into the world should be made so to shine forth in the incidents which we seek to relate, that the sin-sick hearts—of the young as well as the old—may find themselves drawn as by a magnet to the Divine Physician, walking amongst men in their own flesh in quest of the sick, who, when healed, may, like her who washed His feet with her tears, have that said of them, "Their sins, which

are many, are forgiven, for they loved much ;" a love which in every such case passes into adoration. This element, which could have been easily woven into the relation of almost every feature and stage of the Story, without sensibly adding to the bulk, we confess we miss with regret. If the beauty of the book charms us, a little more warmth and elevation would have given it an aroma which it does not possess.

Dr. Fairbairn's *Studies* are full of profound thought, the fruit evidently of long and ripe study, not only of the great theme itself, but of the best setting in which to place it. It does not profess to deal with the Life as a whole, but to give such views of its leading scenes as may lead to a deeper and broader conception of the great Object. It might be styled The philosophy of the Life of Christ, and it is in that light that we are to judge of its execution. Viewing the Person, life, character, and work of Christ in relation to the persons, lives, character, and work of ordinary mortals, the great object of the book evidently is to show that in every scene through which He passed, from first to last, He whose life we have in the Gospel History is absolutely unique. In this Dr. Fairbairn is eminently successful, and the work, in this high view of it, we regard as a contribution of real value on this exhaustless, undying theme. If it wants those features which we missed with regret in Mr. Stalker's book, it may reasonably be said, perhaps, that if we have rightly described its object, we have no right to look for them. We give great weight to this consideration. At the same time, we never like to read through a work of this nature, whatever its object, and find ourselves at the close in a state of wonder and reverence, but without emotions of a warmer, kinder, and more stimulating nature. The inquiring student finds much in it that meets his own difficulties, and is fitted to clear his own conceptions ; but when Dr. Godet tells us, in the preface to his *Commentary on the Gospel of John*, that when he was studying that Gospel with a deceased brother Professor, they were every now and then ready to say one to the other, " Did not our hearts burn within us while He talked with us by the way, and opened to us the Scriptures ?" he expresses the very feeling with which we would fain rise from *Studies in the Life of Christ*—a feeling by no means *alien* to either of the two works we have noticed, though not so likely to rise spontaneously from the perusal of them. Some of the *Studies*

we could have wished to call special attention to, but space forbids.

Coming now, lastly, to Mr. Nicoll's book, if there is one feature of it more prominent than another, it is that in which the other two books are, we think, defective. The reader who will consult chapter vi., on *The Object and Claims of Christ*, will understand what we mean. At the same time, those fine thoughts, finely expressed, which abound in the volume, rather show what the author could accomplish in such a field, than exhibit his full capacity. Representing, as possibly it does, the strain of his public teaching, it partakes of that character to what some may think too large an extent. One feels as he goes along an abruptness about the treatment of some topics which leaves the reader craving what the writer shows himself capable of giving, but does quite partially. Still, one is charmed from time to time with such stirring passages as the following :—

“In reading the prayers of Jesus Christ, we miss instantly one of the most prominent features of our prayers. In His prayers there is no contrition, no sense of sin, no prayer for pardon. Even in the dire extremity, when there are none to help Him, when refuge fails Him, when no man cares for His soul, when He is forsaken even by His Father, He asks, Why? well knowing that the reason is not His own sin. In this He contrasts remarkably with His own followers and disciples. They make much of sin; their prayers are largely confession. . . . And we find also that the holier they grew, the more unholy they felt themselves to be; the nearer they approached God, the more clearly did they perceive the glory of His holiness, and in that glory every spot, speck, and stain in themselves stood out. . . . But the prayers of Christ, earnest, agonised, and tearful as they were, have in them no word of confession. He bore our sins in His own body and in His own soul, yet He Himself had no taint of sin. He was the spotless Son of God. And so, in the longest prayer of His we have recorded, the preface is not a confession of sin, but an assertion of righteousness. ‘I have glorified Thee on the earth; I have finished the work Thou gavest me to do.’ ‘Into Thy hand,’ He said, last of all, ‘I commend my spirit.’ But He did not say, as we do, ‘for Thou hast redeemed me,’ because He needed no redemption, being Himself the Redeemer. Further, it is very striking that, though He prayed often for men and before men, He never prayed with men. We rejoice to pray with each other, and He has encouraged us to do so. Exceeding great and precious promises are bound up with the prayer of two or three together. . . . But He never prayed with any one. He prayed before His disciples, but not with them. He never said, along with His disciples, ‘Our Father,’ lifting up common petitions for both. He never even said, ‘Our Father,’ when speaking of Himself and the disciples. He makes the distinction, ‘Your Father and my Father, your God and my God,’ as if even

in His closest approaches to them there was an infinite distance between man and God. He prayed many a time for His disciples, but He never asked their prayers. Their sympathy, indeed, He was thankful for ; but though He prayed often that their faith might not fail, He never asked them to plead that His might stand."

Passages of this fine nature, so true to the glorious Reality described, so elevating, occur every now and then in this volume ; and in view of them one cannot but feel how much greater a *finish* the whole work would have had, if the rich gifts and fine culture of the young author had been allowed to acquire greater ripeness. It has a glow about it which warms the reader ; but its author might do still more, and probably will, if he husband until he has matured his thoughts.

D. B.

With this publication (4) the Baird Lectureship passes into a new phase. The book before us, while distinctly and decidedly evangelic, is modern, liberal, and original. It may not be the ablest of the Baird series—that honour probably belongs to Dr. Flint's two series of lectures on Theism and Antitheism ; but it is certainly the most genial. Dr. Matheson has poetry and genius in him, and it comes out in all he writes, and very markedly in this work on *The Natural Elements of Revealed Theology*, in which there is hardly a dull or prosaic sentence. Whatever may be thought of the argument, whatever value may be set on the work as a contribution to Christian apologetic,—on that point there will probably be diverse judgments,—we can, at all events, confidently assure the public that they will find this book pleasant, stimulating, and instructive reading.

The design of the lecturer is "to ascertain to what extent the doctrines of revealed religion have a basis in the natural instincts of the human mind." The attempt proceeds on the assumption that there is at once a distinction and an affinity between natural and revealed religion. In taking up this ground, the author, in his introductory lecture, distinguishes between his own position and that of those on the one hand who deny the possibility of uniting, and that of those on the other who deny the possibility of distinguishing between, the natural and the revealed. The former class he describes by the term Ultramontane, the latter by the term Rationalist. The characteristic of the Ultramontane school is to regard the

(4) *Natural Elements of Revealed Theology* ; being the Baird Lecture for 1881. By the Rev. George Matheson, D.D., Inellan. London : J. Nisbet and Co.

elements of supernatural religion as *unnatural*, "not only beyond the range of natural discovery, but beyond the reach of natural appreciation even when discovered." To the Rationalist, on the other hand, nature is everything, and Christianity merely a natural evolution—at best and at most, the highest evolution of human consciousness. The term Ultramontane might lead uninitiated readers to imagine that the former of these two contrasted attitudes represented merely the Roman Catholic position in theology; but this is not the view of the author. On the contrary, he applies the term to all, whatever their ecclesiastical connection, to whom Christianity is a system of purely mysterious truths, possessing little self-evidencing power, and capable of being established only by external evidences—such as Miracles and Prophecy. On this view the word is applicable, and is by the author applied, to the whole English school of apologists of the old hard type—to Butler and even to Chalmers. He is of opinion that many of our greatest treatises in Protestant apologetics have weakened their permanent value by admitting the Ultramontane element. Of Bishop Butler in particular he remarks, that his design is "to show not so much that Christianity is adapted to the natural instincts of the human mind, as that there is nothing in Christianity which is calculated to shock these instincts," no difficulty in the realm of revelation not paralleled in the realm of nature. Such a line of argument, admitted to be legitimate, is pronounced insufficient, especially in the nineteenth century. The title of Butler's work is, from the view of our age, a misnomer. "It would be more correct to call it Butler's analogy between the points which are *unrevealed* in theology and the points which are *unrevealed* in nature." Our author's idea of Revelation is entirely different from the Ultramontane. Revelation to him is not mystery; it is mystery made manifest. "It means literally the drawing back of a veil. The act of drawing back the veil is the supernatural part of the process; it is too high to be touched by the human hand, and therefore its removal demands the agency of another hand. Yet no sooner is the veil withdrawn than the mystery vanishes. The human spirit recognises the vision not as a new vision, but as that for which unconsciously it has been waiting all along. It bounds to meet it as the normal fulfilment of its destiny." In our judgment the general conception of revela-

tion advocated in these Lectures is sound and satisfactory, and the attitude taken up towards natural religion just, keeping the mean between too sombre and too flattering a view of the latter. Christianity is not a mere collection of mysteries standing in no relation to human reason or experience, and incapable of commending itself to the human heart as the solution of its problems and the satisfaction of its needs and desires. It is "the complement of human nature;" it gives to nature "the very thing she needed;" it satisfies the instincts manifested in ethnic or natural religion.

In setting himself to prove this thesis, Dr. Matheson explains that, to ascertain what the instincts and aspirations of natural religion are, he goes not to the science of natural theology as cultivated under Christian influence, but to the religions which prevailed before the advent of Christ. Modern deism he regards, and we think most justly, as "simply Christianity with the figure of Christ left out." The needs of the human mind, therefore, must be ascertained from the pre-Christian religions, whence alone we can know what man can and can not do for himself. Searching in these religions of antiquity he finds underlying them three great problems: viz., What is God? What is his relation to humanity? Is his glory consistent with the existence of moral evil? The solution of the first he finds in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity; of the second in the tenet of the Incarnation; and of the third in the faith in Atonement.

Dr. Matheson's method of proof is original. In such an inquiry it is natural for one who is familiar with the literature of apologetic to think of Dr. Trench's Hulsean Lecture, *Christ the Desire of all Nations* (to which, so far as we have noticed, Dr. Matheson does not refer). But the Baird lecturer constructs his argument on quite a different principle from that followed by the Hulsean lecturer. The principle of Dr. Trench's argument is to find in the *parallels* presented by heathen religions unconscious prophecies of Christian doctrines, say in the Hindoo or Platonic Trinity a foreshadowing of the true Trinity of revelation. Our author attaches little importance to such parallels. He admits that seeming parallels are numerous enough. But he thinks that the proof of the adaptation of Christianity to human nature is to be found not in the *supplies* of nature, but in its *needs*. The so-called trinities,

e.g. were framed from actual observation of the phenomena of nature, and of mind. Brahma, Vishnu, Shiva, represent birth, growth, decay. Plato's Trinity hypostatizes sense, understanding, will. These trinities "stand upon another plane, depend on other principles, and owe their existence to other motives. If we would discover the true point of union between the light of nature and this doctrine of revelation, we must seek in nature for the need of such a doctrine; and if we should find in the natural struggles of the religious intellect the demand for a view of God which shall embrace the diverse in the one, we shall have reached a more satisfactory evidence of adaptation than could be supplied by a thousand instances of mere verbal parallelism." We are inclined to agree with this view; only we should wish that Dr. Matheson in future editions would take into account what has been said for the principle of parallelism and its application by such writers as Trench in the above-named volume, and Delitzsch in his more recent work, *System der Christlichen Apologetik*. A vindication, in a note in the appendix, of his argument with reference to the views of these authors would give additional value to it.

We cannot afford space to illustrate our author's argument in detail. It will suffice perhaps to show how his method works, to point out what are the elements in natural religion which are met by the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. These are: *the sense of dependence, the consciousness of man's greatness, and the sense of solitude*. The natural man asked himself, "Whence am I?" and the answer which occurred to him as the most satisfactory was: "Nature gave me birth." The earliest form of rational religion is nature-worship, and in this worship nature is the substitute for *Fatherhood*. The early religion of India stands as the representative of this phase of the first pre-Christian problem. The second is discovered in Greece. Then man had got to know his own importance, and no longer looked up to nature as above him. The result was that mere nature-worship was replaced by the worship of mind, the universal mind, the great soul of the world. This phase of the problem is represented by Platonism. But Platonism, with its love of the universal, had made man solitary, and human nature craves for companionship. This want was met in the mythology of the West by the deification of men. This phase

could not appear at the earliest stage of religious experience. Only after man had conquered nature could he begin to deify himself. He does so in self-defence. In losing nature-worship he has lost the worship of an outward power, and he dreads to find himself alone. To fill the blank he weaves out of himself a new religious world.

Thus following the process of human need, our author arrives at a threefold thought of God reached by the religious world which lived before the Cross—the thought of a fatherly or begetting principle from which humanity emanated, of a divine spirit in which humanity has its being, and of a human form which humanity can give to the divine. The Christian Trinity unites and satisfies the three wants—the first in the Father, the second in the Spirit, the third in the Son. In natural religion the three needs revealed themselves at different times and in different peoples, but their appearance anywhere and at any time showed them to be real needs of man, though not always or equally felt. In the Christian Trinity we see the reconciliation of the elements which the heathen world has divided. “The ideas of Fatherhood, of Sonship, of Spirituality, rose into new grandeur when they emerged out of their mutual antagonism, and God answered in one thought the needs of a united humanity, in ‘the Father of an infinite majesty; his honourable, true, and only Son; also the Holy Ghost, the Comforter.’”

The line of thought throughout is after the same type. It is certainly interesting, and demands and will repay serious, deliberate consideration. The book is an earnest and eloquent endeavour to utilise the results of the science of comparative religion for the defence and commendation of Christianity as a revealed religion. Specially worthy of note is the mode in which the doctrine of atonement is handled, the theory advocated being what may be called the organic, in which the idea of Headship plays a prominent part. Again, we heartily commend this work to the attention of all interested in such questions, and especially of those who hail the appearance in the field of apologetics of a theologian of Dr. Matheson's type, orthodox, yet catholic in sympathy; a sincere believer in the revelation of grace, yet broad and genial in tendency.

A. B. B.

Few men of so much mark in recent times have been so long in finding a biographer as Dr. William Symington (5). We cannot conceal from ourselves that this has been a great loss to the religious world. We have several memoirs of outstanding men whose career was at once parallel and contemporary. Dr. William Symington was peculiar in this respect, that while his life and work were synchronous with theirs, and sympathetic with the best and strongest pulses and requickenings of his day, he occupied a position which, historically and religiously, gave a distinct tone and significance to all his relation to the men and movements of his time.

No doubt, from his denominational connection, it was mainly in the west and south of Scotland that his power was immediately felt. His name and writings were, however, household words in the more earnest Christian homes of all Scotland and part of Ireland, as well as America. There has ever been a felt charm about all that is truly related to the Scottish Covenanters, and the name *Symington* seemed to be almost a synonym for the truest and purest blood and doctrine of the *Hill-men*, who, not without some reason, repudiated the Revolution Settlement of 1688 as an unworthy termination of Scotland's martyr-testimony and faithful contendings. The denominational strength of the Reformed Presbyterian Church has never been great, and perhaps there was a tendency among its members, as there always is in church as well as in family life, to live and insist on the bare details of a great past rather than to develop a present, resolute, and enlightened correspondence with the real meaning of a previous testimony or history, apart from the accidents which belonged to time and circumstance. However this may have been, there can be no doubt that the influence exercised by the brothers Andrew and William Symington was of a kind to broaden and elevate the inner life, the doctrinal area and the catholic sympathies of their Church.

It would be considered an over-statement were an attempt made to indicate how many men of prominence in Christian

(5) *Messiah the Prince; or, The Mediatorial Dominion of Jesus Christ.* By WILLIAM SYMINGTON, D.D. With a Memoir of the Author by his Sons. Edited by Rev. A. M. Symington, Birkenhead. T. Nelson and Sons, Edinburgh. 1881.

circles of different denominations in the west of Scotland delight to relate that at one time they sat under the ministry of William Symington in Great Hamilton Street, Glasgow. The lion-like massiveness of the man, and the dignified and powerful grasp he took of his subject, made men forget, in his commanding declaration, that his was the power of assimilation and reproduction with wonderful freshness and clearness, rather than that of original thought, or personal speculative or doctrinal elaboration. Nor was any man so aware of this as were some of the most ardent admirers of the preacher. The result was, we suspect, not all that the denomination might have desired. The deep-toned, often most pathetic spirituality of Andrew, and the strong, clear, and well-ordered presentations of truth by William Symington, created a life of impulses, freedom, and energy which very frequently found a more congenial sphere outside the denomination which had produced the men and bestowed the enlightenment and the ambitions. Thus the Symingtons raised the whole character and status of their denomination, but more than any other influence loosened the hold the denomination had on the adherence, though not on the affections, of many of its best sons. No doubt there were other influences also at work. There were changes in the world of politics, and no less deep spiritual changes in the Church of the Revolution, which resulted in the Disruption of 1843. These all together led, a few years ago, to the union of the greater and best part of the life and energy of the Reformed Presbyterian Church with the Free Church of Scotland, and a like conjunction of those of that Church across the Borders with the Presbyterian Church of England. The men who were foremost in promoting these unions were mainly such as had drunk most deeply of the spirit and caught the true logical and spiritual meaning of the contentings of the Hill-men and the teachings of the Symingtons.

It is now twenty years since Dr. William Symington passed away to his reward, leaving a name singularly revered, and a memory no less remarkably surrounded by those traditionary anecdotes which have been a peculiarity of the Hill-men and the Scottish religious peasantry generally. To this day there is no more direct way to a Scottish heart in an audience than

the telling of some old-world story of the earlier or later "Society people." It is unfortunate, as we have already remarked, that the biography has been so long delayed. The old fellowships have been broken up, the gigantic forms of most of the old bonnet lairds of Strathclyde are becoming few among the audiences of any churches, and the present onward rush of life is such that men prefer to leave the past, with whatever of themselves belongs to it, in the Books of God, rather than take time to summon it all before them and discover what they owe to it. Besides, after twenty years' delay, the biographer to whom we owe the handsome goodly volume in our hands, has wisely judged that a sketch, rather than a filled-in portrait of his honoured father, is what should now be offered. We should think he must feel, as many do, that it is to be regretted that his elder brother, who bore the name and was colleague in Glasgow with his father, was unable through enfeebled strength, extending over several years, to complete a work on which he had set his heart too deeply to relinquish it, and had too fine literary taste and perception of what was becoming the biography of such a father, to produce it otherwise than in worthy form. Those who now remain, and who will be most interested to read the Biography of Dr. Symington, may probably feel disappointed that so little of the inner social and intellectual life of the great teacher and speaker is presented to them. Mr. Symington, however, has wisely judged that, after such an interval, the religious reading public were not likely to be interested in a more detailed biography, especially as so few of what might be thought the denominational peculiarities of his Church appear in his father's life and work.

Neither in Dr. William Symington's student life, nor in his earlier religious impressions do we find anything remarkable. Even the point which probably marks his conversion is unusually uneventful for times when so much was made of experiences and processes in connection with turning to God. His feelings in view of the ministry express nothing remarkable for a man of earnest temperament and a due appreciation of the office to which he looked forward. From nothing, indeed, do we so thoroughly gain an indication of the coming eminence of the preacher as from the fact that when a probationer he often took a prominent place in the chief services of Communion occasions.

In 1819 he was ordained at Stranraer. From the first Dr. Symington was a close student of theology, and prepared with extreme care for the pulpit. Evangelical earnestness was then rare, but the preacher's freshness and power soon commanded large audiences and an admiring community for evangelical truth. Nor was this good influence felt in Stranraer only, but, as various testimonies make clear, revived Christian life attended his ministrations in many surrounding places. At Stranraer, Dr. Symington's work as an author was begun, and the best work of this kind was produced by him during his residence there. A fast and ever valued friend, Mr. M'Diarmid of Dumfries, seems to have contributed not a little literary stimulus and encouragement to the preacher and student. In 1834 his work on the *Atonement* was written, and in 1839 that on the *Mediatorial Dominion of Jesus Christ*, generally known by the name it now bears, "MESSIAH THE PRINCE." When this work was passing through the press, Dr. Symington received the degree of D.D. from the Edinburgh University.

To the influence of Dr. Alexander Duff—the great missionary of the Free Church—Dr. Symington owed the impulse which not long after resulted in the founding of the New Hebrides Mission. This remarkably interesting mission has in God's time and way fallen into the direction of the Church whose great pioneer was the instrumental cause of its origination. The son is, through his modesty, less eager than we know many others to be, to claim for his father the honour of founding this mission; nor does he tell us that another son, not in the ministry but in the eldership of the Free Church, still worthily devotes not a little of the spirit of the elder Symington to furthering the progress and deepening interest in this great work.

In 1839 Dr. Symington removed to Glasgow, at the age of forty-five, and there, in Great Hamilton Street, his popularity and influence were very great. Though the church is seated for 1000 persons, Dr. Symington for five years in succession was required to re-deliver his lecture each Lord's Day to an entirely new audience. This is perhaps a unique circumstance in the history of evangelical preaching, and the impression of these lectures is still deep on very many who then heard

them. In the great stirring questions of the *Ten Years' Conflict* Dr. Symington took a public and sympathetic part. He walked in the procession to Canonmills on 18th May 1843, and gloried in the opportunity, feeling that what his own Church had reached through blood the Free Church now reached through the surrender of all earthly good. In 1854 Dr. Symington took his elder brother Andrew's place as Professor of Theology for Reformed Presbyterian students. At the same time Dr. Goold was associated with him in professorial work. Thus occupied discharging the duties of professor for two months in the year, and during the remaining months earnest in his pastoral and pulpit work, the Lord called him away early in 1862. A prince and a great man in Israel indeed fell that day, and no one who has heard others speak of Dr. Symington can wonder at the intense though suppressed admiration and pride which the son breathes in every line and reference to his father—much honoured and beloved by God and men.

We have left little space to call attention to the work which the biography introduces. The preface to the first edition of "*MESSIAH THE PRINCE*" is dated Stranraer, January 7, 1839, and that to the second edition, Glasgow, May 1840. The present edition is much the most handsome, and is enriched with MS. notes and references by the author, carefully collated and extended by his son, the present editor. Other improvements from MS. lectures on this subject used by Dr. Symington as professor have also found a place in this reprint. Mr. Symington, as editor, writes of prominent men in the Church of Christ who have confessed to much indebtedness to this work; we can assure him that many more humble ministers and members of the Church could add a like testimony, and will equally welcome his labour of reverence and duty so lovingly conceived and so admirably executed.

Those who do not already know the book may understand its character when it is mentioned that during the great conflict which preceded the Disruption of 1843, its pages were of much service as a guiding light in that troubled and involved struggle, and its author soon became the intimate and friend of the leading spirits of the great evangelical revival of that time. Apart from what is spiritually and theologically valu-

able, the chapters on the "Spirituality of the Mediatorial Dominion," "The Mediatorial Dominion over the Church," and "The Mediatorial Dominion over the Nations," are singularly wise and powerful, and to-day worthy of the study of multitudes south of the Tweed, whose minds must be occupied with the very considerations here enforced in the midst of the strong and vigorous currents which so often and so seriously encounter each other in the religious life of churchmen. And on the other hand, all Christian men will find here material to strengthen their hands, and also their courage, in the prospect of coming conflicts, when the interests of truth may be imperilled by opposite forces. Dr. Symington in Stranraer displayed a banner for truth which has been now again unfurled, and we trust that as it served well the interests of one great struggle for spiritual freedom and the crown rights of Jesus Christ, it may do so again, and teach God's people to rest more confidently on the old truth, "THE LORD REIGNETH."

This book (6) is an account of a new codex of the Gospels, which was discovered in March 1879 by two German scholars, O. v. Gebhart and A. Harnack. They found it in the Archbishop's palace at Rossano, in north-eastern Calabria, where it is still preserved. The ms. is an uncial written in bold type on purple vellum, with silver ink, and decorated with miniatures, which are here reproduced in outline from the original water-colours.

Unfortunately more than half the ms. is lost, breaking off at St. Mark xvi. 14, in the middle of the verse. The last ten leaves have suffered severely from damp; and all have been much mutilated by the binder's knife, when it was enclosed in its present thick black-leather cover.

188 leaves still remain, size 30·7 × 26 centim., of very fine vellum, arranged in quiniones. The numbering begins on the tenth leaf, the commencement of St. Matthew's Gospel. The figures are in large silver uncials by the first scribe, marked on the right side of the lower margin. A modern hand has numbered the pages in the upper margin with Arabic numerals

(6) *Evangeliorum Codex Græcus purpureus Rossanensis* (Σ). Seine Entdeckung, sein wissenschaftlicher und künstlerischer Werth dargestellt von Oscar v. Gebhart, Göttingen, und Adolf Harnack, Giessen. Leipzig: Giesecke und Devrient. 1880.

in black ink. The same hand has also inserted the verse numbers in the text as far as the end of St. Matthew, chap. ii.

The text of St. Matthew embraces fol. 10-118; St. Mark, fol. 122-188. Of the remaining twelve leaves, one (120) is left empty: eight show the pictures, viz. 1-5, 7, 8, 121: the first half of 6 has the Ep. to Carpianus: the other two have the lists of the chapters (τίτλοι), the one, 9, of the first, and the other, 119, of the second Gospel. The heading of the first in St. Matthew, as well as in St. Mark, is *περὶ τῶν δαιμονιζομένων*. The Ammonian sections and Eusebian canons are marked in the margin, though the table is lost at the beginning.

The writing on each page is in two columns of twenty lines each, generally eleven letters in each line. The first three lines at the beginning of each gospel are written with gold ink in both columns, the rest is written with silver ink.

No accents, breathings, or division of words occur. At the end of a paragraph a point is found, and part of the line is left vacant. Initial letters lie out of the column, and are at least twice as big as the others; smaller letters occur at the end of lines. The letters are regular and well formed; the stroke of the Θ never projects, and iota adscriptum is not found in the text; the abbreviations are those of the oldest uncials.

Itacisms are frequent. Forms of the Alexandrine dialect are very common, e.g., St. Matt. xxv. 36, *ἤλθατι*: xiii. 17, *ἴδαν*: v. 36, *τρίχαν*: also such forms as *λήμφομαι*, *δεκατέσσερες*. The codex contains the concluding verses of St. Mark's Gospel, and the Doxology to the Lord's Prayer. The subscription to St. Matthew is *εὐαγγέλιον κατὰ Ματθαῖον*. In Matt. v. 32 the reading is *πᾶς ὁ ἀπολύων*: the words from *αὐτοῦ*, verse 31, to *γυναῖκα*, verse 32, being written in the margin in smaller characters, omitted by homœoteleuton. Corrections are not frequent, and are in the hand of the first scribe.

But the most interesting part of the ms. is the pictures, which comprise two title-pages, forty vignettes of Old Testament prophets, and eighteen historical pictures of the life of Christ. These last are—1. The raising of Lazarus; 2. The entry into Jerusalem; 3. The cleansing of the temple; 4. The ten virgins, the torches of the foolish are going out (*σβέννυνται*): 5 and 6. The last supper, and washing the feet, on the same page; 7. Breaking the bread; 8. Giving the

cup; 9. Jesus in Gethsemane, a stony place without trees; 10, 11. The man born blind, two parts; 12, 13. The Good Samaritan, two parts, Christ representing the Good Samaritan; 14. Christ before Pilate; 15, 16. Repentance and death of Judas, on the same page; 17. The Jews before Pilate; 18. Christ and Barabbas.

The title-page to the whole is now 5a (fol. 1-9 being wrongly bound). It is ornamented with a circular pattern, in the midst of which are the words *ὑπόθεσις κανόνος τῆς τῶν εὐαγγελιστῶν συμφωνίας*: and in medallions above, below, and on each side, are pictures of the four Evangelists.

The title-page of St. Matthew's Gospel is lost; that of St. Mark's is numbered 121a, and represents the Evangelist sitting in a portico, writing on a scroll, where are seen the opening words of his Gospel: a female figure, crowned with a nimbus, directs his work. Fol. 8 has two pictures on each page, one above the other, viz., 14, 15, 16, 17, 18.

The leaves 1-4 and 7 are divided into two parts, of which the lower is as large again as the upper; the upper part is adorned with one of the historical pictures, stretching the whole breadth of the page. The lower part is divided into oblongs 40 mm. wide. In each of these a text is written with silver ink explanatory of the picture in the upper part; in fol. 1b, which represents the entry into Jerusalem, the texts are—Pa. cxviii. 26; Zech. ix. 9; Ps. viii. 3; Zech. xiv. 9. Above each oblong stands an Old Testament prophet, with the name written above.

Our Lord is a man in his full strength; a large golden, black-bordered nimbus, in which is a Greek cross, surrounds his head. He has a purple tunic and a golden mantle. "Das reiche dunkelblonde Haar wallt, aber nicht ungeordnet, über den Nacken. Der blonde Vollbart ist über dem Kinn nicht gespalten, oder doch kaum bemerkbar. Das Gesicht ist oval, die Stirne noch nicht zu schmal, die Nase wenig gebogen. Die Augen blicken stets sehr ernst, aber doch milde."

The pictures have many life-like touches, *e.g.* in No. 2 the boys climbing into the tree to see the procession go by; and point, say the discoverers, no less than the writing, to the sixth century as the date of the MS.

T. STENHOUSE.

The family is the foundation of both Church and State. Home is the cradle of character. The destiny of nations is determined in the nursery, and the history of churches is fashioned in the thought and life that gather round family firesides. Whatever blesses the home blesses the whole community. Domestic goodness and purity mean national progress and prosperity. We want preaching on vital doctrines and mysteries, on large questions and public interests, but still more must we have from press and pulpit teaching that will make our homes more happy, holy, and helpful. Therefore we heartily welcome in its fourth edition, and warmly commend, this excellent little volume (7) with its earnest spirit and grave kind wisdom. The character and conduct of the various inmates of the home are simply and faithfully delineated—the mutual duties and uses of the ties of family life are lovingly enforced—and through all there breathes a tone of deep piety and strong religious faith. The book is neatly printed, nicely bound, and adapted for presentation by the possession of a tastefully illuminated page to receive the inscription. A more useful or suitable gift for young people just entering a home of their own could not well be found.

In Mr. Baird's volume, entitled *The Living Saviour* (8), we find a quiet charm which makes it easy to account for the favourable reception which it has had. It is the work of a mind which is at home in its theme, and hence what he has to say about Christ and about the spiritual life is spoken from the experimental, rather than the dogmatical, standpoint throughout. It has, moreover, this distinct value, that it leads us away from that atmosphere of controversy which surrounds, alas, even the holy name of Jesus, and brings us to Himself as "The Foundation of Faith," "The Object of Faith," "The Security of Grace," "The Personal Friend," "The Ultimatum of Knowledge," "The Solution of History," and "The Glory of Heaven." Mr. Baird writes as one well aware of passing discussions and siftings of faith, and we are fain to commend

(7) *The Domestic Circle*, by the Rev. John Thomson, D.D. Fourth edition. Edinburgh: Johnstone, Hunter, and Co.

(8) *The Living Saviour*, by the Rev. John Baird, Rafford Free Church. London: James Nisbet and Co.

the spirit of charity with which he regards those from whom he differs, and in which he is even anxious to show the good that has accrued to the Church from the presentation of one-sided views of Christ, and from the necessity of meeting them. At the same time, his own position, we need not say, is clearly and unhesitatingly evangelical; and his book is one which will afford much real enjoyment and suggest many elevating thoughts to the devout reader.

The subject of Palestine and what is to become of it is certainly now a living one, if not to be called either burning or pressing, and the appearance of two such books as *The Future of Palestine* (9) and *The Land of Gilead* (10) close upon one another attests its *livingness*, and, we may add, will do something to sustain its vitality. Turning to the former book first, let us say that we scarcely think that its title accurately describes its character; for really the main part of the book is made up of the history of Palestine, secular and sacred, rather than with forecasting. Hence the book, to some extent, suffers; for it is really, apart from all other things, an admirable compendium of the history of Palestine, and is worthy of extensive use from this point of view alone. The author has, we presume, given the title rather as indicating what is to him the central idea of the book, viz., What is to be done with Palestine? and we may add that, brief as it is, this is the most interesting section of the work. He is very certain that Turkish rule has been misrule, is so, and will be so, so long as it is purely Turkish; and we think he would be a rash man who should disagree with him regarding this. Everything has been neglected—government, commerce, agriculture, even means of transit. “Not a twentieth, perhaps not a fiftieth, part of the land is under cultivation, patches only here and there being farmed in slovenly fashion by the poor Fellaheen, who get a scanty living out of it by working it sometimes on their own account, but oftener on shares for the larger landholders, wealthy capitalists, many of

(9) *The Future of Palestine*, by B. Walker. London: James Nisbet and Co.

(10) *The Land of Gilead*, by Lawrence Oliphant. Edinburgh: W. Blackwood and Sons.

them residing in distant cities of the empire." The author is not, however, contented with merely sketching this sad state of things, and saying that "something must be done;" and the book may be said to culminate in a proposal that the first opportunity should be taken to have some great Power charged with the management of the country for a term of years, and that, at the expiry of this term, all the leading countries should consider, in the light of the knowledge thus gained, the question of its permanent government. We must refer the reader to the book itself, however, for the details of Mr. Walker's solution of this problem of the future; and side by side with the study of these we recommend him to follow the author in his attempt to set forth what appears to him to be the meaning and significance of Scripture prophecy on this point. Altogether the book will well repay careful perusal. Mr. Lawrence Oliphant's *Land of Gilead* differs from Mr. Walker's upon almost every point except its subject, and the conviction, which is here also strongly asserted, of the possibilities of the country. The style is very different, the proposals made are different, and Mr. Oliphant's standpoint in looking at the more religious side of the matter is, we should say, quite different. He writes as a man of high literary culture and as a lover of adventure; and even those who have little interest either in the religious associations of Palestine or in the author's detailed schemes, will be fascinated by the book. We are able to follow Mr. Oliphant and his friend step by step in their pilgrimage, and some of the scenes which he depicts rise as clearly before us as if they were painted on canvas. Few English travellers have ever, we dare say, travelled through the land in more unconventional form, and few have looked at it with more unconventional eyes; and to our mind there is a distinct advantage to be thus gained in studying the route pursued by Mr. Oliphant under his own guidance. As to his plan, he has set his eye upon a portion of Transjordanic Palestine as a suitable quarter for colonisation, a portion of great agricultural capabilities, which has hitherto been sadly neglected. In his view this part—"the Belka," as it is named—is a land of "rich plains," whose resources have not yet come within sight of development, and he proposes that a serious attempt should be made to get a Jewish colony settled here, his opinion in favour

of its being distinctively Jewish being based upon conclusions altogether independent of any reading of Scripture prophecy. With a view to this, he made a careful examination of the engineering facilities which the country offers, as well as of engineering difficulties which might crop up, and the more sentimental reader may perhaps be a little scandalised by the mention of *railways* in connection with the subject. Mr. Walker, anxious as he is for some opening up of the country, has little liking evidently for the intrusion of a railway; but Mr. Oliphant has no such scruples, and would, we have little doubt, calmly propound his scheme even to Mr. Ruskin himself. His book, whatever we may think of these details, is delightful reading, and we make little doubt that it will help to quicken public interest in the land which most of all, as the scene of our Lord's earthly ministry and His crucifixion, is so dear to every Christian heart.

Dr. Given of Londonderry has recently published a book upon a composite theme, which, in all its parts, is engaging the minds of Christian men of our day in a peculiar degree,—*The Truth of Scripture in connection with Revelation, Inspiration, and the Canon* (11). The ground over which he travels is very extensive, and it would be quite impossible for us to make any attempt to follow him within our present limits. Enough to say that Dr. Given states and enforces with considerable ability the general opinion of the Church upon the many points handled; and we may add that he can, and does, meet the free school with pretty hard hitting, as, for instance, in his chapter upon Ecclesiastes. We are rather inclined to think that Dr. Given might have circumscribed his subject with advantage, since its scope as here treated is so wide as to make it impossible to avoid the *appearance* at least of diffuseness; but by the more general reader this objection will not be felt perhaps, or it will be met by the fact that a more complete view of the whole field of study is thus given. Still we are left, Dr. Given's elaborate work notwithstanding, with the feeling that there is "large room" in our modern theological literature for some work of a pre-eminent and permanent kind upon the three

(11) *The Truth of Scripture, etc.*, by John James Given, Ph.D. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

points here discussed. The general Christian mind needs much clearing up and educating, upon the question of Inspiration especially; no one who is in the way of hearing much talk upon Holy Scripture can fail to see and note this; hence the urgent need of having the argument for plenary inspiration not merely defined theologically, but enforced in such literary form as to enable the inquiring mind which is unskilled in theological learning to appreciate its weight.

A volume of sermons which has recently appeared from the pen of Dr. C. S. Robinson of New York (12), claims a word of notice. The two episodes in Jacob's life which are represented by the names of Bethel and Penuel supply a composite theme for these sermons; and, after all the good things which we have read and heard upon it, we still find here much, very much, that is fresh and inspiring. In the part which treats of Penuel, we have been specially struck with Dr. Robinson's power of applying turns in the story to the teaching of lessons for guidance in the various issues of modern life; and what is most remarkable is that you are never conscious of any straining of an incident to make it fit. The style is sharp, incisive, lively; and we should be surprised to hear that many even of the sleeping class slept when these sermons were delivered. Not the least merit in this portion is the prominence given to the idea of wrestling as *God wrestling with us*; ordinarily, we think, this point is passed over all too slightly, and *our* wrestling receives a chief place in expositions of the passage. Dr. Robinson in this does but follow the narrative itself, which is a story of Divine wrestling with praying men. We must also mention the powerful and suggestive discourse in the first section entitled "Vows Forgotten," in which numerous practical lessons are skilfully drawn from Gen. xxxv. 1, when Jacob is commanded to return to Bethel and build an altar there. One lays aside the volume with the feeling that Bethel and Penuel mean more to him than they did before.

The appearance of a new edition of the Rev. J. Agar Beet's

(12) *Bethel and Penuel*; Twenty-Six Sermons by Dr. Charles S. Robinson. London: R. D. Dickinson.

Commentary on Romans (13) gives us the opportunity of offering it a word of welcome not the less sincere that we do not always find ourselves in harmony with his exegesis. Mr. Beet gained for himself at once a high place as an exegete through this work on its first appearance. It has great, even superlative, excellencies. Its style is clear and terse, word-economising, and the language is so well chosen that the average Christian reader will find as little difficulty in understanding the work as the trained theologian. Mr. Beet has made himself widely acquainted with the literature of his subject, but this wide study has not destroyed his independence of judgment or the decisiveness with which he explains disputed passages to his own satisfaction. Were we to go into details, there are matters not a few that would demand attention; we can only here refer to the exegesis of Romans vii. 13-25, the passage which details the strife between the law in the members and the law in the mind. Mr. Beet thinks that the reference is to the "man still unforgiven," and for this view he can claim the sanction of the Greek Fathers, as well as the authority of many modern writers; but, ably as he puts this view, we do not think that he succeeds in establishing it. It is no really overwhelming argument to say that "this is the older opinion, and was accepted by nearly all who spoke as their mother-tongue the language in which this epistle was written." Had the question involved been merely a verbal one, then this would have been very strong evidence indeed: but it is not so; and on such a point we would rather defer to the authority of a commentator because he was deeply Pauline in spirit and sympathy, than because he happened to be a Greek or a "good Grecian." Again, Mr. Beet says that this passage "absolutely contradicts all that Paul says elsewhere about himself and the Christian life;" this we must absolutely contest with such passages as viii. 23; 2 Cor. v. 2-4; 1 Cor. xv. 19, before us. The argument against Mr. Beet's view from change of tense is undoubtedly strong, and he meets it with a mere assertion of opinion that the "past tenses refer, not to Paul's state, but to the event by which he entered it," and that "the present tenses refer to the abiding state which followed the event." And, not

(13) *Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans*, by Joseph Agar Beet. Second Edition. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

to mention other points, we can scarcely help feeling that Mr. Beet was hardly driven when he made his appeal to the classics for evidence that the language used is not "inapplicable to men not yet justified." Certainly the picture which the Bible has taught us to draw of the unregenerate man is not that of one delighting inwardly in the law of God and fretting against the carnal bonds which hinder his spirit from full obedience. But we cannot pursue the matter further. We repeat our high regard for the work, despite all difference of view on special points; and in view of its profound thoughtfulness, clear style, and independent yet always reverent treatment, we look upon it as a substantial addition to our exegetical literature.

Sir Emilius Bayley's *Deep unto Deep* (14) is a book specially fitted for those who are in suffering, or who have passed through the "deep waters." It possesses one great virtue which such books do not always possess—it is a book on sorrow, but it is not a sorrowful book. Its tone is that of Christian faith and courage, and it will be useful in enabling many a Christian sufferer to take a happier view alike of pain and trial; it will help him even to grow in his suffering, not merely in patience, but in real spiritual strength. The chapters upon "Typical Sorrow," in which the various sufferers of Scripture are characterised, deserve special notice, as offering just that amount of consecutive thought which will interest without taxing the strength of the more delicate reader. We speak thankfully of the book, as full of those thoughts and feelings which we should ourselves wish to recall in the time of "deep calling unto deep."

It was a happy thought to reprint in one convenient volume the *Notes on the Book of Psalms* (15) which formed part of the extensive work known as *The Speaker's Commentary*. That section of Scripture, pervaded throughout by the aspirations and experiences of devout souls, commends itself with singular force to all earnest seekers after God. There is, indeed, no

(14) *Deep unto Deep*. By the Rev. Sir Emilius Bayley. London: Hatchards.

(15) *The Book of Psalms, with an Explanatory and Critical Commentary*. Reprinted from *The Speaker's Commentary*. London: John Murray.

lack of helps for its interpretation. In our own country, and of recent date, we may, without invidiousness, note the publication of three excellent commentaries with distinctive and valuable characteristics—Dr. Andrew Bonar's *Christ and His Church in the Book of Psalms*; Professor Perowne's *New Translation of the Psalms, with Introduction and Notes*; and Mr. Spurgeon's voluminous and edifying *Treasury of David*. In our study of this book we cannot dispense with either of these volumes, nor can we safely neglect any of the three methods of treatment which they respectively represent. But at the present time, when disturbing questions concerning the authorship and dates of many of these "Songs of Zion" are so recklessly raised, it is of importance that we should have some assistance in forming a correct judgment as to the relevancy and reasonableness of these questions. The volume before us, while in no respect defective, is pre-eminently distinguished by the marked fairness and ability with which it handles modern speculations. For this reason alone, even if there were no other, it must command the attention of students.

We turn with interest to the notes on the 51st Psalm. Our readers are aware that the followers of a certain critical school have challenged the Davidic origin of that psalm, and that they have professed to find internal evidence of a later date and authorship. Here they are met calmly and firmly, met by one who, while adhering to the orthodox catholic belief, is neither unintelligent nor uncritical:—

"This (51st) begins a series of fifteen psalms, which are attributed in the inscriptions to David, most of them with unusually full notice of the circumstances under which they were composed. They are remarkable for the prevalent, though not exclusive, use of the Divine name Elohim instead of Jehovah. In this psalm the fact may possibly be accounted for by David's feeling that his great sin had endangered, if not suspended for a season, the privileges assured to God's people by the covenant name: he might not plead that before his entire restoration to God's favour. The psalm is said in the inscription to have been written at the time when Nathan came to rebuke him for the terrible guilt which he had contracted. This is confirmed by the strongest internal evidence: of no other person known from Holy Scripture can it be affirmed, that he was a devout man before and after a grievous fall, that his fault involved blood-guiltiness, that his crime was unpunished by law, and that he was restored to God's favour. The depth of penitence and the fervour of devotion are specially characteristic of David."

We add the note that is attached to the eighteenth verse :—

"This and the following verse are supposed by most of the later commentators, and by some of an earlier age, to have been added during, or immediately after, the Babylonish captivity; but the connection of thought appears sufficiently clear and satisfactory. David has just declared that he puts no trust in sacrifices offered for the expiation of his personal guilt; for himself he has but one offering (unfeigned repentance), but as a king he feels differently; he can promise abundant sacrifices if in His goodness God will complete (i.e. enable him to complete) the building of the walls of Jerusalem. The expressions which he uses are exactly appropriate to his own time, when he considerably enlarged the city (2 S. v. 9 and 11), and encompassed the whole with walls, according to Josephus (*Ant.* vii. 3. § 2), who on such a point is not likely to be misinformed. This must have occupied some considerable time, and it has been lately shown (by Mr. Simpson in an excellent article in the *Christian Observer*, No. 333) that the walls were in progress, probably approaching their completion, just about the time of David's fall. Nothing can be more natural than this allusion under such circumstances, when the king might well feel that his crime might bring with it a punishment which would be detrimental to his people. It must be observed that there is no word which implies that the walls were in ruins; the Psalmist does not speak of rebuilding, but of building; and above all, he makes no mention of the temple, which would have been the first consideration with any devout Israelite after the captivity. That David should close a hymn full of intense personal feelings with a prayer for his country, accords well with all that we know of his generous and kingly nature, and shows that he was truly sustained by a 'free spirit.'"

This volume—and the same testimony may be freely given to the other volumes with which it is associated in *The Speaker's Commentary*—examines without fear, and discusses without obtrusiveness, the assertions of destructive criticism, in a manner that is at once seasonable and satisfactory.

Mr. Unsworth discourses clearly and correctly concerning *The Brotherhood of Men* (16). He has studied this brotherhood under three aspects—the physical, the social, and the spiritual,—and in this interesting and suggestive volume he has given us the results of his study. When we mention that under the threefold division already given there are sub-sections entitled "The Bible and Evolution," "Socialism and Christianity," and "Improved Methods of Christian Work," our readers can form a fair idea of the range and purpose of the book. Mr. Unsworth says much that is important and interesting at the present

(16) *The Brotherhood of Men; or Christian Sociology*, by the Rev. William Unsworth. Second Edition. London: Wesleyan Conference Office.

hour, about schemes for social elevation. He criticises with sagacity and common sense both strikes and lock-outs ; and he sums up this part of his argument with these simple yet incisive words :—

"The method of Socialism is to level down, the method of Christianity is to level up. Nothing but individual goodness, intelligence, and industry will improve society effectually. All else, so far, has failed to improve the social condition of the people. There are still great social evils and disharmonies, notwithstanding all that has been done by the social reformers of past centuries. 'Well, what has Christianity done?' it will be said. It has elevated the people who have accepted it, in ideas, in tastes, and in the principles of action. It has led to the establishment of humane laws, philanthropic institutions, day and Sabbath school education, and the ten thousand ameliorating influences of civilised life. And were Christianity allowed fully to operate in human society, it would totally destroy nine-tenths of the evils which now afflict the race. . . . As it is, Christianity has made the Christendom of to-day the Christendom that it is ; it has blest the individual, the family, the state ; it has given freedom, quickened intellect, and given to man the possession of himself. . . . And though some are proclaiming morality apart from the Gospel, they got their very ideas from the Bible, indirectly through literature and science, and the moral notions floating everywhere in Christendom ; and so this very people publishing what they call a natural morality are only offering stolen goods."—(Pp. 161-2.)

In the chapter on Christian work there are some excellent suggestions combined with justifiable, if sharp, fault-finding with methods at present employed. Some idea of the spirit in which this part of the book is written may be formed by a perusal of the sentences that follow :—

"The churches do not cover the whole field of Christian toil, and so the 'Salvation Army' or some such eccentric workers start up, and by their strange methods make Christianity ridiculous in the eyes of the thoughtful, intelligent public. This, however, is far more the fault of the unfaithful churches than it is the fault of the eccentric and ignorant workers, who, seeing the neglected church-work, endeavour to supply the lack of service in a rough, extravagant, out-of-the-way fashion. And if things are not done 'decently and in order,' it is infinitely better that they should be done rudely and blunderingly, than that they should never be attempted by anybody at all. When the Church of England went to sleep and neglected the masses, God raised up Methodism to do a great and glorious work for our country, and for the world. And if the Established and Nonconforming Churches become indifferent to the multitudes who neglect God's house and ordinances, then God will do His great work by the 'irregulars,' since the 'regulars' in the properly drilled and equipped army fail in their duty."—(Pp. 289-90.)

This book, though unpretending, is replete with wise thought and practical good sense.

We are glad to find that Mr. Conder's *Basis of Faith* (17) has reached a second edition, and we heartily bespeak for it a wide circulation in this cheaper and more convenient form. When it first appeared we read it with great delight and satisfaction. On a second reference to it we are confirmed in our opinion that it is one of the best modern statements of the theistic argument. Mr. Conder knows what has been said on the other side; and, better still, he knows how to meet it.

Instead of Many (18) is the quaint title under which a very thoughtful and devout little book has been issued. The whole doctrine of substitution is expounded and illustrated in its pages in an eminently edifying manner. Although evidently written with competent theological knowledge, the author seeks chiefly to serve the household of faith, and he has prepared a book that will give clearness of thought to many minds, and comfort to many hearts.

Mrs. Meredith is so well known as a worker among the criminal classes that any of her utterances upon this subject (19) ought to command the careful attention of all who are interested in their elevation or in the prevention of crime. Many remarkable instances are given of the conversion of men and women, who, to any other than one full of faith in the regenerating power of the Spirit of God, would have seemed utterly hopeless. Their criminal characteristics and modes of thought are strikingly delineated, and while, with the writer, we magnify the Divine grace which has saved so many, we close the book with a feeling of sadness, that in the midst of our boasted civilisation, and notwithstanding all our religious and philanthropic efforts, there should be living in our midst a race, we had almost said, without God and without hope in the world, and with earnest prayer that more labourers may be sent into this most difficult and often dangerous sphere of labour.

(17) *The Basis of Faith: A Critical Survey of the grounds of Christian Theism*. The Congregational Union Lecture for 1877, by Eustace R. Conder, M.A. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

(18) *Instead of Many*, by R. Graves Walker, B.A. London: James Nisbet and Co.

(19) *A Book about Criminals*, by Mrs. Meredith. London: Nisbet and Co.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

J U L Y 1 8 8 1.

ART. I.—*Recent Attacks on Calvinism.*¹

MR. DALE is good enough in his new volume to tell us that "Calvinism is dead, and dead things soon become unlovely, hideous, and disgusting."² So dead is it, in his opinion, that with admirable generosity he declines to attack it with any vehemence.

"I wonder," he says, "that it should be thought necessary to attack the old creed with any vehemence. There are errors and falsehoods enough in the actual belief of living men to task all our strength ; it is a waste of time to denounce a theology which was once crowned, sceptred, and enthroned, but whose power is quite broken, and whose life indeed has gone out of it. Like the rest of the world, I have given up Calvinism ; and twenty years ago, when it had an arm vigorous enough to strike rather heavily any one that challenged its authority, I used to preach against it rather frequently and with hot energy ; but the time has come for considering the idea which is now in the ascendant, and which fills as large a place in the minds of men to-day as Calvinism did in the period of its power."³

¹ *The Evangelical Revival and other Sermons ; with an Address on the work of the Christian Ministry in a period of Theological Decay and Transition.* By R. W. Dale, M.A. London, 1880.

Calvinism, Fatalism, and Materialism : a Sermon preached in Westminster Abbey, November 20, 1880, by the Rev. Canon Farrar, D.D., and printed in the *Christian World Pulpit*.

² P. 194.

VOL. XXX.—NO. CXVII.

³ P. 195.

2 D

Meanwhile it is evident that, if Mr. Dale deems vehemence needless now in dealing with Calvinism, Canon Farrar is of a different opinion. The "old creed," in his view, is not dead, but has only got its "death-wound," and it is doubtless in the hope of expediting its expected and longed-for demise that he proceeds to pour upon it, or rather, we should say, upon his own conception of it, his vials of red-hot rhetoric, in which art he is confessedly a master.

But both these melancholy "bulletins" are suspicious, since they proceed from avowed and bitter enemies of the system in question, and readers of them will suspect from the denunciations indulged in that the "old creed" has more vitality than these enemies at all allow, and may survive both assaults and assailants.

How long Mr. Dale accepted and held Calvinism before, as he tells us, he gave it up, "like the rest of the world," we do not know. He speaks about his denomination beginning the surrender of its Calvinism about a century since;¹ but he admits having been catechetically trained in the system,² and having held it for a season, when, we suppose, he was very young. It will be in the recollection of some that, in his biography of his excellent predecessor, J. Angell James, his criticism of the *Anxious Inquirer* was not very satisfactory or reassuring. He is, however, candid enough to recall his first impressions of the system when he says, "When Calvinism was a living faith it had a great deal of beauty in it, and it had the strength of the granite rocks."³ We naturally ask, when passing on to his present report about its death and subsequent corruption, When did the change in the system take place? When did its pulse cease to throb? Did Mr. Dale hold the glass to the dying system's face? Was he the only witness present? For, so far as we know, the Calvinism of to-day is essentially the same as the Calvinism of Mr. Dale's early days; it has as a system the same elements of beauty in it, and, as we hope to show, the same elements of strength.

The truth is that it is Mr. Dale and "the rest of the world" with whom he happens to be acquainted who have been changing. The charge of corruption comes with singular inconsistency in a book whose closing chapter is "An Address on

¹ P. 22.² P. 263.³ P. 194.

the work of the Christian Ministry in a period of Theological Decay and Transition,"¹ and from a man who has recently given up his belief in "Everlasting Punishment," as well as in Calvinism, and who is manifestly in search of some definite theology. The theological decay is not Calvinistic, but belongs to the opponents of the system, who fancy themselves the sum-total of existing thinkers. Calvinism has been changeless like the sun in the heavens, and it is by a mere *lapsus pennæ* that Mr. Dale has attributed his own and his friends' theological aberrations to the system he has for twenty years attacked. The rhetoric about the death and corruption of Calvinism, therefore, needs, to say the least of it, some little revision.

Whether Mr. Dale is justified in radiating his theological doubts and difficulties upon the world or no is for himself to consider. He has indeed given young preachers admirable advice in his *Nine Lectures on Preaching* against indulging in "the intellectual amusement of destroying the theological creed of other people."² And the volume under present review enables us to understand the preface to his *American Lectures*, where he observes, "I have tried to strike hardest at the evils which have lessened the power of my own ministry." He may possibly excuse himself by asserting that along with his destructive criticisms he has been giving positive teaching well fitted to supply the place of the "old creed" he has given up. We admit that as a preacher of "moral" sermons, to adopt Mr. Dale's own phraseology, he has few, if any, equals; but his efforts at reconstructing theology, even in his most pretentious book, *The Atonement*, are of the most meagre description.³

¹ It is "Transition" on the title-page, but "Reconstruction" in the body of the work. The address was delivered to the students of Airedale College, now presided over by the rather nebulous theologian, Rev. A. M. Fairbairn, D.D. ² P. 20.

³ It is somewhat amusing to read in Mr. Dale's *Discourses on Special Occasions* these words: "It is surely a melancholy sign of the spirit of these times, that while much public curiosity and interest are excited by questions purely ecclesiastical, and by controversies which involve some elementary and preliminary inquiries connected with Divine revelation, there are so few men of great powers who address themselves to the deeper and grander truths of the Christian faith. The race of theologians seems for the present almost extinct. We look in vain for the genius and scholarship which should instruct our own generation in those doctrines which are most characteristic of Apostolical Christianity; . . . to illustrate and unfold the glorious mystery of His Atonement, to present to the mind and conscience of our contemporaries any worthy exhibition of its moral significance, is a task

Canon Farrar, on the other hand, although according to Dr. Pusey educated in the rigid Calvinistic school,¹ has not a single kindly word to say about either its beauty or its strength. One would suppose from his fiery rhetoric that the system had produced an unexampled crop of persecutors. If this be not the insinuation of the following passage, we fail to see in it any intelligible meaning, and must set it down, with many other passages from the same pen, as having been written for writing's sake:—

“If reason and conscience and love are thus to be choked with cruel sophisms, and revelation and hope are thus to be smitten back, as though they were so many wild beasts, by the iron bar of a revolting and remorseless orthodoxy, then let us at least be consistent, let us once more heap up the fagots on the extinguished fires of Smithfield, and Seville, and Toledo. Let heretics once more gasp out their agonising souls in such flames as Calvin kindled for Servetus.”

As a matter of simple fact, however, while we acknowledge that Calvinists have been only men, and, according to their system, have made no claim to sinless perfection, we can review the history of Calvinism with as much well-founded satisfaction as can the professors of any other system in the world.

We propose in the present paper, however, to consider neither the history nor the popularity, but the *truth* of the Calvinistic system. There is at present a very great tendency to make popularity the test of a system, but we have yet to learn that the *vox populi* is necessarily *vox Dei*. Mr. Dale seems quite unduly impressed with the idea that only a really strong man here and there holds fast to the Calvinistic theology.² But if the general average be taken, we have no hesitation in claiming for the Augustinian or Calvinistic system, from the days of Augustine down, the allegiance of the really strong men. The late Canon Mozley was struck with the fact in his review of the scholastic theology, and, as the very strongest thinker we have had in the English Church since the days of Bishop Butler, his acceptance of predestination, and of Calvinism in all but the name, ought to have some

requiring powers of another order than are engaged at present in religious controversy.” And mindful, or forgetful, of this criticism of theological incapacity at present exhibited, and of the great requirements of the theme, he has himself written a volume on *The Atonement*!

¹ Pusey on *What is of Faith to Everlasting Punishment*, p. 6.

² P. 194.

weight in an age like ours.¹ Besides, the Presbyterian Church, to which we have the honour to belong, is not numerically so insignificant a body as to be fairly ignored by Mr. Dale; and we can assure him that dishonest subscription of our Calvinistic formularies is much rarer than such a volume as the *Scotch Sermons* and insinuations in reviews would lead outsiders to suppose. Presbyterians, as a denomination, are still honestly committed to the Calvinistic system, and we can claim our fair proportion, to say the very least, of erudite theologians. But, after all, the question in debate is the *truth* of the system, which must be determined by another canon than a count of heads, be they large or small.

In conducting a controversy, however, disputants must discover a common ground; and here unfortunately, in the present instance, our difficulties begin. We Calvinists contend for the whole canon of Scripture as an inspired book. We feel bound in consequence to respect every *word*, for which there is critical authority, as well as every sentence it contains. We profess to found our system upon a fair induction of Scripture passages, not torn from their context, as Canon Farrar insinuates, but interpreted according to the analogy of faith and the laws of the human mind. We contend that our system alone covers the whole range of Scripture; and even such a bitter opponent as Mr. Matthew Arnold is constrained to admit, regarding one portion of the Epistle to the Romans, that "St. Paul here undoubtedly falls into Calvinism."² His way out of this dilemma is characteristic; he simply charges St. Paul with error in introducing the idea, for he contradicts himself, the critic assumes, a little further on, when he says, "Who-soever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved."³ A writer who, in his inordinate self-confidence, can say of Hymeneus and Philetus that if they rejected Paul's tenets about the approaching Messianic advent, and the resurrection then to take place, then "they were right where Paul was wrong;"⁴ and who can write without hesitation of St. Paul's "real imperfection both as a thinker and as a writer,"⁵ will of course dismiss Calvinism, even though St. Paul falls into it,

¹ Cf. Mozley on *Predestination*, first edition, p. 281.

² *St. Paul and Protestantism*, third edition, p. 99.

³ P. 101.

⁴ *Note*, p. 86.

⁵ P. 98.

as erroneous because unintelligible and unacceptable to Matthew Arnold! But his admission is significant; and as Calvinists we accept it, while we hold up to deserved scorn such pretentious and high-handed dealing with what we believe to be inspired.

Our present opponents, however, while perhaps not prepared to sit in judgment upon Scripture with such barefaced effrontery as Mr. Arnold, substantially take up the rationalistic position. Canon Farrar's views upon *Inspiration* are characterised by the same hesitancy as his views upon *Eternal hope*. He seems to incline to the view of Schleiermacher, that Biblical inspiration only differs in degree from that of literary genius; but thinks himself safest in hazarding no definite opinion.¹ Yet he feels warranted to use such language as this: "Any doctrine of a continuous supernatural inspiration, of an influence directly and immediately divine over the entire extent of the sacred volume, seems to involve a conclusion antagonistic to all our natural feelings when we read its different parts." We are not surprised, therefore, to find in the sermon immediately before us the following counsel regarding the proof texts of Calvinism: "If these texts did mean Calvinism, then these texts must themselves be set aside as flat contradictions of nine-tenths of the rest of Scripture." We are dealing, it is plain, with a writer who has no hesitation in setting aside whatever seems to contradict his idea. "As to the texts," he says, "they will afford no difficulty whatever except to the usurped infallibility of a foolish literalism." And that we are doing no injustice to him will be evident from the example he gives us of his method in his book on *Eternal Hope*. That book, to quote Dr. Pusey, "of unhappy popularity," than which, we take leave to say, no greater insult was ever offered to the understanding of Englishmen, is really an inverted pyramid of rhetoric built upon a single passage of Scripture, whose interpretation is disputed, and in defiance of a multitude of passages which no ingenuity could possibly square with his idea. It is no wonder, therefore, that the proofs of Calvinism from Scripture receive scant courtesy at his hands.

¹ Cf. his articles on "Inspiration" in *The Bible Educator*, vol. i., also his casual references to the subject in his *Life of Christ*, his *Life and Work of St. Paul*, etc.

The attitude of Mr. Dale towards Scripture, while not characterised by Canon Farrar's recklessness of assertion, is really rationalistic too. It will be best seen, perhaps, in his little volume, *The Ultimate Principle of Protestantism*. This lecture is a popular rendering of Thomas Erskine's essay on *The Bible in relation to Faith*.¹ It represents the Protestant position as one ultimately of *independence* of the Bible. If the Bible has conducted the soul into the presence and fellowship of Christ, then in this fellowship we become independent of the book, much as we lay aside a guide-book or time-table when we have reached our destination. What Mr. Erskine meant was quite different from what is contemplated by Mr. Dale. Mr. Erskine meant that in the stress of critical controversies—for his essay was written when *Essays and Reviews*, and *Colenso on the Pentateuch*, were under discussion—we may preserve our personal peace through relying on the Lord, to whom the attacked Bible has guided us, as prepared in due season to vindicate His own Word. Faith in Him gives us rest amid the critical perplexities of the time. But our interest in the whole Word of God suffers no diminution in consequence, nor are we intended to be in any sense independent of it. But Mr. Dale would have us to believe that Protestantism in its ultimate principle consists in entering by the help of Holy Scripture into union with our Lord, and then assuming at His side independence of His book. "Protestantism," he says, "according to its fundamental principle, does not accept the truth of the *teaching* of Holy Scripture, merely because it acknowledges the *authority* of Holy Scripture; it would be more accurate to say that it acknowledges the authority of Holy Scripture, because it accepts the truth of its teaching."² On this theory "private judgment" has no real check or limitation through the Divine Word; it is, on the contrary, the judge and arbiter thereof. We take leave to say that this is not Protestantism, but Rationalism pure and simple.

The first requisite of theological controversy, therefore, at the present time, is the determination of what we are to understand by *Inspiration*. So long as the "Word of God" is not accepted reverentially as the supreme court of appeal, but is itself *sub judice*, so long may we expect theological

¹ *The Spiritual Order and other Papers*, pp. 76-97.

² P. 63.

vagaries to abound. Into this subject of *Inspiration*, however, we cannot at present enter. Nor shall we marshal the "proof texts" of Calvinism, a much larger and compacter band than our opponents seem to imagine. Dr. Channing, in his *Moral Argument against Calvinism*, said, in view of these proof passages, "Let the Scriptures be read with a recollection of the spirit of Christianity, and with that *modification of particular texts* by this general spirit, which a just criticism requires, and Calvinism would no more enter into the mind of the reader than Popery—we had almost said, than heathenism." When we have opponents to deal with who are virtually prepared for such a method as this, the production of our proof texts will seem to them "love's labour lost." We propose, therefore, to take up the *misrepresentations* of our system, so as at once to place it in a clear light, and convict our opponents of having utterly misunderstood it.

I. We shall begin, then, with our foundation doctrine of original sin, whose element of *imputation* has been characterised as "monstrous." "The doctrine of original sin," says Mr. Dale, "as far as it asserted hereditary corruption, is indeed only another form of stating a moral theory which is regarded as a modern scientific discovery; but the imputation of the guilt of Adam's sin to his descendants seems to us a monstrous and intolerable conception."¹ Now, we would remark at once, that the moral inference made by scientific men from their "law of heredity" has gone to minimise, if not altogether destroy, the sense of individual responsibility. The allegation is that, because we have inherited certain tendencies, we ought not to be held accountable for the *entire* of our conduct. Deduct what is due to inheritance, and the residuum will hardly be worth talking about. The sense of sin, on this line of argument, is wellnigh extinguished. But we deny most emphatically that this is the testimony of conscience in the matter. The scientific inference and the testimony of conscience are diametrically opposed. In fact, when we analyse sin, we find that its chief guilt lies in its being a *nature*, and not a mere *act*. Each sinful act is found to spring out of a sinful *nature*, sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, and it is for the possession of this *nature* we feel we are *guilty*.

¹ P. 194.

We have said that the act of sin may sometimes spring *unconsciously* out of the sinful nature. Just as in walking we are not conscious of an act of will at every step, and yet the will is in exercise, since we can stop when we please, so many acts of sin are performed as matters of habit, in a mechanical, unconscious way, and yet the will is in exercise below consciousness, and for the acts we are held responsible and guilty. It will not do, therefore, in analysing sin, to keep to the surface and assert that conscious volition is essential to sin and guilt. We are forced to go down to that *nature* out of which sinful acts spring, some, as we have seen, consciously, others unconsciously, but for all of which we are justly held guilty.¹

As an illustration of how sin should be analysed, let us take our Lord's dealings with the lawyers, as given in Luke xi. 47-51 : "Woe unto you ! for ye build the sepulchres of the prophets, and your fathers killed them. Truly ye bear witness that ye allow the deeds of your fathers : for they indeed killed them, and ye build their sepulchres. Therefore also said the wisdom of God, I will send them prophets and apostles, and some of them they shall slay and persecute ; that the blood of all the prophets, which was shed from the foundation of the world, may be required of this generation : from the blood of Abel unto the blood of Zacharias, who perished between the altar and the temple : verily I say unto you, it shall be required of this generation." These lawyers, be it observed, repudiated the sin of their fathers in killing the prophets. They even went so far as to build the sepulchres of the murdered men, to show that they had no sympathy with the murders. And yet our Lord declares they will be held accountable for all the blood of the prophets shed from the foundation of the world. We have little doubt but these lawyers denounced Christ's doctrine, as Mr. Dale does the Calvinistic view of original sin, as monstrous ; but it so happens that the parallel between the two cases is complete. On what principle does our Lord's deliverance proceed ? On the ground that *sin is a nature*. These lawyers were going in heartily for the murder of Christ, while they were repudiating the murder of previous prophets. But the murder of Christ was only the outcome of a *natural*

¹ Cf. Dr. W. G. T. Shedd's admirable essay on Original Sin, in his *Discourses and Essays* (Andover, 1856), pp. 219-271.

antipathy towards God's witnesses, and so their attitude towards Christ showed an attitude towards God identical with that of their forefathers who murdered the prophets. They would have done the same to the prophets had they been the contemporaries instead of the successors of all their forefathers. So far as the murder of God's martyrs was concerned, they were justly held responsible for *all* the blood, because of the murderous *nature* they entertained, which broke forth against the Prince of Life.

In the very same way are we all related to the initial act of sin on the part of our first parents. That sin of eating the forbidden fruit, as Augustine long ago acutely observed, was not the fall of man, but the consequence of his fall. His fall took place when he began—perhaps not very consciously or deliberately at first, but ultimately with the deliberation which gave birth to the act—to *doubt* God's goodness and love in forbidding him to touch the tree. The attitude of suspicion and distrust taken up by our first parents constituted the fall. It was a fall away from *faith* in God. It is consequently most superficial to repudiate the *act* of our first parents in their representative capacity, when the *spirit* which prompted the act is the very same into which we find ourselves entering with the first dawn of consciousness.

But our opponents will say, If we are born with this bent of antagonism to God, how can we be accountable for it? This might be tenable if by original sin were meant a *physical taint* which affects the Will, dragging it in a certain direction despite its protestations; but original sin lies in the Will itself, as the citadel of our personality. For this antagonism of Will towards God we feel, in unbiassed moments, *guilty*. Hence the imputation objected to really rests upon a more thorough analysis of sin than our opponents ever attempt, and deeper views of sin, on Mr. Dale's own admission,¹ are needed above all else now.

II. We proceed, secondly, to observe that Calvinism does *not* imply a belief that God has elected only a small minority to everlasting life, and passed by the vast majority, who are doomed to eternal death. It merely contends for the fact that God has arranged from all eternity how many are to be

¹ Pp. 169-170.

saved, and how many passed by, reserving the actual number to Himself.

The view which is given of Calvinism by our opponents is that it asserts the election to everlasting life of a *few*, and the reprobation of the vast mass of mankind. Canon Farrar has reiterated this *ad nauseam* in his book on *Eternal Hope*.¹ He repeats the charge in the sermon now under consideration. Dr. Pusey takes the same view of the Calvinistic creed, as an allegation of the election of a small minority and of the reprobation of the vast majority.² We have simply to reply that with *numbers* Calvinism has nothing to do. It simply asserts that God has left nothing in His plan contingent, but determined all. We grant that some Calvinistic writers have expressed themselves unguardedly upon the point, and led their readers to suppose that, in their opinion, the elect at last will be few compared with the lost. But this was simply their *opinion*, and it constitutes no part of the system with which they identified themselves. It constitutes no part of the *Confession of Faith* or the *Catechisms* which office-bearers in Calvinistic churches are required to subscribe, and it would be well if our opponents applied themselves to the refutation of our acknowledged documents instead of seizing upon individual *opinions* which are outside the principles in debate, and which bind nobody but their authors.

Doubtless the eighteen articles concerning *predestination* adopted by the Synod of Dort were abbreviated by Dan. Tilenus into a single article, which was reported by the hostile Heylin and adopted by Bishop Tomline, to this effect: "That God, by an absolute decree, hath elected to salvation a very small number of men, without any regard to their faith and obedience whatsoever, and secluded from saving grace all the rest of mankind, and appointed them by the same decree to eternal damnation, without any regard to their infidelity and impenitency." And this may have imposed on our second-hand theologians as Calvinism. It so happens, however, that the words "a very small number of men," have been substituted for the original "a certain number of men," and, so far from the rest being appointed to eternal damnation without

¹ *Eternal Hope*, pp. xxii, xxxii, xxxiv, 68, 71 n, 91, 128, 155, 179.

² Cf. Pusey on *What is of Faith as to Everlasting Punishment*, p. 8.

any regard to their infidelity and impenitency, the genuine article declares that "the non-elect God hath passed by and decreed to leave in the common misery into which they had, *by their own fault*, cast themselves, and at length, not only on account of their unbelief, but also of all *their other sins*, to condemn and eternally punish, to the manifestation of his own *justice*." Hence the representation of Calvinism made by Heylin, Tomline, and their followers is a calumny got up by our opponents, and unworthy of honest debate.¹

The truth is that many strict Calvinists cherish a quite different hope. We hope, in perfect consistency with our system, that the immense majority of the human race shall yet be brought to glory.

"It is no tenet of Calvinism," says Mr. Paul in the work just quoted, "that the number of the elect is smaller than that of the reprobate. Many Calvinists believe the very reverse. Our Westminster Divines wisely abstain from giving any opinion on the subject. With regard to the *number* or *proportion* of those who will be finally saved we have no controversy with any except those who maintain a universal restoration. From the very nature of the case all rational controversy is excluded. 'Secret things belong to the Lord our God.' Socinians, Arminians, Arians, and Calvinists are all equally ignorant, and must remain so, till the judgment of the great day. Our opponents may, therefore, save themselves the trouble of any reference to the number of the elect, for on this subject we profess ourselves totally ignorant. Should any ask me, 'Are there few that be saved?' I can only answer, in the words of our Saviour, 'Strive to enter in at the strait gate, for many, I say unto you, will seek to enter in, but shall not be able.'"²

And in proof that Calvinists cultivate the widest and highest hope, we may be allowed to quote Dr. Charles Hodge, who, in his *Systematic Theology*,³ when speaking of the salvation of all who die in infancy, says—

"The Scriptures nowhere exclude any class of infants, baptized or unbaptized, born in Christian or in heathen lands, of believing or unbelieving parents, from the benefits of the redemption of Christ. All the descendants of Adam, except those of whom it is expressly revealed that they cannot inherit the kingdom of God, are saved. This appears to be the clear meaning of the Apostle (Rom. v. 18, 19), and therefore he does not hesitate to say that where sin abounded grace has much more abounded, that the benefits of redemption far exceed the evils of the fall, that the number of the saved far exceeds the number of the lost."

¹ Cf. Rev. John Paul's admirable volume, *A Refutation of Arianism and Defence of Calvinism*, pp. 23-25.

² *Ut supra*, p. 306.

³ Vol. i. p. 26.

Hence, as Calvinists, we have no sympathy with such a remark as this of Zanchius when he says, "The blessing of election, somewhat like the Sibylline books, rises in value proportionably to the fewness of its objects," nor with such a line of remark as Dr. Goulburn has quite recently adopted to substantiate his "doctrine of the Fewness of the Saved."¹ These ideas may be agreeable to some minds, and they are welcome to them, but they form no part of our Calvinistic system.

III. We proceed, in the third place, to set in a proper light the nature of *election* and *reprobation*. It has been assumed by our opponents that reprobation is the opposite of election, and that it means an arbitrary decree of damnation launched forth against a certain number of mankind, preventing the possibility of their salvation, even if they desired to be saved. But this is an entire misconception. The opposite of *Election* is *Non-election*, the opposite of *Reprobation* is *Approbation*. It is possible to come through the grace of assurance to the sweet consciousness that we belong to the elect, but no human being has any evidence, either in Scripture or in his own condition, that he has *not* been elected. An anxious soul, in entertaining the notion that he is not elected, is yielding to a suggestion of the devil, which has no warrant in God's Word or in his experience. Indeed, the anxiety and fear entertained by such a soul should be presumptive evidence that the Holy Spirit is operating within him. Who are *non-elect* is known only to God. The charge of being a "scapegrace" and a "ne'er-do-well" is uttered by men without any authority, and often with a strange want of heart. The election of individuals, therefore, as exercised by God, is a matter of pure sovereignty, and interferes in reality with no individual rights; and, since the names of the non-elect are not revealed, no anxious soul should allow himself to be ensnared by the imagination that he may be non-elect. His anxiety is a presumption the other way.

On the other hand, as we have stated, the opposite of *Reprobation* is *Approbation*. Those are reprobate whose conduct God cannot approve of. Scripture uses the term in such a way as to demonstrate that it is *not* equivalent to the *non-elect*. Thus Paul says, 2 Cor. xiii. 5, "Know ye not that Jesus Christ

¹ Dr. Goulburn on *Everlasting Punishment*, second edition, pp. 240-259.

is in you, except ye be reprobates?" Now this cannot mean that they were not elected, if Christ was not in them. But it means that up to the time when Christ is formed in souls the hope of glory, they are in God's sight *reprobate*, that is, He cannot approve of their life and conduct. Reprobation is consequently the condition of the soul so long as God cannot approve of its course of action. The condition may cease if the soul trusts in Christ and admits Him into the heart. Then reprobation gives place to approbation, and God delights in the ransomed soul. There are also cases where the reprobate condition continues, and God has no alternative but to loathe all who continue in that state. This is exactly His relation to the finally impenitent. His holy nature cannot but reprobate the unholy and impenitent soul. It is seen, then, that *Reprobation* is a necessity with God; He cannot do otherwise than reprobate the souls who continue in their sinful condition; the reprobation rests upon the holiness and purity of His character. But election rests upon the free and sovereign will of God. The two doctrines are consequently entirely distinct, and they ought in no respect to be confounded.¹

IV. But our opponents will say that, even granting Calvinism contends only for God's determination of the number of the elect and His holy reprobation of the remainder, it is open to the charge of attributing *partiality* to God. Must not God be partial if, as Calvinists contend, He has elected some to everlasting life and passed the others by? This charge is of old standing, but Mr. Dale has in his volume reproduced it. "Calvinism taught," he tells us, "that God does not love all men alike."² In the course of the same sermon where he makes this charge he acknowledges that God loves some with a special love, because they keep His commandments, and with rare candour he affirms towards the close—

"One of the great lessons we have to learn is to receive the forgiveness of sin for Christ's sake. *And it is for Christ's sake that God loves with a special love those who love Christ and who obey Christ's commandments.* We dishonour Christ if we think that this is incredible."³

¹ See on this whole subject, and on several other difficulties, *Help to Zion's Travellers*, by Robert Hall, the father of the famous Baptist divine. It is one of those precious little volumes that should not be let die.

² P. 194.

³ Pp. 209, 210.

The lines we have italicised really concede the whole Calvinistic position. They affirm that the reason of the Divine love, even when special, is not in the sinner but in his Saviour. We could desire no more complete surrender than Mr. Dale in this passage affords us; and we might ask Mr. Dale to reconcile such a statement as this with those denunciations of partiality which he would apply to the Calvinistic position.

We are anxious, however, to meet the charge fairly and squarely, without availing ourselves of an author's inconsistencies. The word "grace," we may remark at the outset, suggests the idea of *favour*. It means free, unmerited, gratuitous favour. "Salvation by grace" is salvation through the free, unmerited, gratuitous favour of God, and this, we maintain, is the very essence of the Calvinistic system. And we are ready to grant that it sounds uncommonly like unfair favouritism, or, as our opponents would put it, partiality. But a little further insight reveals the glorious fact that salvation by free grace, as we Calvinists hold it, is the *very essence of impartiality*. The gospel preached by us Calvinists is the offer of salvation on the ground of nothing in any one of us, but solely on the ground of our Saviour's merits and atonement. Every soul must divest himself of every hope of commending *himself* to God. He must take his place with the "common herd." He has, strictly speaking, no more to recommend him to God than the vilest sinner that lives. The offer as thus made by us Calvinists is an *impartial* offer; it is strictly "without respect of persons;" no personal claims will be regarded, and every one who falls in with this plan of free grace has renounced all pretence to the possession of personal claims; he accepts God's salvation, conscious that he is an unworthy, hell-deserving sinner. Of course this gospel which as Calvinists we proclaim is most offensive to the "natural man;" it humiliates the whole human race; it sets aside all personal claim as a great impertinence; it makes all men equally undeserving of Divine consideration. Who are they, then, who reject such a salvation? Manifestly those who fancy they have some shred or patch of merit to present to God; those who clamour for acceptance on the ground of some fancied personal claim, that is, those who want exceptional treatment or *partiality*.

It appears, therefore, that the representation which we

Calvinists make of the Divine grace *alone* redeems God's character from the charge of partiality. God in the exercise of sovereign grace proposes to treat all men as alike undeserving; He casts them all down from every pretension to His favour; He offers all alike a free and full salvation; and, if any will not take His way of it, it can only be because they insist on partial treatment, and are too proud to accept of that royal treatment which is in its inmost essence the strictest impartiality.

Self-righteousness in every shape and form is a claim for exceptional and partial treatment. God, therefore, in reprobating the self-righteous, is really insisting on maintaining towards His fallen creatures the position of strict impartiality. It is not the Calvinistic system most assuredly, but its rival, which attributes partiality to God. If God saves men because they make a better use of "common grace" than their neighbours; if He saves men because of foreseen faith and good works which they have been so fortunate as to manufacture out of the "common grace," made over as raw material to all; and if He rejects others because they have not succeeded in working up these qualifications, it is idle to speak any longer of Him as being "no respecter of persons." Salvation in the Arminian view is really a matter of personal effort; it is bestowed on the ground of personal merit, for personal considerations. So that it is the Arminian system of Mr. Dale and Canon Farrar which really attributes partiality to God.

"It was the crime of Simon Magus," says an excellent writer, "that he thought the Holy Ghost might be purchased with money; and it would have been a happy circumstance had the spirit and essence of his crime died with him, or with that age; but alas! it is but too evident, while we find persons saying that when we exert our natural efforts, etc., the Spirit will help us, and turn our natural aids into supernatural ones, that though the *letter* of Simon's crime is not common among us, the *essence* of it still prevails. But if the exertions of our natural abilities are the inducements or *circumstances* that encourage the Spirit to work, grace is no more grace."¹

V. But our opponents will say—"Suppose the gospel offer be the impartial thing you represent it, it cannot by Calvinists be *sincerely offered* to all men if a certain number of them only are elected to everlasting life." On account of this suspicion of insincerity many theologians have maintained the necessity

¹ Samuel Ecking's *Essays on Grace*, p. 84.

for a universal atonement as the only possible ground for a sincere general offer. The real gist of this objection to Calvinism may be best seen in the work of Dr. J. M'Leod Campbell upon the *Nature of the Atonement*. The limitation of the atonement, he maintains, "takes away the warrant which the universality of the atonement gives to every man that hears the gospel to contemplate Christ with the personal appropriation of the words of the apostle, 'who loved me, and gave himself for me.'"¹

We would remark, then, that there are two positions possible upon this subject: first, we may declare it impossible for God to be sincere in His general offer, if His atonement be limited in its extent; or, secondly, we may believe it possible for the Almighty to reconcile a limited atonement with a general offer, and that He will do so in His own good time, while our duty meanwhile is to proclaim the gospel fully and freely upon the ground of this assurance. The latter is the Calvinistic position. It is the attitude of trust. It is the resolve to walk by faith, and not by sight, in this high mystery. The advocates of a universal atonement, on the other hand, refuse to give God credit for the ability to make the reconciliation between the definite and limited atonement and the general offer of His gospel. They seem to think that the skein becomes too tangled for the Divine fingers, that the general proclamation may be so accepted as to upset the definite purposes of the Most High, that, in a word, the Omniscience and Omnipotence of God are insufficient as a guarantee against a collision between the electing decree and the general offer of the gospel. But according to the Calvinist, God's purpose in the atonement cannot be defeated, all are saved at last who were "fore-ordained unto eternal life," and the shooting of the gospel net encloses exactly those intended by the Almighty, neither more nor less. No fringe of uncertainty, so far as God is concerned, surrounds the arrangement. In offering the gospel unto all, we act as Calvinists in obedience to our commission, and we have perfect trust that God will solve the mystery at the last. This is a higher view, we maintain, than to suppose Christ died *in vain* for the lost, simply that we might with mental satisfaction, born of sense and sight, proclaim without reserve the gospel unto men. As a specimen of the length to which

¹ Third Edition, p. 60.

an advocate of universal atonement is led in reflecting upon the character of the Almighty, we would make two quotations from Mr. Dale.

"The rejecters of the gospel are lost," he says, "not because 'they have no interest in the death of Christ,' but because, although He has actually atoned for their sin, they reject the pardon which is now within their reach. They perish, not because they have sinned, but because they refuse to have their sin forgiven. Not by any irresistible necessities of their moral nature do they drift into outer darkness and inconsolable despair: but because by a daring and appalling act of free will, the significance of which eternity alone can disclose, they resist, they *vanquish*, the *infinite mercy of God*, and, with their own hand, destroy their solitary hope of everlasting holiness and everlasting joy."¹

Again, in the book more immediately under review:—

"Those who finally refuse to return will be, in the most terrible sense, *lost sheep—finally lost*. They will cease to be His—will be beyond the reach of His protection and care; and while they refuse, it remains doubtful whether He will lose them ultimately or *whether He will be able to save them*."²

It is evident that Mr. Dale has lost his faith in the omnipotence of God, seeing he has to describe Him as vanquished, or in uncertainty as to His ability to save. It is such monstrous allegations that our Calvinistic system avoids.

It is not to be supposed, however, that as Calvinists we do not believe that Jesus died in a certain sense "for every man." For if we are all hell-deserving sinners, then we deserve as little the bounties of God's providence as we do the riches of His grace. But multitudes, alas! are quite contented with the temporal bounties, and have no desire for "the true riches." They want to live well in this world, and have no desire for meetness for a spiritual inheritance. On what *just* ground do they receive the temporal success they desire? If the Divine government be real, then these outward and temporal benefits are due to the death of Jesus Christ. For these He died. Had He not died, successful worldlings would have been hurried off the stage without success, and would have spent these unproductive years in the worse plight of everlasting despair. Their gilded respite, the only mercy they will accept from the Sovereign Disposer of events, is due to the death and satisfaction of our Lord. But while our Lord's death is thus

¹ *Discourses on Special Occasions*, p. 153.

² *Evangelical Revival*, p. 206.

a "propitiation" for the sins of these individuals, in so far as their day of respite and of opportunity is due thereto, it could not, so far as these parties are concerned, be called an "atonement." The *rappor*t between such souls and God has never taken place. Christ tasted death for them, but His death was *not* in their case an *atonement*. But it is quite different in the case of believers in Jesus. For them the death of Christ becomes an atonement; and Calvinism simply maintains that God has looked into the whole transaction with such minute and microscopic interest that Christ has not been allowed in any respect or degree to have *died in vain*.

In making the offer of a free and full salvation to all who will hear us, we do not as Calvinists entertain any mental reserve. We obey a Divine injunction in doing so, we "draw the bow at a venture," but we believe at the same time that the arrows are carried home where the Almighty pleases, and that Ahab's mortal wound in the battle of Ramoth-Gilead (1 Kings xxii. 34) was not more carefully prearranged by the Almighty than are the spiritual wounds and spiritual healings through the preaching of the word of life. We repose without mental difficulty upon the assurance that we are instruments in the hands of the Almighty, and that He can and will vindicate His whole procedure.

VI. And here we may most appropriately consider the practical outcome of Calvinism. Can its *ethics* be with confidence maintained?

Mr. Dale is, as we have most cheerfully admitted, an able moralist. It is evident, however, that he has hopes of ethical progress in a very different direction indeed from Calvinism.

"There was one doctrine of John Wesley's," he says, "the doctrine of perfect sanctification, which ought to have led to a great and original ethical development; but the doctrine has not grown; it seems to remain just where John Wesley left it. There has been a want of the genius or the courage to attempt the solution of the immense practical questions which the doctrine suggests. The questions have not been raised, much less solved. To have raised them effectively, indeed, would have been to originate an ethical revolution which would have had a far deeper effect on the thought and life—first of England, and then of the rest of Christendom—than was produced by the Reformation of the sixteenth century."¹

¹ *Evangelical Revival*, p. 39.

The ethics of the Arminian theology, with its see-saw between "sinless perfection" and total "falls from grace," present a chronic condition of "unstable equilibrium." There can be no real stability of character upon the Arminian hypothesis; and Mr. Dale's idea of a great ethical development out of a theory of "perfect sanctification" is totally utopian. If any practical evidence of this were needed, it would be found in the "Higher Life" doctrine advocated by W. E. Boardman and his associates, which has been productive chiefly of self-deception.¹

Before stating briefly the ethical advantages of Calvinism, we must refer for a moment to Canon Farrar's attempt to identify it with *fatalism*. The clear distinction existing between our doctrine of predestination and the doctrine of fate is either unknown or ignored. There is surely a difference between believing that we are in the hands of an omniscient, omnipotent, and loving God, who is directing all things according to the counsel of His own will, who can use free will in the creature as His instrument, and accomplish His magnificent designs without violating the rights of any, and believing that we are in the hands of an unsympathetic, it may be unintelligent, force, which goes by the name of *Fate*. But Canon Farrar is so much interested in his superficial analogies that he respects neither logic nor history. He tries to persuade his audience that the Oriental indolence which is now the scorn of Western civilisation is the logical outcome of the Calvinistic system. But as a matter of simple fact, the indolence which we now scorn is due to the fall of these Orientals from all *consciousness of a divine mission*. We are far from asserting that the Mohammedans were right in supposing God sent them to secure the recognition of His spirituality by the sword. We know from the Word of God that He does not desire the promotion of His kingdom by force of arms. But at the same time, we ought not to lose sight of the fact that the belief in a divine mission made Mohammedans in their historic days self-sacrificing and noble. And predestination, when accepted as a practical

¹ For an excellent treatise against this heresy see *The "Higher Life" Doctrine of Sanctification tried by the Word of God*. By Henry A. Boardman, D.D. Philadelphia, 1877.

belief, resolves itself into the *consciousness of a divine mission*. There is nothing else which gives true dignity and glory to human life. Calvinism enforces the Master's words to His disciples: "Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you, and ordained you that ye may go and bring forth fruit, and that your fruit may remain, that whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in my name, he may give it you;" and in the consciousness of this sacred mission men are sent forth to be fellow-workers with God.

Calvinism secures self-abasement before God and then self-abandonment to the Divine will. Calvinism bases its ethics upon gratitude for salvation, provided in its fulness and bestowed with the utmost impartiality, and this gratitude expresses itself in abandonment to the Divine pleasure. "Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?" cries the regenerated soul, as Paul did on the way to Damascus. And history attests the nobility which Calvinism imparts to the souls of men.

We believe, as Calvinists, in "perfect sanctification" as a possible experience even in a world like this, but so high is our idea of what it implies that we believe as a matter of fact that it has only been realised in the one case of "Jesus the Son of God." We believe the raptures, which have been regarded as *temporary* attainments thereof by those nursed on Arminian theology, to have been as far below the idea as morning twilight is below the blaze of noon. The snow-white pinnacle of the perfection of Christ, however, inspires us with hope, and sustains us in the struggle upward. We settle down with no satisfaction upon any past attainment, but forgetting the things behind, we press onward towards the distant and glorious goal (Phil. iii. 12-14), and death, or the change in the twinkling of an eye, will prove, we believe, the last element in a purifying experience, making us at length meet for the inheritance of the saints.

VII. We desire to refer to another charge of Canon Farrar against Calvinism, in which he tries to make out an analogy between it and scientific materialism:—

"In the form of scientific works," he says, "it [the materialistic spirit] rests on the law of evolution, and sees in design nothing but a pitiless law working for the strong, and in thought and soul and spirit nothing but modification of the white pulp of the brain. . . . It makes man a mere machine."

Now we are perfectly ready to admit that Calvinism is a "reign of law," if by "law" be understood the will and good pleasure of an Almighty and loving God. But it so happens that the tendency of science at the present time is to introduce an element of uncertainty and of chance into what is called in general terms "the reign of law;" we refer of course to the anti-teleological tendencies of some of our highest scientific men. Their attack upon teleology will prove, we feel confident, futile. It is a mere *assumption* on their part that "design" must interfere with the nature of things if it exists, instead of working through the nature of things.

"It will not escape notice," says an able writer, "that his [the anti-teleologist's] criticisms of the actual order are both teleological and anthropomorphic. He judges it throughout by the standard of human interests; and where he can see no end, he *assumes* that there is none. But, omitting further reference to these points, his position is this: Nature does, indeed, show harmony and adaptation; but they are accounted for by natural agents; and there is no need to go behind these agents for further explanation. But in judging this view we must guard against an unconscious self-imposition, of which we are often guilty at this point. Theism is often spoken of as a metaphysical and religious theory, while the atomic doctrine is opposed to it as a scientific fact. In truth, both are theories, and both are equally metaphysical and speculative. That the atoms exist is as much a matter of inference as that God exists. That they are adequate to the facts is known by *assuming* them so."¹

In "the reign of law," therefore, we are asked to make room for another kingdom, that of the chance interaction of forces, which can alone, we are told, account for the facts of nature as we find them.

Now this tendency of science at the present time is, curiously enough, an analogy, not for Calvinism, but for the Arminian system. Anti-teleologists are in fact scientific Arminians. They profess to find a region where a foreordaining mind has no place, and no necessary power; where the free play of atoms sufficiently accounts for the whole problem. This is exactly what Arminian theologians, like Canon Farrar and Mr. Dale, do in the region of free-will. They persuade man that he is "his own star," and that "God's decrees do but follow in the path of man's endeavours." But Calvinism maintains the idea of God's reign all through. It believes that the presiding God

¹ Bowne's *Studies in Theism*, p. 160.

overrules all things for His glorious purposes. These may be far above out of our sight, but they do not the less exist, nor are they the less regarded because we are not tall enough to see them. The "wrath of man" may seem as useless as a rudimentary organ, but we believe that God can make both "praise him." "Just as the buttons behind a gentleman's coat show that its pattern came from one who was familiar with coats on which the buttons were needed to support a sword, so rudimentary organs in natural structures show that their framer was familiar with similar structures in which the organ has use." In the very same way we Calvinists believe that the most useless and melancholy portions of human life and history shall be found yet to minister to the praise of Him who reigns over all, God blessed for ever. It is the Calvinistic idea, the idea of sovereignty in all things, which, claimed for God, reduces the problems of nature and of human nature to a consistent whole.

Mr. Dale says truly, "It is not a good ecclesiastical system that saves mankind, but Christ; the best system is that which lets nothing come between Christ and the Church. The same test is to be applied to all theologies and to all methods of spiritual discipline."¹ We accept the test with confidence, believing that no system presents Christ so fully or so faithfully to the soul of the sinner as Calvinism does. It abases the sinner by telling him his helplessness and his utter want of all claim before God; it points to Christ as an all-sufficient Saviour worthy of implicit and continual trust; it magnifies Divine grace as the very essence of impartiality, and it bids the sinner who accepts salvation to rise into the consciousness of a divine mission as the one nobility of life. While it makes man nothing, it makes God all in all.² Such a system may be misunderstood and defamed, but it will command increasing respect when the era of great theologians returns again, when we become, as Mr. Dale suggests, "better Christians," by which we understand "more humble men."

ROB. M'CHEYNE EDGAR.

¹ Pp. 187, 188.

² Cf. Mozley on *Predestination*, p. 16.

ART. II.—*The Christian Ministry not a Priesthood.*

THE power and authority of the ministers of the Church of Christ in relation to the flock can never be a matter of indifference to Christian people, and it is important to have a clear, well-grounded, and intelligent conception of its nature and limits. There are three views prevalent in our day that deeply influence the thought and life of numbers of people. They are the sacerdotal, the pastoral, and what may be called the unofficial views of it. Multitudes of people regard the ministers of Christ's Church as priests, multitudes regard them as pastors simply, i.e. as teachers and rulers, while not a few deny the theory of an official ministry in any form, and depend for edification on the informal exercise of such gifts as may be found among the members of the assembly gathered together simply as Christian brethren.

The difference between the sacerdotal conception of the ministry on the one hand, and the pastoral and unofficial on the other, is deeper, greater, and more important far than the difference between the pastoral and unofficial, important though the difference between these two last is. The sacerdotal conception implies a radically different origin, radically different functions, and radically different relations to the Christian people, for the Christian ministry, from the other two. The sacerdotal conception implies an origin for the ministry from an external rite, derived from an order of men who are supposed to have succeeded each other in unbroken succession from the Apostles, and who, in virtue of their office, have power to communicate the Holy Ghost to those whom they ordain to the ministry. It implies that the chief functions of the ministry consist in the performance of certain rites which are regarded as the channels of grace and of salvation to men in such a sense that those who do not receive them from the regular official priesthood are left to the uncovenanted mercies of God, if they do not place themselves without the pale of salvation altogether. It implies a magical view of the sacrament of Baptism, and a sacrificial view of the Lord's Supper, and resolves the whole Christian system very much into a matter of rites and ceremonies, of holy days and holy places—

into an elaborate and oppressive externalism and symbolism. It implies that the preaching and teaching functions of the Christian ministry are altogether secondary, and wherever the sacerdotal conception of the Christian ministry is dominant, there the ministry of the Word is reduced to a minimum. This conception implies that the relation of the ministry to the congregation is mediatorial. The priest becomes the confessor and director of the people. The priest receives confessions, and communicates absolution, public and private. He gives direction. The people are taught to lean upon him. He becomes the spiritual physician who inspects his patients minutely, and questions them closely concerning all the phases and symptoms of their spiritual disease, and prescribes medicines, diet, and exercise,—penances and performances of various kinds to them. Such is the sacerdotal conception of the Christian ministry, of its origin, functions, and relation to the Christian people.

The sacerdotal conception of the Christian ministry is rejected root and branch by the supporters of the pastoral and unofficial views. The chief difference between these two is, that the latter rejects the idea of office in the Church altogether. It regards the possession of suitable gifts as the sole and sufficient warrant for engaging in the work of preaching or teaching or fulfilling any necessary function in the body of Christ. In common with the pastoral theory, it regards preaching and teaching as chief functions of ministry. It does not vest the function of administering Sacraments in any order of men, when it observes them at all.¹ It leaves the sacrament of baptism an open question in as far as the proper subjects of it are concerned, and gives great prominence to the Lord's Supper; albeit it is quite free from any sacrificial taint in the doctrine and practice which it accepts. To one or other of these theories of Christian ministry all the varieties and sub-varieties we see around us, and that exist in Christendom, may be fundamentally reduced.

The sacerdotal conception of ministry in the Church of Christ can be shown to be quite groundless when tested by the teaching and acts of our Lord and of His apostles; and what

¹ The Society of Friends does not observe the Sacraments. The so-called Brethren in all their branches are those chiefly referred to.

we have called the unofficial theory can also be proved to be seriously defective. This teaching and these acts we shall proceed to examine without further detailed reference to existing controversies and systems. Their bearing on prevalent doctrines and practices around us will be obvious; and the true view of the Christian ministry, of its origin, basis, nature, functions, and relations to the Christian people, will more or less fully emerge in the course of the inquiry.

The first passage in our Saviour's teaching that arrests our attention and invites our consideration in relation to this subject, is the conversation that He had with His disciples in the coasts of Cæsarea-Philippi, which was the first occasion on which our Lord ever spoke of His Church. He asked His disciples on that memorable occasion whom the people took Him to be. On receiving their reply, He asked them whom they themselves thought Him to be. Peter, in the name of his fellow-apostles, said—

“Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God.”

Jesus then pronounced a blessing upon him: “Blessed art thou, Simon Barjona; for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven.”

The vital, fundamental importance of the fact and truth of Christ's Divine Sonship, that it is an essential element in His Messiahship, and the necessity of Divine illumination in order to its right apprehension and confession, are thus emphasised. Jesus further made a declaration concerning Peter: “Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.”

He also added these significant words: “I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.”

The first question that suggests itself on reading these declarations and promises is—Do they refer to Peter personally?

Looking at the narrative simply, divesting ourselves as far as we can of the influence of traditional interpretations one way or another, and of bias derived from fierce and prolonged controversy, it seems hardly possible for us to evade the personal reference to the apostle. Albeit he answered for the others as well as for himself, the Lord addressed him personally

throughout His reply : "*Thou art Peter*"—"I will give unto thee"—"Whatsoever *thou* shalt bind," and "Whatsoever *thou* shalt loose." The force of this reference cannot be broken by the play upon the name of Peter contained in our Saviour's words—*Πέτρος, πέτρα*. Peter confessing Christ must be regarded as the rock on which the Church was to be built in the primary sense designed by the Saviour's words, a sense by no means inconsistent with the teaching of the apostle Paul in 1 Cor. iii. 11 : "Other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is Christ"—as we shall presently see.

In what sense then are these declarations and promises personal to Peter ? is the second question that suggests itself.

They are personal to him in a peculiar sense as designating him to be the first founder of the Church as it was to exist in the future after Christ had sat down at the right hand of God. The utterance of these memorable words to Peter by the Saviour marks a stage in His ministry,—the commencement of the second great division of it. From this time our Lord began to speak of His death and of His resurrection. What He says to Peter here refers to what He purposed to do after His resurrection.

"On this rock *I will* build my church." Peter was here designated as the person who was to open the door of admission into the Church to those who were to compose its membership, and he was further invested with authority in the Church. These things we might infer from an attentive consideration of our Saviour's words alone. From the history of the Church we see how these things were fulfilled in Peter's life and work. In the New Testament scriptures we have what may be called a volume of Church history. It is small in bulk but weighty in contents. It is the first and most reliable volume of Church history that we possess. It is a book that needs to be a great deal more studied than it has been by Christian people for the purpose of ascertaining its real meaning and the principles with which it furnishes us for our guidance in the maintenance and extension of the Church of God. The book we refer to, we need hardly say, is the Acts of the Apostles. When we read that book even in the most cursory way we cannot fail to be struck with the prominence of two men in it, viz., of Peter and Paul. Peter is the chief figure in the first eleven chapters.

After that he is only twice named : in the twelfth chapter we have the story of his imprisonment by Herod and his deliverance by an angel in answer to the prayers of the Church ; in the fifteenth chapter we find him taking part—a prominent, but not the chief part—in the Council of Jerusalem ; but he is no longer the centre of interest in the history. Paul comes to the front, and the remainder of the book is almost exclusively devoted to him, his work, his travels, his companions, and his sufferings. Towards the close of the Petrine portion of the history Saul begins to attract attention. His persecuting career, his conversion, and the beginnings of his work are narrated, but he is still quite a subordinate figure in the history. Our attention is also diverted a little from Peter's work by the Samaritan work of Philip, but Peter is the central figure in the history for the first eleven chapters. Now, in this portion of the history thus occupied with Peter's work two events stand out conspicuously, and attract our attention from their contrasts and their resemblances, from the differences in the races and circumstances of the persons concerned, from the identity of the chief actor on the occasion and the object of his work, and from the fact that on both occasions remarkable supernatural manifestations preceded and followed the transactions recorded. The two events are Pentecost and the conversion of Cornelius and his company at Cæsarea. At Pentecost the assembled disciples at Jerusalem were all filled with the Holy Ghost and began to speak with other tongues. Attention was thus attracted to them and a multitude was gathered together. Peter came to the front, preached the crucified and risen Saviour to them, and three thousand persons believed and were baptized, and added to the hundred and twenty disciples. Now what we wish to emphasise is the fact that Peter was the preacher, that the audience were Jews, and devout men out of every nation under heaven; they were Jews and proselytes, they were all by birth or adoption of the commonwealth of Israel. Peter addressed the whole audience on the occasion as men of Israel. This event took place ten days after the ascension from Bethany. It was the result of Peter's testimony delivered in the power with which Jesus endued all His apostles, according to the promise spoken on the eve of His departure. It was the first public proclamation of the gospel after Christ sat down on the

right hand of God. The other event which attracts attention in the Petrine portion of the history is the conversion of Cornelius and his company at Cæsarea. Peter was prepared to pay this visit by a vision which taught him the important truth that God had removed the distinction between clean and unclean beasts which He himself had established in Israel, that henceforth it was lawful for him to eat that which he had heretofore regarded as common and unclean. He was directed by the Spirit to go without hesitation with the three men who had been sent by Cornelius to fetch him. Cornelius had sent them in fulfilment of instructions given to him by an angel at the time of prayer. When Peter came to Cornelius there was a congregation waiting for him in the centurion's house, waiting to receive a Divine message from his lips. Peter preached Jesus and the resurrection to them, and while he preached the Holy Ghost came upon all them which heard the word, and they spake with tongues, and magnified God. The supernatural circumstances that preceded, and resulted from, Peter's visit to Cornelius mark out the whole event as something unique in his history, and in the history of the Church. The fact that the Holy Ghost was poured out on this company of Gentiles, for they were all Gentiles, in the same way and with the same results as on the hundred and twenty disciples at Jerusalem on the day of Pentecost, when Peter preached Christ to the men of Israel, and three thousand persons were added to the disciples, indicates a connection between the two events as parts of one and the same great transaction. They were so indeed. That transaction was the foundation of the Church by the ministry of Peter in fulfilment of Christ's word: "Thou art Peter, and on this rock will I build my church."

Christ thus used Peter in accomplishing this work. Peter was thus the means of founding the Church by his testimony, and was thus the rock on which the Church was built. By his ministry he was the means of uniting Jew and Gentile in one body on a footing of perfect equality in Christ, which was the peculiarity of the Church, as distinguished from the commonwealth of Israel. Israel occupied a position of peculiar privilege until Christ came, and brought the old economy to an end. Till then Gentiles could only become full partakers of Israel's privileges by submission to the Mosaic law, and being adopted

as Israelites. Until Peter's mission to Cornelius, even the apostles did not understand the change that had been introduced by Christ. Peter made the full discovery in the house of Cornelius when he said, "Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons, but in every nation he that feareth God and worketh righteousness is accepted with him."

He then discovered that race distinctions were of no account with God, and preached a truly *catholic* sermon, the first catholic sermon in the true sense of the word that ever fell from a merely human preacher's lips that is reported to us; and in that sermon we find not one trace, not even the germ from which the peculiarities of so-called Catholic doctrine, to adopt the favourite phrase of an active and aggressive ecclesiastical faction in our day, could be derived. He preached Jesus of Nazareth as Lord of all. He commended Jesus to them by emphasising His universal beneficence, and the deliverance He effected for all that were oppressed of the devil. He preached Christ crucified and risen, and declared the commission given to the apostles to preach unto the people and testify that it is He which is ordained of God to be the Judge of quick and dead, and closed his sermon with these words, "To him give all the prophets witness, that through his name whosoever believeth in him shall receive remission of sins."

Free remission of sins through faith in Jesus Christ is the practical application of the apostle's doctrine. Neither baptism, nor confession to a priest, nor the Church, nor priestly absolution, is interposed between men and Christ, between men and free, full, unreserved pardon. This is the doctrine of the founder of the Catholic Church. This is true, primitive, apostolic, catholic doctrine. Anything claiming to be catholic doctrine which is inconsistent with this is pseudo-catholic doctrine. While the apostle was speaking the Holy Ghost came upon his hearers, and only after they spake with tongues and magnified God did he mention baptism, and then he commanded them to be baptized; he did not perform the rite himself. The facts of the history, as well as the doctrine of the sermon, put baptism in its true place as neither essential to salvation nor necessary in order to the reception of the Holy Ghost by human souls.

Peter acted on the new and clearer light which had broken

in upon him by remaining some days with the Gentile converts and adopting their mode of life—a proceeding which would involve even a greater revolution of feeling and habit in Peter's case than would the emergence in our day into the free pure air of true Christian catholicity of Church life and doctrine, in the case of one who had been brought up from childhood in the oppressive atmosphere of a society which regarded certain orders as essential to the existence of the Church, and certain rites and ceremonies as necessary channels of grace and salvation, and exalted tradition to a place of co-ordinate authority with Scripture, nay, more, placed it practically above Scripture, and treated those who followed Christ and His apostles only in matters pertaining to the Church, and the ordering of its affairs, as destitute of any title to be called Christian Churchmen at all.

On his return to Jerusalem Peter was called to account for his conduct by them of the circumcision, and had to vindicate himself before them. When they had heard all the things that he had to say, they held their peace, glorified God and said, "Then hath God also to the Gentiles granted repentance unto life."

The first Pope, as some call him, who had refused the homage of Cornelius when he fell down at his feet and worshipped him, saying, "Stand up, for I also am a man," recognised the right of the church at Jerusalem to call him to account for what he had done in his official capacity. Were his so-called successors to act as he did, to preach the same doctrine, act merely as men, and appeal to the understandings and consciences of the Christian people, the "reunion of Christendom," in a wider sense than our pseudo-catholics of every kind dream of, would be near.

The light in which they of the circumcision regarded the event was the true one. It was the admission of the Gentiles into the Church. Representative Israelites believed and were baptized into Christ, on the day of Pentecost at Jerusalem. Representative Gentiles were baptized into Christ in the house of Cornelius of Cæsarea on the occasion of Peter's visit. Cornelius as a centurion of the Italian band was a typical Gentile. He represented the dominant power in the world at the time in its most characteristic feature, its military power. The peculiar and unique character of the whole transaction is brought into clearer

light if we consider the fact that Cornelius and his friends were worshippers of God, of Israel's God, before. They became so doubtless through the teaching of the synagogue, and stood in some relation to it. Though uncircumcised, Cornelius was of good report of all the nation of the Jews. Hence his was not a case of conversion in the ordinary sense, but was an advance from a lower to a higher degree of faith and light, and in particular an advance to an equality with the Jew in relation to Him who is the light to lighten the Gentiles and the glory of His people Israel. The day that he and his friends were admitted into this equality, the foundation of the Church was completely laid, its component parts were brought into a true relation to Christ and each other. That day it became a palpable historical fact that Jews and Gentiles are alike children of God by faith in Christ Jesus, that as many as have believed have put on Christ, that there is neither Jew nor Greek, bond nor free, male nor female, but all are one in Christ Jesus.

The constitution of this new society in the world was Peter's peculiar work. It could neither be shared nor repeated by others. He could from the very nature of the case have neither associates nor successors in this work. In this sense he was the rock on which the Church was founded. In respect to this work he was personally addressed by the Saviour.

The third question that the words of our Saviour to Peter (Matt. xvi. 16, 19) suggest, is, Were the promises made to Peter exclusively personal to him? But before answering this question we would glance at the promise made by Christ concerning His Church on this the first occasion in His public ministry in which He ever mentioned that body:—

"Thou art Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it."

In what sense are we to understand this promise? Does it guarantee the unbroken unity, continuity, and perpetuity of the Church as an organised society? Does it mean that there will always be one society, or family of societies, and one only, having an exclusive claim to be regarded as Christ's Church, a society, or family of societies, recognisable by certain conspicuous and easily ascertainable marks, and that separation from that society will involve separation from Christ? So to read Christ's promise is to read into it foregone conclusions in the

interests of some existing Church or Church theory. What Christ promises is that there shall always be a Church, that He will always have a Church in the world, that the opposition of Satan and the kingdom of darkness shall not utterly prevail to destroy it. There will always be associated believers who meet together to show forth His death till He come. He does not imply that any particular society that claims to be a church, or *the* Church, is indestructible, or that all who are included in the membership of any particular society of professed and associated believers, however pure that society may be, are perfectly safe. The Church shall exist in some form or other to the end. Those whom Christ adds to the Church and unites to His own body shall never be overcome by Satan. The promise to them is, "My God shall bruise Satan under your feet shortly."

This promise of our Lord was made before the Church in the peculiar New Testament sense was called into actual existence. It had respect to a then future body. The Church existed before any permanent organisation was set up in it, therefore no particular organisation can be regarded as an essential characteristic of that Church to which this promise was made. No particular orders whatever are or can be of the essence either of the gospel or the Church. The Church or Churches that make the loudest and most exclusive claims to be the inheritors of this promise are just those within whose borders the traces of the ravages of the powers of the unseen kingdom of darkness are most extensive and conspicuous.

To return then to the question as to whether the declarations and promises made by our Saviour to Peter about his being the rock, about the keys of the kingdom, the binding and loosing, refer to him exclusively.

To this question a negative answer must be returned. *First*, touching the declaration that he was to be the founder of the Church, there is a sense in which his fellow-apostles shared this promise, and were joint-founders of the Church with him. We have seen the sense in which Peter was the exclusive founder of the Church. In every other respect his fellow-apostles shared the work with him. They were co-founders of the Church with him by their testimony to the same facts and truths, given in the same power, in virtue of the same Divine illumination, and from the same personal knowledge of the

crucified and risen Saviour. This we might infer from what is recorded of their mutual relations and work. Paul always strenuously asserted his independence and equality as an apostle in relation to the others. He declared that he was not a whit behind the very chiefest of the apostles, and therefore he was not behind Peter. Indeed, he had occasion to withstand Peter to the face when he was to be blamed for again retreating for a time behind that middle wall of partition between Jews and Gentiles, which he himself had been the means of casting down for ever, and thus imperilling the peace and stability of the Church which he had founded; he had thus to defend against Peter himself the constitution of the Church, which that apostle himself had been the divinely appointed means of introducing. We might infer then that all the apostles were co-founders of the Church with Peter from what we read about them and their work; but we have an express declaration on the subject in the second chapter of the Epistle to the Ephesians, verses 19 and 20: "Now therefore ye are no more strangers and foreigners, but fellow-citizens of the saints, and of the household of God; and *are built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets*, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner-stone." The foundation of the Church is threefold—*apostles, prophets, Christ*. The apostles are jointly and equally the foundation of the Church, Christ Himself is the chief corner-stone. As in the peculiar work given to Peter to do he could have no partners and no successors, so in the peculiar work given to the apostles collectively to do they could have no partners and no successors. To talk of successors to the apostles is to display a radical misconception of the nature and functions of the apostolate. The peculiar work of the apostles was to bear accordant, yet independent, personal testimony as chosen witnesses, testimony derived from personal knowledge of the facts, to the Divine Sonship and Messiahship of Jesus, to His death and resurrection.

Does any one claim to be a successor of Peter? Let him show proof that authority was ever given for the appointment of a successor—that Peter could, from the nature of his peculiar work, ever have a successor. Does any one claim to be a successor of the apostles generally? Let him show the signs of an apostle. Let him declare when and where he has seen the Lord Jesus; when and where the Lord Jesus appeared

to him and called him as he called St. Paul; or let him show when and where the essential qualifications of the apostleship, which were found in all those whom Christ called to it—viz., eyewitness-ship of the risen Saviour, personal call or commission by the risen Saviour, supernatural powers conferred by the Saviour—were dispensed with.

The quite unique position of the apostles is seen in the promises made to them, as well as the qualifications required in them, and the work assigned to them. When the rich young man left the presence of Jesus, sorrowful, because he would not part with his great possessions and follow Jesus, and comments were made by Jesus on the event, and an answer was given by Him to His disciples' astonished question, Peter said, "Behold, we have forsaken all, and followed thee; what shall we have therefore?" To this question Jesus answered, "Ye which have followed me, in the regeneration when the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory, ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel" (Matt. xix. 27, 28). And again, at the Last Supper, He said to them, "Ye are they which have continued with me in my temptations: and I appoint unto you a kingdom, as my Father hath appointed unto me; that ye may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and sit on thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel" (Luke xxii. 28-30). And again, in the Apocalyptic description of the heavenly Jerusalem, we read (Rev. xxi. 14), "And the wall of the city had twelve foundations, and in them the names of the twelve apostles of the Lamb."

Thus the number of the apostles was determined by the number of the tribes of Israel, and seems to have had reference to places of honour and dignity to be occupied by them in the glorious kingdom of Christ. The bearing of all that is said on the subject by Christ and in the Apocalypse, together with the direct choice of Paul by the risen Saviour, would seem to be to invalidate the choice of Matthias to Judas's vacant place by the hundred and twenty disciples, under Peter's direction, during the ten days of waiting at Jerusalem before Pentecost. It was perhaps inevitable in the circumstances that the step should be taken. It is recorded, but neither approved nor condemned in Scripture. The Church numbered Matthias with the eleven, but Christ seems to have ignored the election. Matthias lacked the direct, immediate call of Christ, which all

the others had. Thus then Peter was not exclusively referred to in our Saviour's words, "Thou art Peter, and on this rock I will build my church." There was a primary and personal, but not an exclusive, reference to him. The power of the keys, and the power of binding and loosing, whatever they were, were also shared by the other apostles, save just in so far as the first exercise of these powers was involved in Peter's peculiar work in that first period of the Church's history which terminated in the opening of the door of faith to the Gentiles. These powers were also permanent in the Church. In what sense the other apostles first, and afterwards the Church, shared these powers, we shall see in the sequel.

What are the keys of the kingdom of heaven? This is the fourth question which the Saviour's words to Peter suggest. Keys are for the purpose of opening and shutting doors. They are intrusted to housekeepers, and may be regarded as the symbols of their authority. In addressing the lawyers, the teachers and expositors of the law, Christ said, "Woe unto you, lawyers! for ye have taken away the key of knowledge: ye entered not in yourselves, and them that were entering in ye hindered" (Luke xi. 52). They were the authorised teachers. It is said that a key was put into the hands of the scribes when they were set apart to their office; it was the symbol of their authority to teach. But the keys of the kingdom represent more than the teaching powers of the Church. In the 22d chapter of Isaiah, from the 21st verse, we read of the government being committed into Eliakim's hand, and of the *key of the house of David* being laid on his shoulder, so he shall open and none shall shut, and he shall shut and none shall open. Peter and the other apostles were the authorised rulers of the Church. Authority was committed unto them to govern and organise the Church. Plenary authority was conferred upon the apostles for their twofold work, and spiritual illumination adequate to the ultimate universality and permanence of their work was given to them. In virtue of the powers conferred upon them, and in fulfilment of the work intrusted to them, they furnished the Church with a body of inspired and authoritative teaching sufficient for its instruction, edification, and guidance in all time till Christ's return. They thus opened the treasury of Divine wisdom and knowledge to the Church, and made its treasures available for her use. According

to Christ's promise, they were led into the whole truth by the Comforter. He brought all things to their remembrance, whatsoever Christ had said to them. He showed them things to come; He took of the things of Christ and showed them unto them. All that the Comforter taught them, they have embodied for us in their writings. But the keys of government were committed to them. Supreme authority in the Church was vested in them. On occasions it was asserted. It was always in reserve, ready to be used when it was necessary to check disorder; but in virtue of this power they organised the Church, they provided for its permanent government, they called into existence a body of men to whom they intrusted the ordinary work of shepherding the flock, of teaching and ruling it. On this body of men devolved the exercise of the power of the keys as far as that power could be transmitted, and be a permanent power in the Church. Now what was that body of men? On what basis was it organised? Was it designed to be perpetuated? On what does its perpetuation in the Church depend? These are crucial questions, determining the true nature of Christian ministry. It is unnecessary to prove, what no competent Biblical scholar now denies, what any attentive, intelligent, diligent reader of the New Testament can discover for himself, that these men were elders or presbyters, overseers or bishops, and that these terms are indifferently used to designate the same order of men. The office held by these men was derived from the synagogue, and not from the temple. They are never called priests in the New Testament, and they are never represented as fulfilling priestly functions. Nowhere is the administration of the Sacraments expressly or exclusively assigned to them as their work. As a matter of order it is fitting that it should be in their hands. The work assigned to them naturally comprehends the ordering and administration of Sacraments; but it is not prescribed to them in so many words; and their work is everywhere represented as teaching, shepherding, ruling.¹ At first sight it seems a strange thing, when our attention is called to the fact, that there is no record of the first appointment of elders or presbyters, or overseers or bishops, in the

¹ The attempt to derive the sacerdotal character of the Christian ministry from the institution of the Lord's Supper, assuming it to be sacrificial in its character, and inferring thence the priestly character of the celebrant, is quite futile.

Acts of the Apostles ; that the first time they are referred to they are represented simply as existing, evidently as a matter of course. The nature and functions of the eldership in the Jewish synagogue would be so well known, and its adoption in the Church would seem so easy and natural, that it would not seem to call for special notice. When Jewish elders were converted, they may at once have been recognised as elders in the Church. Peter, in virtue of his peculiar functions in the work of founding the Church, may have first moved in the matter of the appointment or recognition of elders in the Church at Jerusalem. It is from the account of St. Paul's Gentile work that we learn the basis on which the eldership, pastorate, or episcopate was placed. We are told that Paul and Barnabas, on their return journey from their first great missionary tour, ordained¹ them elders or presbyters in every church (Acts xiv. 23). The eldership was placed on the basis of popular election—on the suffrages of the associated professing Christian community. We are not told that Paul and Barnabas laid their hands upon the men who were chosen. They may have done so, but it is not recorded. As far as the sacred history shows, the first presbyters, whose appointment is recorded, were not ordained in our sense. Apostolic hands were not laid upon their heads. They were chosen by congregations ; prayer with fasting was offered up for them. They were commended by the apostle and his companion to the Lord. That was all, as far as the record shows. Can we imagine that if ordination by imposition of apostolic hands, or by the hands of so-called successors of the apostles, had been essential to the exercise of a valid ministry, it would have been omitted on this important occasion, or that the observance of the ceremony would have been unnoticed by St. Luke ? It is impossible to think so. We do not say that the ceremony was omitted ; but we think that the conclusion from the omission of the historian to record the fact, if it took place, is inevitable, namely, that ordination in our sense, though of Scriptural authority, and very properly practised in the Christian Church, is not essential to the exercise of a valid Christian ministry. Contrast this historical basis of the Presbytero-episcopate of the primitive Church with the scriptural basis of the Jewish priesthood. The basis of that priesthood was in

¹ Or, as the word literally signifies, "*elected by show of hands.*"

its origin the direct call of God,—in its perpetuation, hereditary descent from one so called.

Does any one claim to be a priest? Let him prove his immediate call or show his pedigree. If he claims in lieu of either to have authority derived from orders transmitted in unbroken succession from the apostles, let him explain the omission of any reference to the fact that the first presbyters appointed in the Gentile Church received orders in his sense, from the record of their election and separation to their work. If his theory be true, it would have been of vital importance to preserve the record that the very first link in the chain of succession from the great apostle of the Gentiles had been duly fastened in its place. The proof fails and the theory falls to the ground. It is significant in this view that the presbytery who laid their hands on Timothy was composed of the elders chosen on the occasion referred to. We read of a priesthood, it is true, in the New Testament, but not of an official priesthood. The priesthood we read of is the universal priesthood of Christian believers, who offer unto God the spiritual sacrifices of thanksgiving and beneficence, who present their bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is their reasonable service.

That this order of presbyter-bishops was designed to be perpetual in the Church might be inferred from its origin and from the basis on which it was placed. Paul and Barnabas recognised and acted on the right of the Christian Churches whom they gathered out to choose their own ordinary teachers and rulers, a right which is common, from the very nature of the case, to all companies of Christian believers everywhere and always. The full description of the character and qualifications of the men required for it, given in the Pastoral Epistles, shows the intended permanency of it. The orderly perpetuation of it was provided for by the powers of ordination vested in the collective eldership or episcopate in a place or district, or, as St. Paul calls it, the Presbytery. The apostles thus organised the Churches on a permanent, self-governing, self-perpetuating basis. This body, thus called into existence, is the natural depository of the power of the keys, *i.e.* of authority to teach and govern the Church in as far as that power is a permanent power. That power is only rightly exercised when it is exercised in accordance with apostolic precedent and principle. It does not confer any right to pro-

mulgate doctrines that are not clearly contained or implied in the Scriptures, or to institute new rites and ceremonies that were not instituted by the apostles, nor to widen or narrow the door of admission into the Church more than Christ and His apostles have done. The power of the keys as a permanent power in the Church in relation to the body of apostolic doctrine, is purely interpretative, declaratory, expository; and in relation to apostolic discipline it is purely executive. The permanent organisation of the Church existed in the beginning, side by side with the apostolate. The apostolate for all practical purposes exists in the Church to-day as much as it did when the men who composed it were alive. For all necessary and practical purposes they govern the Church to-day as much as they did in their lifetime, in as far as the laws they laid down are observed, the institutions they are recorded in Scripture to have set up are established and maintained in vigour and efficiency, in as far as the doctrines they communicated in their recorded sermons and extant writings are expounded in purity and sincerity to the Christian people. These then are the proper marks of a Church and a ministry of true, primitive, catholic, and apostolic type. These things should form our standard of conformity or nonconformity, of judging what constitutes a regular and what constitutes an irregular ministry, and not later and wide departures from this type, that are accepted and favoured by many of the great powers of the world. We do not unchurch any Churches, nor dispute the validity of forms of ministry that depart widely in principle from this ideal. We gladly recognise that Christ is with His people in every ecclesiastical communion, and uses His servants in as far as they are faithful to His truth and their own light, in every type of ministry, even the sacerdotal, but none the less are we bound by our loyalty to Christ to walk according to what we believe to be the clearer light which we enjoy, and testify to that ideal which we are deeply conscious of failing adequately to realise.

The meaning of *binding and loosing* is the last point that our Saviour's teaching in this passage suggests for our consideration:

"Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven."

Interpreted in any adequate sense, these words attach the most grave and solemn sanction possible to the particular acts referred to, whatever they may be. What are these acts? The natural interpretation seems to be that they are the acts done in virtue of the power of the keys by those in whom this power is vested. When these acts are done in accordance with the will and law of Christ, they are ratified in heaven. The sphere in which the whole authority spoken of in this passage is to be exercised is on earth; it is the kingdom of heaven in its present earthly form and manifestation, *i.e.* the Church as a society—the body of associated believers or professed believers. This sphere is purely spiritual. The Church is a purely spiritual society, ultimately deriving its origin, constitution, laws, and doctrines from Christ alone, and designed by Him neither to be subject in its own sphere to any worldly power, nor to usurp any authority over human society in the civil sphere. The particular acts validly done in the spiritual sphere in virtue of the power of the keys by those in whom it is vested, are the acts ratified in heaven. They seem to be primarily what one would call acts of discipline. Binding and loosing seem to represent the judicial functions of the Church. We infer this from our Saviour's teaching, reported in the 18th chapter of St. Matthew's Gospel, from the 15th to the 18th verses. There the Saviour teaches how an offending brother is to be dealt with. If he will not hear the remonstrances of him whom he has offended, either in private when they are alone, or in presence of witnesses, he is to be brought before the Church, and if he will not hear the Church, he is to be treated as a heathen man and a publican; and concerning this process the Saviour says—

“Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.”

The exercise of this judicial authority seems from this passage to be vested in the congregation. There is no mention of any rulers or teachers. When there are none, the congregation must act according to its best wisdom; but when fully organised, it would naturally act through its chosen leaders. The time was not come for speaking of the completed organisa-

tion of the Church. The Saviour said all that was needful at that stage. He gave no detailed instructions on the subject of the permanent organisation of the Church in the days of His flesh at all. He left that to His apostles to carry out under the guidance of the Comforter, when He himself had sat down at the right hand of God. All that the Saviour Himself did say on the subject, however, was in entire harmony with the character of the organisation which was ultimately set up. It was fitted to prepare His people for the effective working out of that organisation,—to imbue them with a right spirit. It is out of harmony altogether with a hierarchical organisation of the Church, with a sacerdotal conception of the Christian ministry, or with the lordly rule of a single man over the Church or any part of it. The place given by the Saviour to the Church, or assembly, or congregation, fits naturally into a system of government which is based on the suffrages of the Christian people. It is in accordance with the pastoral, and not with the sacerdotal, conception of the Christian ministry. According to the sacerdotal theory, it is the priest or priestly power alone that binds and looses, that excludes from the fellowship and absolves from the censures of the Church. The assembly has neither directly nor indirectly any say in the matter at all. The priesthood concentrates in its own hands all ecclesiastical power and authority. Under this system the place of the people is merely to hear and obey; they are deprived of the rights and liberties wherewith Christ has endowed His people, and which His apostles fully recognised and made room for in their ordering of the affairs of the Church.

In viewing the subject of binding and loosing in the light of Peter's personal history and of the history of the Apostolic Church, there are a few incidents and proceedings which seem to illustrate it in its special and temporary as well as in its permanent sense. The first incident in Peter's history is the judgment of Ananias and Sapphira. They professed to do as all the other disciples were doing at the time, to sell their possessions and lay the entire proceeds at the apostles' feet for the common good; but they really kept back a part. Peter divined the truth, and charged Ananias with lying against the Holy Ghost. He recognised Ananias's right of property in the

charge he made against him ; but he convicted him of falsehood toward God in the part he played. The effect of this charge on Ananias was such that he fell down dead. Presently Sapphira, in ignorance of what was done, came in, and Peter charged her with conspiring with her husband to tempt the Spirit of the Lord. He declared that she too should be carried out as her husband had been. It was a movement of the Spirit of God on the hearts of all the disciples that led them thus to surrender their possessions and bring the price to the apostles ; and hence the sin of this guilty couple was against God. No doubt all acts done under the profession of religion that are not what they appear to be, partake of the same moral character. When people profess to do for God what they know they are not doing up to the measure of their profession, they are really lying unto God, they are really tempting God. Now this transaction seems to have been a case of binding on the part of Peter. He was the means of inflicting judgment on offenders against the Holy Ghost in the Church. By charging their guilt home to the guilty couple he was binding them. What he thus bound on earth was bound in heaven, as was manifest in the result. There was a special, supernatural element in the transaction. Peter detected the sin of Ananias and Sapphira in virtue of a special power of discerning spirits which is not ordinary and permanent in the Church, and God followed this first exercise of disciplinary power in the Church with a special visitation of judgment.

In ordinary circumstances the slower processes of private and brotherly dealing, and, if need be, exclusion from the Church till the offender gives proof of repentance and amendment, are the only methods prescribed by Christ, and sanctioned by the usage of the apostolic Church.

Another instance of binding by St. Peter we have in connection with the Samaritan work of Philip, deacon and evangelist. When the tidings of that work reached Jerusalem, the apostles appointed a deputation of their number, consisting of Peter and John, to go to Samaria and report upon the work. They prayed for the Samaritans, laid their hands on them, and then the Holy Ghost was given to them. Simon the sorcerer, who had been carried away with the movement, had believed

in a sense, and been baptized. Observing what the apostles did, and the result—evidently the Holy Ghost was given in some visible form,—he saw, as he thought, an opportunity of recovering his lost hold of the people by purchasing the power of communicating the Holy Ghost from the apostles. When he made his proposals to them Peter said unto him, "Thy money perish with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be purchased with money. Thou hast neither part nor lot in this matter: for thy heart is not right in the sight of God. Repent therefore of this thy wickedness, and pray God, if perchance the thought of thine heart may be forgiven thee." It does not appear that supernatural insight was needed in this case. Simon's character stood self-revealed in his words to the apostles. His total lack of spiritual perception and his unmortified love of power are manifest in his proposal. No infliction of judgment followed Peter's words to Simon. He exhorted him to repentance and prayer, and Simon's words show that he was not absolutely destitute of sensibility by asking the apostles to pray for him. His repentance, however, does not seem to have had much godly sorrow in it. It was not sorrow for sin so much as dread of the consequences of his sin which his own conscience foreboded. This case of Simon in its essential features resembles an ordinary case of discipline more than the case of Ananias and Sapphira. We have here all the essential features of a case of ordinary binding. We have faithful reproof and exhortation to repentance, with a view to recovery, and we have an implied acknowledgment of his offence up to a certain point on Simon's part. The final issue is not recorded in the sacred history, and it is unnecessary to go beyond the record. Love of spiritual power, ascendancy by spiritual, supernatural means, real or feigned, therefore, was Simon's sin. This sin has had much to do with perverting the Christian ministry into a priestly caste wherever this perversion has taken place. Priestly assumptions enable men who could not gain ascendancy over others in any legitimate way to acquire immense power. Once acknowledge that a man is possessed of supernatural powers in virtue of an office into which he is introduced by an outward rite independently of character, gifts, and fitness, that he is a mediator between God and man, the necessary channel of blessings to men, and you

have laid the foundations of a spiritual despotism over men, of the most enervating and emasculating kind. Individual men may be better or worse than their systems, but sacerdotalism, as a system, places the ministry in the Church that adopts or tolerates it in a radically wrong relation to the people, and confers powers upon the ministers which ought not to be placed in any merely human hands. Sacerdotalism as a system of Christian ministry professes to wield powers which Israel's divinely instituted priesthood never wielded.

These cases of binding—the cases of Ananias and Sapphira, and of Simon—were done by the single authority of the apostle Peter. There is an instance however at once of binding and loosing by the Church in its collective capacity recorded in the Acts of the Apostles, which furnishes a precedent for Church action at all times in similar emergencies. It is the procedure of the Council of Jerusalem recorded in the fifteenth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles. The subject of deliberation and judicial procedure on the occasion was the relation of Jews and Gentiles to each other in the Church at Antioch. The decision was come to by the apostles and elders, the apostles taking their place and their part in the discussion on an equality with the elders, and was issued with the concurrence of the whole Church. The Judaizing party in the Church at Antioch on one side wished to impose the yoke of the law on the Gentile believers on the other. This attempt was resisted by Paul and Barnabas, and the appeal was taken to the mother Church at Jerusalem. The Council restrained the Judaizers from encroaching on the Christian liberty of the Gentiles, and released the Gentiles from bondage to the law, and thus in one act bound and loosed. The decision was in some measure a compromise between the two parties, for certain concessions to Jewish prejudice were required of the Gentiles. In this Council we see the whole Church, headed by its extraordinary and ordinary teachers and rulers, exercising the power of the keys in binding and loosing.

Striking instances of binding and loosing occur in St. Paul's Epistles to the Corinthians and in the first Epistle to Timothy. In the first Epistle to the Corinthians, chapter v., we find the apostle summoning that Church to subject a wicked person, who was defiling it, to discipline, to put him away from among

them. In the second Epistle, chapter ii., we find him summoning them to absolve the penitent offender and restore him to their fellowship. The binding had produced its intended effect, and he was now to be loosed. In his instructions to the Corinthian Church St. Paul appears to call on the *assembly directly* to subject the offender to discipline, but we cannot suppose that the *teachers, helps, and governments*, whom he declared in the twelfth chapter of his first Epistle to be *set in the Church*, and who are just the men charged with the instruction, oversight, and rule of the Church, viewed as gifts and not as office-bearers, would be set aside. They would have their place in the body in the proceedings.

It was to the Corinthian Church that St. Paul wrote,—with reference to the exercise of supernatural gifts, it is true, but the principle is of universal application in relation to Church affairs,—“Let all things be done decently and in order.” Whatever be the truth as to the procedure in the Corinthian Church, however, the place and prominence given by St. Paul in his Epistle to the assembly—the body of professed believers as a whole—is quite inconsistent with the idea of the existence and exercise of a sacerdotal ministry in the Church, with a hierarchical system—a government by priests.

The cases that occur in St. Paul's first Epistle to Timothy are those of Hymenæus and Alexander, who had put away a good conscience and made shipwreck of faith. St. Paul had delivered them to Satan to instruct them by punishment, or to discipline them, as the words literally mean. They were under discipline. The offence of the first was heretical teaching; the offence of the second was evil-doing. St. Paul seems to have acted directly in these cases, though he may have acted through the ordinary rulers.

We have thus seen what binding and loosing mean both in their special and temporary sense as purely apostolic acts, and in their ordinary and permanent sense as acts of the Christian assembly, or the ordinary and permanent rulers of the Church. We have seen what they mean in relation to individual cases and in relation to whole classes of persons. The proper subjects of such treatment in the ordinary government of the Church are palpable and proveable offenders against the faith or morals, against the peace and order, of the Church, against

the legitimate Christian liberty of the people. The proper persons to exercise the discipline are those in whom the congregation have discerned fitting gifts and qualifications, and have chosen to govern them, and who have been recognised by the proper organs of the collective Church. The object of the exercise of this discipline is the good of the offender and the purity and fruitfulness of the Church. In all this we see no trace of sacerdotalism, nothing but what commends itself as reasonable and necessary for the welfare and prosperity of the body of Christ to the understanding and conscience.

One other passage of our Saviour's teaching which has been taken as referring to the powers which He conferred on the ministry, and as being parallel to and interpretative of the binding and loosing, we must consider. It is contained in St. John's Gospel, 20th chapter and 22d verse:—

“And when he had said this, he breathed on them, and saith unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost. Whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained.”

From this passage we see that the persons to whom this promise was made were persons to whom Christ had given the Holy Ghost. The conferring of the Holy Ghost on this occasion was partial, preliminary, and different alike in the manner and measure of it from the effusion of the Holy Ghost at Pentecost. But this we learn from the fact that the Holy Ghost was breathed on, and in some sense communicated to, the company to whom the promise was made,—that it is made to *spiritual persons*. They only who are spiritual can use the powers conferred. Persons who are destitute of the Spirit lack the fundamental qualification for the exercise of this power. But we read from St. Luke's account of the same interview, chapter xxiv., verse 46, that they were those “whose understandings were opened to understand the Scriptures.” They were *scripturally enlightened* persons. This is another fundamental qualification for the exercise of this power. Any one, no matter what his office and pretensions may be, who lacks these qualifications is unfit for the exercise of this power. We read also in St. John's Gospel that the persons addressed were persons *sent by Christ*, as *He had been sent by the Father*—and that they were *disciples*. That all disciples must be regarded

as addressed, as inheritors of this promise, and sharers of this power, is clear from the fact that one of the apostles was absent on the occasion, and that others besides the apostles were present, and that the words were spoken to the whole company. This is clear from St. Luke's account. But though all disciples are included in the address of the Saviour, it is plain from St. Luke's account that the words have a special reference to the apostles, and those invested with permanent and ordinary authority in the Church. The eleven, *i.e.* the apostles viewed generally, without taking account of the absence of one of their number, says St. Luke, were gathered together, and they that were with them, when the two to whom the Saviour appeared by the way and talked had returned from Emmaus. And as they were speaking, Jesus stood in the midst of them. Prominence was thus given to the apostles, and the fact that they were sent in a special sense as the preachers of repentance and remission of sins among all nations, beginning at Jerusalem, that in a special manner they were witnesses of these things, points to a special reference to them in the promise of power to remit and retain sins. There is no difference in kind between the action of simple disciples in their sphere, who really possess the necessary qualifications, and the actions of those who exercise official authority in remitting and retaining sins. Private disciples do it in virtue of possessing the necessary moral and spiritual qualifications. Official persons do it with the added sanction of authority from the Church, and the special help and blessing that God will give to its right exercise in accordance with His appointment. Neither accredited profession of discipleship nor office is a certain guarantee that the necessary qualifications are really possessed. Neither absolute purity in the Church, nor exemption from mistake in the appointment of ministers by the Church, nor infallibility in the execution of their office by the most faithful ministers, is guaranteed. Discipleship and officebearership presuppose the possession of certain qualifications, higher in the latter case than in the former, which, in the measure in which they truly exist, fit the possessor for the work of remitting and retaining sins in the sense of Christ's words. Now in what sense are Christ's words to be understood? What are the exact powers which Christ's promise confers?

The qualifications of the persons and the connection between repentance and remission of sins in St. Luke's report of the Saviour's words show that the power conferred is that of declaring and assuring to the truly penitent the pardon of their sins according to the Scriptures, applying the Word of God to them according to their state and needs, so that they may be assured that their sins are forgiven, and the power, on the other hand, of declaring to the truly impenitent, according to the Scriptures, the groundlessness of any hope they cherish of the remission of their sins while in that state. This is done in the public ministry of the Word, and it is done in private intercourse with individuals who need instruction or seek counsel. Whether it be done by those who bear office in the Church or by private Christians, it is done ministerially and not mediatorially. There is no necessary connection between such ministerial action, either on the part of the Christian pastor or the private Christian, and the retention and remission of sins. The Word of God is not so bound. The Word of God is enough, without any other means whatever, to lead men to peace and pardon, or to seal their doom if they are impenitent. The Word remits and retains without any kind of merely human intervention ; or rather God, Christ, the Spirit, remits or retains sin in and by the Word. God alone can forgive sins in an absolute and independent sense. The Son of Man alone, in an absolute sense, hath power on earth to forgive sins. Still, the agency of men who have experience, spiritual discernment, knowledge of Scripture and the human heart, is ordinarily employed by God, and found helpful by men in showing them God's way of peace, and leading them into a state of conscious reconciliation with God. But the words of Christ may seem to some to mean more than this—to confer greater power than this on those who are addressed. They are held by many to point to the habitual practice of private, individual, minute confession of the sins of the daily life, and of formal authoritative absolution of such sins by those in whom this power of remitting and retaining sins is vested. The words of Christ on any subject must be viewed in connection with the whole of His teaching and practice, and with that of His apostles, whom He authorised and fitted to be the founders of His Church. If we find that the practice founded

on such an interpretation as the words, taken alone, might conceivably bear, to be quite inconsistent with these, we must decisively reject it. Further, if we find that the practice founded on such an interpretation is productive of far more evil than good, we must regard it as ill-founded. We have seen in the foregoing discussion the nature and extent of the authority which Christ conferred on the apostles, on the permanent rulers of the Church, and on the Church itself; we have seen the powers He conferred on them with reference to offences against the purity, peace, and faith of the Church, the power of binding and loosing, but we do not find that He inculcated the practice of such habitual confession of sin to man as has been widely inculcated and practised in Christendom. He taught us to seek reconciliation with an offended brother, if we remember he has sinned against us, when we are about to engage in acts of worship. He did not teach us to confess the fault to a minister or a priest, nor even to a disciple, but to seek reconciliation with him whom we have offended, who might not be a believing brother at all. From the publicans and harlots who came to Him He required no private, minute, circumstantial confession. He represented the penitent publican as simply saying, "God be merciful to me a sinner," or "God be propitiated to me the sinner." In His interview with the woman at the well, He exacted no minute, circumstantial confession on her part at all, although He showed her that He knew her true character and life. He made her sensible of this with the utmost delicacy. He showed her to herself in order to bring her to Himself. It was enough that she was brought to ask for the water which He had to bestow, and to receive Him as the Christ. Nor did He exact any explicit, circumstantial confession from His penitent apostle. Even in our confessions to God He did not enjoin us to dwell with circumstantial minuteness on all our sins and shortcomings. In the model prayer He taught us to say, "Forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors." In all the confessions of sin to God, individual and general, by true penitents, recorded in Scripture, we find the utmost depth of godly sorrow, combined with the utmost delicacy and reserve, utterly unlike the kind of confession inculcated, encouraged, and practised by many who misunderstand and misapply our Saviour's

teaching in this single passage. Equally destitute of any sanction from apostolic teaching and practice do we find confession and absolution as understood and advocated by many. At Pentecost those who cried out, "Men and brethren, what shall we do?" were exhorted to repent and be baptized in the name of Jesus Christ, and they should receive the remission of their sins; they were also exhorted to save themselves from an untoward generation. As a result of the manifestation of the power and holiness of the name of Jesus at Ephesus at a later period in connection with St. Paul's ministry, many that believed, but who had not purged themselves from all complicity in the superstitious practices in which they had indulged in the time past of their lives, came forward and confessed and showed their deeds, and made a bonfire of their books. But this was their own spontaneous act, to which their consciences constrained them. It was a united and public act, and it was but due reparation to the cause which they had been dishonouring by their unacknowledged complicity in magical arts. There may have been ignorance in their continuance in these arts after they had believed. Now their eyes were opened to the evil as well as their consciences roused, and they took the most effectual method of renouncing henceforward all complicity with them. Such confession and renunciation of evil practices by which the gospel itself has been compromised, is always becoming on the part of Christian converts. It is one of the fruits meet for repentance.

We have an account from St. Paul's own lips of how he fulfilled the ministry which he had received of the Lord Jesus at Ephesus by the space of three years. He kept back nothing that was profitable to the people, but "*taught* them publicly, and from house to house, testifying both to Jews and Greeks, repentance toward God, and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ; . . . he warned every one night and day with tears."

Teaching, testimony, preaching, warning were the elements of the apostle's work at Ephesus. There is not one word of hearing confessions in the modern sense. To the elders or bishops of Ephesus his injunction was, "*feed*, i.e. *shepherd*, the Church of God." *Teach* and *govern* the Church were his last words to those whom he left in charge of the flock, and who should see his face no more. The *grievous wolves* who were to

enter in after his departure would not be particular as to the means they adopted in accomplishing their ends, but St. Paul certainly did not introduce confession into the Church, nor sanction its introduction by anything he either said or did. Confessors are not among the gifts declared by him to be conferred on the Church by God.

But the passage in the Epistle of James may be quoted as sanctioning the confession of sins to the elders or presbyters, or, as many would say, the *priests* of the Church.

Let us examine the passage and see what it really teaches (James v. 14-16).

The sick believer is told to send for the elders of the Church, that is, of course, the congregation with which he is connected. The elders are instructed to pray over the sick man, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord. A promise is made that the prayer of faith shall heal the sick, and the Lord shall raise him up, and if he have committed sins they shall be forgiven him. And then the general exhortation is given, "Confess your faults one to another, and pray one for another, that ye may be healed."

It is *the elders*, let it be observed, *all the elders*, not one only, who are to be sent for in the case supposed. It is to *pray* for the sick that they are told, *not* to confess him.

If the sickness be the result of some sin which the sick man desires the elders to pray may be forgiven him, it is left to the man himself to acknowledge the fact, and ask their prayers with reference to it. He may do it in the most general way, and when he does it, it is in order that they may pray for him, not that they may absolve him, or at any rate, in any other way than by the ministry of the Word. If the sin be such as to expose him to the censures of the Church, they would assure him of the Church's pardon. The case only of the man whose sickness is the consequence of his sin, would seem to be contemplated here as far as the reference to the committing and forgiving sin is concerned. At any rate, no law of universal application is laid down here with reference to sick-bed confessions and absolutions. And that no exclusive authority in the matter is vested in the elders is plain from the general exhortation founded on the special case.

"Confess your faults *one to another*, and pray *one for another*,

that ye may be healed. The effectual fervent prayer of a *righteous man*," not exclusively of an elder or a priest, "*availeth much.*" Christians are to confess their faults one to another, and in cases similar to the one referred to, they are encouraged to expect the same results in answer to their prayers. Mutual confession of faults among Christian brethren is the only kind of confession to man inculcated as a practice in the New Testament. And naturally the faults confessed would be of such a kind as were a special hindrance to them in the Christian life, and the brethren whose prayers are sought would be those in whose character and wisdom they had the fullest confidence, and whose circumstances and experience would enable them to sympathise with them. They would be persons known to them, and who knew them well. Sometimes doubtless there are cases of complication and difficulty resulting from sins in the past life when the path of duty is not clear, or involves sacrifices, exposure, and humiliation from which the Christian shrinks in dread; and he may need counsel and help which he cannot find among ordinary associates and brethren, and he may seek out some minister of high character and wide experience, and unburden his heart to him, and by his sympathy, advice, and prayer get the guidance and strength which he needs. Temptations, scruples, doubts, and difficulties, groundless, or even silly enough in themselves, may so trouble and perplex the ignorant and the weak that they can get no rest until they have opened their heart to some servant of Christ—it may be a minister—or it may be simply some experienced Christian friend. The bursting heart and burdened conscience must often seek human sympathy and the ministry of consolation from human lips, and in some cases the minister of the gospel is preferred to all others. He may be supposed to have more knowledge and experience than the ordinary private Christian, and his office gives him an authority in dealing with souls which is lacking in the case of the private Christian. No true minister can be long engaged in his work without meeting with cases of this kind, and many have large and wide experience of them. But in all this there is nothing whatever of the nature of private confession and priestly absolution and direction as systematised and practised in some Churches. The minister does not come in between the soul and God, nor usurp any authority over

the conscience, nor prescribe penances ; nor does he act as a spiritual physician, examining every symptom of his patient's malady and varying his prescriptions accordingly. His work is the *cure* only in the sense of the *care* of souls. Christ is at once the physician of souls and the sovereign remedy for the soul's maladies. To render such help as is in his power in leading men to place their whole and sole trust in Christ, and to understand and carry out the will of Christ, is the work of the Christian minister. To teach people to practise confession to a so-called priest, and seek absolution from him as a means of securing Divine pardon, and healing of the disease of sin and checking its outbreaks, is to mislead them as to the true nature of sin and the only effectual means of cure. It is spiritual quackery. It is attempting to heal disease by removing superficial symptoms. To teach people habitually to rely on priestly direction in the conduct of all the affairs of life, in all relationships, is to enervate and emasculate them. Nothing could be more out of harmony with the whole conception of the Christian ministry, its nature and functions, that we get from the teaching and practice of Christ and His apostles, than the sacerdotal conception of it. The sacerdotal system is condemned by its fruit wherever it has full and unhindered effect. And its fruits soon begin to appear wherever it is introduced and acted upon. There is no good result which its advocates ascribe to it that may not be obtained by the full and faithful ministry of the Word in public and private. Distaste for full and systematic exposition of Scripture, particularly the apostolic Epistles, avoidance of certain subjects in the evangelical pulpit, and reticence upon them in the Christian family—between parents or guardians and children,—have, it is to be feared, given an advantage to the advocates of sacerdotalism of which they have not been slow to avail themselves. The best antidotes to it are the full, faithful, and fearless exposition of the Scriptures in the congregation, the extension and thorough working of the permanent primitive Church organisation set up by the apostles, in which pastoral duties were divided among several men, and did not devolve exclusively on one or two, and parental fidelity in the Christian nurture of the young.

JOHN KELLY.

ART. III.—*Culdee Colonies in the North and West.*¹

THE history of the Culdee or native Church of the British Islands, of its missions and of its doctrine, has frequently been brought under the notice of the readers of the *Review*. From the sixth to the eighth century we see it the most important section of the Western Church, occupying all the chief seats of Christian influence north of the Apennines and the Pyrenees. Then suddenly it disappears from view, being done to death chiefly by Anglo-Saxons in the service of Rome. The defection of the Saxon Wilfrid, and the decision of the Northumbrian Oswy at the Synod of Whitby, drove the Culdees from Lindisfarne and out of the many English states in which its missionary presbyters had planted the gospel. The apostasy of Adamnanus, and the fear of Scottish and Pictish monarchs, caused the disciples of Columba to hide their heads as strangers in the Scotland that they had won for Christ. The Anglo-Saxon Willibrord, Boniface, and other missionaries, entering upon the Culdee fields of labour on the Continent armed with the decrees of Rome, brought all their communities into at least outward submission to the growing power of the ambitious bishops of the once imperial city; and, by the twelfth century, Ireland, the mother of the missionary Church, under the influence of the traitor Malachi, Bishop of Armagh, proscribed the faith of Patrick, and completed the fall of the Culdees. Their labours were not indeed lost. In Scotland they lingered in St. Andrews, and elsewhere, as late as the end of the thirteenth century; and the Lollards of Kyle, who bring us down to Reformation days, were probably drawn largely from their ranks. In Ireland a

¹ *La découverte du Nouveau Monde par les Irlandais et les premières traces du Christianisme en Amérique avant l'an 1000.* Par Eugène Beauvois. Nancy, 1875.

Les Colonies européennes du Markland et de l'Escociland (domination canadienne), au XIV^e siècle, et les vestiges qui en subsistèrent jusqu'aux XVI^e et XVII^e siècles. Par Eugène Beauvois. Nancy, 1877.

Les derniers vestiges du Christianisme prêchés du X^e au XIV^e siècle dans le Markland et la grande Irlande; les porte-croix de la Gaspésie et de l'Acadie (domination canadienne). Par Eugène Beauvois. Paris, 1877.

The Voyages of the Venetian Brothers Zeno to the Northern Seas in the Fourteenth Century. By Richard Henry Major, F.S.A. Boston, 1875.

Culdee community existed as late as 1625. They revived in England when Wickliffe led his reformation. Their spirit lived in the Christian settlements they had founded on the Continent, for Tauler of Strasburg and Nicholas of Basle give us back again Fridolin and Columbanus; and, when the Reformation came, it was something more than a coincidence which made the Palatinate of the Rhine, Alsace, and Switzerland, the chief mission fields of the Culdees, the strongholds of the Reformed Church and the Presbyterian polity. But to all outward appearance the eighth century was the Culdees' grave.

Within the past few years information of the most interesting nature concerning the refugee Culdee communities of Scotland has been brought to light. This is derived chiefly from the old Norse Sagas that have been discovered in Iceland, Scandinavia, and Scotland, works of which there is not a more diligent student than Eugène Beauvois, whose three *brochures* find a place at the head of this article. M. Beauvois maintains that, in all the countries in the north and west Atlantic visited by the Norsemen, they were preceded by Culdee colonies. The same view, as far at least as the shores of America are concerned, is set forth by Professor Benedict Gröndals of the College of Reikiavik in Iceland. Their evidence I propose now briefly to summarise.

In 565, Columba, four years after the settlement of Iona, arrived at the capital of Bridei, the Pictish king, near Inverness. Having obtained from him the title to Iona, and authority to preach the Gospel in the country of the Picts, he made yet another request, based upon the presence of the Pictish chief of the Orkneys at Bridei's court. "Some of ours," he said, as we learn from the pen of Adamnanus,— "Some of ours have lately gone forth in the hope of finding a savage country in the unexplored seas. It may be that after a long circuit, they will arrive at the Orkney Islands. Lay your pressing commands therefore upon this chief, whose hostages are in your hands, that he do nothing adverse to them within the limits of his state." Not long after this interview Culdee settlements were formed in the Hebrides, in many parts of Northern Scotland, and in the Orkney and Shetland Islands, where the white-robed brethren of Iona dwelt among the Picts, teaching them the elements of civilisation and Christianity. For a

hundred and fifty years they carried on their missionary labours with little interruption, increasing so much in number that the Scandinavian records recognise them as an element in the population of the isles hardly inferior to the Picts. But in 717 Romish emissaries gained the ear of the Pictish monarch, and, threatening him with the arms of the Saxon and Romish states to the south, prevailed upon Naitan to issue the edict that made the Culdees a persecuted people. Yet Pictish persecution cannot have been severe, for, although expelled from Iona for a time, the disciples of Columba seem to have returned in force before the end of the century, and they still dwelt in the Orkneys and Shetlands on terms of toleration, if not of amity. Their great enemies were yet to come, not Christians this time but Pagans, although of that same Teutonic stock at whose hands their church and their race had already suffered.

Towards the close of the eighth century the Scandinavians began to undertake long sea voyages. In 787 they made their first descent upon England, as we learn from the Anglo-Saxon chronicle; and about the year 800 a body of these Norse pirates, landing in the little island of Iona, put many of the harmless Culdee monks to the sword, and burned their famous monastery to the ground as an acceptable sacrifice to their God of blood. About twenty-five years later, or 825, is made the date of a document that sheds light upon the northern missions, or at least travels, of the brethren of Iona. This is the "*De Mensura Orbis Terrae*" of Dicuil, a Scotch or Irish Ecclesiastic, which was first edited by Walckenaer, and published at Paris in 1807. Some writers have identified this Dicuil with the Dicull of Bede, a follower of the Irish Fursey and the founder of a Culdee monastery in Sussex, in the middle of the seventh century. But his mention of the Norse ravagers of the Scottish coast is incompatible with such a date. He may, however, be the same person as Dungal, an Irish ecclesiastic at Paris, who wrote a letter to Charlemagne, "*De Eclipsi Solari*," and who flourished in the first quarter of the ninth century. He says:—

"There are a great many other islands in the ocean to the north of Britain. Vessels in full sail, and ever driven by favourable winds, require two days and two nights to reach them from the most northerly of the British Islands. An ecclesiastic worthy of credit has told me that, after

travelling two days and one night in summer in a small vessel with two banks of oars, he landed upon one of these islands. They are for the most part small, and are separated from each other by narrow straits. For a hundred years they were inhabited by hermits, who had sailed thither from our Scotia. But, as they had been desert from the beginning of the world so now, that the anchorites have abandoned them on account of the pirates of the Normans, they are occupied by an innumerable multitude of sheep and sea-fowl of every kind. We have not found these islands mentioned by any author."

Letronne thinks they were the Shetlands, but Munch is in favour of the Faroe Isles, which agree better with the "narrow straits." It seems, therefore, to be established that not long after Columba's mission began, there were Culdee settlements not only in the Hebrides and Orkneys, but in the Shetlands, and probably in the Faroes. There were missionaries, however, who had pushed their way further, even to Ultima Thule itself, in which M. Beauvois recognises Iceland. Dicuil says:—

"Thirty years ago certain clerics who had lived in that island from the calends of February to those of August, told me that, not only at the summer solstice, but also some days before and after, the sun disappeared for but a short time, and seemed to hide himself behind a hill, so that, even during his short absence, one was not deprived of the light of day. Thus, one could see well enough to engage in any kind of occupation, *vel pediculus de camisia abstrahere*, as in broad daylight. It is likely that viewed from the top of a mountain there would be no sunset. . . . They certainly do not tell the truth who have written that this island is surrounded by an ice-bound sea, as well as those who assert that, from the vernal to the autumnal equinox, the sun shines without any interruption, and that, *vice versa*, his light is then withdrawn till the vernal equinox of the following year. For the said clerics, who sailed to this island in a time of extreme cold, were able to land, and, remaining there, they saw a continuous alternation of day and night, except at the time of the solstice. It is true that at one day's navigation to the north of this island they found the sea frozen."

From this statement it would appear that Iceland, although discovered by the Culdees, was not colonised by them in the time of Dicuil. Its colonisation, therefore, which doubtless took place about the middle of the ninth century, must have been consequent upon the Norse ravages in the Shetlands and the Faroe Isles.

The presence of the Culdees in the Faroe Isles is attested in the traditions preserved by Pastor J. H. Schroeter in his

Fœroeiske Folkesagn. The following tradition is from Suderoe :—

“Some time before the Norwegians took possession of the Faroes, there were established in the islands certain people, whom the narrator regarded as saints, seeing they had the power to perform signs and miracles, to heal wounds and cure diseases, whether in man or in beast, and to foretell whether the year would be a favourable one for the fishing or for health. They did not live like other men, for their food consisted of milk, eggs, roots, and sea-weeds. They had domesticated goats that they milked, but they killed no living creature, and shed no blood. The sole articles which they would accept as presents, or in remuneration for their services, were unleavened bread, dried fish, and *vadmæl*, or home-spun cloth, for their clothing. Several places are pointed out in which they dwelt; for instance, a spot near Kvalboy, where it can be seen that the soil has been levelled to make a pasture field; also near a village called *Hovi*, as well as in other islands. On the arrival of the Norwegians, who were very violent, some of these people departed by sea, while others took refuge in caves. The last survivors dwelt in a cavern in the isle of Nalsoy. Far in the interior of this cavern their ashes were found at the end of last century.”

Now it was about the middle of the ninth century that Grim Kamban and other Norwegians, fleeing from the tyranny of Harold Harfager, took possession of the Faroe Islands. Such is the testimony of the *Landnamabok* of Iceland, and other authentic documents. A Norse manuscript written in 1403, and published by Wallace in his *Account of the Islands of Orkney*, informs us that in the time of this same Harold the Long-haired the whole of the region of the Orkneys was inhabited by two nations, the Picts and the Papas, who were destroyed root and branch by the Norwegians, “for the latter so set upon these nations that they left none of the posterity of Picts or Papas remaining.” That we may not be in doubt as to who these Papas were, the “*Historia Norwegiæ*” states that “The Papas were so called on account of the white robes with which they clothed themselves like clerics, whence in the Teutonic tongue all clerics are called Papas. To this day the island of Papey is named after them.” These white-clad priests can be no others than the white-robed followers of Columba, and their name Papa still survives in the Hebrides, the Orkneys, the Shetlands, and even in distant Iceland. What a strange mystery in Divine Providence appears in the story of these devoted men, the holders of a comparatively pure faith, far purer than that of conquering Rome, as, driven by fierce and

unpitying pagan foes, they flee from Iona to the Hebrides, from the Hebrides to the Orkneys, from the Orkneys to Shetland, and thence to the desert Faroe Isles! And even there they find but brief respite, for already we have learned that the Norse galleys they knew so well discovered their refuge and drove them once more out into the open sea.

The Culdee fugitives came at length to Iceland. Of this there can be no doubt, apart altogether from the testimony of Dicuil. Our authority here is Ari Frodi, one of the most celebrated of Norse historians, who lived in the early part of the twelfth century. Writing of those who colonised Iceland from Scandinavia after its discovery by Naddod in 860, he says: "There were there Christians of the sort that the Norwegians call Papas; but they departed immediately, because they would not dwell among pagans. They left behind them Irish books, bells, and crucifixes, whence it may be concluded that they were Irish." In another work he makes a similar statement: "Before Iceland was colonised from Norway, there were in in that island men whom the Norwegians call Papas. They were Christians, and it is thought that they came from countries situated in the western sea (west of Scandinavia), for, after they had gone, there were found Irish books, bells, and crosses, and several other articles. These were found at Papey and at Papye." Still the old nomenclature appears in the names of the two places where the unhappy Culdees had made their settlements. The Norsemen knew well what Irish books and speech were, for not a few Irishmen were to be found in their pirate crews. There were such among the famous Jomsburg sea-rovers, and the names of Irish families appear in that Icelandic Doomesday-Book, the Landnamabok, as well as in other chronicles. Small wonder that the Papas were not willing to stay among the heathen after the sack of Iona, the massacre in the Orkneys, and the cruelties of the Norsemen in the Faroe Isles. Whither away, these despairing fugitives, forsaken to all appearance by God and man? To Greenland, it may be, where Eirek founded a colony in the end of the tenth century, which itself perished in the fifteenth; but of this we have no record. But, about Eirek's time, we hear of them still further in the west. They were the first European discoverers of America.

Professor Gröndals, an Icclander, informs us, that—

“After the discovery of Greenland, an Icclander, Ari Marsson, was cast upon the shores of an unknown land, to which in Iceland the names Hvítramannaland, or White Man’s Land, and Írland it Mikla, or Great Ireland, were given. The chronicles add that the navigator Ari Marsson received baptism in that country, the first name of which was derived from the colour of the dress or the complexion of the inhabitants, and the second from the fact that their speech was regarded as a Celtic dialect, appearing to indicate an earlier discovery of the country than that which we had fixed (namely, the Norse discovery). However this may be, that country lies on the American coast.”

All the evidence that can at present be adduced for this statement of the Icelandic professor has been collected by M. Beauvois. Let it be remembered that we have trustworthy evidence of the presence of the Culdees in Iceland, and of their having left that island on the arrival of the Norsemen in force ; for it is supposed that they did not quit their settlements until a body of men large enough to do them injury had landed upon the shores of their northern home. Where could they go ? Back to the Faroes, to Shetland, to Orkney, was to go back to certain death. Better to fall into the hands of God in the wide open sea than into the tender mercies of the wicked, which were cruel indeed, as their past experience had proved. Nothing is said of their wives and children, yet such there must have been to continue the existence of their settlements, and clerical celibacy, save for collegiate brethren, was no Culdee rule. As from Shetland they had pushed westward, seeking immunity from the pirates of the East, so still it is natural to think of them steering their course in the same direction, trusting that He who had led them to land at the Faroes and Iceland, would grant them yet another place of rest from the invasion of their merciless enemies. It is one of the saddest records in the page of history. Plenty of scope for fine writing is afforded by it, but for the present we must get at the facts.

It is now generally admitted that, from the latter part of the tenth century, America was known to the Icelanders. Their explorers spent some time in four different parts of the New World, to which they gave names. The nearest of these to Greenland was Helluland the Great, or Labrador, and after it came Little Helluland, or Newfoundland, Markland, or Nova

Scotia, and Vinland, comprising the southern New England States. It is in connection with the voyages to these regions principally that we learn of the presence of Culdee refugees in the New World. The authority cited by Professor Gröndals for his statement regarding Great Ireland is no less a one than Ari Frodi, the first compiler of the *Landnamabok*, whose period extends from 1068 to 1148. The Ari Marsson, of whose disappearance he wrote, was his great-grandfather. He tells us that Ari was driven by a storm to Hvitramannaland, which some call Great Ireland. "This country is situated in the west, in the sea, near Vinland the good, and they say it is six days' sail from Ireland." He cites the testimony of one Hrafn Hlymreksfare, who had dwelt for a long time at Limerick in Ireland, whence his name, and another sailor, Thorkel Gellison, the uncle of the historian. Both of these agreed that Ari Marsson was treated with honour in Great Ireland, and added the information that he there received the Christian rite of baptism. An attempt has been made to set aside the authority of this narrative on account of its placing White Man's Land only six days' sail from Ireland. At the same time, however, it is spoken of as being in the western sea, near Vinland, which is universally recognised as part of New England, including the coasts of Massachusetts and Rhode Island. The difficulty may be in part removed by substituting an *s* for an *r*, and reading Island instead of Irland, although the six days would still call for revision. If we agree with Professor Gröndals that White Man's Land or Great Ireland was certainly part of America, the two names and the administration of the rite of baptism are strikingly suggestive of the Culdees, who may thus be credited with one notable convert from among their later enemies. What an opportunity for the gentle Papas to return good for evil was presented when the great sea-rover fell, a helpless waif of the Ocean, into their hands! And in a new world what a new life may not the convert have led, as the friend and the defender of the humble Christians whom he had formerly despised, and whose brethren had, it may be, suffered death from his sword. In the year 1000 Iceland itself received the Christian religion, but not from Culdee missionaries. Too late the Norsemen learned the nature of the faith against which, in the persons

of its white-robed professors, they had waged such unrelenting warfare.

The next document which is supposed to treat of Great Ireland is the *Eyrbyggja Saga*. It relates that, about 999, Bjoern Breidhvingakappe, a brave and lawless chief, who had performed great deeds in Iceland, in many parts of Scandinavia and among the Jomsburg sea-rovers, went into voluntary exile. "He set out from Iceland with a fair wind from the north-east, which blew almost without intermission all that autumn, and for a long time nothing was heard of his ship." Then we learn that, in the year 1030, one Gudhleif, returning with many companions from a voyage to Ireland, was driven by a north-east wind to the west and south-west far into the ocean. How long their voyage lasted we are not told. At length, however, they reached a great country altogether unknown to them. Having landed, because they were exhausted by long tossing about upon the sea, they were taken prisoners by the natives, who, "it seemed to them, spoke Irish." From the hands of these people they were rescued by an old white-haired warrior, who addressed them in the Norse tongue, made many inquiries about his friends in Iceland, and gave Gudhleif a sword and a ring to present to a youth and a lady in whom Bjoern had been much interested. He refused to tell his name, and advised them to leave the land of his exile, as the natives were not friendly to the Norsemen. They put to sea again late in the summer, arrived at Dublin late in the autumn, and after wintering there, made sail to Iceland, where Gudhleif delivered the presents as he had been commanded. "Some persons hold for certain that the chief was Bjoern Breidhvingakappe." The weak part of this story is that it represents Bjoern, or the Norse chief of the aborigines, as a horseman. Moreover, it does not call the discovered country Great Ireland, but merely states that the natives were thought to speak Irish, which might have been the conventional name among the Scandinavians for an unknown tongue. As, however, it is cited as part of the evidence for the presence of Culdees in America, I have not thought fit to omit it in this summary.

There is a greater air of likelihood in the third document. This is the *Saga of Thorfinn Karlsefne*, the oldest copy of which belongs to the end of the twelfth century. It is one of the

chief authorities for the Norse discoveries in America. Thorfinn himself was a great navigator and explorer. It is not only placed beyond doubt that his country of Vinland, where the vine grew spontaneously, was the New England coast, but it is also generally conceded that he left behind him in that region an unmistakeable trace of his presence. This is the famous inscription on the Dighton Rock, in Massachusetts, near the mouth of the Taunton River, that Finn Magnusen, the runologist, interpreted as "151 Northmen occupied this land with Thorfins," which reading coincides almost exactly with the statements of the Saga. Early in the eleventh century Thorfinn, after spending three years in Vinland, resolved to return to Greenland, whence he had originally set out. He seems to have coasted along the American shore, ever moving northwards:—

"Driven by a south wind they arrived in Markland, where they found five Skraelings. One of them was bearded, and had two wives and two children. Karlsefne's men carried off the children, while the others escaped and disappeared below ground. The children they had carried away learned their language and were baptized. They called their mother Vethilde and their father Uvaege. They also stated that two kings governed the Skraelings, one named Avalldania, the other Valldidida; that there were no houses in their country; that the natives slept in caves and holes; and that another large country, situated opposite their own, was inhabited by people clothed in white, who walked, carrying before them poles to which flags were attached, and crying out in a loud voice. It is supposed that this land was White Man's Land or Great Ireland."

Markland, where the Skraelings or Indians were found, has been well identified with Nova Scotia. M. Beauvois maintains that the country lying opposite must be New Brunswick and Gaspé, on the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and that there we must place Great Ireland, or White Man's Land. The white-clad natives, walking with poles borne before them and crying loudly, he identifies with the white-robed Culdees, bearing aloft the cross and chanting their hymns.

The last record is not Norse but Italian. It is a letter written about 1400 by the Venetian sailor Antonio Zeno to his brother Carlo from a Frisian colony in the Faroe Islands, he having entered the service of the Frisian chief to make discoveries in the Western Ocean. The important part of the letter is that which relates the adventures of certain Frisian

fishermen, whose return from a far distant land, with a wonderful story, incited their chief to undertake the voyage of exploration for which Antonio's services were required. These fishermen knew Iceland and Greenland, so that, being accustomed to long voyages, that which they considered the greatest of all must have taken them further from their home than the latter country. Zeno says that, driven by a great storm, four fishing vessels, after passing a long time at sea, arrived at a country called Estotiland, situated in the far west, more than a thousand miles from the Faroe Isles. In Estotiland they found a civilised community of a foreign language, possessing all the arts, but ignorant of the mariner's compass; having Latin books which they could not read, and others written in characters peculiar to themselves. Their forests were of vast extent, and their walls and cities were built of wood. To the south of Estotiland lay a barbarous country inhabited by cannibals, and to the south of that again a semi-civilised region, where there were great idol temples in which human victims were sacrificed. The commercial relations of Estotiland were with Greenland. This information was derived from one of the fishermen who had been taken captive by the barbarous inhabitants south of Estotiland, whence he had sailed in the service of its king, and whose life was preserved on account of his skill in catching fish with the net. He was passed on from tribe to tribe, and thus gained an acquaintance with a vast extent of country. Returning to Estotiland, he finally constructed a large vessel and made his way back to the Faroe Isles. For Estotiland in the mouth of an Italian M. Beauvois thinks himself justified in reading Escociland, or the land of the Scots, by which name the Irish and Scotch were alike known. Escociland, therefore, he holds to be the same as Great Ireland, while the vast barbarian tract, ruled over by many savage chiefs, is the country intermediate between the St. Lawrence and Mexico, in which latter region the idol temples and human sacrifices were found. The narrative of Zeno is plainly not a romance, although it may present embellishments not in accordance with strict truth. The reference to Greenland indicates that Estotiland was situated in America, and in the northern part of the continent; and the description of the wooded country, and of the alternation of savage canni-

balism with pagan civilisation and bloody rites, are too true to nature to be lightly regarded as a chance coincidence. If we are to believe the narrative, it would appear that the Culdee community not only existed in America in the fourteenth century, but that it was in a most flourishing condition. It had extended to Maine, for there M. Beauvois finds "the mountain whence issued the four rivers" which Zeno mentions. The mountain he identifies with Mount Katahdin, and the rivers with the Kennebec, the Penobscot, the St. John, and the St. Croix.

That the Icelanders believed in the existence of a Christian Irish or Culdee community in America, and that they placed its geographical position somewhere about the Gulf of St. Lawrence, cannot be doubted. That the refugee Culdees from Iceland found their way to Greenland, and thence to the Canadian coast is exceedingly probable. Even the presence of horses, alluded to in the story of Bjoern, is not necessarily to be disbelieved. The Culdees employed the labour of horses, as we learn from the affecting mention of the old white horse of Iona in the life of Columba. Thorfinn Karlsefne carried many cows and a bull, whose roaring terrified the aborigines and put them to flight, into Vinland, and brought them back again to his own country. The Celtic fugitives may, therefore, have transported their live stock with them into the New World. There is a general air of truthfulness and consistency in the various narratives which M. Beauvois cites in support of his views, and it is hard to believe that the Norsemen, proud of the name of discoverers, should have gratuitously given the credit of being the first European settlers in a great country to a race which they despised. One would naturally desire fuller evidence, and evidence of a more definite character; but as this is not, and may never be, forthcoming, the best should be made of that already possessed.

Let it be granted, then, that the Culdees established a Christian community or communities somewhere between the Atlantic coast of Maine and the St. Lawrence. Among what race of people were these communities established? The answer is an easy one. In all the Norse records but one class of aborigines is mentioned, and these are the Skraelings. They, and no others, with the exception of the inhabitants of Great

Ireland, are found from Vinland or Rhode Island up to Labrador. From the descriptions of their features and modes of life, from the specimens of their language, and from the definite statement of Ari Frodi that "the Skraelings of Vinland and the primitive inhabitants of Greenland were of the same race," we are enabled conclusively to assert that they were Esquimaux. It appears, then, that the Atlantic coast of America, as far south at least as Long Island Sound, was in the tenth and eleventh centuries peopled, where it was peopled at all, by Esquimaux. This conclusion agrees with archæological research, for Dr. Gilpin of Halifax tells us of the shell-mounds or kitchen-middens which are found in all parts of Nova Scotia near the sea; and other writers inform us that the same have been discovered along almost the whole of the Atlantic coast even to distant Patagonia. These shell-mounds are the remains of the Esquimaux. Among the Esquimaux, therefore, we should naturally look for traces of the missionary labours of the Scoto-Irish colony. Such traces, if we except a tolerably complete account of the Deluge reported by Father Petitot, are not to be found in any existing Esquimaux community. The traces cited by M. Beauvois of Culdee influence relate to the Algonquins, and not to the Esquimaux. Yet no more favourable condition for founding and perpetuating a Christian settlement could have been furnished to the exiles from Iceland than among the latter people, who, in spite of many vices attaching to their degraded type of humanity, are docile, feeble, and unwarlike, and so superstitious that they would have regarded the white-robed missionaries as supernatural beings.

The contemporaries of the Esquimaux in the northern part of America at the time of the Norse voyages must have been the Mound-Builders of the Ohio Valley, who do not appear to have advanced farther north than the shores of Lake Superior, where they carried on their copper-mining operations, and of whom no vestiges are found in the east. These Mound-Builders have been identified with the Allighewi of joint Iroquois and Algonquin traditions. About five hundred years ago, it is supposed, or in the fourteenth century, the Algonquins, moving in large bodies from the west, came to the Mississippi and there met the Mengwe or Iroquois, who had

arrived at the same point from the sources of that river in the north. On the eastern bank of the river were the settlements of the Allighewi, whose name survives in the Alleghanias. These settlements consisted of large and well-fortified towns. At first the Allighewi allowed the Algonquins to cross the river, but afterwards, fearing their numbers, they fell upon those who had done so and put them to death. Thereupon the remaining Algonquins and the Iroquois united their forces, invaded the land of the inhospitable Mound-Builders, and either exterminated their race or drove them far into the south. Then, while the Iroquois remained in the neighbourhood of the great lakes, the Algonquins pushed their way into the whole area between the Mississippi and the Atlantic, from the Carolinas to the St. Lawrence. It is the Algonquins who figure in the histories of Captain John Smith of Virginia, of the New England Puritans, and of the French navigators farther north. In the sixteenth and part of the seventeenth centuries they were the Indians of history. How early these Algonquins, as represented by the Abenakis of Maine and the Micmacs of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, found their way to the lands which their descendants now occupy, is impossible to determine with any degree of exactness. As the oldest tree found growing upon the artificial mounds attributed to the Allighewi was computed by its rings to have lived about five hundred years, and as that general date will accord very well with Algonquin and Iroquois traditions, we may suppose the former people to have reached the region which M. Beauvois calls Great Ireland or White Man's Land towards the end of the fourteenth century. The Algonquins are undeniably of Malay origin, as their language, features, customs, and religion attest. Malay traditions reported by Valentyn inform us that about the middle of the thirteenth century great migrations to the east took place from the Moluccas, the region which best illustrates the Algonquin connection with the Malayan stock. About the same period, according to Markham, great changes took place in eastern Siberia, owing to the pressure of warlike tribes from the west, which caused the transference of many populations to American soil. The Iroquois belong to the same family as the Koriaks, who occupy the extreme north-east of the Asiatic continent. In the middle, then, or towards the end

it may be, of the thirteenth century, the Algonquins and Iroquois must have first set foot upon the western part of America, so that little more than a century is left them to find their way to the Mississippi.

If the narrative of Antonio Zeno is to be believed in this age of universal scepticism, the Algonquins must have reached the Atlantic coast twenty years, at least, before the close of the fourteenth century, although they had not penetrated as far as Escociland, or the land of the Scots. They had destroyed the feeble Esquimaux, or driven them into the far north, for of these Antonio has nothing to say. His savages to the south of Escociland had little or no clothing. Hence they were neither Esquimaux nor Iroquois, but might easily be Algonquins, who had not yet cast off their Malay notions of Adamic freedom. They were cannibals, which neither Esquimaux nor Iroquois seem to have been, but which Algonquins were, according to the testimony of Mather and other New England historians, and as we would naturally expect from their Moluccan ancestry. The time Zeno treats of was one of unsettled life, tribe warring with tribe over the possession of the Frisian fisherman, who caught more fish with his nets than they with all their arts. It is also to be noted that the Algonquins, like the Malays, are a fish-eating people. The Iroquois have ever been hunters. It must be confessed, in regard to the Italian mariner's story, that *se non è vero, è bene trovato*. What were the good people of Escociland, with their wooden towns and Latin books, doing at this time? Were they succouring the poor Esquimaux fugitives from Algonquin cruelty? Were they striving to win these savages from beyond the broad Pacific and the whole breadth of the American continent to the faith for which their fathers had become exiles in a strange land? History has no answer to give, and Zeno says not a word of missionary effort. But M. Beauvois thinks that the Algonquin did receive some Christian rites from intercourse with the Celtic colony. How slender is his foundation for this opinion we shall see.

M. Beauvois makes much of the glowing reports which many early writers on Canada gave of a town in the present State of Maine called Norombegue. Its inhabitants were said to be superior to the other aborigines in appearance and in the arts, to make use of cotton, and to have some Latin words in their

language. Hence M. Beauvois, with little consistency, since he regards it as a Celtic settlement, renders Norombegue as Noroenbygdh, or the "country of the Norwegians." Charlevoix briefly disposes of the glory of this settlement. "About half-way from St. Croix to the Kennebek," he says, "is the Penta-goet, which passes through the midst of what has been called Norimbegue, which has so long been represented as a beautiful and powerful state, and where there have never been but a few Etchemin villages, poorly peopled." So far from being a Norse name, Norombegue is a French corruption of that of an Abenaki tribe, which still survives in the town of Norridgewock. Yet some tradition of a civilised community that existed prior to the arrival of the French seems to have lingered among the Indians, for the Huron or Iroquois chief Donnacona told Jacques Cartier in 1536 of a country up the Saguenay, "where there are men dressed like us (the French), who live in towns and have much gold, rubies and copper." Again M. Beauvois finds evidence of Christianising and civilising influences in the kindness and hospitality of the Micmacs of Nova Scotia towards De Poutrincourt and his followers in 1610, and their readiness to receive the Christian religion. The Huguenot traveller Lescarbot made a hero of their chief Mambertou, a venerable man, a hundred years of age, who, unlike his people, was tall of stature and of noble appearance, and, still more remarkable, who wore a beard. Charlevoix says "that if he had not been born before the arrival of the French in his country there could have been no doubt that European blood was mingled with the American in his veins." Before his conversion he had been a heathen priest or medicine man as well as a king, and all the narratives concerning him concur in representing a most amiable, wise, and accomplished savage. He does not seem to have claimed any more illustrious origin than that of the people over whom he ruled with firm but benignant hand. In Lescarbot's time the Micmacs were still engaged in warring upon the Esquimaux. What if the Culdee colony had perished in these wars, and Mambertou, a child of the colony, had been adopted into the tribe of the conquerors? It is possible, but a conjecture after all, and nothing more.

The last proof offered by M. Beauvois is that some remains of Christian rites have been found among the aborigines of

the large region which he identifies with Escociland or Great Ireland. He says :—

“The Recollet father, Christian Le Clerq, who spent twelve years in Gaspé on the right bank of the St. Lawrence, found there in the seventeenth century numerous traces of Christianity, notably the worship of the cross and reminiscences of the Pater ; and the Jesuit, Joseph Francis Lafiteau, asserts that Christianity was, among the Canadian Indians, a reminiscence rather than a new belief, and that they regarded the cross as the symbol of the religion formerly taught to their ancestors.”

It is of course to be remembered that these missionaries whose testimony is cited truthfully by M. Beauvois knew nothing of the Norse visits to America, which have only come to light of comparatively recent years, although they may have had some knowledge of Zeno's narrative, to which Charlevoix makes slight and disrespectful allusion as a fabulous document. Charlevoix, indeed, is an iconoclast throughout, for he ridicules the idea that the worship of the cross was an original practice of the Indians at Gaspé or elsewhere. But let M. Beauvois continue his evidence :—

“In 1534 the aborigines of Gaspé, seeing Jacques Cartier plant a cross on the shore of this country, crossed their fingers and then pointed to the surrounding region, as if to indicate that they had the same in all parts of their territory. In 1607 Champlain indeed found one in the Bay of Fundy on the northern coast of the ancient Markland. It was very old, covered over with moss, and nearly rotten, whence the celebrated navigator justly concluded that formerly Christians had been in the country. The aborigines of the neighbourhood observed certain Christian practices before they were baptized ; for instance Chkoudun, a sachem of River St. John, would not eat a morsel before raising his eyes to heaven and making the sign of the cross. He had crosses in all his huts, and bore one upon his breast. The islanders of Cape Breton very willingly made the sign of the cross, and painted it spontaneously upon their faces, on their chests, their arms and their legs. So Lescarbot thought that these people ‘are derived from some race which has been instructed in the law of God.’ The Acadians, the name by which the inhabitants of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Gaspé, the neighbouring islands, and even the eastern part of Maine, were called, had some notions of the Flood and the matters of the ancient law. They knew the doctrine of the Trinity, one of the persons of which, called Messou, was a restorer like the Messiah ; and his mother, according to the opinion of Father G. Sagard Théodat, ‘seems in some respect to resemble the mother of our Saviour Jesus Christ.’ They had not forgotten the name of Jesus ; but, having become idolaters, they applied it to the sun either in its original form or slightly corrupted, as *Kesus*, *Kisous*, *Gischi*. In the time of John Alphonso (1541), their language yet contained many Latin words, and Halle-

lujah was still heard in one of their songs in the middle of the seventeenth century. Finally the Souriquois (Micmacs) of Acadia had adopted a great principle, which was the first and perhaps the only article of their laws: it was to do to others what they wished others to do to them. They had, therefore, not only retained some of the practices of Christianity and some remembrance of its doctrines, but they had also not forgotten the sublime precept which lies at the foundation of Christian morality." . . .

"Thus all clear-headed and well-informed men, Champlain, Lescarbot, Nicholas Denys, Monseigneur de St. Vallier, Fathers Le Clerq and J. Sagard Théodat himself, in spite of the dubitative form of his statement, struck with the numerous indications referred to, have drawn the conclusion that Christianity must have been preached in the country before the arrival of the French; but they could give no account of the way in which this evangelisation had taken place, nor of its period. All the novelty of our thesis consists in replying, point by point, to the questions which these judicious observers had put to themselves in vain." . . .

"It is folly to attempt to assign a modern origin to these traces, which have been pointed out in Acadia from the sixteenth century. The worship of the cross, Christian rites, dogmas, and names could not have been adopted by the Indians in imitation of what the French navigators and missionaries did, believed, and said, since their presence in the country was remarked at the very time of its discovery. Towards 1680, an old man of the tribe of the cross-carriers (Porte Croix) of Gaspé, whose traditional knowledge went back into the past a hundred and twenty years, affirmed to M. de Fronsac and Father Le Clerq, that he had seen the first European who had landed on these shores; that, before his arrival, the aborigines already possessed the worship of the cross; that this custom had not been brought thither by foreigners; and that what he knew of the matter he had received by tradition from his fathers, who had lived at least as long as himself. This worship, therefore, was so widely spread among the people of Gaspé in the second half of the seventeenth century, before their new conversion to Christianity, that there is no other way of explaining it than by the evangelisation of the country in pre-Columbian times."

M. Beauvois has proved too much; yet it does not follow that he who proves everything proves nothing. The main argument is that derived from the use of the cross as an emblem among the Indians. Now the Culdees undoubtedly used this emblem, but we have no evidence that they ever made it an object of idolatrous worship. Its presence also is not necessarily a sign of Christianity, for the cross is as old as Egypt, and appears on American ground, as in the central and southern parts of the continent, amid purely pagan surroundings. The trinities of the Algonquins and Iroquois alike are no more Christian than those of the Greeks and the Hindus. The name supposed to be that of Jesus is the Algonquin word for

the sun and the day he brings with him, a word that existed before they left their native isles, for the Abenaki *kesus* and Mohegan *keesogh* are just the Pelew *kokook* and the *gawak* of the Moluccas. As for the Latin words, more evidence is needed, even had we not Zeno's testimony that the people of Estotiland could not read their Latin books. The service of the Culdees, moreover, was in the vernacular or Gaelic, not in Latin. And the refrain that resembled hallelujah is one that meets us in the music of many widely separated people, in the *ya lay lee* of the Copts, the everlasting *lelo* of the Basques, the *hel-lel-lu* of the Senel of California, and the *i-e-ly-yah* of the Queen Charlotte Islanders. On American ground, I say it with regret, M. Beauvois has failed to establish his point.

Still there is an evidence, it may be, which he has overlooked. The northern Algonquins may, without exaggeration, be called monotheists, for they and they only of American tribes worshipped, as many, alas! still worship ignorantly, Gitche Manitou, the Great Spirit. My own study of the religions of the world, which has been at least extensive, leads me to the conclusion of M. Naville: namely, that monotheism among any people indicates Jewish or Christian influence. We have many testimonies to the effect that the Algonquins were originally idolaters, possessing and worshipping idols of carved wood, and their mythology, collected by Schoolcraft and others, presents us with the names of former deities whom they do not seem to have acknowledged as objects of worship within the historical period. Like Abraham, they also, beyond the Flood, in their Malay or Polynesian home, served many strange gods. Whence this great change? Whence even the complex name Gitche Manitou, the Great Spirit? Manitou is doubtless an old heathen name for deity, like the Latin *deus* and our English word *god*, derived from Guotan or Odin, as *deus* from Zeus. But the Gitche seems to suggest an attempt on the part of some teacher to elevate the heathen name into the title of the One Living and True. The Hurons and Iroquois were not Monotheists, nor were any other American people whose religion is known to me. The beings of the Algonquin mythology appear in genealogical order, like those of the Greeks and Romans, the Persians and Indians. But Gitche Manitou, like Melchizedek, has neither father nor son.

He stands alone, the Creator and Preserver of men. Under forms presenting but slight variation, the name of the Great Spirit appears among the Algonquins proper, the Crees, and the Ojibbeways. The Micmacs call him Nikskam, and the Abenakis, Ketsi Niwasku. The latter people seem, at the time of their first intercourse with the French missionaries, to have become devil-worshippers, for their efforts to propitiate Matai Niwasku, or the bad spirit, are said to have been greater than those put forth by them to seek the protection of Ketsi Niwasku. It does not appear that the Ojibbeways and Crees discriminated to the same extent in favour of Matchi Manitou, the Algonquin equivalent for the evil one. This dualism in religion, together with the use of the same generic term Manitou or Niwasku, to designate the good and the evil spirit, is suggestive of European influence. The Indian does not generalise naturally, but employs distinct words to designate each individual species. It is, therefore, far from improbable that the conceptions of one God or great spirit of good and of a devil or enemy of mankind were presented to their minds by Christian teachers at some remote period under the manufactured forms Gitche Manitou and Matchi Manitou. I am not acquainted with any corresponding phenomena among the other aboriginal tribes of America.

M. Beauvois also refers to two matters which he thinks add probability to his thesis: one being the widely spread tradition of the White Man, which can be proved to have existed in America prior to the landing of Columbus; the other, the perpetually recurring story of the Welsh Indians. The tradition of the White Man is too vague and too far-reaching, for it was early found in South America, to permit of any theory being established upon it. The story of Indians who spoke the Welsh language, who possessed manuscripts, and were of fairer complexion than their fellows, is told by a number of independent writers, and has quite a bibliography of its own. Madokwando, chief of the Penobscots, an Abenaki tribe, in the latter part of the seventeenth century, was supposed to preserve in his name a reminiscence of the ill-fated Prince Madoc, who, in the twelfth century, sailed from Wales never to return. By many writers the Welsh colony has been sought among the Tuscaroras, a purely Iroquois tribe, and by others, such as

Catlin the artist, among the Mandans, a section of the Dacotahs. No scientific evidence has yet been adduced for the existence of a Welsh colony in any part of aboriginal America. Specimens of the languages of all, or almost all, North American Indian tribes have been collected, but among them all, so far as is known to me, there is only one which may be called Celtic. It is a list of Darien numerals published by Mr. Hubert H. Bancroft in his magnificent work, *The Native Races of the Pacific States*. These numerals are almost pure Gaelic, and lead us to think that Mr. Bancroft or his authority has been made the victim of a hoax.

There is sufficient evidence for believing that the Culdees established themselves in Iceland, and that they deserted that country on the arrival of the Norsemen in the last quarter of the ninth century. It is exceedingly probable that their spirit of enterprise, combining with their fear of the enemies who had driven them step by step into the north and west, induced them to direct their flight westward, first to Greenland, it may be, and afterwards to a more hospitable region on the American main. Two Norse records of maritime discovery belonging to the tenth and eleventh centuries, and one Italian document of the fourteenth, indicate the existence of a civilised Celtic and Christian colony on the northern shores of the continent. And the presence of Christian influences in the region which M. Beauvois identifies with White Man's Land, Great Ireland, or Escociland, seems to be attested by the appearance of Christian symbols and monotheistic belief among the Indians who occupied it at the time of French settlement. It must have been very late in the fourteenth, and perhaps not till the fifteenth, century that the Algonquin tribes came in contact with the Scoto-Irish community. Driving the Esquimaux before them, they would seem to have respected the white-robed bearers of the cross, and to have submitted to receive religious instruction from their lips. Nor can that instruction have been brief which put an end to idol-worship, and firmly rooted in the Algonquin mind the names of Gitche Manitou and Matchi Manitou, with the truths of which they were the symbols. But one naturally asks how this community of Christian teachers came to perish utterly, after preserving its existence for five hundred years.

The answer is not far to seek. A new race came on the scene, how long before the advent of the French we cannot tell, but it was there when Jacques Cartier arrived in the St. Lawrence in 1535. It was the race of the Wyandot-Iroquois, men of large stature, of great strength and vigour, superior to the Algonquins in culture and intellectual power, and the most indomitable warriors of the American continent. It was with their chiefs that Cartier treated, and from them that he received the names Canada, Stadacona, and Hochelaga; for the Algonquins at that time were their subject vassals all along the St. Lawrence and the Gulf. Who more likely than they to have broken up the mission settlement, and to have left no Culdee tongue to tell the tale? The Senecas in the middle of the seventeenth century utterly exterminated the Eries, so that they ceased to be a nation. It was these same Senecas who gave to Cartier the geographical name Canada, which is particularly their own, so that in 1535 they were to be found not far from White Man's Land. Their eye did not pity nor their hand spare. Age and sex, innocence and helplessness, were nothing to them. Those who in 1649 could dance with fiendish joy round the missionaries Brebœuf and Lallemand, whom they plied with tortures too horrible to relate, were the worthy descendants doubtless of earlier generations as ready to murder the white-robed Culdee as they the black-robed Jesuit. Read the massacre of Wyoming, an Iroquois exploit, and judge of the probable fate of the Celtic dwellers in White Man's Land. At some time in the fifteenth century must have been performed this last terrible act in the sad Culdee tragedy. Their lamp went out, struck to the earth by a cruel hand, in the midst of gross heathen darkness, just at the time when, beyond the ocean, their fathers had crossed in doubt and fear, the better day began to dawn that gave at length to Lindisfarne and Derry and Iona even a purer light than theirs.

M. Beauvois deserves our gratitude for the strangely romantic, though melancholy, story he has told. Yet even he does not know half its strangeness. The Christian teachers, driven across the northern Atlantic by savage pagan foes to the American strand, is but half the scene. Looking from that strand away to the far west, and beyond another sea, we observe a larger group of refugees from the Moluccas and the Philip-

pires crossing the Pacific to the Oregon coast, and passing thence to join the Christian white men. They came with idols in their hands and the names of many gods upon their lips; but, as they converse with the white-clad teachers, the idols fall, and the many gods are spoken of no more. One name only they keep. It is the Philippine word *anito*, which means an idol, and therefore a god, but on American ground with the prefixed article becomes *manito*; and this sign of an originally idolatrous race, preceded by the adjective *gitche*, as if to answer the question "Who is your God?" with the fitting reply "Ours is the Great God," becomes the sign of a new creed. What else was taught we cannot tell yet, and perhaps we shall never know. But doubtless those who took pains to instruct the savage in the unity of the Godhead made known to him the person and work of the Son, whose symbol of redemption he afterwards ignorantly cherished. Though it be true that much of the truth communicated soon disappeared, and later generations of Algonquins fell into devil-worship and a reverence for personal totems or fetishes, they never forgot the great lesson which the name Gitche Manitou embalms. It is not wonderful therefore that the first great missionary successes among the Indian tribes should have been achieved on Algonquin ground. Would that we had a few Culdee communities to carry the blessings of Christianity and civilisation to our western Indians to-day, for by some such mission-settlements as theirs must the work they are supposed to have commenced on American ground be carried to its completion.

JOHN CAMPBELL.

ART. IV.—*A Great Doxology.*

THERE is a doxology of Paul's, under which it were well if Christian men would glorify God every day of their lives. It is recorded in Ephesians iii. 20, 21: "Now unto him that is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, according to the power that worketh in us, unto him be glory in the church by Christ Jesus throughout all ages, world without end."

It is, as we have said, a doxology; there is a devotional ascription of glory to God: "Unto him be glory." The locality, or scene, or sphere of this ascription, or ministration, or offering up of glory to God, is the church; the company of the elect or redeemed; the whole family in heaven and earth; the higher principalities (it may be) taking part in this ministering, but secondarily, as being adopted into and embraced by grace among the redeemed from among men: "Unto him be glory in the church." The responsible, supreme, and ever acceptable minister of this glory to God, he by whom it is proffered and presented with acceptance, is the Lord Jesus Christ, the minister of the true tabernacle which the Lord pitched and not man: "Unto him be glory in the church by Christ Jesus." And the duration of this service, this ministration of glory to God, is eternal; it is no secondary, temporary, parenthetical, or transitory worship; it is no interlude or episode occurring in the middle of some nobler theme, thrown in to grace the onward march to something better, something more nearly final, more worthy to be permanent. It is itself the terminal and everlasting issue, to the enhancement whereof all other themes and movements tend: "Unto him be glory in the church by Christ Jesus, throughout all ages, world without end. Amen."

And now let it be inquired, What is the theme or subject-matter of this great doxology which is to fill all ages with glory to God by Jesus Christ? This is no abstract, vague, or indefinite ascription of glory to God. It is well defined and limited. One special perfection of the Divine nature is fastened on and celebrated as the theme of this particular Halleluiah. It is indeed one that is replete with great consolation and grace, hope through grace to the church of God; worthy to be the theme of a distinct and everlasting doxology. It is inspiring to listen to the very language that expresses it: "Unto him that is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think." Because of this, because our God is able to do so, let him be gloried in, and glorified for evermore. On this single, most sufficient ground, make his praise glorious. Contemplating him under this one specific title, let us enthusiastically ascribe eternal praise and glory to him; let eternal glory and honour redound unto him in the church by Christ

Jesus, the glory implied in his being able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think.

The marvellous strength and bulging greatness of this language has often been animadverted upon. Inspiration would seem to have done its uttermost in tasking and compelling the power of words to set forth the glory of God in what he is able to do for his people. He is a God able to do "what we ask"—"what we think"—"all that we ask"—"all that we think." And this alone were much. Such things can the mind of man think—embracing much and reaching far. "I think my thoughts in God," said the pious Kepler, when first he caught hold of the true idea of the solar system. He had found the very thought of God—the thought which had been in God's mind ere yet the heavens were—the thought to which God their Creator had given expression and embodiment when he created the mechanism of planets and their moons moving round the sun, the great central source of light and warmth and power to them all. Great desires, also, as well as great thoughts, can the heart of man entertain—large and wide in their extent, long and lasting in their duration. God is able to fulfil them all. When illuminated by the Holy Spirit, filled with the Divine vision of the glorious things of the kingdom of Christ (John xvi. 13, 14, 15)—purified by Divine grace and quickened by Divine power—great and noble are the things the sanctified reason of man can think,—great and noble the desires the sanctified heart of man can breathe. God is able to accomplish them all—all that we ask or think. But his power transcends this greatly. He is able to do *above all* that we ask or think. Nay, more: *abundantly* above all that. Yea, rather, he is able to do *exceeding* abundantly above all that we ask or think.

We propose, *in the first place*, to recall to mind certain illustrious cases or instances in God's dealings with every believer, in which he vindicates this claim for himself; *in the second place*, it will be important to point out that he uniformly acts out this designation in the whole of his procedure with his Israel, from the moment of his bringing them out of Egypt till he lands them safely in the promised land; and *in the third place*, the bearing of this on different classes of persons may be briefly indicated.

I. It will give fixity to our meditations on this theme, if we specify illustrious instances in which God vindicates for himself the title under which this doxology glorifies him in what he does for each and every one of his children.

For evidently Paul has not in his eye such interposition as that by which he brought out Israel after the flesh with a high hand and outstretched arm from Egypt, or fed them with manna from heaven, and water out of the rock, but what he does and is continually doing behind that veil which hides him and his movements from the eyes of our flesh and imagination, and from which he is continually, with all and each of the faithful, writing a history which eternity alone will unveil. Thus—

1. First of all, and best of all, and above all else besides, God hath done exceeding abundantly above all that we asked or thought, or could have asked or thought, when he sent his Son into the world to be the propitiation for our sins, that we might live through him. Was not this above all that had been asked? above all that had been thought?—exceeding abundantly so? No one had asked this gift. No one had thought it. When promised, it was most assuredly what they had not asked, and had not thought; neither had any asked it on their behalf, or thought of it for their benefit. It is the unthought-of, the unasked, and, even now that it is given, it is the UNSPEAKABLE GIFT.

Oh, the complete, exclusive self-containedness of the covenant of grace! “My covenant,” saith the Lord, as well he may. Who in this matter of the GIFT of God’s Son hath known the mind of the Lord? With whom took he counsel, or who was in circumstances to give him any? From whom received he a suggestion or hint the most distant or indistinct? Surely here was “the counsel of his own will, according to his good pleasure which he purposed in himself.” And well it was for us that it should be so. For never could man have asked it, never even thought of it. Never could angels have asked it on our behalf, and never could it have come into their thoughts. Even now that, unasked, unthought-of by all creatures, it is revealed, it is the theme of the angels’ astonishment, the matter of their holy adoring study. These things the angels desire to

look into. For they see that God hath achieved for himself the glory of being able to do exceeding abundantly above all that could be asked or thought.

Nor is it merely in the gift of his Son in general that God vindicates for himself this glorious title; but in all the circumstances and modes of this gift, and in all the effects unto which it is bestowed, and all the depth and intensity of its duration, and in all the grace and glory with which it is completed.

"Unto the Son he saith, Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever;" but thou shalt be my gift to mine enemies—even to them that have lifted up their heel against thy throne, O God,—my gift to be light to them that are in darkness, salvation to them that are in ruin, glory to them that are in shame. Is not this exceeding abundantly above all asking, exceeding abundantly beyond all thought? beyond all that we had thought before, or even yet can think? For this gift of God is God, but who can by searching find out God? But the Son, as God the Father's gift, is God's unspeakable, because God's unthinkable, gift.

"Unto the Son God saith, Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever," and thou dwellest in my boundless bosom of infinite and eternal love and delight. But dwelling still in my bosom, which in Godhead's inviolate blessedness and glory thou canst never leave, thou shalt be found dwelling also in a manger, wrapt in swaddling bands; for "a body have I prepared thee." And the Son said, "*Lo! I come.*" Was this asked or thought? It is what we do not need to ask—for unasked it has been given. It is what, even when given, we cannot think—for great is the mystery of godliness, God was manifest in the flesh,—but can only cry, "To us a child is born, to us a Son is given, and his name shall be called Wonderful"—wonderful beyond our power to think—wonderful beyond all possibility to think. A sweet name Hannah gave her child—"Samuel"—"for I asked him of the Lord." But sweet and fragrant as it is, it was the very last of names to give with truth to Jesus, for *he* came unasked, and he is exceeding abundantly above all that we could ask or think.

Ah! and when he came unasked, he came to do what he never could have been asked to do. "Unto the Son he saith, Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever;" thou dwellest in

light that is inaccessible, which no eye hath seen, still less any hand can reach. Yet thou shalt dwell in yon dark world; and that in such form that they may get their hands upon thee, if they please, and nail thee to a tree, if they please,—and please they will. Could that have been asked? Could that have been thought? Nay: no created intellect could have thought it otherwise than as a blasphemy. No intellect save Divine could have thought it in holiness. No man even now can think it in holiness save by the Holy Ghost. “No man can call the crucified Jesus Lord save by the Holy Ghost.”

“To the Son he saith, Thou art ever with me, and all that I have is thine: for thou art the heir of all things, and by thee also I made the worlds.” Nevertheless, in yon apostate world, created by thyself, as were all worlds, thou shalt be poor. Yea, in that only nation in it in which the poor man’s bed dare not be taken as a pledge, but it must be restored to him ere nightfall, thou shalt not have where to lay thy head. Could that have been asked or thought?

“To the Son he saith, A sceptre of righteousness, O God, is the sceptre of thy kingdom.” But in the body prepared for thee, thou shalt so stand in the room of sinners, and be made sin for them, that—as if thou wert, O thou Holy One, sin’s very embodiment, impersonation, and essence—the consuming fire of wrath shall fall upon thee, and the avenging sword of justice smite thee. Could that have been proposed, asked, or thought of?

“Unto the Son he saith, Thou art daily my delight, rejoicing always before me, rejoicing in the habitable parts of the earth—thy delights therein being with the sons of men.” But these sons of men will give gall in thy hunger, and vinegar in thy thirst; and when *they* hunger and thirst, thou wilt give them bread of life and water of life, and this shall be the bread thou shalt give them, even thy flesh, which thou shalt give for the life of this world: and this shall be the water of life which thou shalt give them, even thy blood, which thou wilt shed for the remission of the sins of many—even shed for the remission of the sin of shedding it.

Could that have been asked or thought? Even when first

broached to them by himself, they could not *think* it. They said among themselves, How can this man give us his flesh to eat? Only by the Holy Ghost can we think it in holiness even now. It is the Spirit that quickeneth: the flesh profiteth nothing. "Yet my flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed."

In every view that we can take of this first and greatest gift, oh, is it not exceeding abundantly above all that we could ask or think! Herein is love, not that we have loved God—not that we even asked God to love us, or thought of such a thing, but that, unasked by us, unimagined and unthought by any, he loved us in his own unanticipated, unsolicited, unthought-of love, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins.

2. When the Lord regenerated us by his grace, and united us to his Son by his Spirit, he does exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think. When regenerating grace first visits a sinner, it is what that sinner had not asked and had not thought. Herein is that saying of the Lord true: "Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you;" or that other saying of the Lord by the prophet: "I am sought of them that asked not for me, I am found of them that sought me not." No man apprehends or finds Christ, but was first apprehended or found of Christ. No unregenerated man asks regenerating grace. No man dead in trespasses and sins is capable of truly desiring or intelligently receiving the regenerating grace. To think of grace correctly implies and demands the previous possession of grace. To desire grace truly and ask it aright, is the fruit of grace already given and received. Can you ask grace from God in faith?—and if not in faith, it is not his very grace, but some mistaken and deluding semblance of it that you ask. Then whence is this faith of yours, this believing asking of grace? It is not of yourself; it is the gift of God. "By grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of yourselves: it is the gift of God" (Eph. ii. 8). Can you so much as even think rightly, that is spiritually, of the grace of God?—and if not spiritually, it is your own carnal imagination that fills your mind, and not the real, true, holy grace of God, for the natural man knoweth not the gracious things of the Spirit of God, for they are

spiritually discerned. Whence is your ability so to think? "We are not able of ourselves so much as to think one thought as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is of God" (2 Cor. iii. 5). Your power to ask or think spiritually, your spiritual petition or spiritual idea, is from the grace of God given you when spiritually you could not think at all. Your believing desire and supplication is from the grace of God given you when you could neither pray nor think. The Lord has prevented you, anticipated you with his grace; he has been beforehand with his communication of it, when otherwise you had remained conspicuously destitute of it. *His* GIFT of it had preceded both *your* ASKING AND THINKING; preceded not only your actual asking and thinking, but preceded your ability to ask or think; has been the very origination, beginning, and cause of your ever being able to ask it or think of it. And clearly, therefore, in God's first bestowment of his grace upon you, he did exceeding abundantly above all that you had asked or thought.

"Very bold doctrine," I hear some one saying. True, it is indeed. But Isaiah is very bold, and saith, "I was found of them that sought me not; I was made manifest unto them that asked not after me." Exactly is it this doctrine of God's unanticipated grace, anticipating all solicitation, and transcending and preceding all thought and capacity thereof, that is the doctrine which is called bold, but which Isaiah was bold enough to proclaim with unfaltering voice. Good were it that all successors of his upon the mountains publishing glad tidings of mercy were always as bold in magnifying the sovereign, reigning, royal, prevenient, anticipating grace of God. The heady and high-minded may cavil at it. They may say—they have in all ages said: If none but those who already have it can seek it,—if none but the already regenerate—regenerated before asking or being able to ask or even think of regenerating grace,—if none but those already in possession of this same grace of God can either ask or think about it, we need neither trouble ourselves to think about it or ask it till it comes. It may seem a very clever rejoinder. But it is melancholy work, O man, rebelling against God, against the grace of God and the God of grace. Depend upon it, this same grace is on the throne, and you cannot depose it. Grace reigns.

and will reign, and it will prove a desperate time to you when it is seen that you cannot bow the knee, nor say, God save the king! but must quibble and cavil, and impudently assail the saving grace of God, and the God of all grace. And it is a most miserable cavil this, about never troubling yourselves about grace until it come, if you are spiritually and eternally dead and damned without it. One would rather think that if you are not insane, the inference with you would have been all the other way. The immediate effect of prevenient grace is to secure that grace shall be rightly thought of, grace shall be earnestly asked for, grace shall be sovereignly, royally given, given into your heart to reign there, till even conscience, that delegate of justice, shall itself become within you a throne of grace, a throne for grace to sit upon and speak from and shine from; and what therefore is your refusal to ask or trouble yourself till it come, as your well-nigh blasphemous suggestion runs, but a rejection of preventing grace itself—a bold and wicked conviction, that as for you it shall not come at all, a determination that it may strive as it may to lead you to ask and pray, but as for you, you see through the whole delusion of our Calvinism, as you call it, and have resolved to have done with its self-contradictions and absurdities? And oh! therefore, are you not a living proof that if Isaiah's bold saying (for the thing is far older than Calvin), if Isaiah's bold saying has been graciously accepted among the Gentiles, to the glory of God and of the gospel of his grace—"I am sought of them that asked not after me, I am found of them that sought me not,"—his counterpart rebuke to perverse Israel is due to you: "But unto Israel he saith, All day long I have stretched out my hands unto a disobedient and a gainsaying people?"

Yet, gainsay whoso may, it remains a fundamental truth of the "glorious gospel of the blessed God," that to be able to think and ask the grace of God, is the fruit of grace already given, given when not asked, given when not even thought of, given when no capacity as yet existed to ask or think of it at all; and in that case is it not exceeding abundantly above all that had been asked or thought? Oh, child of God, when the God of all grace arrested you in your ungodliness and unconcern, when he convinced you of your sin and misery,

when he drew a veil to your view over this poor and perishing, unrecompensing, unsatisfying world, and all its semblances and seducing offers, and with it drew at the same time the veil from the world to come, with all its solemnising realities; when he compelled you to cry out, "What must I do to be saved?" when he revealed to you that Jesus, whom his love and wisdom had appointed without your asking, and beyond all your thought, to be a perfect propitiation for your sins—(oh, only think of it!—three persons in the Godhead, the same in substance, equal in power and glory—the *same in substance*, and one of them the propitiation for your sins),—a perfect propitiation for your sins, your perfect peace with God, and your life everlasting; when he disposed and empowered, "procured all, and enabled" you to lay the weight of the grand eternity of your lost wretched soul on the righteousness and love, the all-sufficiency and faithfulness of Christ, thus quickening you to newness of life, and by vital faith uniting you to him who was dead in your desert of death, and is now alive for evermore,—eternal life for you—you now alive in him,—oh! whatever others say in cavilling at the sovereign, anticipating, prevenient grace of God, will not *you* bear testimony that, when God did all this for you, the chief of sinners, the very picture and model of negligence and unconcern,—he did what you had never asked for and never thought of, in all this he did exceeding abundantly above all that you had asked or thought!

3. God vindicates this title for himself, and does exceeding abundantly above all that had been asked or thought, in the view of that estate of grace and privilege into which regeneration or effectual calling ushers those that are persuaded and enabled to embrace Jesus Christ freely offered to them in the gospel, and brought into an *estate of salvation*. As their former condition was an estate of sin and misery, so their new condition is a whole, complete *estate* also, an *estate of salvation* by a Redeemer. They are not brought merely into new circumstances, in which they may look for a gratuitous mercy merely here and there, a haphazard blessing now and again; they are brought into a perfect and eternal estate of salvation, and they shall never perish, neither shall any pluck them out of their loving and powerful Redeemer's hand. Theirs is an

estate of gracious privilege exceeding great and abundant. Being justified by faith, they are adopted also as sons of God, and sanctified into the holy image of God. And there do accompany or flow from those great master blessings of the kingdom such precious enjoyments as assurance of God's love, peace of conscience, joy in the Holy Ghost, increase of grace, and perseverance therein to the end. "Being justified by faith, we have peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom also we have access by faith into this grace [the state of grace, or favour, or privilege] wherein we stand, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God" (Rom. v. 1, 2). Believing souls are liberated from all condemnation, and not only so, but positively justified before God, as possessing a righteousness already adequate to all that the law demands, or ever will or can demand at their hands. They stand in the Lord's throne-room, the objects of the Sovereign's favour, approbation, good pleasure, and fellowship—the honoured nobles of his kingdom. That all the noisomeness of their iniquity is hidden from his sight, and never suffered to come into remembrance, is the least of it, the least portion of their privilege before him. They are represented unto him in all the favourableness which the righteousness of his own Son can secure for them, or even for him, who himself speaks of it with delight: "I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him," and the Father says, "Behold my servant whom I uphold, mine elect in whom my soul delighteth." They are welcome at court, where they cannot too often present themselves, and well-pleasing in all the acceptableness that the Eternal Son in their nature can assert in the Father's eyes for himself; finding before God, each one of them, all the grace and favour which God the Son, Immanuel, finds with God the Father. For the Branch of the Lord is for beauty and for glory, for excellency and for comeliness: his blood makes them whiter than the snow, the Eternal Righteousness of all the earth himself being Judge: and they are comely through his comeliness put upon them. Nor is it thought sufficient by him who worketh all things according to the counsel of his own will to make his people accepted in the Beloved: he admits them to the standing of sons in his family—dear children in his household—free of the house, as well as acceptable, well-pleasing subjects and nobles of his

kingdom. To as many as receive the Son, no wonder if to *them* he gives power to become the sons of God. And seemeth it to you a small thing to become son to a King? to become the sons and daughters of the Lord Almighty? Nor is it a nominal, honorary, or ornamental—it is a real, a *born* sonship. No doubt, it must be called—for it must be—adoption. They must be received into the number and acquire a right to share all the privileges of the sons of God. Were they not, each one of them, aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, strangers from the covenants of promise, without God, and without hope in this world? *It must be adoption*: and there is even a charm in that which they never *will* forego. But it is an adoption resting on truth—an adoption resting on, guarded and guaranteed by, regeneration, which is not less real generation, or birth, for being regeneration. These sons are not less *born* sons, because born again; their generation is not the less generation for being regenerated. We indeed know little about it. But the likelihood is, could we know all, that we would stand in awe before those princes of the blood-royal of heaven, and be admitted into an intelligent appreciation of the indefeasible, inviolable, eternal certainty of bliss and beauty, of the great glory and high destiny of splendid distinction and boundless joy—unique in the wide plains of God's moral government—to which men are born when they are born again. Talk of being born in the purple! *They* are born in the purple who are born of the Spirit; they are the veritable born sons of God who receive the Son Eternal by faith, born not of blood, nor of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God; and because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father.

Our Father which art in heaven, Hallowed be thy name! Behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and should *be*, the sons of God! It abundantly exceeds all that could have been asked or thought.

He yet further exalts them to royal dignity, and inaugurates them into the honours of a royal priesthood, clothing them with change of raiment—pure linen, clean and white; he sets a fair mitre upon their head; gives them a censer in which to

offer incense at the shrine, which is a throne also—the throne of grace, where grace reigns, and they that receive abundance of grace shall reign too; and incense, pleasing to him in heaven, they need never want; even the breathings of their hearts' desire for whatsoever is agreeable to his large and limitless will. Looking down with delight and paternal appreciation—and whosoever has looked upon his own flock of little ones well know what I mean,—he permits them to compass an altar which *they* have no right to eat at which serve the tabernacle: feeds them on a paschal lamb and feast of tabernacles such as angels partake not of; accepts their offerings with good pleasure and gleamings of the light of his countenance, which, once seen, electrify them,—for that is nothing short of the light of the land where there is nothing to hurt in all God's holy mountain. Moreover, besides a priestly mitre, he sets a royal crown upon their head. He binds a diadem of tender mercies round their brow, crowns them with loving-kindness, kisses them with the seal of eternal delight and joy; points them right onward to the golden gates of heaven; first, indeed, a journey through the wilderness, but then to the promised land, saying, "This is the victory that overcometh, even your faith. And to him that overcometh (even to him that believeth), I now give the Morning Star." Jesus saith, "I am the bright and the Morning Star." How sweet it is! Oh the dewy freshness of it! Oh the beaming, brightening hope of the eternal day that is in it! The Morning Star *glowing in your heart* for love and joy; *glistening on your breast* for dignity and honour, such as earthly monarchs wear not; *gleaming on your brow* for high daring in the battle, to flash helplessness and terror on your foes; and *glistening in your eye* for truth and honour bright with all your friends, giving certificate concerning you, that whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are pure and lovely and of good report, you habitually think on these things.

No wonder that these things are true of those whom heaven hath certified and established irreversibly as heirs of God, joint heirs with Christ, whom the Father hath embraced as the favourite daughter of the King, the bride and spouse of his own Son, and dowered as such with a chartered and unlimited

inheritance, having throughout all high heaven made proclamation to them in these terms: "All things are yours, whether Paul or Apollos or Cephas, or the world or life or death, or things present or things to come; all are yours, for ye are Christ's, and Christ is God's!" Yes, glorious things are spoken of thee, O city, O child of God. Thou art a peculiar treasure unto him above all people, O people of the Lord; thou art a kingdom of priests unto him, for the Lord's portion is his people: Jacob is the lot of his inheritance. "There is none like unto the God of Jeshurun, who rideth upon the heaven in thy help, and in his excellency on the sky. The eternal God is thy refuge, and underneath are the everlasting arms. Happy art thou, O Israel; who is like unto thee, O people saved by the Lord, the shield of thy help and the sword of thine excellency! and thine enemies shall be found liars unto thee; and thou shalt tread upon their high places." And all this, thine estate of searchless privilege, already conferred on thee in Christ and enjoyed in its first-fruits of the Spirit—the Spirit of love and power and light and sonship—is guarded and guaranteed by a sealed and everlasting covenant: "For this is as the waters of Noah unto me, saith the Lord: for as I have sworn that the waters of Noah should no more go over the earth, so have I sworn that I would not be wroth with thee nor rebuke thee: for the mountains shall depart, and the hills be removed, but my kindness shall not depart from thee, neither shall the covenant of my peace be removed, saith the Lord that hath mercy on thee."

Who could have thought of—who could have asked—privileges great and manifold, tender and loving, gracious and abundant, like these? And when, introducing us into the kingdom and fellowship of the Son of his love, he hath given us an "estate of salvation" such as this, hath he not done exceeding abundantly above all that we can ask or think?

4. But once more, *fourthly*, God will again vindicate and verify the title by which this magnificent doxology glorifies him, when he shall introduce his people into an estate of glory. Then pre-eminently will he prove himself able to do for them exceeding abundantly above all that we can ask or think. It will be an exceeding, a far more exceeding and abundant and eternal weight of glory. As the rapture of holy

and eternal glory breaks upon the shining countenances of the ransomed of the Lord, it will be felt by each in himself, and seen by each in all, that the joy of our Lord, into which he hath ministered to us an abundant entrance,—this beatific vision of our Lord's glory which he had with the Father before the world was, and which the Father hath given us because he who hath redeemed us with his blood is worthy of this fulness of joy at God's right hand and before his face—transcends all notions and efforts of our faith and hope. We prayed for it, we longed for it, we asked it, we thought of it. But it is exceedingly abundant above all that we asked or thought.

Take these few eminent instances in which the Lord verifies the designation with which this doxology glorifies him:—*First*, in giving his Son to be the propitiation for our sins, a gift before all others and beyond all thought; *secondly*, in calling us effectually into the fellowship of his Son, training us to ask, and teaching us to think, when as yet we neither asked nor thought of such grace at all; *thirdly*, in bringing us into an estate of grace and privilege—of rights and titles, experiences and enjoyments—a relation which is the ground of our right to ask anything, and our power to think anything; and, *fourthly*, as having in view a prospect in store for us—as having in sure prospect because in eternal purpose for us an inheritance surpassing all possibility of solicitation or conception—a glory which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath entered into the heart of man.

II. We have been at some pains to lay a foundation for our second topic, namely, a consideration of the fact that God verifies this title also in his procedure towards his people throughout their whole course and pilgrimage, their whole journey between their introduction into the estate of grace and their introduction into the estate of glory. Along all the path in which this weak, defenceless, poor, and needy people pass to glory, surrounded and beset by a thousand wants, temptations, necessities, and dangers, he is able to do for them exceeding abundantly above all that they ask or think.

And let it be carefully observed that God's "ability" here celebrated—his ability to transcend all our solicitations and conceptions—is not a mere abstract ability. It is not a mere

ability in possession or distinct from an ability put forth in action. It is not such an ability as leaves the thing contemplated in the position of a mere possibility, a possibility which may never pass into a reality. Rather it implies that what God is thus able to do, he does.

For the glory that God seeks and secures in the Church—the glory that accrues and redounds to God in the Church by Christ Jesus throughout all ages—is the glory of perfection, which, in his marvellous dealings with the Church, he has proved himself possessed of, by actually putting forth for her salvation, preservation, and eternal benefit. The Church does not glorify God for perfections which she may *suppose* him to possess, or may prove by abstract reasoning, or be satisfied on testimony that he possesses indeed. She glorifies God, and is called on to glorify him, by *bearing her own testimony*, by specifying and quoting instances, and setting forth her own experiences, by bearing witness to such attributes of God, and such marvellous degrees and fruits of them as shine forth in her own history, and are inlaid in her own condition, felicity, glory, and perfection. It is ability in actual exercise that she celebrates in the text. Yea, it is expressly said that this ability is put forth in herself and in her members. He is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, according to the power that *worketh in us*. This very ability is in operation. He does not wait till we can ask or think. The very heart-thought of all this doxology is that if he waited for that, he would wait for ever. And besides, there are no abilities or attributes on which the Church can look abstractly, or as separated in their action and history from her own estate, interest, and condition. This God is our God. In all the fullness in which he is God, he is ours! His perfections, in their multitude, harmony, glory, and action are himself. God's perfections and attributes are not a mere bundle of theological conceptions, though we are too apt so to regard them; they are himself. His power, therefore, is ours to save us, to protect, defend, and avenge us. His ability to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, is promised, pledged, engaged, by an everlasting covenant, while it is also implicated, committed, and at work with us, according to the power that *worketh in us*—the working of that mighty power which he

wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead and set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places ; which he wrought in us also when we, who were dead in trespasses and sins, were quickened together with Christ, and raised up together with him, and made to sit together with him in these same heavenly places ; the power which worketh in us when God worketh in us to will and to do of his good pleasure ; the self-same power as will yet again work in us when he shall fashion our vile body like unto his glorious body, according to the power whereby he is able to subdue even all things unto himself.

This glorious and surpassing power of God—this ability to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think—is irreversibly pledged and irrevocably in operation, actually to do for us exceeding abundantly above all that we can ask or think. To quicken grace in us and mortify corruption ; to refine and purify our nature ; to guard and rule our desires and motives ; to support us in our fight of faith, in all our manifold temptations ; to keep us at all times from temptation and a snare, or to recover us therefrom with ultimate advantage, if through unwatchfulness we have been ensnared ; to sustain, console, and sanctify us in our afflictions and bereavements ; to maintain in us a heart for duty and an ability for it ; to work in us to will and to do of the will of God ; to make us more than conquerors over all our enemies ; to fill all our emptiness, and satisfy all our desire, to keep us from falling, or, fallen, to restore our souls, and fill them with marrow and with fatness and with the finest of the wheat, so that we shall not covet and shall not need to covet ; and finally to perfect that which concerneth us, and perfect us in all the will of God, that we may be without blemish and without spot before him at his coming ; and to carry us in safety, if not in manifest transport, through the river of the water of death unto the land whose children shall never say, I am sick, and where there shall be nothing to hurt or to destroy in all God's holy mountain ; to keep us (till then) from falling, and present us (then) faultless, having fashioned our bodies like unto his own glorious body, and transform our souls into his own image from glory to glory as none but the Spirit of the Lord could transform them ;—for these and suchlike ends embraced in the history

and requirements of the passage from our first entrance on grace to our first entrance on glory, God's ability to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, is not only pledged by promise and by covenant, but is implicated and operating in fact.

And ye that are escaping to the rest that remaineth for the people of God, exercised under various and ever accumulating proofs of your own weakness, sinfulness, and insufficiency, how precious, how glorious a thought is this! a privilege how sweet! a daily prospect how consoling, how invigorating! You have a God who can do for you all that you ask! Is not that great? Yet it is the least of it. And what this God can do, he is your God to do; yea, above all that you ask, above all that you think; abundantly—exceeding abundantly above it.

And how necessary that he should, in your experience, transcend all that you can ask and think, all along the course and march of your wilderness journey! How necessary, and, I will add, how certain!

1. How necessary! His doing so in those four illustrious instances already specified, renders it necessary—necessary that he should do it always, should do it all along. For it makes the object and the aim of the Christian life high and holy beyond all that we can think.

For (1) if God so amazingly transcended all prayer and all conception as to give his only begotten Son a sacrifice for our sins—a representative for us, taking our place of sin and shame and death and the grave, that we might be adopted into his place of righteousness and glory and life and heaven,—surely the hatred of sin, the purity of purpose, the disinterestedness, the gratitude, the love, the service, the zeal, the whole galaxy of Christian graces, the excellency and perfection of Christian character we are hereby bound to endeavour to attain are beyond all that we can think!

If (2) God in sovereign mercy quickened us when we were dead in trespasses and sins, and, when we could neither ask nor think what to ask, did beyond all our askings and all our thinkings, and effectually taught us to think what we ought to ask, and then enabled us to ask what he had taught us to think—graciously taught us to seek, and effectually enabled us to find, nothing less than himself—even this God for our God for ever

and for ever—oh ! surely the devotion of prayerfulness and love to which he is entitled is beyond all our powers of thinking of it, and cannot be rightly or fully rendered save in heavenly perfection and in heaven itself.

If (3) he hath brought us into such an estate of grace and privilege as that wherein the justified in Jesus stand ; if he hath effectually veiled, even from his own vision, all our iniquity, and clothed us with his own Son's comeliness—made us sons and heirs, kings and priests, placing us towards himself in a relation so near, so sure, so endearing, so exalted, so replete with privilege and with blessing, and all this freely, without money and without price, without change or the eternal possibility of it, without all risk of failure, removal, reversal, world without end,—oh ! how can we think aright of our obligations to him, or how can we express our feelings save by exclaiming, in a species of joyful bewilderment or blessed perplexity, "What shall I render to the Lord for all his benefits toward me ?" I owe him exceedingly above all that I can speak or think.

And (4) lastly, if he hath designed for us the glory which is to be revealed, but which flesh and blood cannot inherit, it is so exceedingly abundant above all that we can ask or think ; if we, according to his word, look for new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness, for an inheritance incorruptible and undefiled and that fadeth not away, for a presentation in faultlessness before his throne, and a body fashioned like unto his own glorious body—eyes that are like *his*, even as a flame of fire, a countenance like *his*, even as the sun shineth in his strength,—oh ! does not this also convey the extent of our obligations, and the purity and perfection of the holiness to which they bind us, far beyond our present powers of apprehending and appreciating them, and leave us with the similar question of perplexed enjoyment and bewildered gratitude, "What manner of persons ought we to be ?"

We are bound by these noble verifications of our Father's glorious title—bound to a holiness that is beyond all that we can think ; but if our powers of attaining it be still less than our powers of thinking it or asking it ; if in us, that is, in our flesh, there dwelleth no good thing ; if in this world we shall have deadly opposition ; if the principalities of darkness (which

would seem to be in light compared with us, and able, with hell's own malignity, to take advantage of our weakness) hate us and shoot at us in secret—they secret mysteries to us, we open targets to them, waylaying our weak souls at every turn of the road with manifold temptations; and if, last of all and worst of all, SIN dwelleth in us, forcing out the cry, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"—oh! what would become of us were not God, as the text assures us he is, a God able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think? We feel it absolutely *necessary* that it should be so—that it should be so along all the pilgrimage, were it only that we might be preserved in keeping with the exceedingly abundant great things he hath already done for us at the opening stages, and hath designed to do for us ultimately at its close. But we are not left to exclaim merely, *How necessary!*—

2. But, how certain! how certain is it that the Lord will vindicate this his glorious title to the believer in all his history!

Yes; it is certain that he will do so. It is certain that he will do so, though it were only that in the noble instance we have given he has done it already, and especially, also, as he has deigned in the heavenly glory to do so again. Is it conceivable that in these three brilliant instances God should exceeding abundantly surpass all asking and all thought, namely, *first*, in giving up his Son to the death and shame of the cursed tree; *secondly*, in calling you into his kingdom, when you had neither thought enough, to think of coming, nor power enough, nor will enough, to ask to be brought; *thirdly*, in establishing you in covenant things, on covenant terms, in an estate of grace unchanging and privilege inexhaustible, and indeed unspeakable, like the fountain and the measure of it, God's unspeakable gift;—is it possible that God should do these three things for you, thus ministering an abundant entrance for you into the Christian life?—

And, *fourthly*, deigning at the close of your believing pilgrimage to minister an exceeding, even an abundant, entrance into the kingdom of glory—the exceeding and eternal weight of glory; and that, nevertheless, between the entrance of grace, so exceeding abundantly above all that you could ask or think.

and the entrance on glory so still more exceeding abundantly above the same measure,—is it conceivable that between these delightful and God-glorifying epochs, he should for one moment interpose a blighted, woful, melancholy, drivelling interval, during which his gracious might slept and slumbered, and came not forth for your protection, deliverance, progress, preparation, and perfecting for his heavenly kingdom? Impossible. “He that hath begun a good work in you will perfect it unto the day of Jesus Christ.” He will not forsake the work of his own hands. He will not interpose in the progress of it an intermediate or intercalary portion, out of taste, out of harmony, out of keeping with the searchlessly gracious commencement of it, and the searchlessly glorious close. Between the elect foundation and the top-stone, brought forth, as he means it to be, with shoutings, crying, “Grace, grace unto it,” he will not thrust an incongruous and unseemly piece of parenthetical or inferior, hasty, heartless workmanship. There shall be no one of all God’s dealings with you in your Christian life over which it might be written, “Here God did not act to this believer like a God able to do exceeding abundantly above all his prayers and thoughts.” There shall be no page in all your Christian history to which a foot-note might be appended, saying, “Here God failed to verify the title under which the Church glorifies him through all ages, world without end.”

“I will sing of the mercies of the Lord for ever.” And all round and round thy walls, O city of the Lord, not one tower, even the least, shall provoke the verdict, “Here the builder began to build, but forgot the cost.” Nor among all his countless myriads who, with open faces beholding the glory of the Lord, are being transformed into the same image from glory to glory, shall there be one single image like that on Babylon’s plain, with head of gold and feet of clay. God’s gold mines are not so easily exhausted.

“Deep in unfathomable mines
Of never-failing skill,
He treasures up his bright designs,
And works his sovereign will.
Ye fearful saints, fresh courage take,
The clouds ye so much dread
Are big with mercy, and shall break
In blessings on your head.”

My grace is sufficient for you ;—the grace of him who is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that you ask or think, according to the power that worketh in you. To him be glory in the church by Christ Jesus, throughout all ages, world without end. Amen.

III. Let me now close by applying this so precious doctrine to three classes of persons.

1. To the careless and worldly. Sad it is to think there should be such needing to be spoken to where the gospel has been preached. Yet there is always ground for fear, always call for faithfulness.

You have no interest in this God who is able to do exceeding abundantly above all his people's prayers and thoughts. As to the other gods and idols in which you *are* interested—the other lords that have had dominion over you—I want to know if they can do exceeding abundantly above all that you can ask or think? One would think so, considering your devotion to them and perseverance in serving them. Hast thou not known, hast thou not learnt by sad and sore and long and full experience, that the very reverse is true? Hast thou not, in many a bitter lesson, read the fact that you can both think and wish for exceeding abundantly more than they can do for you? Does not the old commonplace of the insufficiency of all earthly things come out with a freshness and even brilliancy of conviction when contrasted with that special glory of our God which we have made the special topic of our celebration? Is it not sealed upon your deep conviction, as your own personal and profound experience—the same that has been the experience of all who have gone before you on the same broad road to ruin,—that the portion you have chosen is as much below your power of thought and of desire, as God's ability is above the desires and thoughts of those who put their trust in him? Have you not found, without aught of self-elation—far otherwise—that your capacities of thinking and desiring are far greater than the elements on which you have hitherto tried to satisfy them? The believer's portion abundantly excels his capacities of understanding and enjoying it. But your capacities of thought and of enjoyment far transcend everything on which you have hitherto sought to exercise

them. And so, for evermore, will you find that this heart-withering fact is true. You spend your money for that which is not bread, and you labour for that which profiteth not. And wherefore do you do it? Holy Scripture asks you wherefore? "Wherefore do you spend money for that which is not bread, and your labour for that which satisfieth not?"

2. To the convinced, sin-sick, and anxious sinner. Here is a glorious divine light for *you*, a glorious view of God in Christ which, by the Divine blessing, ought to do very precious, very perceptible good to you, yea, exceeding abundantly above all that you can ask or think. Will you not, at least, once for all, and now for ever, by faith,—will you not yoke this blessed fact to your actual case as you feel that case now grieving, perplexing, baffling you? What is it that is at the root of all your distress? For I take for granted that you are distressed. I will not think so ill of you as to believe that you could go on in a jaunty dance to eternal doom. No. You think about it gloomily enough sometimes. You know you do. And what is it that always drives back upon you and seals down the perplexity upon your souls, and prevails to keep you from peace and joy in believing? Is it not just the fact that you ask for nothing greater than you expect, and expect nothing greater than you can think? You cannot think how sin like yours can be forgiven. You cannot think how a guilty conscience like yours is ever to be made clean, and free, and honourable, and boundlessly or even averagely blessed beneath the eyes that are as a flame of fire. You can not think how a worldly heart like yours is ever to be made to find delight in prayer and fellowship with God and things divine. You cannot think how the doctrine of election is ever to consist with your own responsibility and freedom of choice to receive or reject Christ as you yourself on your own peril shall decide. And you cannot think what this mysterious faith can be on which, for weal or woe, it seems, your everlasting destiny depends. And then you go the weary round of your thinkings, and you fall down in despair at the end of them—as if hope must end when *they* end, and God's doings must be limited by *your* thinkings!

Get up, and get rid of these thinkings of yours. What good have you ever got—or will you ever get—from *them*! Get up

and get out of the miserable narrow rut of them ! Be not as the horse or as the mule, content to beat, in dull and weary round, with eyes continually earth-prone, the clay-baked track of human thinkings about things Divine. Get up, and do the living God at last, and at least, the justice to believe that he has got a larger mind and greater powers of thought than you. Jesus Christ will have nothing to do with you, the gentle Jesus even will fling you off, if you will not do his Father at least *this* small and poor amount of justice. "He that hath heard and learned of my Father, *he* it is that cometh unto me." *That's* the man that I will in no wise cast out : for *that* really is the man that cometh. Hear, then, and learn of my Father when he says, "Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts : for my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts." You cannot think precisely how sin like yours, those very sins that sting you, can be forgiven. But just on that very point "my thoughts are not your thoughts ; for though your sins be as scarlet they shall be white as snow, though red like crimson, they shall be as wool." You cannot think how corruption and selfishness like yours can ever be eradicated, since instead of the brier there cannot come up the myrtle-tree. You think your evil heart must be improved, and you cannot think how it can be improved enough. 'But that is not in the line, nor in the measure, nor in the kind of my thoughts at all,' saith the Lord. 'A totally new heart will I give unto you, and a new spirit will I put within you, and wholly new things shall spring up before you. Old things shall pass away, and all things shall become new.' Have done with your own thoughts, and have done trusting to your own powers of thinking. Have done carnalising spiritual things, and humanising things Divine by casting them into the mould of human thought and reason. Learn that you are not sufficient of yourself to think one thought as of yourself on any point that concerns your pardon, your peace, your relation to God and Jesus, or that eternal life that is freely placed at your acceptance in him. Not one spiritual soul-profitting thought on these things are you able to think as of yourself. But your

sufficiency is of God. Yes, of God. For, in the *first* place, in God's Word God's thoughts are written down before your eyes, and, in the *second* place, God's Spirit is promised to enable you to think God's thought at last and not your own. And with God's written thought in real and definite words before you, and with God's Spirit within you, just as if, with a written page of music before you, the very spirit or soul of music took possession of your breast, and every pulse within you beat responses to the master-mind of the composer, and your whole soul thrilled to find that you had caught the idea, the imagination, the rapture that glorious master-mind meant to express or convey, even so with God's written thought before you, and not the soul of music or the spirit of reason, but the Spirit of God within you,—the Spirit of God, who is the Spirit of power—thinking power,—and of a sound mind—the very spirit and master-mind of thought,—of Divine thought within your mind and spirit;—*then*, according to your limited capacity, indeed, yet truly and in your measure, you will think God's very own thought (where came your power of thinking from if not from him, if not from his)—you will think God's own thought in unison and fellowship with him. Then will you take in God's thoughts so as to feel that they are the grandest and most solid of facts—his thoughts great facts of love, mercy, forgiveness, peace, and joy; thoughts of love and not of evil, to give you an expected end. “Many, O Lord my God, are thy wonderful thoughts to us-ward; they cannot be reckoned up in order unto thee: if I would declare and speak of them, they are more than can be numbered” (Ps. xl. 5), for they are exceeding abundant above all that we can ask or think, each one of them a great deep. Think *for* me, O Lord, think upon me. “I am poor and needy, yet the Lord thinketh on me.” O Lord, thou hast finer powers of thought than mine, and good it is for me. Thou art able to do exceeding abundantly above all that I can ask or think.

Yes, O anxious soul! poor and needy, I ask you to take hold by faith on this glorious doxology, and begin to be thankful and hopeful, and praise God under this most blessed ascription of glory to him in the highest, above our utmost reach of thought. Yoke your needy case to this heavenly chariot, in which the infinitely amiable Lord God Almighty rideth

for the help of his Church in this excellency of his, and it will make your own soul as the chariots of Amminadib. Oh! whence is it to us that the Lord is so willing as then? Whence is it to us that we ourselves are so willing with some little beginnings and pluckings-up of heart as it is this day? There is no anxiety, no fear, no distress, no necessity under which you can now be exercised and pained, or under which you can ever suffer, but faith in God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, under the glorious aspect of his glory in the Church, will suffice for your relief. No prison this key will not open; no devil this oriflamme will not blind and quell; no shadow of death this glory will not lighten up. "God is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think."

3. And now for the happiness of giving a word to you that believe. Whence is it to you that you indeed believe? "Thy people shall be willing in the day of thy power." Ah! that's it! Thy people have been made willing in a day of thy power. And what a God they have to believe upon! Ah! sure it does and must need Divine power to believe in a God like this.

What can or ought I to say to you? What more is there to say, unless I say this again? I call upon you, this day, again once more to appropriate and praise your God in Christ under this magnificent doxology. I call on you to glorify him, and glory in him as able to do exceeding abundantly above all that you can ask or think. Let this transcendent power of his be one express and very special motive of faith with you. "Believest thou that I am able to do this?" said Jesus to the blind man. "Abraham staggered not at the promise of God, but was strong in faith, giving glory to God, and being persuaded that what he had promised he was able also to perform, and therefore it was imputed to him for righteousness." When, therefore, you come into perplexing circumstances (as what believers do not?), either in your outward life, or in your inward spiritual experience, and cannot find your way, cannot tell what to think, cannot think what to ask—remember that God can abundantly exceed all your asking, and all your thinking too. Rejoice and give him thanks because of this. And do not

require to wait for relief till you are thankful,—there is the cloven hoof of unbelief again.

There is no place for despondency, there is no room to tarry for thankfulness and hang back from the praise of God, till you get everything you want in hand. It is simply not true, in this joyous sphere of rich and reigning grace, that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. The whole grove is vocal with a hierarchy of choristers. "I would have told the very crows," said John Bunyan. The birds are all a-song, and the fountains all are playing. Spring up, O well, sing ye unto it. And there never shall come a time, with those to whom belongs the short song, "This God is our God," when it will be time to despond, far less despair. When staggered by some sudden trial, when all but consumed by some slowly-eating grief, when you know not what to think, and cannot think what to ask (for there are groanings which can neither be uttered nor understood), ask God to think for you, while you stand still and see the thought gradually become a fact—stand still and see the salvation of God. Assuredly it shall be yours to know that his thoughts are not as your thoughts, but as much higher as heaven is high above the earth, and that all things work together for good to them that are the called according to his purpose. Arise in lowliness of mind, and simplicity of faith, and blessed boundlessness of hope, and meet your Almighty God. "Why sayest thou, O Jacob, and speakest, O Israel, My way is hid from the Lord? Hast thou not known, hast thou not heard, that the everlasting God, the Lord, the Creator of the ends of the earth, fainteth not, neither is weary? there is no searching of his power of thought. He granteth power to the faint, and to them that have no might he reneweth (bless the Lord, he reneweth) strength. Even the youths shall faint and be weary, and the young men shall utterly fall: but they that wait on the Lord shall renew their strength, they shall mount up on wings as eagles, they shall run and not weary, they shall walk and not faint."

"Bless the Lord, O my soul, and all that is within me, bless his holy name."

ART. V.—*The Liberal Theology.*¹

THE "Liberal Theology" is essentially different from modern unbelief. Whilst the latter absolutely rejects the Christian and indeed every religious conception of the world, and contemplates the world and human life without any regard to an overruling God, the former professedly recognises the Christian conception of the world, seeking to purify it, however, from all those elements which are in conflict with the results of scientific thought and the demands of the progressive spirit of the times, and which therefore, as they say, alienate the educated from the Church.

Consequently it applies the same critical processes to the writings of the Old and New Testaments as to the profane ancient authors, without, however, undervaluing the high moral and religious worth of the fundamental thoughts set forth in the old Biblical records. It rejects miracles at least as facts not to be accounted for by the laws of natural development, and does not hesitate to rank among myths even the resurrection of Christ, spoken of by Paul as the foundation of our faith. It rejects also the doctrine of the sacred Trinity, which has been held by the Church of all ages. The majority of its representatives, however, stand by the idea of a personal God, to whom we may pray, and to whose kind providence we may intrust our interests; and only here and there among them are seen the beginnings of a transition from the theistic to the pantheistic conception of the world. It has broken with the entire Christology of the past history of the Church, and as for the doctrines of the union of two natures in Christ and his offering up of himself as a sacrifice and such like, it spurns them away with contempt; but it regards the person of the Redeemer as the pattern of a religious and moral perfection and as the point of departure of a moral regeneration of the human race. It reckons almost the entire Biblical eschatology as a mythological addition to Christianity, yet, at the same time, it seeks for a place in its system of doctrine for the hope of eternal life, but only in the form of an ap-

¹ From a recent number of Luthardt's *Zeitschrift für kirchl. Wissensch. u. kirchl. Leben*, by Sup. Lic. Gust. Kreibitz of Arnswald.

pendage to Christian doctrine, which might yet, in case of necessity, be dispensed with, and the denial of which would in no way injure the moral and religious character of any Christian.

It is incorrect to speak of this liberal theology as the product of the most recent scientific research. Modern speculation has only impressed upon it its peculiar stamp, but as a system its origin is to be found in the very first age of the Christian Church. From the very moment when the gospel as a divine living power entered into the Jewish and Heathen world, there was present, in every one who embraced it, the consciousness of an effort to modify the forms of Christian truths which were particularly obnoxious to the thoughts and inclinations of the natural man, to change their character, or altogether to set them aside, and thus to gain a Christianity more conformable, as it was supposed, to reason. This striving of the natural man against the gospel was kept in check during the first century, and still more in later times, by the power of the Christian consciousness and by the authority of the Church. We meet with traces of it, however, in the most diverse epochs of the history of the Church.

While Gnosticism built up its vain and giddy speculation, there appeared in the Ebionitism of the first century a form of Christianity stripped of all that was mysterious and supernatural. Christ is only, according to it, the carpenter's son of Nazareth, furnished through his baptism with extraordinary divine power, and his Messianic function was completed in his teaching, by which he expounded and extended the law of Moses.

Arianism, which arose at a later period, went considerably beyond these Jewish conceptions of the Lord. The celebrated presbyter of Alexandria, distinguished by his rich spiritual endowments, firmly maintained the supernatural character of the Christian religion and of its Founder. But so far as he introduces into the problem of the homocousia of the Son, then generally engaging thoughtful minds, the idea of a Logos created in a definite moment of time and in essence only like the Father, there mingles in his whole circle of thought an obvious rationalistic element. The same tendency to harmonise Christianity with the natural thoughts and wishes

of men characterises also Pelagius and his followers, only that this tendency showed itself among them especially in the sphere of soteriology. In the East, Nestorius, the follower of Arius, expounded soteriology after the manner of Pelagius, and in the West, Pelagius expounded Christology after the manner of Nestorius.

By the decrees of the Bishops of Rome and of several great councils, orthodoxy, as recognised by the Church, was established and universally accepted towards the end of the sixth century, and it might have been expected that the theologians of the middle ages would have closely adhered to the system of doctrine thus established. But when they attempted to show that the Church doctrine was also conformable to reason, and to evolve one point of doctrine from another, and to arrange the whole system by means of the Aristotelian categories, placing the several parts in relation to each other, it could not but follow that many of the stones of the building would be rejected by one and another of these master-builders as unsuitable, many an ancient part of the structure disturbing its harmonic unity removed, and thus the whole built up in a more pleasing uniform manner till the too audacious builder was suddenly arrested by the anathema of the always watchful Church authorities. This sentence of ecclesiastical heterodoxy was particularly directed against that tendency of scholasticism which was designated by the name of Nominalism. Not without reason had Peter Abelard, the dauntless leader of this tendency, to congratulate himself in that he was protected by the free-thinking Church historians. One willingly pardons the not less liberal conduct in its moral aspect of this liberal theologian who astonished his contemporaries by pointing out, in his work entitled "*Sic et non*," the dogmatic contradictions found in the writings of the older Church-fathers, and by setting forth his "*intelligo ut credam*" in opposition to the Augustinian "*credo ut intelligam*."

At the Reformation the religious consciousness burst asunder the fetters of the Church's doctrinal authority. But the danger of a dogmatic subjectivity was overcome by Luther and his co-reformers' making of paramount authority the written Word. It is therefore altogether a mistake to call the free religious movement of the present day the logic of

Protestantism, for that could be done only in the same way in which sin might be called the logic of personal freedom. Luther never made conscience and reason as such the judges of Christian truth, but he placed in opposition to the Church's doctrinal authority the conscience bound by the Word of God, and the reason held in subjection by the law of faith. The principle of the free investigation of the written Word, as held by him, was essentially different from modern criticism which raises itself above the Word, because for him the Bible had authority as the publication of the divine revelation. And when he speaks of certain New Testament books in the way of opposition, the reason is that his personal experience of salvation, as acquired from the Epistles of Paul, is not with sufficient prominence brought to view in these books. And thus the Scriptures themselves, and the faith gained therefrom, always formed the test of his religious opinions.

But, on the other hand, when faith in the Scriptures lost much of its depth and energy, then, after breaking with the doctrinal authority of the Church, there naturally arose the inducement to measure both the Catholic Church doctrine and also evangelical truth by the standard of subjective criticism. And thus it happened that, soon after Luther, the brothers Socinus awakened great alarm and astonishment in evangelical Christendom by the views they propounded. The Socinian doctrinal conception is in itself indeed altogether supranaturalistic, but around the supernatural facts of the miracles, the resurrection, the ascension, and the final judgment, Faustus Socinus, in his learned dogmatic work, *Praelectiones Theologicae*, grouped the entire system of Christian doctrine in such a way as to make these facts appear only in the character of unnecessary ornamental parts. Throughout the whole there runs so decided a polemic against the Church dogma that the rationalism of the eighteenth century could obtain its keenest weapons against it from the armoury of the writings of Socinus and the Socinians. Even a D. F. Strauss knows nothing better to aim against the Church doctrine of redemption than the sharp-witted, yet withal very shallow arguments of Socinus.

But the later rationalism has advanced far beyond the Socinian beginnings, in that as the so-called historical criti-

cism it resolutely contends against the supernatural character of the Bible, and unhesitatingly rejects from the sacred history all miracles as mythological additions. Of the whole fulness of evangelical doctrine, the systematic upbuilding of which by the ancient divines filled even a Lessing with wonder, nothing was retained but the three Kantian ideas of God, virtue, and immortality; and this rationalistic theology, which was the second stage in the process, did not confine itself to isolated theological circles, or to Unitarian congregations which separated themselves from the universal Church, but in a comparatively short time spread over the whole evangelical Church of Germany and of neighbouring countries. How deeply rationalism penetrated into the life and thought of our people during the more than fifty years of its dominance we have even yet the most distinct evidences. The removal of the person of the Redeemer from the consciousness of the educated, the widely-diffused Pelagian representation of the way of salvation, the disappearance of the evangelical doctrine of justification from the circle of the religious ideas of great numbers of our people, the very general ignorance of the sacred Scriptures, which in comparison with other countries such as England and Scotland appears so much the more remarkable—all these things are to be explained from the fact that our people through many years heard from the servants of the Church nothing but a sentimental religion of reason, and Zschockke's *Hours of Devotion* was almost the only religious book in the possession of educated families. Even the religious indifferentism of the present, which has recently begun to give way to a more lively interest in Church questions, arises principally from the fact that religion was presented to several generations in so feeble and insipid a form that it awakened in no one any earnestness about it.

As for Schleiermacher, I could scarcely present any generally accepted opinion regarding him. Those who were his students have a different view of him from that of many of the present day, who believe that they find in his Dogmatics only an artfully veiled Pantheism.¹ That he formed an epoch in

¹ To the question, "Did Schleiermacher then edify you by his sermons?" the answer was returned by one of his former students: "Edify!—that is too little to say: he inspired us so that we could not draw breath till he said Amen."

modern church history is manifest from this, that in our age of rapid life, in which distinguished theologians are almost forgotten as soon as they pass away from the scene of their labours, his name survives, and always re-appears in scientific discussions as few others do. And, indeed, two tendencies set in operation mainly by him still continue to develop themselves. While on the one side he pointed out to many the way to the forgotten person of the Saviour, and by the tracing back of doctrine to Christian consciousness completely remodelled the whole system of dogma; on the other, the rationalistic system of doctrine, within the circle of which his scientific representation of Christianity moved, was essentially elevated, made subjective by him, and brought into relation to all points of Christian doctrine to a greater degree than had been done by the older rationalism. Only in this sense may Schleiermacher be spoken of as the founder of the liberal theology of the present time without in any way, on that account, identifying him with it as regards his personal religious life and his ecclesiastical position.

For a long time it appeared, indeed, as if theological liberalism were pressed into the background by the powerful religious revival that sprang up after the War of Freedom, and by a very energetic scientific reaction, and it seemed to retain but a very feeble hold on only a few of the smaller German churches. The most recent development, however, has taught us otherwise. Favoured by the political liberalism which, since the beginning of the so-called New Era, has acquired new power, the liberal theology after fifty years began to cherish new hopes. From the defensive it passed, in close alliance with the ecclesiastico-political aims of the "Protestantenverein," over into the position of the offensive; and it has indeed gained such a measure of temporary success as might well fill us with a certain degree of concern, if we only look at the outward aspects of things. Its influence extends far beyond the limits of the German empire. The Protestant Church of Holland and of Switzerland is to a great extent dominated by it; in the Reformed Church of France it wages war with orthodoxy for the sway; it has influential advocates at the English Universities; the work of evangelisation in Spain and Italy is continually in danger from it, and

even in the strongly Lutheran Scandinavia an unmistakably rationalistic tendency has manifested itself. But it is in Germany that the Liberal Theology has its proper seat, and its intellectual arsenal. While some two decades ago only the faculties of Jena and Giessen, and perhaps also of Heidelberg, could lay claim to the honour of being free-thinking, we see at the present time, that in most of our Universities one or more of the chairs are occupied by its adherents. It has control over a number of theological journals, it fills the German book-market with its literary productions, and the judgment-seat of scientific recension is principally occupied by it, and that in a way that is by no means impartial. The entire liberal daily press looks to it as the acknowledged representative of theological science, as if outside this circle there existed only narrow-minded pietism and pitiable ignorance. In the well-known *Collection of Popular Scientific Lectures*,¹ whenever any religious theme is handled, there is found only a decided liberal theology, and the communal and church corporations of the large towns choose for vacant pulpits none but those who have first been recommended to them as liberal theologians.

In remarkable contrast to all this is the proper church work which we find carried on by such men. The great and widely extended field of foreign and home missions is all unheeded by them. They occupy a position of indifference if not of antipathy to all the church societies which have for their object the advancement of the Christian life of the congregation. Practical religious literature, with the exception of some collections of sermons, is throughout the entire year enriched by them by scarcely a single noteworthy book, and their as a rule thinly attended churches proclaim not only a lack among them of popular talent but also of ability to present attractive discourses. Even in circles which take an interest about them in the matter of an election to a vacant charge, while they may be highly spoken of as agreeable society, when they are once heard in the pulpit nothing is ever said in commendation of their discourses. It is even found to be the case that in those houses which make no claim to pietism the believing pastor

¹ *Sammlung gemeinverständlicher wissenschaftlicher Vorträge.* Von R. Virchow, u. Fr. v. Holtzendorff.

is preferred at the bedside of the sick or the dying. Hence the so-called free-thinking tendency, in spite of all that is favourable to its influence, finds surprisingly few representatives among the working clergy, so that, at least in Prussia, when a pastor is to be chosen there is frequently a difficulty experienced in finding one, and hence recourse must be had to smaller neighbouring States.

These feeble practical results of the liberal theology are, however, they assure us, counterbalanced by an eminent scientific superiority belonging to it. It has so exclusively laid claim to this honour that with an almost enviable *suffisance* it calls itself the scientific, and thus in effect places under the ban of being unscientific all other theological views. So far as regards the scientific treatment of a subject, the thorough comprehension of it and the critical appreciation of the opposing views, no one will dispute that the representatives of this tendency have in fact a prominent claim to scientific ability. Biblical Isagoge, the critical and exegetical treatment of the text, the history of the Church and of dogma, have undoubtedly received from it a great impulse.

But how stands it with the other requirements for scientific research or the tests by which the scientific treatment of a subject is tried?

1. By science we understand that, as far as possible, all-sided penetrating cognition of a sphere of life which explains the individual phenomena from their final causes (the analytic mode), and from these again deduces the entire fulness of the separate phenomena (the synthetic mode). When such a process is carried out, even though it should be only approximately, then for the first time may we expect firm certainty and a general acceptance of the results gained. Hypotheses that are always changing, when that of to-day sets aside that of yesterday, in a brief time in its turn to give place to a third of quite an opposite character, have scarcely any claim to scientific worth. Thus, *e.g.*, the solid modern study of nature in all its realms has established a series of results which no competent student of the present day in any way doubts. The Liberal Theology, however, cannot boast of any parallel to this. The parallelism limits itself here merely to negation. As soon as we inquire after positive results, we at once everywhere meet

with contradictions, with an uncertain wavering and groping about, which seldom or never reaches a general definite view. How variegated, *e.g.*, the form and aspects of the views adopted by Old Testament critics regarding the origin and authorship of the Pentateuch and the Biblical books which follow thereafter! Here we have a perfect medley of documents and fragments, and of hypotheses regarding supplements and crystallisation, a true Penelope's work of patching together and separating again the several portions of the Scriptures. The same section which the one critic with the greatest decision claims to be Elohistic the other refers no less confidently to the Jehovist. A section in which the one thinks he has discovered unmistakable traces of the highest antiquity, the other as positively attributes to the post-exilic period. The same thing may be said regarding the critics of the Gospels. That the Gospels were not written by the authors whose names they bear is an undeniable certainty to the negative theologian; but when an attempt is made to account for their origin the most contradictory and confusing hypotheses are advanced, and every new critic believes that he has found a new and of course the right key to the solution of the great problem of the Gospels, so that after the most careful study we can scarcely name a single result of the much applauded gospel criticism as in any good degree assured. The case is no better with the other New Testament writings. One rejects the authenticity of the Apocalypse but regards the Fourth Gospel as written by John, while a second, for such and such abundant reasons, of the higher and the lower criticism, objects to the genuineness of the Fourth Gospel, but contends that the Apocalypse is by John. According to one, the Pastoral Epistles, according to another the Catholic Epistles, must be rejected; a third holds that of all the Pauline Epistles, only the first four are genuine, which a fourth finally also rejects, the same critical experiments being perhaps recommenced in a reversed order. They may indeed find it difficult to assign their true names and their proper place to authors who knew how so dexterously to conceal themselves behind the mask of a pseudonym, and so cunningly to imitate the outward circumstances and the views of a period long gone by; but so long as these inquirers, who claim by way of eminence the title "critical," are so far from

being at one, they ought to think somewhat more modestly of their critical performances.

2. A second requisite to scientific research is clearness and precision in the expression of thought. Clearness and distinctness are, according to Des Cartes, the satisfactory criteria of truth. He who thinks that he has attained any certain knowledge will seek to give an unambiguous expression to it as far as that is possible, and to make it clearly intelligible to others. The Liberal Theology, at least in the sphere of dogmatics, aims at the very opposite. If one unacquainted with their much-rounded and artificial terminology were to hear their lectures on religious topics, he would almost believe that he listened to the very language of Scripture and of our Confession. They speak of creation and redemption, of the forgiveness of sins and justification, of faith and the new birth, of the divinity of Christ, his omnipotence, his high priesthood and his resurrection, but we may truly say of them when they discuss such topics, "The voice is the voice of Jacob, but the hands are the hands of Esau." On a closer acquaintance with their public utterances, it is soon made evident that there is bound up with their expressions a meaning which is altogether different from that in which they have hitherto been understood in the Church. When, *e.g.*, they speak of Christ as the Son of God, they only mean the ideal elevation of his fellowship with God; by his resurrection they mean his spiritual continuance and influence in the Church, by his omnipotent power over the elements, the independence of his moral-religious consciousness of the restraining influences of the external world; when they understand by the conception of creation an everlasting world-creation which is indeed no longer a creation; when by the conception of justification and the pardon of sins they understand merely the expression of a gracious relation never interrupted, in which God stands to the sinner, and by the reconciliation effected through Christ they seek to express the idea that the sufferings of this life are now no longer to be regarded as punishments,—when with all this they intentionally use all the concrete Biblical expressions common to the Church, then indeed, with a well-known French diplomat, we may say that language is meant not to express our thoughts but to conceal them. In accommodating their

expressions to the Biblical forms, we may well recognise a tribute paid by the liberal critics to the consciousness of the Church and to Christian truths. And we can well imagine that it will be a source of satisfaction to a preacher who must confess that he now no longer believes anything, in its proper meaning, of all that has entered into the Church's confession, when by such an accommodating mode of address he comes to learn what the Scriptures and the Church in all ages have taught. On the pretended scientific character of the negative theology, however, such an experience throws a by no means favourable light. Above science stand the interests of truth, which seeks for every newly-acquired conviction, if possible, an adequate expression, which points out the opposing arguments instead of concealing them, and which altogether avoids the forms of expression which are derived from antiquated circles of thought, and which therefore no longer correspond to the new conceptions. When the very opposite of all this appears, we can have no confidence in such a science.

3. A third requisite is that scientific research should be prosecuted on positive grounds, and not on mere suppositions. One of the watchwords of the present day is that of "positive science," and a scientific character is denied to the Church theology because it proceeds on certain and immutable statements already announced, *i.e.* on the normative authority of the Scripture as the record of divine revelation. But the idea of positive science is a mere fiction. Even Des Cartes, who so earnestly proceeds to build up his system with the abstraction from it of all hypotheses, that he altogether disavows the thinking subject as the only firm and certain point, as the *eo ipso* certain fact of thinking, and with it the existence even of a thinking subject, yet afterwards assumes that which is apparently rejected, unchanged, for he simply accepts the substance of matter as an empirical something that has been met with. The critical scepticism, with its absolute positiveness, thus returns again to dogmatism. And in this the founder of the new philosophy is followed by the so-called positive science. Thus the exact study of nature rests on the supposition of the certainty of the testimony of the senses. The writing of history grounds the veracity of its communications on the credibility of the sources of its information; and when it is not fortunate enough to be able to compare together

divers independent documents, and to test one by means of another, it has in many cases no other proof to offer than the veracity of the writer himself. The philosophical ethics supposes the idea of moral good stamped on the conscience as an *eo ipso* true and sound idea—of course a simple supposition. None may therefore, it is to be hoped, reject the scientific worth of theology simply because it proceeds on a series of unproved truths, *i.e.* of truths not to be discovered by abstract thought forming its propositions, not from the sphere of the observation of the senses, but from the Scriptures and the Christian conscience.

On the other hand, this dogmatism, warrantable for theology as well as for every other science, is at once changed into a false dogmatism, when, from fondness for their suppositions, men handle scientific problems in a one-sided and partial manner. Such false dogmatism is emphatically chargeable against the liberal theology.

The fundamental dogma of naturalism is, that all outward phenomena must be explained from natural laws known to us, and thus, that there is no such thing as that which we call miracles. Now although this dogma rests on a very feeble foundation, in so far as these natural laws have been derived from an altogether limited number of empirical observations, and their certainty can only be argued from an equally limited number of experiences, yet the liberal theology submits to it far more unconditionally than the Romish Church does to the dogma of Infallibility. A whole series of critical and exegetical researches are influenced by it, yea, their results are beforehand determined by it, and that oftentimes in such a way as to do violence to the given facts. The foreknowledge of the future on the part of the prophets would, *e.g.*, be incompatible with that dogma. Consequently the critical and exegetical screw has been applied to the Biblical prophecies till the prophets have been transferred to a period which gives the predictions the character of being a mere *vaticinium post eventum*. The fact of the resurrection is at once destroyed by this fundamental naturalistic dogma. The reports of the resurrection can thus rest only on conscious deception, or on unintentional legends, and the witnesses for its reality may yet be so important, yea, so convincing, that every impartial historian would at once recognise it as a certified fact. The

negative theology contends against the fact. Why? Because the return to life of one who is dead belongs to the sphere of the impossible. For Christ is not risen, because He cannot be. The entire rationalistic theology is dominated by this false dogmatism. As to the question of the genuineness of the Gospel of John, the origin of the Acts of the Apostles, and the development of the ancient Catholic Church, and many other things it speaks with decision. The critical and exegetical research would often reach too negative results, were not the path and the goal previously determined by reference to certain dogmatic suppositions. From opposite sides the same error is not seldom reached. I refer to the well-known older Gospel harmonies constructed in the interest of a one-sided idea of inspiration, and to the distortions and dislocations of historical facts to which recourse was had in the attempt to establish the dogma of the Pope's infallibility! But when the liberal theology in such circumstances as these is so free with its reproaches against opponents as being unscientific, dogmatically confused, and the like, these words should fairly be kept in mind, "Why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?"

4. Consistency is a fourth duty devolving on the scientific investigator. He may not bend the line of investigation into a false direction or altogether break away from it, but must prosecute it on to the end, and the certainty of a principle is proved just by its consistency. The liberal theology is in the position of being under the necessity either of breaking with Christianity, when it consistently follows out its premises, or of being inconsistent in order to remain Christian, and as a rule it prefers the latter. Some examples will make this plain.

The negative criticism, as already remarked, rejects from the Gospels all miracles as lying additions made to them. That which remains it regards as historical, when there are no reasons to think otherwise, and draws therefrom a so-called portrait of the life and character of Jesus. Has it any right to do this? No judge would give any credit at all to a witness, two-thirds of whose testimony had been proved false. He would reject it all. How much less here, when the whole Gospel representation of the life of Jesus is penetrated with

such statements that the separation of the natural and the supernatural is impossible; and consequently with the un-historicity of one, and that by far the greater part, that which remains loses all credibility. If all the Gospel records of miracles are unhistorical, then, since we have no other than these altogether untrustworthy writers, we know next to nothing of the life of the Redeemer.

A second point: With the old mechanical theory, the liberal theology rejects every other theory of inspiration. At all events that which it calls inspiration is not applicable to the origin of the Gospel narratives as such. These are the reproductions of what Christ said and did, and owe their origin to the reminiscences of others, being frequently deeply tinged with the strong colouring of a tendency in the accounts given. But at the same time it holds that the discourses of Christ therein recorded, so far as they fit in with the rationalistic religious system, are certainly authentic. Is that consistent? How often do we find from experience that words spoken by any one are sometimes so inaccurately observed, and so misunderstood by the hearers, that when they are reported by them to others, the speaker discovers in them the precise opposite of that which he really said! Few are able, in general, to report the contents of an address to which they have listened without written records. After the lapse of days and weeks, only a general impression remains in the minds of the most attentive and educated hearers, and the details pass away from their recollection. How shall the sayings then, often so deep and difficult to be understood, which enter into the life of Christ, after, as they maintain, being preserved only by tradition for a series of decades of years, and then at length committed to writing by some unknown author,—how shall these sayings correspond even approximately to the original utterances? If the Gospels were not composed under special Divine guidance (John xiv. 26), then we have no certainty that a single discourse of our Lord's, not even the Sermon on the Mount and the Lord's Prayer, are even anything like what was spoken by him; we might suppose that in these only the religious conceptions of the primitive Church were reflected. And indeed their authenticity would be so much the more doubtful when the most of the words of Jesus are in the closest manner connected with the

accounts of miracles, which again are to be regarded as nothing else than unhistoric legends.

A third point: The liberal theologians unanimously reject the doctrine of the divinity of Christ, and yet recognise him as the Redeemer, and attribute to him sinlessness. In this Schleiermacher is followed by his immediate disciples. The idea of one growing up under the conditions of life known amongst us as merely human, and being yet sinless, is a contradiction which cannot be entertained.¹ But we further ask, How can any one be regarded as our Redeemer whose entire life is so much veiled in obscurity that we possess no authentic knowledge of his actions and words? A personality which shall influence and determine our life in a normative manner must be presented before us at the least in well-defined historical certain outlines. A Christ, on the contrary, whose life-image, at first drawn by the hand of poetic fancy, was afterwards so tampered with by the religious tendencies and ideas influencing the Church that the original lines can no longer with certainty be recognised, is not a Redeemer even in the sense of Schleiermacher, and the historical Christ is wholly renounced, the ideal Christ alone remaining.

Indeed, we must say that this theology puts in question even the first article of the Apostles' Creed. If the entire contents of the sacred scriptures of the Old and New Testament are only the product of the prophets' and apostles' own conception regarding sacred things; if further the whole course of the world develops itself entirely in conformity with immutable natural laws known to us; if the idea of a creation of the world in time is changed into the pantheistic conception of an eternal world-creation, so that the world is *in* God and *from* God but not *by* God; and if, in fine, all confidence in the absolute truth of his word is shattered by the apprehension of the Redeemer as of a person not passing beyond the rank of mere humanity, then all conception of a personal God as governing the world disappears, and the difficulties of dualism are overcome by the construction of a view of the world in which the world itself is the Eternal, the Infinite, the Divine.

True, there are many among these theologians who do not go

¹ Cf. *Die Versöhnungslehre auf Grund. d. Christl. Bewusstseins dargestellt* (Berlin, 1878), p. 197.

so far as this. Amid the general wreck of Christianity one lays hold of one portion, and another of another, because they feel, with all their protestings and negations, that amid the storms of life safety lies only in faith. But how weak must this so-called scientific theology be, when in order to remain Christian it must deny its own conclusions, and has not the courage to follow out its premises to their logical results! This rejecting of consequences, this standing midway, is the weakest side of the liberal theology. Persons like D. F. Strauss, and recently the philosopher of the unknown, have inexorably gone to the extreme, and it is only in accordance with the logic of facts, when they were constrained against their will to move forward step by step in the way of negation, and several among their followers have already taken up the position in which they have nothing more in common with Christianity than the most elementary principles of morality. A house cannot stand whose foundations are undermined, and one cannot remain a Christian if part after part he rejects the facts and verities with which Christianity goes forth as a life-power into the world. The thoughtless multitude may regard that as religious freedom of thought and scientific advancement, but, to him who quietly observes it, it is in the best case only a lamentable self-deception.

This brings us in the last place to speak of the tendencies for the future. According to their own assurances these are as brilliant as possible. The shadows that lie on the Church's present serve only as a foil by which to bring out its future in the brightest colours, and the more boldly they attribute all the evils of our Church-life to orthodoxy, so much the more confidently do they promise a new golden future as soon as the confessionless German Church is founded, and free-thinking theology is in possession of all her pulpits and professorial chairs. In the meantime, what we have seen of its practical consequences by no means warrants such hopes. It is to be lamented that for a long time there has been a perceptible lack of students of evangelical theology. Should this continue, the interests of the Church will be seriously affected at diverse points. The Church will lose its influence on the public life unless she gain from the educated ranks a sufficient number of preachers of her gospel of salvation, and counterbalance that

which detracts from the ministerial office in material interests by an exalted measure of religious enthusiasm. But would free-thinking professors again, as they assure us, fill their academic halls with students? A survey of the present condition of the theological faculties of the German Universities shows the very opposite. It is certainly not a mere accidental circumstance that the deficiency in the number of theological students began first to be felt in the so-called Falk era, with its manifest favour for Church liberalism, while now with the more vigorous conservative current in State and Church an interest in theological studies has been happily awakened. I can conceive how a deeply religious spirit may find amid the Babel confusions of the present a certain rest under the iron authority of the Romish Church. I can also suppose how a man of no intelligence, in whom the religious life from childhood up has remained without any animation, may at last find satisfaction and peace in a view of the world and of life which seeks to comprehend the entire world and the life of men without any reference to a supernatural God over all. In the one case as in the other there is clearness and consistency; a man gives himself fully and entirely up to one principle, even though it be a false one. But how a theology can justify its public affirmations only by limitations and mental reservations; which contends against the Christian mysteries with so-called arguments of reason, while other truths, such as the existence of God, and the continued existence of the soul after death, which present just as great if not greater difficulties in the way of reason, are accepted as valid; which surrounds a system with the glory of being scientific; which yet, however tested, betrays the greatest obscurity, uncertainty, and inconsistency—how such a theology can inspire a young man with zeal in studying it is absolutely inconceivable.

Who does not wish for a regeneration of our Evangelical Church, so that the indifferent and the hostile may be filled anew with the Christian spirit? As once the prophet's servant from the summit of Carmel surveyed the wide horizon and the blue sea to discover whether any cloud appeared which, even though like a man's hand, might bring the longed-for rain, so many now are examining the signs of the times to see if they can discover anywhere a promise of a

new Pentecost for the Church. Only this much is certain : on the left side no cloud arises promising a refreshing spiritual rain, and from the heart of the *Protestantenverein* there comes forth no second Luther for the German Church. Rationalism has emptied the churches, and is incapable of filling them again. In its contention against the Church's Confession it leans on the godless masses, but fails altogether in animating these masses with a single religious idea.

Rationalism, in the course of the Church's history, has repeatedly attempted to build up congregations, from the days of Ebionitism to those of the Socinian Unitarians and the Friends of Light ; but all such attempts have been fruitless. Supposing that the free-thinking Protestants were separated from the National Church, and founded independent congregations on the ground of the programme of the liberal theology, what would be the consequence of such an attempt? what would be the character of the churches so formed? They would have no sacraments, no Bible, no spiritual life. The liberal theology is a parasite that has clung for a thousand years to the old tree of biblical Christianity. From this tree it has drawn its life-sap. It is able to maintain itself only by its connection with the Church and with its institutions, the offspring of the spirit of faith ; separated from it, it would very soon, from its inherent inanity, altogether perish.

One might suppose that the negative and the Church theology would have at least a broad common basis in the region of the moral-religious life, on which it might be possible to carry on a common work in the many branches of the Church's activity. Experience on all hands shows the futility of such a supposition. A deep gulf separates the two in every department of the moral-religious life ; their tendencies and aims are totally divergent.

In regard to that question, so weighty in its bearings on the life of our people—the Sabbath question—all who stand on the ground of a Christian view of the world are essentially at one, and even between the Evangelical and the Roman Catholic Church there is scarcely any real difference. On the contrary, the liberal theology, when it deals with this subject, limits itself to common warnings against the Puritanic mode of keeping the Sabbath, against the Jewish Sabbath law, etc., and, remov-

ing the Sabbath rest from the rank of a Divine institution, it regards it, at the highest, only in the light of humanity.

So long as there is a Church, it is exercised in penetrating the popular life with a Christian spirit, by means of certain customs and habits of life, such as prayer for a blessing on the food we partake of, family prayer, regular church-attendance, and other things; but the free-thinking theology looks upon such efforts with cold indifference; it warns against such customs as works of mechanical piety, expending itself in externalities.

As to the relations of the Christian to the world, all positive Christians are at one in believing that the New Testament contrast between the world and the kingdom of God can in no way be removed by bringing the world into the Christian Church, and every earnest Christian will maintain a very decided reserve toward the world as such, and a certain category of worldly enjoyments and aims; while, on the other hand, the world meets decided Christianity with a greater or less hatred and antipathy. The contrasts are too deep and real to be set aside. It is otherwise with the modern theology. It has completely bridged over the gulf between the world and Christianity, so far, that is to say, as it identifies the latter with itself. The more actively it combats the tendencies it dislikes within the Church, so much the more really does it sympathise with all that is called the world and the worldly life; and it is noteworthy how, especially among the younger liberal theologians, many formally accommodate themselves, in their outward manner of life and their social actings, to the ways and customs of the world.

The extensive sphere of the inner mission should certainly be one in which the liberal theology might show its capability and its readiness to co-operate in the great practical labours of the Church for the purpose of establishing the moral life of the people on a Christian foundation. In the saving of the lost, in caring for the sick and for children, and prisoners and Magdalenes, and suchlike works, we would think that every one, whatever his dogmatical convictions, would show a warm heart for the moral necessities of his people. There have not been wanting calls addressed to the church liberalism to take part in such work, but a cold and haughty refusal has been the only

answer. Co-operation in missions to the heathen has been refused by pointing to the poor at our own doors, but they will not put forth their hands to relieve the crying distresses of home, till the ecclesiastico-political purposes of liberalism are accomplished. Thus they move in a region of pure negations, and leave to despised orthodoxy the work of seeking to save the perishing around us.

The liberal theology, in its critical and polemical utterances, has frequently adopted a tone which has hitherto found no place in theological circles. It is found elsewhere only in the columns of certain liberal newspapers. Malignant and personal attacks too often take the place of arguments; communications, confused in their character, destitute of criticism, and coloured with a tendency; a polemic, spiced with biting satires against everything that does not do homage to theological liberalism, especially a number of ever-recurring phrases and catch-words which, however vague to him who uses them, nevertheless, as is too well known, do not fail to make their impression on the great unthinking public,—these characterise their literature.

It is not our intention by what we have said to do injury to any one. We know that a tendency as such never altogether corresponds with the persons representing it. As under the covering of ecclesiastical propriety and confessional fidelity there may be concealed not seldom an inner godlessness and a dead faith, so we willingly acknowledge there may be in many a so-called liberal theologian an earnest sense of truth and a deep-felt love for Christ. Nevertheless, the judgment we have expressed regarding the system as such remains the same. The liberal theology shows itself incapable of bringing about a revival of Church life; it unwarrantably claims the honour of scientific activity; it leads, by necessary consequence, to a pure Pantheistic view of the world alienated from Christianity. The promise of everlasting existence and of the perfect conquest of the world with its sins and sorrows, is given only to faith which rests wholly on the revealed Word of God.

This theology, with its critical and dogmatical objections, may therefore be a constant admonition to us to investigate anew, in an earnest scientific spirit, the foundations of our faith, and to build up the system of the doctrine of salvation more surely and more fully; if such research goes only hand

in hand with moral-religious fidelity, and is rooted in the actual personal experiences of salvation, then all this scientific testing and investigation, instead of shattering the fabric of Christian truth, will much rather make it appear all the more glorious and divine before us. We too are theologians, but we know we can speak of the unseen and the eternal only after God has himself first spoken to us regarding them. We also are free-thinking liberals, if you will; but the right theological free-thinking consists in one's being made free from the dictatorial influences of a mind which thinks that it is able to measure eternity and the actions of God by the standard of ideas borrowed from the world of sense, and to decide regarding them. We also love and value science; but she is for us not a queen who constructs the world and human life according to her own ideas, but a handmaid who seeks out, with the light of the Divine Word in her hand, the footsteps and the ways of God in the world and in the human heart. We also ask, What is truth? and in putting this question we are influenced by a spirit of holy earnestness; but we have only the courage so to ask, because we know Him who is not only the truth, but also the way and the life; and the truth will remain even when the systems of the liberal master-builder built upon the sand have long ago crumbled into ruins.

ART. VI.—*Presbyterian Consolidation in Canada; a Chapter in Canadian History.*

RELIGIOUS partisanship has not exhibited the fierceness with us that characterises it in "the old country," especially in Scotland. This may be partly owing to the effect produced on the imagination and the whole mental structure, as Professor David Swing puts it, by the vastness of the scale on which nature in America is built, so that room is afforded for all and sundry without the necessity of elbowing each other. It is a much more likely explanation of the toleration which obtains in Canada, that every form of religion has "a free field and no favour" here. We have no

burning questions, such as flow out of the cherished institutions of England and Scotland. Both ministers and people may have carried with them to the New World the strongest partialities in favour of one set of views, and equally strong antipathies to others; but these feelings do not survive the cold of many Canadian winters, except in the case of those who possess unusual stores of the *perfervidum ingenium*. There was, therefore, in this country nothing to keep alive the ardour of the attachment which drew people in Scotland to the Relief, Burgher, Antiburgher, or Established Church, as the case might be. At first the impulse was to transplant Old-World distinctions to our virgin soil; but those who attempted it soon found that the Shibboleths which Presbyterians had learned to pronounce across the sea failed to evoke the same enthusiasm on this side the Atlantic, where they lost their force. It was soon discovered that there was something for Presbyterians to protest against in Canada, more tangible than the nice shades of difference that marked them off from each other in Scotland. Not to speak of a grasping and ambitious Popery, and a supercilious Prelacy, the Methodism which early in the century took root in Canada, although well-intentioned, had undoubtedly the effect of producing not a little ecclesiastical disorder, as well as of propagating an enfeebling Arminianism. These were the three earliest types of ecclesiasticism planted in this country; and in them Presbyterians of every description had their natural rivals, without turning their force against each other.

I use the word "rivals" advisedly. At the present time, we count no Church an "enemy;" our attitude to no religious denomination is that of positive hostility. There is no bitterness in the relations of the several religious communities to each other. The policy of all Churches amongst us is "to live and let live." Whichever body can by fair means make most headway is entitled to the success it achieves. The Church which can most commend itself "to every man's conscience" is that which has the best chance of winning the day. Such is the force of circumstances, that even the Church of Rome, except in the Province of Quebec, where it enjoys all the privileges without any of the responsibilities that usually are supposed to belong to an Established Church, has to

content itself with an inoffensive attitude, evincing no special hostility to the Protestant community. The most it can attempt is to meddle with politics and intrigue for or against Governments, in order to maintain its relative importance in the Dominion.

Such is the present posture of religious matters here ; but it has not been always thus with us. Canada has passed through ecclesiastical struggles as well as older lands ; although we have had this advantage, that our battles have been generally waged on broader lines than the religious contests in Scotland of the last two hundred years. I do not think, however, that we are done with the battle. There is yet a great conflict in store for the Canadians of this or of some not far-off succeeding generation, in order to sweep away the concession made to the French one hundred and twenty years ago—which may now well be considered out of date—guaranteeing to them the perpetuation amongst us of their “language, religion, and laws.” When the day of conflict arrives, the Presbyterian Church will not fail to show itself, as hitherto, the champion of justice and freedom. But up to the present time, our contention, as Presbyterians, has been chiefly with the Protestant Episcopal Church, calling itself “the Church of England in Canada.” The matters at issue between the two representative Protestant systems arose out of what has been known in Canadian history as *the Clergy Reserve Question*. This question contributed not a little to the early organisation of Presbyterians in Canada ; and as it has produced far-reaching consequences that may extend into the future, a short narrative on the subject may be of service. The more interest attaches to it that it is the history of an experiment to establish the Church of England in the British colonies—an experiment which failed, however.

In New York and a few other places, provision had been made by the colonial authorities, before the American revolutionary war, for the maintenance of certain Churches ; but in the colonies generally there was no attempt to erect a religious establishment, as the aim of the settlers of the New England district especially, in coming to the New World, had been to escape from the oppression, as they deemed it, of the Church of England, and seek “a faith’s pure shrine—freedom

to worship God." After the revolt of the colonies, British statesmen of both parties concluded that a mistake had been committed in neglecting to foster Episcopacy in America. Sir Peregrine Maitland, who was Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada during a large part of the first quarter of this century, may be taken as the mouthpiece of the English rulers of the period. He strongly espoused the cause of the Church of England in this country, and based his advocacy of it upon the assumption that it was best calculated to promote loyalty in the Province, asserting that all the clergy of that communion had remained faithful to Great Britain throughout the American war. The best antidote to the dreaded Puritan leaven, it was thought, would be the extension of the influence of the Church of England. It was with this view that George III., in what is known as the Quebec Constitutional Act, providing for the self-government of Canada, set apart one-seventh of the waste lands of the Province for the maintenance of "a Protestant clergy." That term was, indeed, afterwards found broad enough to cover Presbyterians of every hue, and Methodists, as well as Episcopalians; but the *Hansard* report of the debate on the occasion, as well as the drift of the Act itself, shows that it was the Church of England that was designed to be benefited by it. The term "Protestant clergy" was used in contradistinction to "Roman Catholic," and was inserted to indicate that the latter could have no claim upon the Clergy Reserves, but must rely on the advantages conferred upon them by the Treaty of Paris and the Act of 1774, by which the Romish priests had been secured in their "accustomed dues and rights," while "the right was reserved to the Crown of making such provision out of the said accustomed dues and rights for the encouragement of the Protestant religion, and for the maintenance and support of a Protestant clergy, as might be thought from time to time necessary and expedient." Fox, indeed, objected to the privilege contemplated to be bestowed upon the Church of England by the Bill, contending that the Church of Rome or the Church of Scotland, as representing a proportion of the population of Canada as large as that belonging to the Church of England, had an equal right to recognition at the hands of the Government. But Pitt, and Lord Grenville, the author of the Act, in framing it, proceeded upon the sup-

position that the Episcopal Church of England was the Protestant Church of the realm ; and so one of the clauses of the Bill empowered his Majesty to "authorise the Governor to erect in every township one or more parsonages or rectories, according to the Church of England, and to present to such parsonage or rectory an incumbent or minister of the Church of England, duly ordained according to the rites of that Church." The King's instructions to the Governor of Canada in 1818 were quite explicit as to the special favour to be shown to the Episcopal Church. After enjoining that the religious susceptibilities of the Roman Catholics of the Province were to be respected, he was told always to remember "that it is a toleration of the free exercise of the religion of the Church of Rome only to which they are entitled, but not to the powers and privileges of it as an Established Church, *that being a preference which belongs only to the Protestant Church of England.*" Governor Maitland carried out these instructions only too faithfully ; and, while pretending to be friendly to the adherents of the Church of Scotland, endeavoured to throw suspicion upon the loyalty of the Presbyterian community generally, by calling the other sections of it "Independents," and representing them as more inclined to the "neighbouring republic" than to the British Empire.

And while this was the state of matters in Upper and Lower Canada, by a law of Nova Scotia it was enacted that "the sacred rites and ceremonies of divine worship, according to the Liturgy of the laws of England, shall be deemed the fixed form of worship, and the place where such Liturgy shall be used shall be respected and known by the name of *the Church of England as by law established.*" All other religious communities were counted "dissenters," and for seventy years the Protestant Episcopal Church in that Province alone had the right to solemnise marriage by licence.

At this stage Presbyterianism found a formidable opponent in one of its "own kith and kin," John Strachan, whom Thomas Carlyle counts among the "good many fanatics of different kinds" he met in the house of Edward Irving—"one insolent *Bishop of Toronto*, triumphant Canadian, but Aberdeen by dialect." He came to Canada as a tutor at the beginning of the century, and was afterwards a candidate for the pastorate

of the St. Gabriel Street Presbyterian Church, Montreal. Not succeeding in his candidature, he entered the ministry of the Anglican Church, and afterwards rose to be a Privy Councillor, and was appointed the first Bishop of Toronto, having the whole of Upper Canada for his diocese. He was a man of great activity of mind, and of untiring energy, and he threw himself with much zeal into the cause which he now espoused. He had more to do with shaping the policy of the Government of Canada than either the Ministers of the Crown or the Governors, for upwards of thirty years. It cannot be said, however, that it was much to his credit, that he sought to cast imputations upon the orderliness and loyalty of those whose creed he had cast off, especially "the Seceders," with whom he was allied by the ties of blood. At this time too the Oxford movement had begun, and the High Churchmen, chafing under the want of Catholicism, the *orbis terrarum*, which so greatly distressed Newman, were anxious to remove the stigma that the insular position of Anglicanism affixed to them; and so desired to girdle the world with offshoots from the parent Church, beginning literally with Jerusalem. Strachan zealously promoted this policy of the authorities in England. His astute mind foresaw in the reservation of one-seventh of the unappropriated lands of Canada, the means of endowing the Anglican clergy in the colony, on a scale that would vie in influence and grandeur with the livings of the Church of England at home; provided all could be kept in the hands of his own Church. As yet these lands yielded scarcely any revenue, but he succeeded in obtaining large sums of money from the public chest for promoting the extension of the cause of Protestant Episcopacy. His Church had thus the advantage of the smile of the rulers of the day, and enjoyed the patronage of all officialdom; so that, in comparison, the other religious communities that had commenced operations in the country were handicapped in the race. Dr. Strachan in 1823 sent to the Imperial authorities a letter, accompanied by what he called an Ecclesiastical Chart, which purported to give a comparative estimate of the strength of the respective denominations; but its tenor was so manifestly unfair, magnifying his own Church and belittling others, that it roused both the Methodists and Presbyterians, not only to assert the strength they had already

attained, but also to put forth greater exertions for the time to come. The attack made upon Presbyterianism by Dr. Strachan, in the document referred to, had an important bearing upon the fortunes of our cause in Canada. The few ministers then in the country buckled on their armour in right earnest, and they urged their friends in Scotland to come to their assistance. From that day forward the interest of the Established Church of Scotland, in the progress of Presbyterianism in Canada, was secured, and both men and money were liberally supplied. The intervention of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland with the Imperial authorities, craving that the ministers and adherents of the Church in this country should be placed on an equal footing with those of the Church of England, so far as the favours of the Government were concerned, contributed not a little to the obtaining of their just rights by our people; although it shows how great the odds were against which they had to struggle, that even Dr. Chalmers at this period, in his enthusiasm for Church Extension in Scotland, and championship of religious Establishments, was prepared to advise that the Church of England alone should be established in Canada. The influence of the Presbyterians in the colony was, however, too great for this policy to be carried out. It was a strong point that the Church of Scotland was established at home, equally with the Church of England, and therefore had claims throughout the empire, outside the United Kingdom, that were as good as those of the sister Establishment. It was advantageous to the Presbyterian claims that the Canadian Parliament, on motion of Hon. William Morris, who manfully espoused and maintained the cause of his own Church until its just rights were conceded in 1840, passed resolutions in 1824, memorialising the King to place the representatives of the two Established Churches on a par. The Governor of the day did not think that the Legislature was sincere in its championship of the cause of the Church of Scotland. And he was probably right. The sentiment of the country was against Established Churches altogether; and it was foreseen that if the Presbyterians were allowed to share in the proceeds of the Clergy Reserves, other denominations would continue to demand the same privileges, until it would be found necessary to abolish such privileges entirely. Accordingly the Canadian Legisla-

tive Assembly soon after took the ground, which it continued to maintain until its views prevailed, that in the circumstances of the country it was impolitic and unjust to favour one denomination more than another, and moved that the Clergy Reserve lands should be applied to the promotion of education rather than of religion.

In 1826 the claims of ministers of the Church of Scotland, who had come to labour in Canada, as entitled to Government support equally with the clergy of the Church of England, were recognised, and they received £50 each from the casual funds of the Canadian treasury. This concession to the Church of Scotland made the religious communities unprovided for clamorous to be put on the same platform. The result was that, in 1832, the Methodists, the ministers of the United Presbytery of Upper Canada—representatives of the non-endowed Presbyterians of Scotland,—and the clergy of the Church of Rome in Upper Canada, had the same status accorded them as the ministers connected with the Established Church of Scotland—were granted an annual allowance from the territorial funds of the Government. This was the situation of affairs up to 1840, when, at the instance of the Canadian Legislature, the Imperial Parliament passed the Act which authorised the sale of the Clergy Reserves. The Bill provided that ministers connected with the Church of Scotland should receive the same advantages from the proceeds of the lands sold as those of the Church of England did. It was specially reserved, however, that all those parties to whom the faith of the Government had been pledged from 1832 onwards should henceforth share in the benefits of the Clergy Reserves; and thus it came about that not only ministers representing the Secession Churches at home, and Methodists, but even the Roman Catholic priests of the Western Province, curiously enough, participated in an endowment which, in the first instance, was set apart for the support of a Protestant clergy.

The Imperial Act placing the Church of Scotland on the same footing as the Church of England was a compromise that the latter agreed to. But the concession came too late. Had a pact been made at an earlier period between these two Churches, the Clergy Reserves might have been kept intact much longer. The Disruption of the Church of Scotland in

this country took place in 1844, and the ministers going out, being denied a continuance of the allowance they had been receiving while in the Church, soon joined with the other denominations that were opposed to endowments. Their influence turned the scale against the continuance of special privileges to any Church or Churches in Canada. An attempt was indeed made in 1847 to save the fund for religious purposes by the process known in Great Britain as "the levelling-up process." All Protestant Churches, whose principles would allow them to receive aid from Government, were offered a share in the Clergy Reserves, and amongst others the Presbyterian Church of Canada, that had been constituted by those who had separated from the Synod in connection with the Church of Scotland. Their opposition, however, could not be thus bought off. The agitation was continued, and so in 1854 the Clergy Reserves were "secularised," that is, the proceeds of the sales of the reserved lands were handed over to the several municipalities to be expended as they chose, vested rights being held sacred as in the Imperial Act of 1840. These rights were commuted with the several Churches, as was done in the case of the Irish Churches lately ; and thus originated the fund called the "Temporalities Fund" in the "Presbyterian Church in Canada" to-day.

I have gone at some length into this question, because for upwards of thirty years it was "the burning question" of Canadian politics, in which the welfare of the Churches too was involved. It may be of interest also because it is the history of the attempt made to plant Established Churches in the British colonies ; for the same thing was planned as regards Australia. The experiment of Pitt to reproduce Episcopacy here, with Bishops in the Legislative Council or Upper House, in order to promote loyalty to the Crown, failed, and is not likely to be repeated, the mixture of races and creeds making it impracticable, even if it were desirable. And it is found that we are wonderfully loyal without the preserving salt of dominant Episcopal influence.

But the history of the "Clergy Reserves" is specially important in connection with Presbyterian consolidation. I have in some measure anticipated the progress of events. The first union of Presbyterians in Canada took place in Nova Scotia.

and was a token of the ameliorating influences at work in America, assuaging the tempers engendered by Old-World controversies. The Burghers and Antiburghers had been for a time all the more bitter in their denunciations of each other because of their nearness of kin. At an earlier stage the Associate Synod had cut off those of their communion in the United States that had united with the Burgher Synod, declaring them in a state of "apostasy from their Reformation testimony and their witnessing profession;" and in Nova Scotia a few years previously they had declined each other's good offices. But a quarter of a century's experience of the hardships and privations of bush life helped either to enlarge their charity or to dull the sharpness of their metaphysics—or both. At all events, the two rival communions in that Province embraced one another in 1817, thus setting an example to their respective mother Churches at home, an example which they followed three years afterwards in forming the United Secession Church. This first union was an earnest of larger and more influential ones to follow, and demonstrated the irresistible logic of circumstances in moulding popular sentiment.

The next step towards consolidation was taken under the influence of the Clergy Reserve question, simultaneously by the ministers of the Church of Scotland in Upper and Lower Canada, who in 1831 formed themselves into "the Presbyterian Church of Canada in connection with the Church of Scotland," and by the ministers that belonged to the several other branches of Presbyterians in the country, including those from the United States, who together constituted "the United Synod of Upper Canada." These latter were the men whom Bishop Strachan had striven to bring into disrepute with the civil authorities, although, at a later period, when he wished to secure their co-operation in opposition to the Church of Scotland, he patronisingly gave them a good character. The formation of the two Synods was with a view to facilitating the work of the Government in conceding the claims of the Presbyterian ministers. Sir George Murray, Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote to Sir John Colborne, Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada, in 1830, expressing the wish of the Imperial Government that the Presbyterian ministers should all unite into a Presbytery or Synod, in order that the organisation might

guarantee to the Government the individuals to whom money ought to be paid. Instead of uniting into one body, however, they formed two Synods. It would seem that the objections to a Synod embracing all the Presbyterianism of the country must have come from the ministers in connection with the Church of Scotland, probably growing out of a fear of imperiling their claim to the Clergy Reserves, which was still in dispute, as the Church of England would not have been slow to point out that a union with "dissenting" ministers would invalidate the argument that the Church of Scotland, as by law established, had equal rights in the colonies with the Church of England. The United Synod of Upper Canada, in an address to the Governor, declared that the fault of non-union did not lie with them: "they had publicly expressed their willingness and used their endeavours to have that object effected; but these endeavours had been ineffectual owing to the want of co-operation of the Church of Scotland." As already stated, the Government at this stage treated both Synods alike: neither of them received a penny out of the Clergy Reserve Fund till 1840; both received aid out of the "casual and territorial fund." As a consequence, overtures for union were made the next year, after the formation of the two Synods; and although the movement did not result in an immediate amalgamation, four of the ministers of the United Synod joined the Synod in connection with the Church of Scotland in 1834, and the Synod, as such, was incorporated in the Church of Scotland six years afterwards, it being thought advantageous, in view of the Clergy Reserve question, that the united body should preserve the title "in connection with the Church of Scotland." The basis of this union was the Presbyterian standards in their integrity. It will thus be seen that the stream of tendency in the British American colonies had long ago set in towards union.

The Church of Scotland in the Maritime Provinces, as well as in Canada proper, had already acquired a commanding position, a large number of promising young ministers having been sent out by the Glasgow Colonial Society. It had begun to surpass in both numbers and influence the protected and cherished Church of England. In 1828 there were 37,225 Presbyterians to 28,000 Episcopalians in Nova Scotia, while in Upper

Canada the numbers had become in 1839 relatively 78,383 Presbyterians to 79,754 English Churchmen. Among other strides forward taken by the Church of Scotland was the establishment of a College at Kingston, with University powers, the Church of England holding the key to the University which had been previously erected at Toronto, and making it imperative upon every matriculant to sign the Thirty-nine Articles. But the energetic progress of the "Kirk" Synod was doomed to a sudden arrest. The mighty wave that passed over the old Church of Scotland in 1843, almost engulfing it, did not reach Canada till the next year. But although its force was greatly spent before it touched our shores, so that it was with manifest reluctance and with many misgivings that at last a minority resolved to go out from the Synod, yet for some time it stayed the onward advance that Presbyterianism had been making for four years previously. I think it can scarcely be doubted that the Disruption tended ultimately to lengthen the cords and strengthen the stakes of Presbyterian influence in the land ; but this was at a heavy cost, and against the instinctive yearnings towards each other that moved the breasts of the best men in both the Churches that had gone apart. God leads his people by ways that they know not. This temporary separation was part of the discipline through which the members of the several branches of Presbyterianism were destined to pass, that they might be the better prepared for the exercise of that charity which is the bond of perfectness,—which has held the united Church together in spite of severe strains, and which gives promise of long and prosperous co-operation by all parties in the Church.

The United Synod of Upper Canada, it has been shown, amalgamated with the Presbyterian Church of Canada in connection with the Church of Scotland. A few individual ministers, however, declined to enter the Church of Scotland. The Voluntary principle by this time was developing into one of the distinctive tenets of the "dissenting" Presbyterian Churches in Scotland ; and the United Presbyterian Church at home, having been organised the same year, sent out missionaries to Canada, who joined those ministers who stood aloof from the union here in 1840, and they together constituted in due time a new United Presbyterian Synod in Canada. So that up

to the year 1860, six separate Presbyterian organisations existed among us—three in Canada proper, and three in the Maritime Provinces,—representing the views and sentiments respectively of the three Presbyterian Churches in Scotland. The Churches in the Maritime Provinces again led the van in the most Christian enterprise of union. The United Presbyterian and Free Churches of that section became one in 1860. The corresponding Churches in Upper and Lower Canada joined together in 1861, the same year that saw the union in the Australian colonies. From time to time slight movements in the direction of union took place in the two Synods “in connection with the Church of Scotland;” but until 1870 the sentiment of that branch of Presbyterianism did not seem ripe for union. The tendency was too strong, however, and the practical advantages of union were too obvious for mere feeling to be able long to withstand them. The two great Churches of the United States, in which doctrinal differences had obtained, had been able to draw together, in spite of separating lines, in 1869 ; and this fact helped on the cause of union in Canada not a little. But the political confederation of these Provinces had still more to do with determining the question. Minds that were able to look into the future and comprehensively to grasp the situation, saw the desirableness of having the boundaries of the Church co-extensive with those of the country. The Church of England and the Methodist Church, the two religious denominations that divided the bulk of the Protestants in the Dominion with the Presbyterians, had at once taken steps, after confederation, to bind together their adherents into one compact whole. The two Synods that before had shown a backwardness for union in the separate Provinces, now that it was proposed to unite all into one, took a more favourable view of the situation ; and when the Moderator of the General Assembly of the Canada Presbyterian Church, Dr. Ormiston, now of New York, during his term of office addressed a letter to the three Moderators of the Supreme Courts of the other Churches, proposing that action towards union should be taken all along the line, there was a hearty and unanimous response. Negotiations were entered upon in September 1870, which ended in the grand consummation of the 15th June 1875, when the several distinct organisations that had originated in Old-

World controversies, resolved to lay aside their peculiarities and rally around the Westminster standards as the common object of their traditional regard. With the view of making our Church national in the sense of embracing all the Presbyterians in the Dominion, as the Church of Scotland once did, and at the same time of declaring its catholicity, or community with those holding the same standards throughout the world, it gave itself the title of "The Presbyterian Church in Canada." Equal in numbers to any of the Protestant denominations of the country, and not inferior to any of them in all the elements of power, it is addressing itself hopefully and earnestly to the task of giving a bold front to error and unbelief; and, with the encouragement and co-operation it counts on receiving from the parent Churches of the British Isles, of providing religious ordinances for the many millions with which the future promises to people the Dominion of Canada.

ROBERT CAMPBELL.

ART. VII.—*The Reasonableness of Faith.*¹

WHATEVER may be the cause or causes of the fact, the fact itself cannot be denied, that there has come on our time a great ebb of faith, a great receding of the tide from the shore of the spiritual world. If this is so, it cannot be inopportune to put to ourselves the question, Is faith a reasonable principle of action? Is it reasonable to shape our whole life by belief in truths which we can apprehend but cannot demonstrate? No more momentous question can be asked. And it is being asked by many at the present time, and is receiving many answers. Of those who answer it in the affirmative, many able writers might be named. But there is one answer to the question which has recently been given, and which seems to me so fair and so solidly grounded that I propose to follow now the main outlines of the work which contains it. That work is the Rev. Henry Wace's Bampton Lectures for 1879, entitled "The Foundations of Faith." In

¹ From the *Princeton Review*.

the survey of this work which I propose to make, while I shall summarise his main argument, I shall reserve to myself the right to add here and there such other thoughts and comments as may seem to throw light on the whole subject.

The first great fact to which Mr. Wace draws attention is that almost all the great civilisations of the world have been founded on faith rather than on reason, on moral trust in some man or set of men, in whose words and promises their followers have placed implicit reliance. It was so with the Jews, the whole of whose polity was built on faith in an unseen but almighty Leader, on the assurance that whatever might betide, the Lord of Hosts was with them, the God of Jacob was their refuge. Their sacred books were all one prophecy that Israel should yet blossom and fill the face of the world with fruit; their whole history looked forward to a Deliverer who was yet to be born. With them, at least with the leading spirits of their race, the present and the visible was as nothing compared with the invisible and the future.

Still larger and more imperative is the demand for faith, for trust, made by the Christian Church and by Him who founded it. Our Lord never once professed to demonstrate the truth of his assertions to the common understanding, but called for faith, absolute trust in himself and in his assertions. Believe in me, Trust me, Follow me, absolute reliance on his Person, not assent to demonstrated propositions, was his whole method of dealing with men. The parables in which he announced the fate of the Jewish polity, and the nature and spread of his own kingdom, were essentially prophecies, which at the time made the largest demand on men's faith, but which the history of Christianity has so far wonderfully fulfilled.

But it is not the Jewish and the Christian religions alone that make their appeal to faith, and faith in a Person. The whole strength of Mahometanism has been reared on the assurances of one man, and on his appeal to one great truth and to certain moral intuitions.

Similarly, Buddhism, and the more ancient religions out of which it sprang, all ground themselves, not on convictions as to the visible, but on faith in things invisible. To the followers of Buddha, who outnumber those of any other creed, the things unseen which they believe in on the authority of their leader

are more real and more substantial than all that they see or handle. For these they are ready to sacrifice all that men hold dear, and life itself.

Look back on the whole course of history : everywhere and at all times you will find that it has been "the invisible rather than the visible, the future rather than the present, faith rather than sight, that, as a matter of fact," has swayed the hearts of mankind, has organised them, has advanced the world to its present condition. Or "the giving substance to what is hoped for, the testing of things not seen," has, as a matter of fact, been the mightiest and most universal lever in the movements of the world's history. And all these different creeds, which have been at once the organisers and the dividers of mankind, widely as they differ in the objects of their faith, yet agree in this, that they make their appeal to a faculty which is essentially the same in them all, the faculty of faith.

St. Paul said, "We walk by faith [or trust], and not by sight," and all the Christian nations which had received his teaching, and all other nations who have had any religion, have either lived or professed to live by faith of some kind. Hitherto faith has been the supreme principle by which men have professed to govern their life and direct its aims. In the conduct of life intellect has played an important but yet a subordinate part. But nowadays we are told from many sides that all this is to be reversed ; that we are henceforth to live by sight, not by faith ; that we are to believe nothing which has not been verified by scientific methods. And the scientific methods are observation and experiment, in which the understanding works solely on data supplied by the senses. "Science is in the air," and not only in the air, but seems to have filled it to the exclusion of everything else. Its achievements during the present century have been so marvellous that it has in many ways changed the whole outward condition of our lives. In the opinion of some it should now proceed to change the whole inward condition of our life also. As represented by some of its exclusive devotees, it would now fain usurp dominion over our hearts and affections, and dictate all that we are to love, to believe in, and to hope for. If there have been ages in which faith was made too much of, in which the future life was made everything and the present life too little regarded, the

wheel has come full circle, and now we are at the opposite extreme.

The tendency natural to all men, learned and unlearned alike, to be entirely absorbed in the present and the visible, and to forget that these have eternal issues—this tendency against which all prophets and teachers have from the beginning cried aloud, and against which all good men have striven as a sore temptation, it now appears is not wrong at all, but altogether right. A science, or rather a philosophy founded upon science, has arisen which justifies this secularity of mind, and tells us that we have no right to believe anything which we do not clearly understand, and cannot prove by scientific methods. And scientific methods demand verification by observation and experiment, and where this is not forthcoming, they deny all right to believe. This principle, true and important within the domain of physics, it is now proposed to extend into the region of moral and spiritual truth, and before its touch all such supersensible truth disappears. If the moralist or religious teacher cannot produce the same kind and amount of evidence for their beliefs as that which the physicist demands for his, then the right to believe at all in moral or spiritual verities is denied. The circle of our belief is to be co-extensive with the circle of our accurate knowledge. This is really what Mr. Huxley's principle comes to. In his exposition of Hume's doctrines he has said that "a belief is void of justification unless its subject-matter lies within the boundaries of possible knowledge, and unless its evidence satisfies the conditions which experience imposes as a guarantee of credibility." The drift of this somewhat vague and ambiguous language clearly comes out when we find Mr. Huxley agreeing with Hume that our belief in immortality or in God is without scientific warrant. And scientific evidence is the only one evidence which men of that school will receive. Trust in moral truths which cannot be verified by their methods, trust in an inspired or in a Divine Teacher, faith in his words and character, are, it would seem, no sufficient grounds of belief. But these are the grounds on which we receive all Christian truth. It comes to this, therefore, that the scientific method applied to religious truth not only conflicts with it, but sweeps away the very grounds on which it rests. If we are to believe

nothing but those things which can be verified by the scientific method, then we can have no religious faith and no moral convictions. This is what we must land in if we give ourselves up to the unbalanced predominance of one exclusive habit of mind—to the understanding, judging according to sense. And to this some of the foremost expounders of science in our time have themselves come. And the very boldness and extravagance with which they urge their claims seems in many quarters to insure success. It wins for them a hearing, and even credence in many minds which are overborne by strong assertion, and are not able to answer the specious arguments which they hear.

The presence, or, in many quarters, the predominance of this habit of mind in our time is acting much as an iceberg acts when it floats from the arctic zone into the milder atmosphere of the temperate seas. It is chilling the moral atmosphere, discouraging all nobler impulses, and rendering the old enthusiasms all but impossible. In the region of theology it has long since given rise to the extreme rationalistic school, which denies every element in the Scriptures which cannot be explained by the natural understanding. But, far short of this, it has produced in our day what has been called a minimising theology; that is, a theology which shrinks from asserting anything which is mysterious, and pares down all that is essential in Christianity to that only which at once commends itself to the enlightened intelligence and feeling of educated society. What squares with this it reserves; whatever transcends this and passes into mystery, it rejects, or at least throws into the background. It takes its stand on the Sermon on the Mount, as if that were all plain and easy to be fulfilled; and the more mysterious words which our Lord uttered and the deep truths which St. Paul taught, it passes by, as not in harmony with the spirit of our enlightened age. This minimising theology is an attempt to meet and satisfy that frame of mind whose first question is, "How little are we required to believe?" But the attempt is from its very nature a futile one. For the one fundamental tenet of all religion, without which no religion is conceivable—the faith in the existence of an all-good and omnipotent God—is a demand on our faith which at once carries us beyond all the limits of human understanding or

demonstration. He who has once really laid to heart the belief in God as the Bible has declared Him, has committed himself to a region of faith which lies beyond all our power of reasoning, and compared with which all other parts of the Christian faith are easy to embrace. To see and feel the existence in the world of so much pain and suffering and sin, and yet in the face of that startling anomaly, to lay to heart and live by, the faith in an all-wise and all-loving God, this demands an exercise of faith which makes all belief in miracles and other mysteries seem a light thing beside it. As Mr. Wace has well expressed it: "When subjected to the analysis of reason, and brought into contact with a rigid scientific standard, the belief in God presents more momentous difficulties than any of the articles of faith which follow it. The moment the scientific reason begins to discuss it, we are confronted with the tremendous and apparently insoluble problem of the existence of evil. The faith which, in the full sight and consciousness of that problem, maintains its firm assent to the absolute goodness and omnipotence of God, has abandoned the ground of mere rational belief, and has taken a step which justifies, in principle, any subsequent advance. It has given up, once for all, the right to measure its assent by the limits and dictates of reason alone, and has committed itself to the hands of an altogether different guide."—(P. 15.)

It is just when the evil of the world is most deeply felt, when the burden of this mystery presses most heavily on the human spirit, when the dark facts of existence, before which reason is impotent and speculation unavailing, are most vividly realised, it is precisely then that the deepest, most mysterious parts of the Christian faith assert their power to meet the human need and satisfy the soul's anxious questionings. At such a time the deistic representation of a benevolent yet impassive God, who calmly from aloof contemplates the spectacle of human sin and suffering, is rejected with something like indignation. Rather no God at all than such a God as that! But when the soul in its anguish hears of a God who is touched with a feeling for human infirmities, who does not stand wholly aloof from us, but has himself entered into the contest with evil, taken on himself our human nature and borne the full burden of man's wrong-doing,—of one who is at once the

redresser of wrong to those who have suffered, and the pardoner to those who have done it,—it feels that here at least is a truth that comes home to it, a remedy that at least does not mock its need. More and more as the pressure of the great problem raised by the existence of evil has come home to men and troubled them both speculatively and practically, it has been felt either that no answer speculative or practical can be given to it, or that the one adequate antidote to such perplexities lies in the deepest and most distinctive truths of Christianity; that therein lies, not a speculative solution, but a practical satisfaction to these perplexities; that in them there is hope for the direct ills: if not there, then nowhere.

As Mr. Wace has expressed it, it is "in those doctrines which make the strongest demands on faith, and are the most remote from any possibility of scientific verification, that Christian souls find their support and refuge under these burdens of the flesh, these torments of the spirit. 'The message that God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life'—this is a message, simple as are its terms, which transcends all philosophy, all reason, all experience, nay, all capacity of comprehension; and yet it is in reliance on this message, and on other assurances of the same kind, that Christians are delivered from despair, and are enabled, under whatever distresses, to cling to their belief in the love of their Father in heaven. When the Christian minister can assure a suffering soul on the bed of death, in misery and pain, that, whatever its agonies, the Son of God in human form endured far worse for its sake, . . . he applies a remedy which is equal to any need. The message of the Cross, interpreted by the doctrine of the Incarnation, is thus, in moments of real trial, the support of the most elementary principle of faith. In fact, the minimising theology depends for its plausibility on a simple evasion of the real problems of philosophy and of the practical difficulties of life. The full and explicit faith of the creeds recognises these difficulties and looks them in the face. It owns that they are insuperable on any grounds of mere natural reason, and it offers supernatural realities and supernatural assurances to overcome them."

Every philosophy professes to seek for and to reverence facts.

Here, then, is a series of assured facts which philosophy would do well to lay to heart. For eighteen continuous centuries there have existed in each generation hundreds on hundreds of well-authenticated instances in which human beings, under every pain of body and every perplexity of spirit, have found support and comfort from those very Christian truths which most transcend all understanding, which mere cold reason most scorns—from these truths and from no other. Has any science or any philosophy ever furnished a remedy that can meet such a need? Have they not rather turned away from such cases in despair? These are facts which are indubitable, and no fair-minded man, believer or unbeliever, but must in candour acknowledge to be facts, however he may explain them.

To this the candid sceptic might reply: 'I grant the facts you point to, that such beliefs reaching into the unseen world have been wide-spread and long-enduring; I even admit that they have worked beneficent results in the past. But the same might be said of many delusions which in time have been proved groundless, and have been exploded. And of the spiritual convictions you allude to all that we say is that they cannot be shown to have reasonable grounds. Nothing has a reasonable ground for being believed which cannot either be demonstrated from first principles, like mathematical truths, or verified by observation and experiment, like physical truths. Outside of these two spheres there may lie many truths, but we cannot be assured that they are truths. The scientific method recognises nothing as true which does not submit to its proper tests.'

In opposition to this we maintain that man has within a power which rises above nature, outgoes the realm of sight and sense and observation, and lays hold or becomes assured of things not seen. This power is faith. That this is a reasonable process—one which, if reason cannot prove to be trustworthy, it can at least see to be reasonable—we hope to show in the sequel. And faith and its objects have this good warrant, that the more the one is acted on and the other are laid to heart, the more is faith transformed into knowledge. This experience, to him who attains to it as a personal argument, is incontrovertible, but it is not one which he can produce to satisfy those who have had no such experience. It is personally and sub-

jectively satisfying, though it is not intellectually or objectively available. The state of the case seems to be this: In the intellectual world there seems to be for the present a weakening of the principle of faith, owing to the presence and the predominance of the purely scientific spirit. But how has this come about? Not because either physical science or historic criticism have disproved any one of the great Christian truths. Even in the case of miracles, which most of all falls within the physical sphere, science can allege nothing to disprove them. Mr. Huxley has lately said that "no one who wishes to keep well within the limits of that which he has a right to assert would assert that it is impossible that the sun or moon should ever have been made to appear to stand still in the valley of Aijalon." Again: "No event is too extraordinary to be impossible, and therefore if by the term miracle we mean only extremely wonderful events, there can be no just ground for denying the impossibility of their occurrence." How, then, has science acted against faith if it has not disproved any of the truths of faith? Simply by the way in which it has absorbed men's attention, and turned them, for a time, from other objects and other kinds of evidence. Mr. Wace has well said: "It is simply that the dazzling blaze of the greatest illumination ever opened to the natural eye has entranced the mental vision of our age, and has made other objects and other sources of illumination for the moment dim to men. The apprehension of Bacon has been fulfilled: 'Sense, like the sun, opens the face of the earth but conceals the face of the heavens.'"

Men are all one-sided. Exercise one faculty exclusively, the other powers dwindle and cease to act. Many scientific men have been so absorbed in the exercise of their purely scientific faculties that they have allowed the spiritual side of their nature to lie dormant. This may account for the negation which is found in many of them. And as for the multitude, they seldom judge of speculative problems for themselves, but are led by the strong assertions of those who are distinguished in any line of thought. I shall therefore now turn to the question, If the scientific method can neither prove nor disprove spiritual truths, is there in man's nature any other power which can guide us aright as to these truths, any other kind of assurance

regarding them which, though not scientific, is yet reasonable and trustworthy? If religious truths are not to be tried by the same tests as facts of physics or chemistry, by what tests are they to be tried? Is there any rational evidence which can be produced in support of them?

Now history and religious experience alike prove that there is one principle in man's nature to which religious truths appeal, and that is the principle of faith. Moral action and spiritual progress alike presuppose this principle, rest on this basis. The highest or most perfect goodness is, St. Paul tells us, revealed from faith to faith; that is to say, "It begins by acts of faith, it advances by acts of faith, and it is perfected by further and larger acts of faith." The rule here is not *intelligo ut credam* (I understand in order that I may believe), but *credo ut intelligam* (I believe in order that I may understand). That this is in things moral and spiritual a true and reasonable principle, that in these regions knowledge grows out of trust, trust especially in persons, and that exact knowledge does not precede trust, I shall try to show. Let me begin by asking whether there is anything analogous to this theological act of faith in common life. Does faith in any way enter as a practical power into the ordinary concerns of men? It does. Trust, we answer, in one sense or another, is the starting-point in all our thinking; it is the cement of our practical dealings and of our social intercourse. Look at the sphere of intellect: on what does all thinking rest if not on trust in our mental faculties, trust in their verdict, which we cannot prove by reasoning or verify by experience?

I suppose that the belief in our personal identity, that we are the same persons now as we were ten years ago, lies at the root of all our thinking. Without this belief we cannot proceed a single step. Yet who can prove it were any one to deny it? Again, is not belief in the acts of our memory a fundamental necessity before we can lay up any knowledge? I had such or such an experience ten years ago, as this, I believe, because I remember it. Yet how can I prove it except by trust in the truthfulness of my own memory?

Again, in the beginning of all physical science we see that no step can be taken unless we assume certain hypotheses which cannot either be demonstrated or verified by any experience. These are assumed, and all the verification they

ever receive comes from the fact that we find that by assuming them we can work out certain results, and introduce into confused phenomena order and intelligent explanation, which but for these assumptions would be impossible. For instance, take that axiom on which Newton grounds his whole discussion on the laws of motion. Every body continues in the condition of rest or of motion in which it happens to be, except in so far as it is made to change that condition by some force impelling it from without. Here is an axiom assumed without proof, but which justifies itself only by enabling other truths to be proved—truths which explain all the movements of the planets. This instance—and many more might be given—is perhaps enough to show that even in purely intellectual operations we must begin with reliance on the truthfulness of our faculties. And such reliance, if not faith in the usual sense of the term, is at least analogous to it. It is the opposite of that scepticism which distrusts all things, and so destroys the first grounds of all thinking.

But it is in the moral region rather than in the intellectual that faith in its distinctive character first comes into play. The roots of all morality, as well as of religion, lie in faith. In moral action, as well as in spiritual inspiration, faith has a region of its own, in which it is the rightful and supreme power, and in which scientific reasoning has no place.

What is it that is the bond of all men's dealings with each other, the cement of all healthy society? Is it not trust in others, confidence in character? This trust, this confidence, is not founded on scientific data, cannot be justified by any reasoning or tested by any process of scientific experiment. We see and know a person, and if he commends himself to us to be trustworthy, we do not wait for any scientific process, do not analyse his character till we have found that it may be relied on, but we give him or her our confidence, we say, "I will trust that man to the end of the world," and in nine cases out of ten we are not disappointed. The result justifies the confidence we reposed in him. Here, then, is a principle of action founded on nothing scientific, but on an instinctive perception of character. Here we trust our instincts, our natural perceptions of character. We cannot justify them by reasoning, cannot analyse them; but not the less on this account, perhaps rather the more, we give our confidence to persons, and for the

most part are not deceived. This is the principle on which society is in a great measure organised, and if it were withheld or impossible, society would be dissolved.

Again, it is by trust in others that the moral education of the world has been carried on, that every advance in righteousness has been won. Some great teacher or prophet arises who, by his words, his example, the elevation of his whole character, attracts men to himself and wins their confidence. They see him, they hear, they trust, they give him their hearts, and devotion to him becomes the ruling power of their lives, the source of their moral renovation. The most momentous changes in the world's history have been wrought by such influence. Moses, Socrates, Confucius and Buddha and Mahomet—it was not by scientific proof or by experiments in morality that they won the devotion of their followers, and set the world rolling on a new course. They strengthened men by their words; they animated them by their example; they inspired them by the contagion of their own self-devotion. One can imagine the noble scorn with which they would have silenced him who should have asked them to prove their words or to justify their lives by scientific processes. Not thus, but by the self-evidencing power of the spirit that was in them, did they overcome the world, and leave it other and better than they found it. Not to speak as yet of the greatest of all instances of personal example, how was it that the early Christian Church overcame the Pagan world, and restored its moral decay by a new and living morality? It was by men who "had heard, had loved, had trusted the apostles and their teaching, and who in the strength of that trust lived lives which abashed the dissoluteness of the Greek and the profligacy of the Roman, and woke up a conscience within that witnessed to the truth they uttered."

If it were not an ultimate law in human nature that in moral action men should begin by following the lead of those whom they feel to be wiser and better than themselves, no new moral habits could be formed, no moral advance would be possible. What would become of the young man who should say, "In all things moral I shall experiment for myself—I shall try for myself whether it is better to be truthful or untruthful; I shall 'love provisionally,' be pure if, after trial.

it proves itself to be best ; be unselfish, if consequences seem to warrant it"? But, as has been said, "Life is not a laboratory of social experiments, but a field of action and of conflict," in which the weak by intuition recognise the strong and follow them ; the fallen and defiled feel the presence of the pure, and take hope ; the despairing take courage from the sanguine and the brave. And this they do, not from any evidence which they could produce in argument, but from intuitions which they cannot explain, but which justify themselves in their results. For there are feelings which are their own evidence, promptings of the heart which men act on in proportion as they are single and true. "Faith or trust, love and hope, then, are not mere theological virtues," of which we hear only in the Bible. They are the root-powers of human nature, the shuttles which weave the whole web of healthful society. Yet these powers which govern human action are incapable of scientific verification. If they are not self-evidencing, they cannot be confirmed by any better evidence.

We see, then, that trust—trust in the character of others, which we can give no reasons for, but in which we have the fullest confidence—is the bond of all social life. But I now go a step further, and say that, even in the case of individual men, every really moral action springs directly out of faith—is a product of faith. Take the simplest instance. A case occurs in which it would be obviously for my worldly interest to tell a lie, and I could do so with impunity, for there would be no chance of discovery. But a principle of honour, a sense of right within me, constrains me to tell the truth, though it will be to my disadvantage. What is this—the refusing the seen gain and abiding by the unseen principle—but an act of faith? This preferring the unseen to the seen is of the very essence of faith, and this is what constitutes morality as distinct from expediency.

I know that there are philosophers at the present day who will explain the preference for truth to falsehood as a generalised experience. The experience of the race, they say, has proved that truth pays best ; that it is more useful for society in the long-run that men should speak truth ; and this generalised maxim of the race, handed down, becomes an instinct in individuals. But there is something in the case

which the inherited sense of utility cannot explain. Whence comes the sense of approval or self-satisfaction that follows the speaking of truth, the feeling of pain and remorse that follows the disregard of truth? The feeling that we had set at naught a generalised maxim of the race could not account for these feelings. They are generated from within; they are the witness of our own essential being to righteousness, which is independent of ourselves, and even of the experience of the race.

From this one instance we may see that all action which is truly moral is born of faith—of trust in unseen principle, which is above us and independent of us.

To quicken and to deepen the moral nature in man no power has ever acted so directly and penetratingly as the appearance of Christ in the world, and the revelation of God in him. And to this day it is practically found that the presentation of the historic Christ is powerful to quicken conscience and call forth faith far beyond all systems of evidences. But at a day like the present, when the primary acts of faith to which Christianity appeals, on which it rests, are being set aside, and scientific verification is being demanded for moral and spiritual truths, it is necessary to go back and ask what are the real grounds on which these actually rest, what is the kind of evidence which properly belongs to them? We have seen how powerful faith or trust in the unprovable is in social life, how it lies at the root of all truthfulness in speech or act. We now go on to ask more generally whether we are justified in believing anything which cannot be demonstrated like mathematical truth, or verified by ordinary experience like physical? The primary truth of all religion, the existence of God, is incapable of such verification, and therefore has by some pretended lights of our day been treated as an unwarranted hypothesis. They demand proofs which shall satisfy the cold, unfeeling reason, and we tell them that we have them not to give. And this because it is not by demonstrations or by arguments of probability, or by any simply intellectual process, that we become convinced of moral truths. To apprehend moral truths at all, much more to verify them, requires some amount of active moral feeling; to apprehend the primary truth of all religion requires some amount of religious feeling. And once really to apprehend these things at all is to be con-

vinced of their truth in a real way which no arguments would make us do.

To realise moral truth at all puts a strain on a man's moral nature, tries of what stuff he is made. For it is of the very essence of moral truth that we fully apprehend it only when we obey it. If we do not try to obey it and act on it, if we take the easy and broad road of "moral supineness," we lose all hold of moral truth and of Him who is the life of it.

We all know what is meant by "the voice of conscience." To hear that voice at all is an act of faith more than of intellect. To hear it clearly and practically implies a very decided act of faith. For consider what it contains: not merely an intuition of right and wrong, not merely a perception that this act is right, that act is wrong; not this only; no, nor merely a sense of duty, a conviction that we ought to do the right and to refuse the wrong. It is both of these—the perception of right and wrong and the conviction that it is our duty to do the one and to avoid the other. But it is something more—a conviction that behind the perceived duty there lies a sanction for it; something, call it a power or what you will—a something which will maintain the right, will befriend him who does it, and will avenge the violation of it. This is the distinctive, the peculiar element in conscience—the sense that there is that in it and behind it which will ultimately uphold its verdicts; something which will in the long-run bring it to pass that it shall be well with the righteous and ill with the unrighteous.

This voice of conscience, with the sense that there is a power which will support it, is something very different from any mere physical law. Fire burns; if we fall over a precipice we suffer injury or death. Here the consequence is visible and immediate. But the uneasy sense of wrong-doing points not to a present and visible consequence, but to a future retribution. And the conviction is not merely that certain consequences will follow, but that they ought to follow; that wrong-doing not only will be punished, but that it deserves punishment, which will somehow, at some time, be inflicted; a conviction that "we are responsible, and will be held to our responsibility."

This conviction rests on a pure act of faith. Our own

personal experience does not warrant it. The experience of history does not warrant it. We see the law of righteousness partially fulfilled now; that is all. History shows a balance of evidence in favour of the conviction, or, as Bishop Butler puts it, the constitution of things shows on the whole a tendency to reward the innocent, to punish the guilty; but there is no complete proof that this tendency will ever be perfectly fulfilled. Nay, there are many contradictions to it. In this life evil-doers flourish and die unpunished; good men suffer and have no visible recompence. Experience does not prove that every man will be rewarded according to his works. If then we cling to this conviction in spite of all the anomalies we see, we do so on faith, not on intellectual proof. "Notwithstanding instances to the contrary which are flagrant and obtrusive, notwithstanding the bitter complaints of prophets, priests, poets, and historians, though the righteous perish and no man layeth it to heart, men believe in a judgment to come, and their deepest moral convictions involve a principle which no experience can demonstrate, and with which much bitter experience seems daily to conflict."

The great denier of the validity of this act of faith, by which there is within man a conscience, a forecast of future judgment, is David Hume. And Professor Huxley has recently refurbished anew his subtle argument. It runs thus: Are there visible in this world any marks of justice rewarding men according to their works? You say, Yea. Then, Hume answers, justice operates here and is satisfied; you need not go to look for any future retribution. If you say No—Then, he answers, you cannot ascribe justice to God; or rather to your gods, for he puts his argument in the mouth of an Epicurean, seeing that they are careless about justice in this visible state of things. If you say both Yes and No, justice is partly executed here, partly not, then Hume replies, You have no warrant to extend the operation of justice beyond what you see it at present have, and to expect that it will be more perfectly fulfilled hereafter.

Or, as Mr. Huxley puts it, Nature—that is, this visible frame of things—is your only measure of the character of Him who, you say, created and upholds it. What right have you to suppose that he manifests his righteousness otherwise and more perfectly on the other side of Nature, if it has another side,

from what he does on this side? Certainly none, if Nature—that is, the things we see—be our only measure of the character of God. But this is just the question in dispute. Shut out the warnings of conscience, confine yourself to sensible experience, and Hume's argument is unanswerable. Let in the voice of conscience, admit its witness, though you cannot see or prove its truth, and then you are at once introduced into a wholly different, even a spiritual region, and vistas of future possibilities are opened up "which this gross world no sense hath to perceive, no soul to dream of."

Here, then, we stand at the great dividing-point where the two roads, the road of faith and the road of sight, part company. Hume and his school, taking their stand only on what can be seen, on what we ourselves have observed, or on the experience of the past, reject all else, pay no heed to the intimations of conscience, and can arrive only at a code of expediency. Virtue, on the whole, seems to pay best in this world, therefore it is prudent to adhere to it. This is the road of sight which Hume and his followers travel. The other road, that of faith, accepts the forecast of conscience as true, and on the strength of it is prepared to go out beyond the guidance of mere experience—is convinced and is prepared to act on the conviction that though within the range of our observation righteousness is not adequately rewarded, nor vice adequately punished, yet that they surely will be. On this conviction it takes its line, sets its face, not towards the seen, but towards the unseen, and calmly and confidently awaits the issue. This is the beginning of all real faith, the first of what have been called the ventures of faith. It is no doubt a momentous act, one which opens up an entirely new world—a world which, in the words of Hume, "subverts all the principles of the understanding, and gives a man a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience." No doubt it is so, but it is the side which all prophets, all the best men, the great benefactors of mankind, have chosen. They have believed that right is stronger than wrong, that the good will yet conquer the evil, that there is a futurity before them in which all the wrong will yet be redressed, and in the strength of that hope have lived and worked and died.

I have spoken of the sanction which lies in the voice of

conscience—the sense that there is a power behind it which will give effect to its behests. What is the nature of that power? Can we in any way divine its character? We have all lately heard much about a Power not ourselves which makes for righteousness. And the great recommendation of this strange formula was said to be that it hits the ground where faith or knowledge, Scripture or science, meet, and reconciles these two often seemingly opposed partisans. I doubt if it will do so, if even the belief in this formula does not carry us as far beyond observation and experience as the highest principles of morality and faith do. But however this may be, one thing is plain enough. No mere law, no great blind impersonal power, can ever meet and vindicate that which conscience demands. What it craves is that the most discriminating and perfect justice should be done. But no influence which is not personal can ever execute complete judgment on the acts, the thoughts, the intentions, or the motives of a personal being. Human law, we see, cannot do this. Its action is rough and inexact: here too severe, there not severe enough. It cannot discriminate personal merits and demerits. No impersonal agency or power or influence can do so. Here, as elsewhere, it takes like to judge like. None but a personal being endowed with intelligence and morality like our own, only far higher and more perfect than ours, can enter into all the intricate windings, the delicate movements of mind, heart, and brain, which determine the conduct of every human being. That is, that which gives sanction to the verdicts of conscience, that power which is moving close behind it, is no other than the living and personal God. As one has said, the movements are “the touch of God.” It is no merely theological assertion, but the expression of the practical experience of all thoughtful persons, that, more than any formula ever invented by philosophers and moralists, better than Kant’s Categorical Imperative, the finding of the awakened heart is expressed most simply, immediately, most truly in the words of that psalm which begins, “O Lord, thou hast searched me out, and known me; . . . thou understandest my thoughts long before.” The more keen and sensitive the conscience is, the more it is driven to feel that it is not a mere law, no mere categorical imperative, no impersonal power or moral order, with which it has to do, from which its intimations

come, to which they return ; but a Living Person, akin to our own hearts, containing all that they do and far more. From its depths the soul cries out and appeals to such a Being, who works not by any mere hard and fast lines or mechanical rules, but who can take account of the "minutest circumstances of our condition, can make allowance for them, can have compassion on our weakness, can pardon our sins." Such the Being behind conscience whom the human heart craves, and on whom alone it can repose and be at peace.

It would thus appear that faith in the primary convictions of conscience will not stop short till it leads up to and finds rest in a personal God. That is, that a living and sensitive morality cannot stop short of real religion ; that morality is, in fact, underlain by religion. "If the highest impulses of life are not to be balked, if the deepest dictates of morality are not illusive, some Being there must be who is at all events so far personal as to be able to deal justly with persons."

I am well aware that there are many who take another view, and who believe that a distinct and substantial morality can be built up without any reference to God or religion. And I know that there are men who are moral in practice and in principle and yet seem to have no sense of religion. It is not the interest of the highest truth to deny this, if it be so. Only we must add that such a view of the possible separation of morality and vital religion is at the best an imperfect one, and that the two sisters cannot be sundered without tears. For what are our best moral ideas—the idea of justice, for instance, or of mercy—but broken arcs of circles which do not complete themselves within our sight, but pass off on either side into mystery? They are like those broken fragments of the rainbow which you see on a stormy day, and which, incomplete as they are, always carry out thoughts directly to a hidden sun. There may be, there are, those who do not feel this, who do not feel that any moral truth once livingly felt carries them at once to a Personal Being as its Author and Upholder. But those who do feel this have at all events this great witness to the truth of their feeling, that He who of all who ever walked this earth was at once the most perfect Exemplar of spiritual morality and its greatest Vivifier among men, united the two elements indissolubly, and that in his consciousness to see a thing to be

right and at the same time to be the will of God was one act. To him morality and the perceived will of God were identical.

It may perhaps have occurred to some that I have given no definition of faith. Nor do I intend to do so, but rather to suggest what its nature and action are. I have spoken of it mainly as trust, as a relation between persons, as confidence in character, as reliance on a person; that is, I have taken it rather on its moral, which I believe to be its most important side, than on its intellectual side, which seems to me comparatively subordinate. This has not generally been the view of theologians. They have rather inclined to regard it from its intellectual side. According to Bishop Pearson's well-known definition, they have made it to be "an assent to that which is credible as credible," as an assent on the ground of testimony which seemed to them to be sufficient. And Mr. Wace, though in the main portion of his work he has thrown himself on the moral idea of faith, has not done so quite consistently, but has here and there wavered, and has quoted with approbation Pearson's account of it, as though it were satisfactory. If we take this, the intellectual view, then the living trust in a person becomes subordinate, is only a means to "obtaining knowledge and ascertaining truths" which we could not otherwise obtain. According as we regard faith as an intellectual act, or chiefly as a moral and spiritual one, an entirely different view of the nature and object of revelation ensues. If faith be mainly an intellectual process, then the great end of revelation must be to communicate certain abstract truths about the Divine nature or certain eternal principles of morality, and the character of the Revealer is valued mainly for the sake of the truths which he communicates. If we are to believe the truths revealed, then the character of Him who reveals them must be proved to be trustworthy. But if the great end of all revelation has been to reveal the character of God, as shown in his dealings with men, then we shall find in the Old Testament "not the promulgation of certain dogmas, but the revelation of God and of the way in which he manifested his presence in a long and special history of redemptive activity." In the New Testament we shall find one central object, the manifestation of the person of Christ and of God in him. It makes all the difference in the world which of these two views of faith we adopt. If we

take the former, then we are involved at every step in intellectual disputes, arguments about the nature of testimony, the credibility of witnesses, the criterion of the truth of the revelation, whether its inherent reasonableness or its agreement with other truths is already established. Here is opened up a field of endless debate. If, however, we take the other view, and regard the Scriptures, both old and new, as revelations of the Divine Character, and supremely of that character as summed up in Christ, then we are on solid and unassailable ground—ground which commends itself directly to the spiritual interests of man, which speculation cannot shake, and in which practical faith finds an immediate resting-place.

This I take to be the side to which Mr. Wace chiefly leans, even if he does not always hold to it consistently. For in one of his notes he remarks: "The question is not whether we think certain theological opinions more tenable than others, but whether we believe certain men to be more worthy to be followed and trusted than others." Above all, as he says, the fundamental law, the supreme motive power in Christianity, is trust in, loyalty, personal devotion to a Person, allegiance to Him who is the head of redeemed humanity.

Faith, then, is not to be valued, as theologians have too often valued it, for its intellectual product, for the knowledge of unseen things to which it introduces us. "The true goal is not a creed, but God in Christ; not things to be believed, but a life of living fellowship to be lived."

The moral view of faith as a personal relation, trust of persons in a Person, if it had been held consistently and without any wavering by Mr. Wace, would have given more clearness and directness to his third and fourth lectures, "The Witness to Revelation" and "The Faith of the Old Covenant." As it is, though in the main he has clung to the moral view, he has not always held to it with a firm grasp, but has here and there allowed the intellectual view of faith, as the belief in testimony, the assent to things credible as credible, to come in and obscure the supremacy of the truer view. I shall now, however, notice some portions of the third and fourth lectures which seem to be in harmony with the view of faith as a personal relation.

It has often been set forth, by no one more emphatically than by the late Canon Mozley, that man must needs conceive

of God through some medium, in that there are only two media through which it is possible for man to think of him. There is the medium of Nature and there is the medium of man. If we try to apprehend the Divine Being through the image of Nature we shall think of him mainly as the great First Cause, or as the Reality that is behind all phenomena. This way of conceiving of him soon becomes vague and intangible, and cannot permanently influence life and conduct, however much it may suit speculative thought. It is towards this purely intellectual conception that philosophy always tends. If, however, man is the medium through which we try to conceive of God, it is in the moral part of human nature that we find the only clew which can guide our thoughts toward him. If we lose hold of this clew we shall never find another. If there is any link between us and God, any avenue up which our thoughts can travel to him, it must be through our moral affections, our sense of righteousness, goodness, and love; that is, we think of God as possessing, only in an infinitely higher meaning, whatever is best in ourselves.

This, from first to last, is the conception of God which is taken in Scripture—from the words, “God created man in his own image,” down to “and the Word became flesh.” The Scriptures are based throughout on a human conception of the Divine nature, on a true anthropomorphism, but an elevated and elevating and entirely spiritual anthropomorphism. It is easy for frivolous wits to make a joke of this conception, to point to the exaggerations and the unseemly familiarities on which some divines have ventured on the strength of it, and to treat it with light mockery. But the principle in itself, reverently used, is one of the deepest and truest, lies at the bottom of all right thinking about things divine. It is this, that there exists a harmony between the human reason and the divine, that there is a link of true kinship between the moral nature of man and the nature of God, that, not in a mere figure, but in reality, there is a kinship between the nature of man’s spirit and the spirit of God. This, which is the root-conception of Scripture, is also the faith of conscience, as we have seen, when it is rightly interpreted. The sanction which conscience points to, the binding power which lies behind it, is that not merely of a blind power, but of a Person,

for it is only a Person who can deal righteously with persons, can adequately judge persons. And this, which is the Biblical conception from end to end, has been reached here and there by the most morally gifted men, even without direct revelation. Socrates attained to it, Plato taught it. But the unaided human reason of the race has never been able permanently to keep hold of that which a few chosen spirits have been able to apprehend as from afar.

The higher intimations of conscience are lights which could not live in this dark world unless supplemented and supported by answering lights from above. The faith of conscience, if it was to live and become operative, required the support of direct appeals to it from without and from above ; that is, of positive revelation. High and self-evidencing as the light of conscience is, could it have sustained the strain that this world of sense puts on it, if God himself had not come to its aid by positive communications of himself, his character, and his will ? Now this is a truth which rationalism is for ever either flatly denying, at least attempting to pare away. All that Christians have hitherto held to be real communications from God, it regards as only the natural fetches of the human intellect in its attempts to penetrate into the Divine nature. It denies objectivity to the so-called revelations, and accounts for them all on subjective and natural principles ; that is, in plain terms, it makes them to come from within ourselves, not from without. There is much tendency this way at the present time, and perhaps, if we are honest, many will confess that they have felt this tendency in themselves.

In regarding the Old Testament, it makes all the difference in the world whether we consider it to be a record of the gradual advance which man has made by his natural faculties towards a knowledge of God, a record of the efforts of men to seek and to find God ; or a record of the means which God has taken to seek and to find man. These two attitudes of mind are not only different, but entirely opposed.

Every one must feel how entirely opposed this is to the mental attitude of the writers of Scripture. In the Old Testament, and in the New alike, lawgiver, prophet, and apostle felt themselves to be the recipients of a message direct from God, the bearers of a voice which did not originate in

their own heart and conscience, but a voice from without, coming from one who is supreme over the heart and the conscience of man. And yet it is to be noted that those Hebrew men who believed most entirely in those appeals from without, were the very men of all the world in whom the inward moral convictions were strongest, in whom the belief in conscience and in God were absolutely at one, the one belief strengthening and deepening the other. That means, to the best Hebrew minds morality and religion, righteousness and God, were not only in harmony, but identical.

Mr. Wace's third lecture, that on "The Witness to Revelation," concludes with some very searching reflections. They, he says, who are most sensitive to hear the voice that speaks in conscience will be found to be also most apprehensive of the voice that speaks in revelation. As men grow spiritually enfeebled they cease to appreciate the authority of revelation. The real obstacle to faith is this, that it lays a severe moral strain on us, and we shrink from it. The practical conclusion of the whole is this, that if faith in our day has grown languid, and is to be revived, it must be by an appeal to the conscience still more than to the intellect of man.

The fourth of Mr. Wace's lectures deals with the main elements of the faith of the Old Covenant. Though it was one of the Old Testament prophets who first said "The just shall live by faith," and though prophets and righteous men did live by faith in that old time, yet it was in the New Testament that the word Faith, as meaning a personal trust in a Person, attained its full proportion and started into sudden life. The meaning and the importance of it were then only fully recognised when the true and adequate object of faith was given and was vividly apprehended. It then became firm in grasp and definite in outline, as it could not be till the Word became flesh and tabernacled among us. We have seen that trust in persons is the source of whatever is noblest and most devoted in human nature. But no mere man was adequate to draw out for the hearts of his fellow-men the full compass of this latent energy. Neither could moral law nor spiritual ideals do so. These are too vague, too impalpable, "to open and unlock the heart, to elicit the ten thousand senses which belong to us, and through which we really live, to answer to the mysterious

assemblage of thoughts and affections which the soul has within it." One alone was adequate to this, even He who in the fullness of time came to be all things to the hearts that trust him. When he came, all the higher impulses of humanity seemed exhausted. Trust, hope, aspiration, self-devotion, finding no sufficient object, had died down within the hearts of men and yielded place to despair. Our Lord came to rally the scattered forces of good, to call forth, as it had never been called forth before, that faith in a higher life which had nearly gone dead, and to be henceforth the centre and the source of trust and hope to universal man. And ever since he came, whatever of purest, noblest, best has appeared amongst men, may be said to hold of him and his direct or indirect influence. It is remarkable that in all his teaching he not only gives faith the first place before all other virtues, but demands a quite unlimited faith to be put in himself. He was not in the least content to be accepted merely as a Moral Teacher. From the very first he demanded a faith in himself which far outwent this. He asked his disciples to place their whole fate in his hands, and to trust him through agony and death.

It is usual with those at the present day who would fain regard our Lord as merely a great Moral Teacher, and Christianity as only the promulgation of a purer moral code, to appeal to the Sermon on the Mount as containing all that is essential in the Gospel. They are very profuse in their praises of it, and in their exhortations to us to stick to its practical precepts, and not to mind the transcendental additions which, as they say, theologians have made to its simple morality. But is the Sermon on the Mount all so simple and so easy a matter as these men would make it? Was not the ground for that discourse prepared by "an intense moral illumination, by a call to repentance more solemn and penetrating" than the world had ever heard before? When our Lord appeared, "he, like his forerunner, laid the foundation of his work in preaching repentance." "He probes the hearts of his hearers with a depth and a severity which lay bare the very recesses of the soul." Mr. Wace has well said: "It is one of the strangest features of rationalising writers that this aspect of the Sermon on the Mount is so little appreciated by them. They applaud its 'sublime morality;' they condescend to

pronounce that, in their opinion, no teacher has ever soared to such a height, and they would fain represent its moral teaching as the sum and substance of the Gospel. But unless a man be made in some other mould than his fellows, it is wonderful that he can read the Sermon on the Mount without trembling. In proportion to the beauty and the force of the moral truths it declares is the spiritual and moral ruin it reveals among us, and the condemnation it pronounces on every human soul. 'Whosoever shall be angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judgment.' 'Whosoever looketh . . .' 'If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee.' The laws of Sinai . . . are as nothing compared with this sword of the Spirit, discerning the very thoughts and intents of the heart, and denouncing the severest judgments upon mere words, looks, and inclinations. The loftier and more spiritual the standard, the more utter appears our failure to approach it, and the more disastrous must seem the consequences of our sins. . . . The wrath of God is revealed in that discourse with a terrible calm, which leaves a man desperate of all resources in himself, and compels him to cry for deliverance from the body of death and evil which encompasses him."

Those who fancy that by confining themselves to the Sermon on the Mount they can keep in the region of mere morality, and get rid altogether of the theological element, have they ever considered how that whole discourse is interpenetrated with the thought of God? At every step of it direct reference is made to the will and character of God; each successive precept is underlain by it. From beginning to end it is illuminated by that idea.

We are taught to love our enemies. Why? That we may be the children of our Father in heaven, who is kind to the unthankful and to the evil. We are taught our alms are to be done in secret, and the motive is, the Father which seeth in secret shall reward thee openly. The same is the encouragement held forth to sincere prayer, to forgiveness of injuries, and so on throughout all the other precepts. The one strength and encouragement given is the thought of God and his willingness to help us. As has been said, the teaching of that discourse, with its censures and demands so penetratingly

severe, would have been cruel had it been addressed to men unaided and in their natural condition. But it is softened and rendered tolerable by the gracious words, "Ask, and it shall be given," and by the promise that our heavenly Father will give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him. Even in the Sermon on the Mount, then, He who teaches it bases his every word on the faith in God's presence. It is saturated with the thought of God. What then becomes of the fancy that it is pure morality divorced from theology? And He who spoke it, does he make no claim to be other than a moral teacher? Who is He who speaks thus: "Many will say to me in that day, Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name? . . . Then will I profess unto them, I never knew you"? Can He who claims for himself this position in "that day," the great day of reckoning, be a mere man? If ^{so} been only this, he would have been the most presumptuous and self-deluded man of whom there is any record. All this is so plain and obvious to ordinary persons that it may seem to them that in dwelling on it I am almost repeating truisms. They are not probably aware how persistently some of what are called the leaders of thought in our day have laboured to persuade the world that the Gospel is nothing more than pure moral precepts, and our Lord himself only an enlightened moral teacher.

For instance, in the face of this, the author of that well-known book *Supernatural Religion* ventures to assert "that the earliest teaching of Jesus recorded in the Gospel which can be regarded as in any degree historical is purely morality, almost, if not quite, free from theological dogmas." Yet only two pages afterward the same writer states, wholly unaware of his own inconsistency, that Christ's teaching "confined itself to two fundamental principles—love to God and love to man." As if the precept to love God with all the heart and soul and mind implied no theology! as if it did not, indeed, involve the whole of theology,—the belief that God is; that he rewards those who diligently seek him; that, in spite of all the darkness and unrighteousness there is in the world, he is still worthy of our entire trust and love. No theology, indeed, in this! To believe this much demands the fullest stretch of faith of which man is capable. After accepting these fundamental beliefs, all else is comparatively easy of acceptance.

Renan, too, falls into the same inconsistency—first asserting that “we seek in vain for a single theological proposition in the Gospel,” and then that “a lofty conception of the Divinity is in some sort the germ of our Lord’s whole being.”

Even the author of a less extreme book, *Ecce Homo*, is not free from the same inconsistency. The object of his inquiry is to answer the question, “What was Christ’s object in founding the society which is called by his name, and how is it adapted to attain that object? And yet he goes on to assure us that in his book “no theological questions whatever are discussed;” that is, the author of *Ecce Homo* assumes at the outset that our Lord’s object and method excluded all theology. Indeed, this is the primary assumption which underlies all attempts to explain away the Christian faith, to eliminate from it all that is mysterious and miraculous, and to account for it on purely natural principles. As Mr. Wace says, “Around the question whether, and in what manner, Christ revealed God, the battle rages, and to this it continually returns.” Men assume that truths are simple because they are simply expressed. The commandment to love God with all the heart and soul and mind and strength—what could be simpler, it is asked, than this? No doubt the words are simple—they are all mere monosyllables. Yet in these few monosyllables, simple as they sound, our Lord based his whole teaching on that truth of theology which is at once the loftiest and the most profound we can conceive.

The greatness of the demand for faith which our Lord made on his first hearers, and the immense prophetic power which he claimed for himself, are seen conspicuously in the parables in which he announced the advent of the kingdom of God, its fortunes and its destiny. The words of those parables are so familiar to us that it is not easy to read them with fresh eyes now, and to imagine how strange they must have sounded to those who first heard them. He announced that a kingdom had begun on earth which was to change the face of the whole world; that he himself was the Life and the Ruler of that kingdom; that from the smallest beginnings, a grain of mustard-seed, it was to become a great tree which would overshadow the world; that this kingdom would effect an entire revolution in the moral and spiritual condition of man; that

they, his disciples, poor and uneducated men, of no account, were first to revolutionise their own lives on the faith of it, and be set at variance with all the world, and that they were to be made the instruments which would carry this revolution to the ends of the earth. What a power of faith in his one mission did it require to make such a prophecy at that age, and how great a faith did it demand in those who should believe what he said and stake their lives on that prophecy! All visible experience was against its realisation. He who made the announcement had nothing to offer them in this world but labours, persecutions, and loss of all things. What faith did it imply to accept these things, with no earthly recompence in store, nothing but his word to assure them of ultimate victory and of an eternal reward! We see not as yet the full end of that prophecy; but we see enough in the work which the Christian Church has done on earth, and in the still living power of Christ, to convince us that it has been in a large measure fulfilled.

Again, along with the demand for faith in himself which our Lord made on others, think of the faith by which he himself lived and died.

One cannot, I think, be wrong in assuming that even by those who do reject his Divinity, our Lord is admitted to be "the supreme ideal of all that the conscience and the heart of man demand." This admitted spiritual perfection, on what was it founded? Was it merely as a good man that he did his works and spoke his words? Surely it is but reasonable to take his own testimony as to the power in the strength of which he did these things. Everywhere he insists that it is not by his own independent power that he lives and works; that in all he does he is carrying out the will of another and revealing his mind and character. Everywhere he disavows either the right or the power to act independently. "I can of mine own self do nothing." This, whether expressed or only implied, is the ground-tone of his whole life. From first to last he identifies his work absolutely with doing his Father's will and revealing his character; and nowhere more than in the final crisis of his life. Throughout the Passion all his words are filled with the sense of his Father, and in the Crucifixion he bows in absolute submission to his Father's will.

The question then naturally arises, Are we to allow Christ's moral perfection as far as we can judge of such a thing, as far as we can see and understand him? And are we not then to trust him when he tells us of that which we cannot see, his consciousness of his oneness with God the Father, his witness to the Father's will and character, and his witness to the eternal world, and to our close relations to it and our destiny therein?

When he speaks of these things, he does so under the sense of the most tremendous responsibility ever realised on earth, with the eye of his soul fixed on his Father, and at every moment calling God to witness to the truth of the words he uttered. If, as far as we can apprehend his character, we feel him to be perfect in truth and goodness, shall we not trust him when he utters his own deepest consciousness about those things which transcend all understanding of ours?

This is the claim he makes, and reasonably makes, on our trust; these are the foundations on which his demand for our faith are laid:—

1st. The very thought of him seriously entertained awakens the conscience of men, as nothing else can do, to a sense of the moral evil and the weakness that is in them.

2d. He brings them through contact with himself into the presence of his Father, the God of light and truth.

3d. In that awful presence he declares himself to be their Lord and Saviour, and bids them trust to him for forgiveness and for all spiritual life. It is a matter of trust, not of proof. It is to his assurance that the soul has to commit itself for time and for eternity.

I have thus tried to condense what seems most valuable in Mr. Wace's fifth lecture, that on "Our Lord's Demand for Faith." There are three more lectures, on the Faith of the early Church, of the Reformation, and of the Church of England. But on these I need not enter.

It may have been observed that I have not attempted to define metaphysically what faith, as an act of the soul, is, but have rather spoken of it as it shows itself in operation, and of the objects on which it lays hold. All remember the description of faith in the Epistle to the Hebrews, as "the giving substance to things hoped for, the testing [putting to proof,

bringing to conviction] of things not seen." Men speak of the faculty of faith as they do of the faculty of judgment. It is truer to say with Julius Hare that "every genuine act of faith is the act of the whole man, not of his understanding alone, not of his affections alone, not of his will alone, but of all three in their central aboriginal unity." And thus faith becomes the power "through which the spiritual world exercises its sway over man, and thereby enables him to overcome the world of sin and death."

Then as to its objects, they are diverse and manifold, but they all have this in common: they are unseen, and they are moral in their character. It manifests itself by trusting to these, and preferring them to things seen and material. We saw that faith shows itself in the most obvious way in trusting to the character of our fellow-men, putting confidence in each other. And on faith in this sense we may say that all society and common social intercourse, not to speak of friendship and affection, are built. Again, it shows itself in the life of individuals by the aim or end which each man sets before him, the things which he lays to heart and prefers, which he makes the guide of his life. Does he choose for himself material goods, wealth, bodily comfort, or even the honours of this world and the praise of men? or does he desire most to be upright, pure, unselfish, loving? In the choice of these last faith is seen. Again, as we saw, all morality is founded on faith. A man cannot be thoroughly truthful except by a strong exercise of it. Further, to listen to the intimations of our natural conscience, to act on them, to believe in the forecast which conscience contains that its verdicts will one day be fulfilled and perfect righteousness executed,—this is a strong exercise and trial of faith, and it is in this exercise of it that the thought and conviction of God is most intimately brought home to the soul. For it puts a great strain on the moral nature to believe in a future and perfect retribution, in the face of the visible contradictions of it. It is as the Living Being who is behind conscience, and reveals himself in its sanctions, that God primarily makes himself known to men. So imbedded are we in things visible, and overborne by them; so severe, indeed, is the strain which this belief puts on human nature, that a few only, and these the elect souls of earth,

have been able to live in the faith of conscience—Socrates, Plato, Epictetus—without the aid of some external confirmation. The prophets, and the best men of the Jews, found this in the special but partial revelations which they had. But it was only when Jesus Christ was manifested on earth that a fully adequate and perfect object was given for faith to rest in. He came to the rescue of man's moral nature, which otherwise would have been overborne in the conflict with the powers of this world. How he came to the world's aid, by what means he awakened and reanimated the human conscience, well-nigh dead at his coming, and brought "the remedy both for guilt and for moral impotence," all here know well enough. "I need not go into truths so familiar to all men in a Christian country." As I have said, it puts a great moral strain on a man to live at all by faith in this world. But it is not in believing the higher truths of Christianity that the chief stress of the strain lies; it is in believing the first moral truths which are necessary as a preparation of any religion. To take the moral and spiritual view of life at all, this, if we understand it, is the real difficulty. It is so easy, so natural to give up all moral effort and to go with the stream, to live by sight and sense, either taking whatever ease and sensual pleasure the world offers, or, if we wish to be more intellectual, taking up a philosophy founded only on sensible experience. As it has been well expressed, "The visible world seems made for the enjoyment of just such a being as man, and man is put into it. He has the *capacity* for enjoyment, and the world supplies the *means*. How natural this, what a simple and pleasant philosophy, yet how different from that of the Cross!"

To believe and act upon the hidden whispers of conscience when these go against our natural likings, and also against the opinions of those around us, those with whom we wish to stand well, this it is that tries a man, this demands faith. It is faith, indeed, in its first steps, in its lower stages, but it is just here that the pinch really lies, not in believing the higher and more mysterious truths which Christianity reveals. To accept as literal truths what we feel within us—the obligation to live by the highest standard, and the sense that we utterly fail to do so—the consequent sense of failure, guilt, moral helplessness, these are the primary teachings of conscience, and they

are at the same time the severest trials to faith. Those who accept these intimations have in them the due preparation for Christianity, and all else follows almost naturally. To those who turn aside from these searching heart-truths Christianity gradually becomes a sealed book. But when persons are once convinced that there is deep within them a call to be what, in themselves, they cannot be, that as regards the attainment of moral perfection, or even of inward cleansing, they are helpless, and when to persons with this experience the life and character of our Lord is presented, they begin to feel that here, if anywhere, is what they need—that nowhere else in the universe is help, strength, hope for them. Even after they have learnt this, innumerable questions may arise, both with regard to themselves and their fellow-men, to which they can give no answer. But from these they can turn away without despair, if only they can fix their eye on Him, and feel that in spite of the burden of the mystery all things may be hoped for a world in which such a life was lived, for which such a death was died.

J. C. SHAIRP.

ART. VIII.—*Inspiration*.¹

THE word Inspiration, as applied to the Holy Scriptures, has gradually acquired a specific technical meaning, independent of its etymology. At first this word, in the sense of God-breathed, was used to express the entire agency of God in producing that divine element which distinguishes Scripture from all other writings. It was used in a sense comprehensive of supernatural revelation, while the immense range of providential and gracious divine activities concerned in the genesis of the Word of God in human language was practically overlooked. But Christian scholars have come to see that this divine element, which penetrates and glorifies Scripture at every point, has entered and become incorporated with it in very various ways, natural, supernatural, and gracious, through long courses of providential leading, as well as by direct suggestion, through the spontaneous action of

¹ From the *Presbyterian Review*.

the souls of the sacred writers, as well as by controlling influence from without. It is important that distinguishable ideas should be connoted by distinct terms, and that the terms themselves should be fixed in a definite sense. Thus we have come to distinguish sharply between Revelation, which is the frequent, and Inspiration, which is the constant, attribute of all the thoughts and statements of Scripture; and between the problem of the genesis of Scripture on the one hand, which includes historic processes and the concurrence of natural and supernatural forces, and must account for all the phenomena of Scripture,—and the mere fact of Inspiration on the other hand, or the superintendence by God of the writers in the entire process of their writing, which accounts for nothing whatever but the absolute infallibility of the record in which the revelation, once generated, appears in the original autograph. It will be observed that we intentionally avoid applying to this inspiration the predicate “influence.” It summoned, on occasion, a great variety of influences, but its essence was superintendence. This superintendence attended the entire process of the genesis of Scripture, and particularly the process of the final composition of the record. It interfered with no spontaneous natural agencies, which were in themselves producing results conformable to the mind of the Holy Spirit. On occasion it summoned all needed divine influences and suggestions, and it sealed the entire record and all its elements, however generated, with the imprimatur of God, sending it to us as His Word.

The importance of limiting the word “Inspiration” to a definite and never-varying sense, and one which is shown, by the facts of the case, to be applicable equally to every part of Scripture, is self-evident, and is emphasised by the embarrassment which is continually recurring in the discussions of this subject, arising sometimes from the wide, and sometimes from the various senses in which this term is used by different parties. The history of theology is full of parallel instances, in which terms of the highest import have come to be accepted in a more fixed and narrow sense than they bore at first, either in Scriptural or early ecclesiastical usage, and with only a remote relation to their etymology; as, for instance, regeneration, sacrament, etc.

PRESUPPOSITIONS.

From this definition of the term it is evident that, instead of being in the order of thought, the first religious truth which we embrace, upon which, subsequently, the entire fabric of true religion rests, it is the last and crowning attribute of those sacred books from which we derive our religious knowledge. Very many religious and historical truths must be established before we come to the question of Inspiration; as, for instance, the being and moral government of God, the fallen condition of man, the fact of a redemptive scheme, the general historical truth of the Scriptures, and the validity and authority of the revelation of God's will which they contain, *i.e.* the general truth of Christianity and its doctrines. Hence it follows that, while the inspiration of the Scriptures is true, and being true is a principle fundamental to the adequate interpretation of Scripture, it nevertheless is not in the first instance a principle fundamental to the truth of the Christian religion. In dealing with sceptics it is not proper to begin with the evidence which immediately establishes Inspiration, but we should first establish Theism, then the historical credibility of the Scriptures, and then the divine origin of Christianity. Nor should we ever allow it to be believed that the truth of Christianity depends upon any doctrine of inspiration whatever. Revelation came in large part before the record of it, and the Christian Church before the New Testament Scriptures. Inspiration can have no meaning if Christianity is not true, but Christianity would be true and divine, and, being so, would stand, even if God had not been pleased to give us, in addition to His revelation of saving truth, an infallible record of that revelation absolutely errorless, by means of Inspiration.

In the second place, it is also evident that our conception of revelation and its methods must be conditioned upon our general views of God's relation to the world, and His methods of influencing the souls of men. The only really dangerous opposition to the Church doctrine of Inspiration comes either directly or indirectly, but always ultimately, from some false view of God's relation to the world, of His methods of working, and of the possibility of a supernatural agency penetrating

and altering the course of a natural process. But the whole genius of Christianity, all of its essential and most characteristic doctrines, presuppose the immanence of God in all His creatures, and His concurrence with them in all their spontaneous activities. In Him, as an active, intelligent Spirit, we all live and move and have our being. He governs all His creatures and all their actions, working in men even to will, and spontaneously to do His good pleasure. The currents, thus, of the divine activities do not only flow around us, conditioning or controlling our action from without, but they none the less flow within the inner current of our personal lives confluent with our spontaneous self-movements, and contributing to the effects whatever properties God may see fit that they shall have.

There is also a real logical and ideal, if not a physical, continuity between all the various provinces and methods of God's working; providence and grace, the natural and the supernatural, all constitute one system in the execution of one plan. All these agents and all these methods are so perfectly adjusted in the plan of God that not one interferes with any other, and all are so adjusted and controlled as that each works perfectly, according to the law of its own nature, and yet all together infallibly bring about the result God designs. In this case that design is a record, without error, of the facts and doctrines He had commissioned His servants to teach.

Of the manner in which God may inform and direct a free intelligence without violating its laws, we have a familiar analogy in nature in the relation of instinct to free intelligence. Intelligence is personal, and involves self-consciousness and liberty. Instinct is impersonal, unconscious, and not free. Both exist alike in man, with whom intelligence predominates, and in the higher animals, with whom instinct predominates. In every case the instinct of the creature is the intelligence of the Creator working through the creature's spontaneity, informing and directing, yet never violating any of the laws of his free intelligence. And in nature we can trace this all the way from the instinct of the bee, which works mechanically, to the magic play of the æsthetic instincts which largely constitute the genius of a great artist. We are not absurdly attempting to draw a parallel between natural instinct and

supernatural inspiration. But the illustration is good simply to show that as a matter of fact, God does prompt from within the spontaneous activities of His intelligent creatures, leading them by unerring means to ends imperfectly discerned by themselves; and that this activity of God, as in instinct or otherwise, does not in anywise reveal itself, either in consciousness, or in the character of the action to which it prompts, as interfering with the personal attributes or the free rational activities of the creature.

THE GENESIS OF SCRIPTURE.

We allude here to this wide, and as yet imperfectly explored subject, only for the purpose of distinctly setting apart the various problems it presents, and isolating the specific point of Inspiration, with which we, as well as the Church in general, are more particularly interested. All parties of believers admit that this genesis of Holy Scripture was the result of the co-operation, in various ways, of the agency of men and of the agency of God.

The human agency, both in the histories out of which the Scriptures sprang, and in their immediate composition and inscription, is everywhere apparent, and gives substance and form to the entire collection of writings. It is not merely in the matter of verbal expression or literary composition that the personal idiosyncrasies of each author are freely manifested by the untrammelled play of all his faculties, but the very substance of what they write is evidently for the most part the product of their own mental and spiritual activities. This is true except in that comparatively small element of the whole body of sacred writing, in which the human authors simply report the word of God objectively communicated, or as in some of the prophecies they wrote by Divine dictation. As the general characteristic of all their work, each writer was put to that special part of the general work for which he alone was adapted by his original endowments, education, special information, and providential position. Each drew from the stores of his own original information, from the contributions of other men, and from all other natural sources. Each sought knowledge, like all other authors, from the use of his own natural faculties of thought and feeling, of intuition and of logical inference, of

memory and imagination, and of religious experience. Each gave evidence of his own special limitations of knowledge and mental power and of his personal defects, as well as of his powers. Each wrote upon a definite occasion, under special historically grouped circumstances, from his own standpoint in the progressively unfolded plan of redemption, and each made his own special contribution to the fabric of God's Word.

The divine agency, although originating in a different source, yet emerges into the effect very much through the same channels. The Scriptures have been generated, as the Plan of Redemption has been evolved, through an historic process. From the beginning God has dealt with man in the concrete, by self-manifestations and transactions. The revelation proceeds from facts to ideas, and has been gradually unfolded, as the preparation for the execution of the work of redemption has advanced through its successive stages. The general Providence unfolding this plan has always been divine, yet has also been largely natural in its method while specially directed to its ends, and at the same time surcharged along portions of its line, especially at the beginning and at great crises with the supernatural, as a cloud is surcharged with electricity. There were divine voices, appearances, covenants, supernatural communications and interventions; the introduction of new institutions, and their growth under special providential conditions. The prophet of God was sent with special revelations and authority at particular junctures to gather and interpret the lessons of the past, and to add to them lessons springing out of the providential conditions of the present. The Scriptures were generated through sixteen centuries of this divinely regulated concurrence of God and man, of the natural and the supernatural, of reason and revelation, of providence and grace. It is an organism consisting of many parts, each adjusted to all the rest, as the "many members" to the "one body." Each sacred writer was by God specially formed, endowed, educated, providentially conditioned, and then supplied with knowledge naturally, supernaturally, or spiritually conveyed, so that he, and he alone, could, and freely would, produce his allotted part. Thus God predetermined all the matter and form of the several books largely by the formation and training of the several authors,

as an organist determines the character of his music as much when he builds his organ and when he tunes his pipes, as when he plays his keys. Each writer also is put providentially at the very point of view in the general progress of revelation to which his part assigns him. He inherits all the contributions of the past. He is brought into place, and set to work at definite providential junctures, the occasion affording him object and motive, giving form to the writing God appoints him to execute.

The Bible, moreover, being a work of the Spirit for spiritual ends, each writer was prepared precisely for his part in the work by the personal dealings of the Holy Spirit with his soul. Spiritual illumination is very different from either revelation or inspiration, and yet it had under the providence of God a large share in the genesis of Scripture, contributing to it a portion of that divine element which makes it the Word of God. The Psalms are divinely inspired records of the religious experience of their writers, and are by God himself authoritatively set forth as typical and exemplary for all men for ever. Paul and John and Peter largely drew upon the resources, and followed the lines of their own personal religious experience in the intuitional or the logical development of their doctrine, and their experience had, of course, been previously divinely determined for that very purpose. And in determining their religious experience, God so far forth determined their contributions to Scripture. And He furnished each of the sacred writers, in addition to that which came to him through natural channels, all the knowledge needed for his appointed task, either by vision, suggestion, dictation, or elevation of faculty, or otherwise, according to His will. The natural knowledge came from all sources, as traditions, documents, testimonies, personal observations, and recollections; by means also of intuitions, logical processes of thought, feeling, experience, etc., and yet all were alike under the general direction of God's providence. The supernatural knowledge became confluent with the natural in a manner which violated no law of reason or of freedom. And throughout the whole of his work the Holy Spirit was present, causing His energies to flow into the spontaneous exercises of the writer's faculties, elevating and directing where need be, and everywhere

securing the errorless expression in language of the thought designed by God. The last element is what we call Inspiration.

In all this process, except in a small element of prophecy, it is evident that as the sacred writers were free and active in their thinking and in the expression of their thoughts, so they were conscious of what they were doing, of what their words meant, and of the design of their utterance. Yet, even then, it is no less evident that they all, like other free instruments of Providence, "built better than they knew." The meanings of their words, the bearing of the principles they taught, of the facts they narrated, and the relation of their own part to the great organism of divine revelation, while luminous to their own consciousness, yet reached out into infinitely wider horizons than those penetrated by any thought of theirs.

STATEMENT OF THE DOCTRINE.

During the entire history of Christian theology the word Inspiration has been used to express either some or all of the activities of God, co-operating with its human authors in the genesis of Holy Scripture. We prefer to use it in the single sense of God's continued work of superintendence, by which, His providential, gracious, and supernatural contributions having been presupposed, He presided over the sacred writers in their entire work of writing, with the design and effect of rendering that writing an errorless record of the matters He designed them to communicate, and hence constituting the entire volume in all its parts the Word of God to us.

While we have restricted the word Inspiration to a narrower sphere than that in which it has been used by many in the past, nevertheless we are certain that the above statement of the divine origin and infallibility of Scripture accurately expresses the faith of the Christian Church from the first. Still, several points remain to be more particularly considered, concerning which, some difference of opinion at present prevails.

1st. Is it proper to call this Inspiration "plenary"? This word, which has often been made the occasion of strife, is in

itself indefinite, and its use contributes nothing, either to the precision or the emphasis of the definition. The word means simply "full," "complete," perfectly adequate for the attainment of the end designed, whatever that might have been. There ought not to be on any side any hesitancy to affirm this of the books of the Bible.

2d. Can this Inspiration be properly said to be "verbal"? The objection to the application of this predicate to Inspiration is urged upon three distinct grounds.

(1.) We believe that the great majority of those who object to the affirmation that Inspiration is verbal, are impelled thereto by a feeling, more or less definite, that the phrase implies that Inspiration is, in its essence, a process of verbal dictation, or that at least in some way the revelation of the thought, or the inspiration of the writer, was by means of the control which God exercised over his words. And there is the more excuse for this misapprehension because of the extremely mechanical conceptions of Inspiration maintained by many former advocates of the use of this term "verbal." This view, however, we repudiate as earnestly as any of those who object to the language in question. At the present time the advocates of the strictest doctrine of Inspiration, in insisting that it is verbal, do not mean that in any way the thoughts were inspired by means of the words, but simply that the divine superintendence, which we call Inspiration, extended to the verbal expression of the thoughts of the sacred writers, as well as to the thoughts themselves, and that, hence, the Bible considered as a record, an utterance in words of a divine revelation, is the Word of God to us. Hence, in all the affirmations of Scripture of every kind, there is no more error in the words of the original autographs than in the thoughts they were chosen to express. The thoughts and words are both alike human, and, therefore, subject to human limitations, but the divine superintendence and guarantee extends to the one as much as the other.

(2.) There are others, who, while insisting as strongly as any upon the presence of the divine element in Scripture, developed through special providences and gracious dealings, religious experiences and mental processes, in the very manner we have just set forth under the head of the "Genesis of

Scripture," yet substantially deny what we have here called "Inspiration." They retain the word "Inspiration," but signify by it the divine element in the revelation, or providential, or gracious dealing aforesaid, and they believe that the sacred writers, having been divinely helped to certain knowledge, were left to the natural limitations and fallibility incidental to their human and personal characters, alike in their thinking out their several narrations and expositions of divine truth, and in their reduction of them to writing. This view gives up the whole matter of the immediate divine authorship of the Bible as the Word of God, and its infallibility and authority as a rule of faith and practice. We have only the several versions of God's revelations, as rendered mentally and verbally, more or less adequately, yet always imperfectly, by the different sacred writers. This class of objectors are, of course, self-consistent in rejecting verbal inspiration in any sense. But this view is not consistent either with the claims of Scripture, the consciousness of Christians, or the historic doctrine of the Church.

(3.) There are others who maintain that the Scriptures have been certainly inspired so far forth as to constitute them in all their parts, and, as a whole, an infallible and divinely authoritative rule of faith and practice, and yet hold that, while the thoughts of the sacred writers concerning doctrine and duty were inspired and errorless, their language was of purely human suggestion, and more or less accurate. The question as to whether the elements of Scripture relating to the course of nature and to the events of history are without error, will be considered below ; it is sufficient to say under the present head, that it is self-evident that, just as far as the thoughts of Scripture, relating to any element or topic whatsoever, are inspired, the words in which those thoughts are expressed must be inspired also. Every element of Scripture, whether doctrine or history, of which God has guaranteed the infallibility, must be infallible in its verbal expression. No matter how in other respects generated, the Scriptures are a product of human thought, and every process of human thought involves language. "The slightest consideration will show that words are as essential to intellectual processes as they are to mutual intercourse. . . . Thoughts are wedded to words as

necessarily as soul to body. Without it the mysteries unveiled before the eyes of the seer would be confused shadows; with it they are made clear lessons for human life."¹

Besides this, the Scriptures are a *record* of divine revelations, and, as such, consist of words, and as far as the record is inspired at all, and as far as it is in any element infallible, its inspiration must reach to its words. Infallible thought must be definite thought, and definite thought implies words. But if God could have rendered the thoughts of the apostles regarding doctrine and duty infallibly correct without words, and then left them to convey it to us in their own language, we should be left to precisely that amount of certainty for the foundation of our faith as is guaranteed by the natural competency of the human authors, and neither more nor less. There would be no divine guarantee whatever. The human medium would everywhere interpose its fallibility between God and us. Besides, most believers admit that some of the prophetic parts of Scripture were verbally dictated. It was, moreover, promised that the apostles should speak as the Spirit gave them utterance. "The Word of God came unto the prophet." The Church has always held, as expressed by the Helvetic Confession, II., "that the canonical Scriptures *are the Word of God.*" Paul claims that the Holy Spirit superintended and guaranteed his words as well as his thoughts (1 Cor. ii. 13). The things of the Spirit we teach "not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth, combining (*συνκρίνοντες*) spiritual things with spiritual," i.e. spiritual thoughts with spiritual words.

It is evident, therefore, that it is not clearness of thought which inclines any of the advocates of a real inspiration of the Holy Scriptures to deny that it extends to the words. Whatever discrepancies or other human limitations may attach to the sacred record, *the line* (of inspired or not inspired, of infallible or fallible) *can never rationally be drawn between the thoughts and the words of Scripture.*

3d. It is asked again: In what way, and to what extent, is the doctrine of Inspiration dependent upon the supposed results of modern criticism, as to the dates, authors, sources, and modes of composition of the several books? To us the

¹ Canon Westcott's *Introduction to Study of the Gospels*, 5th ed., pp. 14, 15.

following answer appears to be well founded, and to set the limits within which the Church doctrine of inspiration is in equilibrium with the results of modern criticism fairly and certainly :—

The doctrine of Inspiration, in its essence, and consequently in all its forms, presupposes a supernatural revelation and a supernatural providential guidance, entering into and determining the genesis of Scripture from the beginning. Every naturalistic theory, therefore, of the evolution of Scripture, however disguised, is necessarily opposed to any true version of the catholic doctrine of Inspiration. It is, also, a well-known matter of fact that Christ himself is the ultimate witness on whose testimony the Scriptures, as well as their doctrinal contents, rest. We receive the Old Testament just as Christ handed it to us, and on His authority. And we receive as belonging to the New Testament all, and only, those books which an apostolically instructed age testifies to have been produced by the apostles or their companions, i.e. by the men whom Christ commissioned, and to whom He promised infallibility in teaching. It is evident, therefore, that every supposed conclusion of critical investigation which denies the apostolical origin of a New Testament book, or the truth of any part of Christ's testimony in relation to the Old Testament and its contents, or which is inconsistent with the absolute truthfulness of any affirmation of any book so authenticated, must be inconsistent with the true doctrine of Inspiration. On the other hand, the defenders of the strictest doctrine of Inspiration should cheerfully acknowledge that theories as to the authors, dates, sources, and modes of composition of the several books, which are not plainly inconsistent with the testimony of Christ or His apostles as to the Old Testament, or with the apostolic origin of the books of the New Testament, or with the absolute truthfulness of any of the affirmations of these books so authenticated, cannot in the least invalidate the evidence or pervert the meaning of the historical doctrine of Inspiration.

4th. The real point at issue between the more strict and the more lax views of Inspiration maintained by believing scholars remains to be stated. It is claimed and admitted equally on both sides that the great design and effect of Inspiration is to

render the sacred Scriptures, in all their parts, a divinely infallible and authoritative rule of faith and practice; and hence that in all their elements of thought and expression concerned in the great purpose of conveying to men a revelation of spiritual doctrine or duty, the Scriptures are absolutely infallible. But if this be so, it is argued by the more liberal school of Christian scholars that this admitted fact is not inconsistent with other facts which they claim are matters of their personal observation; to wit, that in certain elements of Scripture which are purely incidental to their great end of teaching spiritual truth, such as history, natural history, ethnology, archæology, geography, natural science, and philosophy, they, like all the best human writings of their age, are, while for the most part reliable, yet limited by inaccuracies and discrepancies. While this is maintained, it is generally at the same time affirmed, that when compared with other books of the same antiquity, these inaccuracies and discrepancies of the Bible are inconsiderable in number, and always of secondary importance, in no degree invalidating the great attribute of Scripture, its absolute infallibility and its divine authority as a rule of faith and practice.

The writers of this article are sincerely convinced of the perfect soundness of the great catholic doctrine of Biblical Inspiration, *i.e.* that the Scriptures not only contain, but ARE THE WORD OF GOD, and hence that all their elements and all their affirmations are absolutely errorless, and binding the faith and obedience of men. Nevertheless we admit that the question between ourselves and the advocates of the view just stated, is one of fact, to be decided only by an exhaustive and impartial examination of all the sources of evidence, *i.e.* the claims and the phenomena of the Scriptures themselves. There will undoubtedly be found upon the surface many apparent affirmations presumably inconsistent with the present teachings of science, with facts of history, or with other statements of the sacred books themselves. Such apparent inconsistencies and collisions with other sources of information are to be expected in imperfect copies of ancient writings; from the fact that the original reading may have been lost, or that we may fail to realise the point of view of the author, or that we are destitute of the circumstantial knowledge which would

fill up and harmonise the record. Besides, the human forms of knowledge by which the critics test the accuracy of Scripture are themselves subject to error. In view of all the facts known to us, we affirm that a candid inspection of all the ascertained phenomena of the original text of Scripture will leave unmodified the ancient faith of the Church. In all their real affirmations these books are without error.

It must be remembered that it is not claimed that the Scriptures, any more than their authors, are omniscient. The information they convey is in the forms of human thought, and limited on all sides. They were not designed to teach philosophy, science, or human history as such. They were not designed to furnish an infallible system of speculative theology. They are written in human languages, whose words, inflections, constructions, and idioms bear everywhere indelible traces of human error. The record itself furnishes evidence that the writers were in large measure dependent for their knowledge upon sources and methods in themselves fallible; and that their personal knowledge and judgments were in many matters hesitating and defective, or even wrong. Nevertheless, the historical faith of the Church has always been, that all the affirmations of Scripture of all kinds, whether of spiritual doctrine or duty, or of physical or historical fact, or of psychological or philosophical principle, are without any error, when the *ipsissima verba* of the original autographs are ascertained and interpreted in their natural and intended sense. There is a vast difference between exactness of statement, which includes an exhaustive rendering of details, an absolute literalness, which the Scriptures never profess, and accuracy, on the other hand, which secures a correct statement of facts or principles intended to be affirmed. It is this accuracy, and this alone, as distinct from exactness, which the Church doctrine maintains of every affirmation in the original text of Scripture without exception. Every statement accurately corresponds to truth just as far forth as affirmed.

PROOF OF THE DOCTRINE.

We, of course, do not propose to exhibit this evidence in this article. We wish merely to refresh the memory of our readers with respect to its copiousness, variety, and cogency.

1st. The New Testament writers continually assert of the Scriptures of the Old Testament, and of the several books which constitute it, that they ARE THE WORD OF GOD. What their writers said God said. Christ sent out the apostles with the promise of the Holy Ghost, and declared that in hearing them men would hear Him. The apostles themselves claimed to speak as the prophets of God, and with plenary authority in His name binding all consciences. And while they did so, God indorsed their teaching *and their claims* with signs and wonders and divers miracles! These claims are a universal and inseparable characteristic of every part of Scripture.

2d. Although composed by different human authors on various subjects and occasions, under all possible varieties of providential conditions, in two languages, through sixteen centuries of time, yet they evidently constitute one system, all their parts minutely correlated, the whole unfolding a single purpose, and thus giving indubitable evidence of the controlling presence of a divine intelligence from first to last.

3d. It is true that the Scriptures were not designed to teach philosophy, science, or ethnology, or human history as such, and therefore they are not to be studied primarily as sources of information on these subjects. Yet all these elements are unavoidably incidentally involved in the statements of Scripture. Many of these, because of defective knowledge or interpretation upon our part, present points of apparent confusion or error. Yet the outstanding fact is that the general conformableness of the sacred books to modern knowledge in all these departments is purely miraculous. If these books, which originated in an obscure province of the ancient world, be compared with the most enlightened cosmogonies, or philosophies, or histories of the same or immediately subsequent centuries, their comparative freedom, even from apparent error, is amazing. Who prevented the sacred writers from falling into the wholesale and radical mistakes which were necessarily incidental to their position as mere men? The fact that at this date scientists of the rank of Faraday and Henry, of Dana, of Guyot, and Dawson maintain that there is no real conflict between the really ascertained facts of science, and the first two chapters of Genesis rightly interpreted, of itself demonstrates that a supernatural intelligence must have

directed the writing of those chapters. This, of course, proves that the scientific element of Scripture, as well as the doctrinal, was within the scope of Inspiration. And this argument is every day acquiring greater force from the results of the critical study of Scripture, and from advanced knowledge in every department of history and science, which continually tend to solve difficulties and to lessen the number of apparent discrepancies.

4th. The moral and spiritual character of the revelation which the Scriptures convey of God, of the Person of Christ, of the Plan of Redemption, and of the law of absolute righteousness, and the power which the very words of the Record, as well as the truths they express, have exercised over the noblest men, and over nations and races for centuries; this is the characteristic self-demonstration of the Word of God, and has sufficed to maintain the unabated catholicity of the strict doctrine of Inspiration through all changes of time and in spite of all opposition.

5th. This doctrine of the Inspiration of Scripture, in all its elements and parts, has always been the doctrine of the Church. Dr. Westcott has proved this by a copious catena of quotations from Ante-Nicene Fathers in Appendix B to his *Introduction to the Study of the Gospels*. He quotes *Clement Romanus* as saying that the Scriptures are "the true utterances of the Holy Ghost." He quotes *Tertullian* as saying that these books are "the writings, and the words of God," and *Cyprian* as saying that the "Gospel cannot stand in part and fall in part," and *Clement of Alexandria*, to the effect that the foundations of our faith "we have received from God through the Scriptures," of which not one tittle shall pass away without being accomplished; "for the mouth of the Lord the Holy Spirit spake it." Dr. Westcott quotes Origen as teaching that the Scriptures are without error, since "they were accurately written by the co-operation of the Holy Ghost," and that the words of Paul are the words of God.

The Roman Church (Can. Conc. Trid., Sess. iv.) says "God is the author of both" Testaments. The second Helvetic Confession represents the whole Protestant Reformation in saying (ch. i.): "The canonical Scriptures are the true Word of God," for "God continues to speak to us through the

Holy Scriptures." The Westminster Confession says: "It pleased the Lord at sundry times and in divers manners to reveal Himself and to declare His will unto His Church, and afterwards . . . to commit the same wholly unto writing." It declares that the Scriptures are in such a sense given by inspiration, that they possess a divine authority, and that "God is their author," and they "are the WORD OF GOD."

It is not questionable that the great historic Churches have held these creed definitions in the sense of affirming the errorless infallibility of the Word. This is everywhere shown by the way in which all the great bodies of Protestant theologians have handled Scripture in their commentaries, systems of theology, catechisms, and sermons. And this has always been pre-eminently characteristic of epochs and agents of reformation and revival. All the great world-moving men, as Luther, Calvin, Knox, Wesley, Whitefield, and Chalmers, and proportionally those most like them, have so handled the Divine Word. Even if the more lax doctrine has the suffrage of many scholars, or even if it be true, it is nevertheless certain that hitherto in nineteen centuries it has never been held by men who also possessed the secret of using the Word of God like a hammer or like a fire.

LEGITIMATE PRESUMPTIONS.

In testing this question by a critical investigation of the phenomena of Scripture, it is evident that the stricter view, which denies the existence of errors, discrepancies, or inaccurate statements in Scripture, has the presumption in its favour, and that the *onus probandi* rests upon the advocates of the other view. The latter may fairly be required to furnish positive and conclusive evidence in each alleged instance of error, until the presumption has been turned over to the other side. The *prima facie* evidence of the claims of Scripture is assuredly all in favour of an errorless infallibility of all Scriptural affirmations. This has been from the first the general faith of the historical Church, and of the Bible-loving, spiritual people of God. The very letter of the Word has been proved from ancient times to be a tremendous power in human life.

It is a question also of infinite importance. If the new

views are untrue, they threaten not only to shake the confidence of men in the Scriptures, but the very Scriptures themselves as an objective ground of faith. We have seen that the Holy Spirit has, as a matter of fact, preserved the sacred writers to a degree unparalleled elsewhere in literature from error in the departments of philosophy and science. Who then shall determine the limit of that preserving influence? We have seen that in God's plan, doctrine grows out of history, and that redemption itself was wrought out in human history. If, then, the Inspiration of the sacred writers did not embrace the department of history, or only of sacred and not of profane history, who shall set the limit and define what is of the essence of faith, and what the uncertain accident? It would assuredly appear that as no organism can be stronger than its weakest part, that if error be found in any one element, or in any class of statements, certainty as to any portion could rise no higher than belongs to that exercise of human reason to which it will be left to discriminate the infallible from the fallible.

The critical investigation must be made, and we must abide by the result when it is unquestionably reached. But surely it must be carried on with infinite humility and teachableness, and with prayer for the constant guidance of the gracious Spirit. The signs of success will never be presumption, an evident sense of intellectual superiority, or want of sympathy with the spiritual Church of all ages, or with the painful confusion of God's humble people of the present.

With these presumptions, and in this spirit, (1) Let it be proved that each alleged discrepant statement certainly occurred in the original autograph of the sacred book in which it is said to be found. (2) Let it be proved that the interpretation which occasions the apparent discrepancy is the one which the passage was evidently intended to bear. It is not sufficient to show a difficulty which may spring out of our defective knowledge of the circumstances. The true meaning must be definitely and certainly ascertained, and then shown to be irreconcilable with other known truth. (3) Let it be proved that the true sense of some part of the original autograph is directly and necessarily inconsistent with some certainly known fact of history, or truth of science, or some other statement of Scripture certainly ascer-

tained and interpreted. We believe that it can be shown that this has never yet been successfully done in the case of one single alleged instance of error in the WORD OF GOD.

CRITICAL OBJECTIONS TRIED.

It remains only to consider more in detail some of the special objections which have been put forward against this doctrine in the name of Criticism. It cannot be indeed demanded that every one urged should be examined and met. But it may be justly expected that the chief classes of relevant objections should be briefly touched upon. This, fortunately, is no illimitable task. There are, as already stated, two main presuppositions lying at the base of the doctrine, essential to its integrity; while to them it adds one essential supposition. The presuppositions are: 1. The possibility of supernatural interference, and the actual occurrence of that interference in the origin of our Bible; and, 2. The authenticity, genuineness, and historical credibility of the records included in our Bible. The added supposition is: 3. The truth to fact of every statement in the Scriptures. No objection from the side of criticism is relevant unless it traverses some one of these three points. The traditional view of the age and authorship of a document or of the meaning of a statement may be traversed, and yet no conflict arise with the doctrine of a strict inspiration. But Criticism cannot reach results inconsistent with the genuineness and authenticity of a document judged according to the professions of that document or the statements or implications of any other part of Scripture, or incompatible with the truth of any passage in the sense of that passage arrived at by the correct application of the sound principles of historico-grammatical exegesis, without thereby arraying herself in direct opposition to the Church doctrine of Inspiration. All objections to that doctrine based on such asserted results of Criticism are undoubtedly relevant. Our duty is, therefore, to ask what results of Criticism are claimed which traverse some one of the three assertions: of a supernatural origin for the Scriptures; of genuineness and authenticity for its books; and of absolute freedom from error of its statements.

I. THE AUTHENTICITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE BOOKS OF THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS, AS THEY HAVE COME DOWN TO US.

The first point for us to examine would naturally be the bearing upon the Church doctrine of Inspiration of the various modern critical theories concerning the origin and present integrity of the several books of the Old and New Testaments. This is at present the most momentous question which agitates the believing world. The critical examination of all the most intimate phenomena of the text of Scripture is an obvious duty, and its results, when humility, docility, and spiritual insight are added to competent learning and broad intelligence, must be eminently beneficial. It is obvious, however, that this department of the subject could not be adequately discussed in this paper. It is consequently postponed to the near future, when it is intended that the whole subject shall be presented as fully as possible.

In the meantime, the present writers, while they admit freely that the traditional belief as to the dates and origin of the several books may be brought into question without involving any doubt as to their inspiration, yet confidently affirm that any theories of the origin or authorship of any book of either Testament which ascribe to them a purely naturalistic genesis, or dates or authors inconsistent with either their own natural claims or the assertions of other Scripture, are plainly inconsistent with the doctrine of Inspiration taught by the Church. Nor have they any embarrassment in the face of these theories, seeing that they believe them to rest on no better basis than an over acute criticism overreaching itself and building on fancies. Here they must content themselves with reference to the various critical discussions of these theories which have poured from the press for detailed refutation of them. With this refutation in mind, they simply assert their conviction that none of the claims or assertions of the Scriptures as to the authenticity of a single book of either Testament has hitherto been disproved.

II. DETAILED ACCURACY OF STATEMENT.

We are next confronted with objections meant to traverse the third of our preliminary statements, consisting of bold

assertions that, whatever may have been their origin, our Scriptures do exhibit phenomena of inaccuracy, that mistakes are found in them, errors committed by them, untrue statements ventured. Nor is this charge put forward only by opponents of Revelation; a Van Oosterzee, as well as "a Tholuck, a Neander, a Lange, a Stier," admits "errors and inaccuracies in matters of subordinate importance."¹ It is plain, however, that if the Scriptures do fail in truth in their statements of whatever kind, the doctrine of Inspiration which has been defended in this paper cannot stand. But, so long as the principles of historico-grammatical exegesis are relied on to determine the meaning of Scripture, it is impossible to escape the fact that the Bible claims to be thus inspired. And thus, it is not a rare thing to find the very theologians who themselves cannot believe in a strict inspiration, yet admitting*that the Scripture writers believed in it.² We cannot, therefore, occupy the ground on which these great and worthy men seem to us so precariously to stand. A proved error in Scripture contradicts not only our doctrine, but the Scripture claims, and, therefore, its inspiration in making those claims. It is, therefore, of vital importance to ask: Can phenomena of error and untruth be pointed out?

There is certainly no dearth of "instances" confidently put forward. But it is abundantly plain that the vast majority of them are irrelevant. We must begin any discussion of them, therefore, by reasserting certain simple propositions, the result of which will be to clear the ground of all irrelevant objections. It is to be remembered, then, that—1. We do not assert that the common text, but only that the original autographic text, was inspired. No "error" can be asserted, therefore, which cannot be proved to have been aboriginal in the text. 2. We

¹ See Van Oosterzee's *Dogmatics*, p. 205.

² Thus *Tholuck*: "Yet his [the author of Heb.] application of the Old Testament rests on the strictest view of inspiration, since passages where God is not the speaker are cited as words of God or of the Holy Ghost (i. 6, 7, 8; iv. 4, 7; vii. 21; iii. 7; x. 15)."—*Old Testament in the New*, in *Bibliotheca Sacra*, xi. p. 612. So also *Richard Rothe*: "It is clear, then, that the orthodox theory [i.e. the very strictest] of inspiration is countenanced by the authors of the New Testament." So also, *Canon Farrar*: "He [Paul] shared, doubtless, in the views of the later Jewish schools—the Tanaim and Amoraim—on the nature of inspiration. These views . . . made the words of Scripture co-extensive and identical with the words of God."—*Life of Paul*, vol. ii. p. 47.

do not deny an everywhere-present human element in the Scriptures. No mark of the effect of this human element therefore—in style of thought or wording—can be urged against inspiration, unless it can be shown to result in untruth.

3. We do not erect inspiration into an end, but hold it to be simply a means to an end, viz., the accurate conveyance of truth. No objection, therefore, is valid against the form in which the truth is expressed, so long as it is admitted that that form conveys the truth.

4. We do not suppose that inspiration made a writer false to his professed purpose; but rather that it kept him infallibly true to it. No objection is valid, therefore, which overlooks the prime question: What was the professed or implied purpose of the writer in making this statement? These few, simple, and very obvious remarks set aside the vast majority of the customary objections. The first throws out of court numbers of inaccuracies in the Old and New Testaments as either certainly or probably not parts of the original text, and therefore not fit evidence in the case. The second performs the same service for a still greater number, which amount simply to the discovery of individual traits, modes of thought or expression, or forms of argumentation in the writings of the several authors of the Biblical books. The third sets aside a vast multitude, drawn from pressure of language, misreading of figures, resurrection of the primary sense of idioms, etc., in utter forgetfulness of the fact that no one claims that inspiration secured the use of good Greek in Attic severity of taste, free from the exaggerations and looseness of current speech, but only that it secured the accurate expression of truth, even (if you will) through the medium of the worst Greek a fisherman of Galilee could write, and the most startling figures of speech a peasant could invent. Exegesis must be historical as well as grammatical, and must always seek the meaning *intended*, not any meaning that can be tortured out of a passage. The fourth in like manner destroys the force of every objection which is tacitly founded on the idea that partial and incomplete statements cannot be inspired, no documents can be quoted except *verbatim*, no conversations reported unless at length, etc., and which thus denies the right of an author to speak to the present purpose only, appeal to the sense (not wording) of a document, give

abstracts of discourses, and apply, by a true exegesis, the words of a previous writer to the present need. The sum of the whole matter is simply this: no phenomenon can be validly urged against verbal inspiration which, found out of Scripture, would not be a valid argument against the truth of the writing. Inspiration securing no more than this—*truth*, simple truth—no phenomenon can be urged against verbal inspiration which cannot be proved to involve *an indisputable error*.

It is not to be denied that such phenomena are asserted to be discoverable in the Scriptures. Is the assertion capable of being supported by facts? That is the only question now before us. And it thus becomes our duty to examine some samples of the chief classes of facts usually appealed to. These samples—which will, moreover, all be chosen from the New Testament, and all at the suggestion of opponents—must serve our present needs.

HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL ACCURACY.

1. It is asserted that the Scripture writers are inaccurate in their statements of historical and geographical facts, as exhibited by the divergence existing between their statements and the information we derive from other sources, such as profane writers and monuments. When we ask for the proofs of this assertion, however, they are found to be very difficult to produce. A generation or two ago this was not so much the case; but the progress of our knowledge of the times, and the geography of the region in which our sacred books were written, has been gradually wiping out the "proofs," one by one, until they are at this day non-existent. The chief (and almost the only) historical errors still asserted to exist in the New Testament, are, the "fifteenth year of Tiberias," of Luke iii. 1, the enrolment during Cyrenius's governorship of Luke ii. 2, and the revolt of Theudas of Acts v. 36. It is not denied that these statements present difficulties, but it is humbly suggested that that is hardly synonymous with saying that they are proved mistakes. If Herod died in the spring of A.U.C. 750 (which seems well-nigh certain), and if, in Luke iii. 23, the "about" be deemed not broad enough to cover two years (which is fairly probable), and if Luke iii. 1 means to

date John's first appearance (as again seems probable), and *if* no more than six months intervened between John's and Jesus' public appearance (which still again seems probable),—then it is admitted that “the fifteenth year of Tiberias” must be a mistake, *provided that, still further*, we must count his years from the beginning of his sole reign, and not from his co-regnancy with Augustus; in favour of which latter mode of counting much has been, and more can be, urged. Surely this is not a very clear case of indubitable error with its *five ifs* staring us in the face. Again, *if* the Theudas mentioned in Acts is necessarily the same as the Theudas mentioned by Josephus, then Luke and Josephus do seem to be in disaccord as to the time of his revolt; and *if* Josephus can be shown to be in general a more accurate historian than Luke, then his account must be preferred. But neither of these *ifs* is true. Josephus is the less accurate historian, as is easily proved; and there are good reasons—convincing to a critic like Winer, and a Jew like Jost, neither certainly affected by apologetical bias—to suppose that Acts and Josephus mention different revolts. Where then is the contradiction?

The greatest reliance is, however, placed on the third case adduced—the statement of Luke that Jesus was born at the time of a world enrolment, which was carried out in Syria during the governorship of Cyrenius. Weiss¹ offers three reasons why Luke is certainly incorrect here, which Schürer² increases to five facts, viz., 1. History knows nothing of a general empire census in the time of Augustus. 2. A Roman census would not force Joseph to go to Bethlehem, nor Mary to go with him. 3. Nor could it have taken place in Palestine in the time of Herod. 4. Josephus knows nothing of such a census, but, on the contrary, speaks of that of Acts v. 37 as something new and unheard-of; and, 5. Quirinius was not governor of Syria during Herod's life. This has a formidable look, but each detail has been more than fully met. Thus, 1 turns wholly upon an *argumentum e silentio*, always precarious enough, and here quadruply so, seeing that (1). An empire census is just such a thing as Roman historians would be likely to omit all mention of, just as Spatian fails

¹ Meyer's *Markus und Lukas*, p. 286. (Ed. 6.)

² *N. T. Zeitgeschichte*, pp. 268-286.

to mention in his life of Hadrian the famous rescript of that monarch, and all contemporary history is silent as to Augustus's geometrical survey. (2) We have no detailed contemporary history of this time, the inaccurate and gossiping Suetonius and Josephus being our only sources of information. (3) Certain oft-quoted passages in Tacitus and Suetonius acquaint us with facts, which absolutely require such a census at their base. And (4), we have direct, though not contemporary, historical proof that such a census was taken, in statements of Cassiodorus and Suidas. Objection 2 gains all its apparent force from a *confusio verborum*. Luke does not represent this as a Roman census in the sense that it was taken up after Roman methods, but only in the sense that it was ordered ultimately by Roman authority. Nor does he represent Mary as being forced to go to Bethlehem with Joseph; her own choice, doubtless, determined her journey. The same *confusio verborum* follows us into objection 3. It may be improbable that Herod should have been so far set aside that a census should have been taken up in his dominions after Roman methods, and by Roman officials; but is it so improbable that he should be ordered to take, himself, a census after his own methods and by his own officials? Josephus can give us the answer.¹ Whatever may have been Herod's official title, whether *rex socius*, or, as seems more probable (one stage lower), *rex amicus Caesaris*, it is certain that he felt bound to bow to the Emperor's every whisper; so that if Augustus desired statistics as to the *regna* (and Tacitus proves he did), Herod would be forced to furnish them for his *regnum*. Objection 4 again is easily laid: Josephus not only mentions nothing he could escape which exhibited Jewish subjection, but actually passes over the decade 750-760 so slightly that he can hardly be said to have left us a history of that time. That he speaks of the later census of Acts v. 37, as something new, is most natural, seeing that it was, as carried on by the Roman officials, and after Roman methods, not only absolutely new, and a most important event in itself, but, moreover, was fraught with such historical consequences that it could not be passed over in

¹ Cf. *Ant.* xv. 10. 4; xvi. 2. 5; 4. 1; 9. 3; xvii. 2, 1; 2. 4; 5. 8; 11. 4, etc., for Herod's status.

silence. Objection 5 is the most important and difficult—but not, therefore, insuperable. It states, indeed, a truth: Quirinius was not governor of Syria until after Herod's death. But it must be noted, on the one hand, that Zumpt has proved almost, if not quite, to demonstration, that Quirinius was twice governor of Syria, the first time beginning within six months after Herod's death; and, on the other, that Luke does not say that Christ was born while Cyrenius was governor of Syria. What Luke says is, that Christ was born during the progress of a census; and then defines the census as the first which was carried on when Cyrenius was governor of Syria. If this census was begun under Varus and finished under Quirinius, Christ may have been born, according to Luke, at any time during the progress of this census. This, because Luke ii. 2 is not given to define the time of Christ's birth, but to more narrowly describe what census it was, which had, in verse 1, been used to define the time of Christ's birth.¹ Thus, doubtless, it is true that Christ was born under Varus, and yet during the course of the first Quirinian census; and thus Schürer's fifth objection goes the way of all the others.

The wonderful accuracy of the New Testament writers in all, even the most minute and incidental details of their historical notices, cannot, however, be made even faintly apparent by a simple answering of objections. Some sort of glance over the field as a whole is necessary to any appreciation of it. There are mentioned in the New Testament some thirty names—Emperors, members of the family of Herod, High-priests, Rabbis, Roman Governors, Princes, Jewish leaders—some mention of which might be looked for in contemporary history or on contemporary monuments.² All but two of

¹ Take an example: If one should say of any event, that it occurred during our war with Great Britain, and then add, I mean that war wherein Jackson fought, would he necessarily refer to an event *late* in the war, after Jackson came to the front? Not so, because *the war alone* defines the time of the event; and Jackson only *which* war. So in Luke, *the census alone* defines the time of Christ's birth; and Quirinius only *which* census. It ought to be added that there are at least three other methods of explaining Luke's words, all possible, and none very improbable, on the supposition of any one of which conflict with history is impossible.

² These are: Augustus, Tiberius, Claudius—Herod Antipas, the two Philips, Archelaus, Agrippa I., Agrippa II., Herodias, Herodias' daughter, Berenice, Drusilla,—Annas, Caiaphas, Ananias,—Gamaliel,—Quirinius, Pilate, Felix, Festus, Gallio, Sergius Paulus—Aretas, (Candace), Lyzanias,—[Theudas], Judas of Galilee, [Barabbas]. Candace seems to represent a hereditary title,

these—and they the insignificant Jewish rebels Theudas and Barabbas—are actually mentioned; and the New Testament notices are found, on comparison, to be absolutely accurate in every, even the most minute, detail. Every one of their statements has not indeed passed without challenge, but challenge has always meant triumphant vindication. Some examples of what is here meant have been given already; others may be added in a note for their instructiveness.¹ Now, the period of which these writers treat is absolutely the most difficult historical period in which to be accurate that the world has ever seen. Nothing was fixed or stable; vacillation, change, was everywhere. The province which was senatorial to-day was imperial to-morrow,—the boundaries that were fixed to-day were altered to-morrow. That these writers were thus accurate in a period and land wherein Tacitus failed to attain complete accuracy means much.

We reach the same conclusion if we ask after their geographical accuracy. In no single case have they slipped here either; and what this means may be estimated by noting what a mass of geographical detail has been given us.² Between forty and fifty names of countries can be counted in the New Testament pages; every one is accurately named and placed. About the same number of foreign cities are named, and all equally accurately. Still more to the purpose, thirty-six Syrian and Palestinian towns are named,³ the great majority

not a personal name; Theudas and Barabbas are not named in profane sources. Cf. the (incomplete) list and fine remarks of Rawlinson (*Hist. Evidences*, Boston, 1873, p. 195 sq.)

¹ It was long boldly asserted that Luke was in error in making Lysanias a contemporary tetrarch with the Herodian rulers. But it is now admitted that Josephus mentions an earlier and a later Lysanias, and so corroborates Luke; and inscriptions also have been brought forward which supervindicate Luke's accuracy; so that even M. Renan admits it. Again, it was long contended that Luke had inaccurately assigned a proconsul to Cyprus; but this was soon set aside by a reference to Cyprian coins of Claudius' time and to Dio Cassius, liv. 4; and now Mr. Ceanola publishes an inscription which mentions the veritable proconsul Paulus whom Luke mentioned. —(Cyprus, p. 425.) So with reference to the titles of the rulers of Achaia, Philippi, Ephesus, etc, see, in general, Lee on Inspiration, p. 364, note 2.

² Compare the efforts of a real forger with the accuracy of these autotypic writers, e.g. of Prochorus, as given in Zahn's *Acta Joannis*, p. lii. Only nine real places can be found in a long list of geographical names, invented for the need. Thus, to the little Patmos a number of cities and villages is ascribed which would require a Sicily or Cyprus to furnish ground to stand on.

³ These names are:—*Enon, *Antipatris, †Arimathea, *Azotus, *Bethany, †Bethany beyond Jordan, *Bethlehem, †Bethphage, §Bethsaida, §Cana,

of which have been identified, and wherever testing is possible the most minute accuracy emerges. Whether due to inspiration or not, this unvarying accuracy of statement is certainly consistent with the strictest doctrine of Inspiration.

COMPLETE INTERNAL HARMONY.

2. Another favourite charge made against these writers is, they are often hopelessly inconsistent with one another in their statements, and this charge of disharmony has sometimes been pushed so far as to make it do duty even against their historical credibility. But when we begin to examine the instances brought forward in support of it, they are found to be cases of *difficult*, not of *impossible*, harmony. And it is abundantly plain that it must be shown to be *impossible* to harmonise any two statements on any natural supposition, before they can be asserted to be inconsistent. This is a recognised principle of historical investigation, and it is the only reasonable principle possible, unless we are prepared to assert that the two statements necessarily contain all the facts of the case and exclude the possibility of the harmonising supposition. Having our eyes upon this principle, it is not rash to declare that no disharmony has ever been proved between any two statements of the New Testament. The best examples to illustrate the character of the attempts made to exhibit disharmony, and the rocks on which these attempts always break, are probably those five striking cases on which Dr. Fisher most wisely rests his charge against the complete harmony of the four Evangelists, viz. :—the alleged disharmony in the accounts of the place and phraseology of the Sermon on the Mount, the healing of the centurion's son, the denials of Peter, the healing of the blind man at Jericho, and the time of the institution of the Lord's Supper.¹ But that in each of these, most natural means of harmonising exist, are even in some instances recog-

§Capernaum, *Cæsarea, *Cæsarea Philippi, *Chorazin, ||Dalmanutha, *Damascus, †Emmaus, *Ephraim, *Gadara, *Gaza, §Gerasa, *Jericho, *Jerusalem, *Joppa, †Jouda, †Kerioth, *Lydda, *Magdala, *Nain, *Nazareth, *Salim, *Seleucia, *Sychar, *Tiberias, *Tyre. These marked * are pretty certainly identified; those †, with great probability; those §, with a choice between the two places; and those ||, as to their neighbourhood. There are, besides, some names quoted from the Old Testament, e.g. ||Gomorrhah, *Rama, *Sarepta, *Shechem, ||Sodom. Also some other geographical names, e.g. *The brook Kedron, *Jordan, the Mount of Olives, and *the Sea of Galilee, etc.

¹ *Beginnings of Christianity*, p. 460 seq.

nized as possible by Dr. Fisher himself, President Bartlett has lately so fully shown in detail,¹ that we cannot bring ourselves to repeat the oft-told tale here. Take one or two other examples: for instance, look at that famous case alleged in the specification of the *hour* in John xix. 14 and Mark xv. 25. The difficulty here, says Dean Alford, is insuperable; and with him Meyer *et al.* agree. But even Strauss admits that it would be cancelled, "if it were possible to prove that the fourth Gospel proceeds upon another mode of reckoning time than that used by the synoptics." And that it is possible to prove this very thing any one can satisfy himself by noting the four places where John mentions the hour (i. 39, iv. 6, 52, xix. 14); whence it emerges that John reckons his hours according to the method prevalent in Asia Minor,² from midnight, and not from daybreak. Thus all difficulty vanishes.³ The disharmony claimed to exist between Matt. xxvii. 6-8 and Acts i. 18, 19, is also voided by a naïve kind of admission; Dean Alford, for instance, asserting in one breath that no reconciliation can be found consistent with common honesty, and in the next admitting that the natural supposition by which the passages are harmonised is, "of course, possible." This admission, on the recognised principles of historical criticism, amounts simply to a confession that no disharmony ought to be asserted in the case.

Perhaps, however, the two most important and far-reaching instances of disharmony alleged of late years are: that asserted between the narratives of the events preceding, accompanying, and following the birth of our Lord given by Matthew and Luke, which is said to prove the historical untrustworthiness of *both* (!) narratives; and that asserted between the accounts of Paul's visits to Jerusalem and his relations to the twelve in Acts and Galatians, which is said to prove the unhistorical character of Acts. In the brief space at our disposal it is not possible to disprove such wholesale charges in detail. It must

¹ *Princeton Review*, January 1880, p. 47 *seq.*

² That this was the custom in Asia Minor is evident from *Marturium Polyc.* c. 21, etc. Cf. also (in general) Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* ii. 77, and Plutarch, *Quest. Rom.* lxxxiii.

³ Cf. Townson's *Discourses*, discourse 8; McClelland's *N. T.* vol. i. p. 737 *seq.*; Westcott on John, p. 282; Lee on Inspiration, p. 352; where this subject is fully discussed.

suffice, therefore, to point out the lines on which such a refutation proceeds. In the first instance, the charge can be upheld only by the expedient of assuming that silence as to an event constitutes denial of that event, supported by criticisms which tacitly deny a historian's right to give summary accounts of transactions or choose his incidents according to his purpose in writing. Any careful examination of the passages involved will prove not only that they are not inconsistent, but rather mutually supplementary accounts;¹ but also that they actually imply one another, and prove the truth of each other by a series of striking undesigned coincidences.² And when it is

¹ The events recorded by Luke are:—1. Annunciation to Zachariah; 2. Annunciation to Mary (in the sixth month thereafter); 3. Mary's visit to Elisabeth (extending to three months later); 4. Birth of John (after 3); 5. His circumcision (eight days after 4); 6. Journey of Joseph and Mary to Bethlehem ("in those days"); 7. Birth of Jesus (while at Bethlehem); 8. Annunciation to the shepherds (the same day); 9. Visit of the shepherds (hastening); 10. Circumcision of Jesus (eight days after); 11. Presentation (thirty-three days later); 12. Return to Nazareth (when all legal duties were performed). The events recorded by Matthew are:—A. Mary is found with child (before she is taken to Joseph's house); B. Annunciation to Joseph; C. Mary is taken home by Joseph; D. Visit of the Magi (after Jesus' birth at Bethlehem); E. Flight into Egypt (after their departure); F. Slaughter of the innocents (when Herod had discovered that the wise men were gone); G. Death of Herod; H. Return from Egypt to Nazareth (after Herod's death). These events dovetail beautifully into one another as follows:—1, 2, 3, 4, 5, A, B, C, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, D [12, (E, F, G, H)]. It is only necessary to assume that 12 includes E, F, G, and H compendiously, and all goes most smoothly. Other arrangements are also possible, e.g. the first half may be varied to 1, 2, A, B, C, 3, 4, 5, 6, or to 1, 2, A, 3, B, C, 4, 5, 6; and the second half to 9, 10, D, 11, [12, —(E, F, G, H)], or even to 9, 10, D, E, F, G, half H, 11, half H—12. In the face of so many possible harmonisations, it certainly cannot be asserted that harmony is impossible.

² Thus the account in the one of the annunciation to Joseph, and that in the other of that to Mary, which are often said to be irreconcilable with one another, actually prove each other's truth. Both assume exactly the same facts at their bases, viz., that Mary conceived a child supernaturally and remained a virgin while becoming a mother. Moreover, if Luke's narrative be true, then something like what Matthew records must have happened, and if Matthew's be true, something like what Luke records must have happened. Two things needed explanation: why Mary was not crazed at finding herself so strangely with child, and how Joseph, being a just man, could have taken her, in that condition, to wife. Luke's narrative explains the first, but leaves the other unexplained; Matthew's explains the second, but leaves the first unexplained. It is admitted that there was no collusion here. How does it happen, then, that the two so imply one another? Again, Matthew does not mention where Jesus' parents lived before his birth; but only states that, after that birth, they intended to live in Bethlehem, and, after having been deterred from that, chose Nazareth. Now, why this strange choice? Luke, and Luke alone, supplies the reason: Nazareth was their old home. Still again, that Luke calls Mary Joseph's "betrothed" in ii. 5 is not only

added that the choice of the material which each writer has made, can in each incident be shown to have arisen directly out of the purpose of the writer, it may be seen what a load the assertion of disharmony must carry.

The asserted contradiction between Acts and Galatians is already crumbling of its own weight. Thus Keim, certainly no very "apologetic" critic, has shown very clearly that the passage in Galatians has suffered much *eis-egesis* in order to make out the disharmony,¹ and sober criticism will judge that even he has done inadequate justice to the subject. We cannot enter into details in so broad a question; it will be sufficient, however, to call attention to the fact that no disharmony can be made out unless: (1) Violence be done to the context in Galatians; where Paul professes to be giving an exhaustive account, *not* of his visits to Jerusalem, *but* of his opportunities to learn from the apostles. Any visit undertaken at such a time as to furnish no such opportunity (and Acts xii. was such) ought therefore to have been omitted. (2) Convenient forgetfulness be exercised of the fact, that while the context shows that Paul uses "apostles" in the narrow sense in Gal. i. 19, yet this is not true of Acts ix. 27; but, as Luke's usage shows, the contrary may very well be true (Acts xiv. 4, 14). So that it is in no sense inconsistent for Paul to say that he saw but one apostle, and Luke that he saw several. (3) Misunderstanding be fallen into as to the nature of the "decree" of Acts xv. 20, and its binding force to churches not yet formed and not parties to the compromise. (4.) Misrepresentation be ventured as to the testimony of Galatians as to Paul's relations to the twelve; which Paul represents to have been most pleasant (Gal. ii. 3, 7-10), but which are made out to have been unpleasant through misinterpretation of phrases in Gal. ii. 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, etc. (5) Incredible pressure of the detailed language of both Galatians and Acts be indulged in. (6) And, finally, a tacit denial be made of the possibility of truth subsisting through differences in choice of incidents arising from the diverse points of view of the two writers. In other words, an unbiassed comparison of the two

remarkable, but totally inexplicable from Luke; we can only understand it when we revert to Matt. i. 25 and the preceding verses. These are but samples.

¹ In *Aus der Urchristenthum* (1878).

accounts brings out forcibly the fact that there is no disharmony between them at all. Taking these examples as samples (and they are certainly fair samples), it is as clear as daylight that no single case has as yet been adduced where disharmony is a necessary conclusion. Therefore, all charges from this side fall to the ground.

CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

3. Another favourite charge against the exact truth of the New Testament Scriptures is drawn from the use of the Old Testament in the New, and especially the phenomena of its quotation. Here also, however, most of the objections urged prove nothing but a radical lack of clear thinking on the part of those who bring them. For instance, Dr. Davidson argues¹ that the verbal variation which the New Testament writers allow themselves in quoting the Old Testament is conclusive against verbal inspiration, for "the terms and phrases of the Old Testament, if literally inspired, were the best that could have been adopted," and, therefore, the New Testament writers "should have adhered to the *ipsissima verba* of the Holy Spirit (seeing they were the best) as closely as the genius of the Hebrew and Greek languages allowed." Here, however, a false view of inspiration is presupposed, and also a false view of the nature and laws of quotation. Inspiration does not suppose that the words and phrases written under its influence are the best possible to express the truth, but only that they are an adequate expression of the truth. Other words and phrases might be equally adequate;—might furnish a clearer, more exact, and therefore better expression, especially of those truths which were subordinate or incidental for the original purpose of the writing. Nor is quotation to be confounded with translation. It does not, like it, profess to give as exact a representation of the original, in *all* its aspects and on *every* side, as possible; but only to give a true account of its teaching in *one* of its bearings. There is thus always an element of application in quotation; and it is, therefore, proper in quotation to so alter the form of the original as to bring out clearly its bearing on the one subject in hand, thus throwing the

¹ *Hermeneutics*, p. 513.

stress on the element in it for which it is cited. This would be improper in a translation. The laws which ought to govern quotation seem, indeed, to have been very inadequately investigated by those who plead the New Testament methods of quotation against inspiration. We can pause now only to insist: (1) That quotation, being essentially different from translation, any amount of deviation from the original *in form*, is thoroughly allowable, so long as the sense of the original is adhered to; provided only that the quoter is not professing to give the exact form. (2) That any adaptation of the original to the purpose in hand is allowable, so long as it proceeds by a true exegesis, and thus does not falsify the original. (3) That any neglect of the context of the original is allowable so long as the purpose for which the quotation is adduced does not imply the context, and no falsification of sense is involved. In other words, briefly, quotation appeals to the sense, not the wording of a previous document, and appeals to it for a definite and specific end; any dealing with the original is therefore legitimate which does not falsify its sense in the particular aspect needed for the purpose in hand.¹ The only question which is relevant here then, is: Do the New Testament writers so quote the Old Testament as to falsify it?

Many writers who have pleaded the phenomena of the New Testament against verbal inspiration, yet answer this question in the negative. Thus, Mr. Warrington admits that there are "no really inapposite quotations"—"the pertinency of the quotations may be marred by their inaccurate citation, but pertinent, notwithstanding, they always are. In a word, while . . . the letter is often faulty, the spirit is always divinely true."² This is simply to yield the only point in debate. Others, however, of not such clearness of sight, do not scruple to assert that the New Testament writers do deal so loosely with the Old Testament as to fall into actual falsification, and this mainly in two particulars: they quote passages in a sense

¹ Still further: the amount of freedom with which a document is dealt with will be greater in direct proportion to the thoroughness with which it is understood. If a quoter feels doubtful as to his understanding of it he will copy it word for word; if he feels sure he understands it fully and thoroughly he will allow himself great freedom in his use of it; and if he is the author of the original document, still more. If he is conscious of having supernatural aid in understanding it, doubtless the amount of freedom would be greatest of all.

² *Inspiration*, p. 107.

his excellent classification of New Testament quotations as to their form,¹ cites two passages only which can be plausibly asserted to be cases of mistaken ascription, viz., Mark i. 2 and Matthew xxvii. 9, 10. The first of these ought not to present any difficulty. The form of the sentence shows that the actual words of the citation are parenthetical in essence: Mark declares that John came preaching in accordance with a prophecy of Isaiah, and then inserts, parenthetically, the words referred to, adding also a parallel prophecy of Malachi. That he gives more evidence than he promised ought surely to be no objection; it is enough that, having promised a prophecy from Isaiah, he does give it. This is strengthened by the fact that the prophecy quoted from Malachi is actually based on, and largely drawn out of, Isaiah, so that Isaiah is actually the ultimate source of both the prophecies given, and that from Malachi can be rightly looked upon as simply a further explanation of what is essentially Isaiah's. The quotation in Matthew xxvii. 9, 10, on the other hand, does present a difficulty, and is indeed, in whatever aspect it be looked upon, a very puzzling case. It presents the extreme limit of paraphrase of the original, and it is exceedingly difficult to assign all its parts to their proper originals. It is plain, however, that Zech. xi. 13 was strongly colouring the writer's thoughts when he wrote it. Yet he ascribes it to Jeremiah. Here, it is said, is a clear case of erroneous ascription. This judgment, however, takes no account of the exceeding difficulty of ascribing the words actually quoted to Zechariah alone. There seem to be but three ways in which the passage can be plausibly understood, and no one of these implies an error on Matthew's part. We may either (1) understand the words as a very free paraphrase of Zech. xi. 13 and then appeal to the fact that in the Talmudic arrangement Jeremiah stood first in the "book of the prophets," so that "Jeremiah" here stands as general title for the whole book;—with Lightfoot, Scrivener, Cook, Schaff-Riddle, etc.; or (2) take the reference in ver. 9

immediately admitted not to be allegories in the only sense of the word which would be to their disadvantage, i.e. in the sense of an interpretation which treated the literal sense of the words as unimportant, in which sense of the word no allegory occurs in the New Testament. These "allegories" are, some of them, simple illustrations, some *typical* interpretations.

¹ *Gospels in the Second Century*, pp. 16-25.

as intended for Jer. xviii. xix., apart from which passage, indeed, the quotation following cannot be understood, and suppose the quotation itself to be deflected to the words of Zechariah, so that the passage becomes analogous to Mark i. 2, and is meant to call attention to both Jeremiah and Zechariah, —with (in general) Hengstenberg, Hofmann, Thrupp, Fairbairn, etc. ; or (3) we may, with Lange, find the originals of the words in four passages in Genesis, Zechariah, and Jeremiah, the key to the whole being Jeremiah xxxii. 6-8. Whichever of these views may be accepted is of no moment so far as the present question is concerned ; each alike is consistent with the Evangelist's truth, and therefore with his inspiration.

With these examples we must close. It is only necessary to add the caution that the passages dealt with are supposed by Mr. Jowett and Dr. Sanday to be the most striking and difficult ones that could be put to the apologist out of the 278 quotations which the New Testament makes from the Old. It is surely not presumptuous, then, to assert that Mr. Warington's wisdom is apparent, and that it is true that the New Testament quotations always preserve the sense of the Old Testament passages.

And with this, this paper must close. It has been possible, of course, to examine only samples of critical objection. But those that have been examined are samples, and have been selected wholly in the interests of the objection. These laid, therefore, and all are laid. The legitimate proofs of the doctrine, resting primarily on the claims of the sacred writers, having not been rebutted by valid objections, that doctrine stands doubly proved. Gnosis gives place to epignosis—faith to rational conviction—and we rest in the joyful and unshaken certainty that we possess a Bible written by the hands of men indeed, but also graven with the finger of God.

A. A. HODGE

B. B. WARFIELD.

ART. IX.—*Current Literature.*

IT is very doubtful whether Dr. Bruce will have added either to his reputation or his usefulness by his latest book (1). Incidentally there are crisp little sentences of combined literary and theological worth; and, as might have been expected from his previous writings, there are evident marks everywhere of sympathetic appreciation of the difficulties of religious belief at the present critical epoch. Nevertheless we could wish that so sketchy an examination of so great a theme had not sought an audience beyond the limits of the lecture-room where these lectures were delivered. Certainly no opponent can complain of unfairness in the representation of his views, for Mr. Greg and Mr. Matthew Arnold receive more courteous notice than Melancthon and Turretine. Would that our apologetes would remember that in surrendering so many outposts of the Christian faith they are endangering the central citadel itself! Undoubtedly, as Dr. Bruce bids the critic remember, the apologist's task in these days is a delicate one, but courtesy is not compromise, nor is gentleness incompatible with wariness. Dr. Bruce states the purpose of his book to be, to endeavour to form as definite ideas as possible concerning the chief design of revelation, or God's end in making that special manifestation of Himself above the plane of nature, whereof the Bible is the literary record, and to bring the ideas thus formed to bear on past and present controversies. That this task is not superfluous, Dr. Bruce shows by calling attention to some of the erroneous and vitiating notions which have been and are still entertained both by believers and unbelievers, as prominent instances whereof he mentions not only the views of Lessing, Greg, Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, and Matthew Arnold, but also the supernaturalistic views of the great Lutheran and Calvinistic divines, somewhat slightly called by our author Dogmatists. All these err, it is thought, by regarding the

(1) *The Chief End of Revelation*, by Alexander Balmain Bruce, D.D., Professor of Apologetics and New Testament Exegesis, Free Church College, Glasgow. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

chief end of revelation to be exclusively doctrinal (*doctrinaire*, Dr. Bruce says) or practical. If we ask what meaning is attached to *doctrinaire*, the word is defined thus: common to all patrons of theoretical or *doctrinaire* conceptions are these two opinions,—that revelation is identical with the Bible, and that the Bible was given by God to men for the purpose of communicating doctrinal instruction on certain topics of importance; thus the so-called Dogmatist regarded the chief end of revelation to be instruction in Christian doctrine, the Deist regarded it to be instruction upon the three points of Deism, and Lessing regarded it to be general instruction of the reason. Spinoza and Matthew Arnold are selected as exponents of the ethical view, the former of whom taught that the Bible was a handbook of morals, a view substantially adopted by Kant and Fichte, and the latter that the Bible was a revelation of a power in the world not ourselves making for righteousness. These views, whether they regard the chief end of revelation to be doctrine or conduct, Dr. Bruce considers to be insufficient and misleading. His own view is elaborated in his second chapter. First, it is said, revelation is different from the Bible which is its record, and secondly, the chief end of revelation is the manifestation of the God of grace. Mr. Matthew Arnold had said that the Bible is unique because it shows a power not ourselves making for righteousness; Dr. Bruce says that the Bible is unique because it shows a power not ourselves making for mercy. "On thoughtful perusal, the Bible conveys the impression that its contents chiefly relate to *grace*, and that its watchword is *redemption*." In the subsequent lectures Dr. Bruce emphasises that this revelation of grace was a revelation by history, by miracle, and by prophecy, a mode of view which lifts these points of attack of the rationalistic critics into a less vulnerable sphere than they have occupied of late. Now it is not Dr. Bruce's leading principle, of course, to which we object, but his method of advocacy. He raises many more spectres than he lays, and whilst a large-minded, sober, thorough, and scriptural treatment of his great theme would just now be invaluable, he seems to us to fail by the opposite characteristics,—by being suspicious, wayward, superficial, and unscriptural. The chief end of revelation, according to the Scriptures, is conduct through doctrine,

or the production of the wide range of Christian experience and activity, by means of the knowledge of the wide range of Christian truth. To our mind this work is a hasty attempt to apply the great method of Schleiermacher, so fertile in Dogmatics, to Apologetics, an application which Schleiermacher was too keen-witted and logical to make.

The motive of this brochure of Dr. Nicolson's (2) is to show the utility of judging of the Greek of the New Testament by a purely classical standard. Believing that much vagueness and uncertainty is introduced into renderings of the New Testament, upon the supposition of the great difference in idiom and structure between Hellenistic and Classical Greek, an illustration is here given of the light which may be thrown upon numerous passages mistranslated in the Authorised Version by adhering closely to classical grammatical rules. It is needless to say that the numerous examples given are of singular interest, and the intention of the Revisers of the New Testament to adhere closely to the significance of the tenses of the original must have been strengthened by Dr. Nicolson's researches. It remains true, however, that a knowledge of Hebrew is also of considerable value in the comprehension of many a turn of phrase in the Greek New Testament, and that whilst a knowledge of the laws of classical Greek is invaluable to the exegete, a knowledge of the laws of the ancient Semitic languages is no less invaluable. Still we thank Dr. Nicolson for his labour, and shall be glad to see his promised Grammar of the New Testament.

We are glad to find that Professor Bruce's valuable treatise on the "Humiliation of Christ" has reached a second edition (3). A new lecture has been added on "Modern Humanistic Theories of Christ's Person," completing the original design. This lecture admirably describes these theories, and satisfactorily disposes of them. Incidentally

(2) *Classical Revision of the Greek New Testament tested and applied on uniform principles, with suggested alterations of the English Version.* By W. Millar Nicolson, M.A., D.Sc. Williams and Norgate.

(3) *The Humiliation of Christ.* Sixth Series of Cunningham Lectures. Second edition, revised and enlarged, by A. B. Bruce, D.D. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

there is a severe but just discussion of what Dr. Bruce calls "nondescript eclectic naturalism," a form of thought, or rather no-thought, by no means uncommon at the present time in England.

Dr. Sexton has had peculiar opportunities for reaching a full and familiar acquaintance with current sceptical theories; and in *Theistic Problems* (4) he endeavours to counteract these theories by Christian affirmations. Beginning with an exposure of the folly of Atheism, and a short though suggestive estimate of Agnosticism, he proceeds to construct an argument, of some interest and freshness, on the facts of Providence, Worship, and Mediation.

Dr. Wainwright's volume (5), though also apologetic, is written with a different purpose, and bears quite another character. He makes bold and vigorous attacks on the scientific pretensions of the more prominent modern assailants of Christian faith. We have long been convinced that most effective service can be rendered in this direction. There is not much original argument in this volume; nevertheless it is worthy of special commendation as an excellent *résumé* of the most searching and successful criticism that some scientists have challenged and compelled by their rash efforts to undermine Christian truth. The worthlessness of the Evolution theory as an argument against Christianity is forcibly shown by the confessions of its own weakness and lack of proof which are plentifully found in the writings of its most earnest advocates. Indeed, without expressing any opinion on the value of this theory, we are warranted in saying that it would long ago have vanished from this controversy were it not for the unabashed and unblushing assertiveness of certain writers who believe that it is the only available weapon against teleology. No one can read this book without being convinced that in this matter at least Christian apologists have silenced (not the boastings but) the argument of their opponents.

(4) *Theistic Problems*, by George Sexton, M.A., LL.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

(5) *Scientific Sophisms*, by Samuel Wainwright, D.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

opportunities for
current sepa-
rations to come
Beginning with
short thought
constructive
the facts of the

b also spoke
hears quite
ous state
it modern
continued to
direction -
; however
lent was
it and so
different
of the In-
; finally,
last 10
to make
quite a
change
more
more
more
more
more

teresting, treats of the "specific evidences," and is mainly historical. The volume throughout is thoughtful and stimulating.

A few years ago it was our good fortune to meet with a little book on the *Gospel and its Ministry*, by R. Anderson, LL.D. With a lively recollection of the freshness and vigour which characterised that volume, we began to read *The Coming Prince*, recently published by the same author (8). As the title indicates, it is an examination of the prophetic intimations which Scripture gives concerning the last great Monarch of Christendom. The first sentence of the preface is characteristically incisive: "It seems to be an axiom with many commentators, that the prophetic Scriptures never mean precisely what they say; and the same licence which is deemed legitimate in interpreting Scripture, is used also when the facts of history are adduced as the fulfilment of it." Accepting the opposite axiom that Scripture prophecies are precise and that the historical fulfilment must truly correspond, Dr. Anderson investigates both Scripture and history for the purpose of ascertaining what may be known concerning the Antichrist of the latter day. We cannot attempt to give any epitome of the book; nor are we prepared, *brevi manu*, to accept his conclusions. We may, however, state that Dr. Anderson maintains, and on fairly reasonable grounds, that the present times of the Gentiles form an intercalation of ordinary providence (if we may so express it) between the past and future special and supernatural manifestations of God in connection with the Jewish nation. As a study in prophecy characterised by strong common sense and remarkable subtlety of judgment, we cordially commend this volume to our readers.

To what extent may the preacher fairly avail himself of homiletical helps? The appearance of two additional volumes of the *Pulpit Commentary* (9) suggests this question. No one denies the advantage of homiletical training. But is it lawful and honest to adopt a suggestive outline prepared by another?

(8) *The Coming Prince, the last great Monarch of Christendom*, by Robert Anderson, LL.D., Barrister-at-law. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

(9) *The Pulpit Commentary: Joshua, Judges, and Ruth*. Edited by Canon Spence and Rev. Joseph S. Exell. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co.

We are convinced that if any one is tempted to frame his discourses on the lines drawn for him by another hand he will not only victimise his congregation, he will also victimise himself. A sermon thus produced must be heterogeneous and ineffective. It must lack that unity of thought and feeling and force on which success depends. Besides, such a mode of preparation fosters indolence and enervates thought.

Are we then to conclude that such volumes as these are injurious and inopportune? By no means. Apart from the Introductions and Critical notes, which are of much intrinsic value, the short Homilies in which the thoughts of each section are developed may prove of real service if they are *studied* as examples of homiletic treatment, and if their contents become *suggestive* to the student. If it is lawful for the artist to examine the methods whereby the great masters have succeeded in producing their finest effects, it is surely no less lawful for the preacher to familiarise himself with the great sermons whereby ministers of the Word have persuaded men to be reconciled to God. The first rough sketches of a true artist have also large educational value. And for the same reason, germs or sketches that are really capable of noble expansion are worthy of careful study. Of course, in such volumes as these, where we have not only the work of different authors, but also subjects of varied character, it would be vain to expect uniform excellence. Nevertheless, we repeat with even fuller emphasis the opinion we expressed in noticing previous volumes of this Commentary, that "it stands first in its own department."

In the volume on Joshua, the Rev. A. Plummer, Principal of University College, Durham, furnishes an extensive yet admirably condensed introduction to the historical books, from Joshua to Nehemiah, which is followed by a full and special introduction to Joshua, written with a clear appreciation of the most recent discussions. The Exposition and leading Homiletics are by the Rev. J. J. Lias of Cambridge; the Homilies are supplied by Dr. De Pressensé, Revs. J. Waite, R. Glover, W. F. Adeney, and S. R. Aldridge.

To the commentary on Judges the introduction is disappointingly short. The Exposition and Homiletics are by the Bishop of Bath and Wells; the Homilies by the Revs. A. F.

Muir and W. F. Adeney. The Expositions and Homiletics on Ruth are by Professor James Morrison, and are characterised by his well-known incisiveness, although occasionally we meet with expressions that surprise and do not please. The Homilies are by the Revs. W. M. Statham and Professor J. R. Thomson.

When Professor Godet's second volume (10) reached us, we turned with special interest to his summary of conclusions promised in the preceding volume. We have found it brief enough, but wondrously satisfactory and suggestive. He recognises three texts of the Epistle—the Alexandrine, the Western, and the Byzantine. On the whole he prefers the Alexandrine, maintaining, however, the general integrity of the *commonly transmitted text*. Exegesis confirms historical investigations relative to the founding, composition, and religious tendency of the church at Rome. The aim of the Epistle "cannot have been to transform the convictions and tendency of the majority of the church of Rome, but solely, as St. Paul himself declares, both in beginning and concluding (i. 11 and xvi. 25), to *strengthen* them." He recognises this Epistle as at once the first *Dogmatic* and the first Christian *Ethic*. The two pages in which he sums up (429, 430), the *Apologetic* materials are of surpassing interest. Professor Godet's statement on the *true nature* of this apostolic writing is terse and excellent:—"The second feature which strikes us in his writing" (Paul's) "is the perfect calmness with which he seems to handle truth. He does not seek it, he has it. Compare the Epistle to the Romans with Pascal's *Thoughts*, and the distance will be seen between the Apostle and the thinker of genius. It is also evident that the Apostle himself draws his life from the faith which he preaches; he has faith in his faith as one cannot have in his thought, for the very simple reason that his faith is not his discovery, but the gift of God."

Throughout, this commentary will be found instructive and useful in no common degree. It is replete with scholarship, exegetical tact, and spiritual insight.

(10) *Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans*, vol. ii. By F. Godet, D.D., Professor of Theology, Neuchâtel. Translated from the French by Rev. A. Cusin, M.A. Edinburgh. Edin' urgh: T. and T. Clark.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

OCTOBER 1881.

ART. I.—*The Old Testament in the Jewish Church.*¹

THIS book will have to be numbered among the numerous unsuccessful "Apologies." Penned at a time when the forces of the Free Church were gathering for a final struggle upon the author's retention of his Chair, dealing therefore less with bare assertion and more with studiously guarded statement than the now famous articles in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, minimising with some art, if not concealing, the momentous issues for theology and religion of the change of view demanded respecting the Jewish Law, and at the same time emphasising advantages supposed to be afforded by the critical method, labouring in fact to show how the views of the author upon the Pentateuch, which had proved themselves so unwelcome, were the logical outcome of any scientific study of the Old Testament, these lectures nevertheless failed to effect a successful combination. There were many reasons, besides the art of their composition, why they might have won the day. Some sympathised with the thought of the lecturer, and many more with his position; legal grounds caused some to hesitate, and grounds of expediency others; whereas not a few feared

¹ *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church: Twelve Lectures on Biblical Criticism* by W. Robertson Smith, M.A. Edinburgh, 1881.

to condemn opinions they repudiated lest they should seem to condemn the man they justly admired. Notwithstanding, that the decision was adverse is known everywhere.

To some it may seem therefore that the question itself is now shelved, and that further allusion, if it do not partake of glorying over a fallen foe, is at least supererogatory. Such a view would be a gross mistake. Mr. Robertson Smith is by no means a fallen foe or a controversialist to be ignored. He is the upholder of opinions which are avowed by a large and growing section of thinkers, and it is really of the highest moment that those opinions be honestly met in the realm of argument as well as of authority. Though his voice be no longer heard in the professor's room, with his strong convictions he will assuredly appeal by writing and speech to a wider audience. The mere fact of his defeat will lead many to a study of the sentiments he was willing to run such risks to uphold. It is possible, from his views of church government, that the present writer is apt to underrate the value, as a deterrent, of a majority in a religious congress; he yields to none in the belief that one of the most pressing questions of the day, the solution of which will ramify throughout the spheres of theology and practice, is just this question which Mr. Robertson Smith has, by his literary talents, aided to popularise, and to popularise of set purpose. "I have striven," he says in his preface, "to make my exposition essentially popular in the legitimate sense of that word—that is, to present a continuous argument . . . so framed that it can be followed by the ordinary English reader who is familiar with the Bible and accustomed to consecutive thought." It would seem indeed that this question of the age of the Pentateuch is peculiarly one for experts, and this conviction ought to be strengthened by a careful perusal of these lectures, where the weighty conclusion is really made to turn upon a consensus of minute points of criticism, which it requires a close and lengthened acquaintance with the facts in the original language adequately to estimate. Cautious thinkers may well doubt whether Paley's "twelve men of known probity and good sense" are after all the best judges of these critical minutiae which are seldom decisive, and which may be made, like so much circumstantial evidence, to turn either way by a skilled

advocate. They seem to be questions for judges rather than juries. Still, if Mr. Robertson Smith has prematurely or unadvisedly transferred this question from the academy to the forum, from the arena of the school to that of the popular assembly, the advocates of the ancient date of the Pentateuch have nothing to fear. Unlike the esoteric reasonings of their opponents, their most conclusive arguments might be fearlessly submitted to any competent panel.

In these Lectures we meet with Mr. Robertson Smith characteristically. They display at once his greatest excellencies and his most egregious faults. They testify to an abundant scholarship, microscopic enough to utilise recondite shades of thought in Hebrew phrase, and wide enough to lay the prominent labours of recent German criticism under contribution. They also bear witness to something more than scholarship, and without which scholarship is pedantry,—a keen eye for contradiction, a fine scorn of compromise, and those other invaluable literary instincts which issue in clearness of perception, sharpness of statement, directness in exposition, a pleasing blend of generalities with detail, and, by no means least, a rare tact in choosing common ground with his audience, however hostile. But these excellent virtues, alas! are accompanied by their corresponding vices. How often the clear vision is contracted! How frequently the crisp statement is unfair! If generalisation is often too hasty, details are as frequently too scant. Not unseldom the strong relief in expression is gained by the excision of modifying features. Persuasion is apt to degenerate into manipulation, and scholarship to be confined to writers of one school and one age, not infrequently displaying the lamentable atmospheric distortion which inevitably results from acquaintance with important sources at second hand. Even the manifest moral and religious faculties of the author seem as a rule to lack that breadth of grasp which is at once cause and effect of respecting wide interests and surveying broad realms. In a word, Mr. Smith seems to fail in that *balance* which is Aristotle's ideal of virtue. Or perhaps there is too much imitativeness in his nature. Descartes once said, "The great fault of scepticism is that it is not sceptical enough;" and the reading of this book strengthens the impression that its "criticism" is not "critical" enough.

Mr. Smith manifestly has the courage not to accept old opinions because they are old, and is determined to examine them fearlessly without thought of consequences; it is by no means so certain that he has not the temerity to accept new opinions simply because they are new, and that he is not dazzled by the glamour of great reputations. He does not seem to have arrived at the stage of criticising criticism. One cannot resist the feeling that, had he had as much to do with Hengstenberg as Lagarde, his career would have been different, although, in the non-development of this critical faculty, his opinions would have been no more reliable. And this is the place to state that one feature of this book is an utter absence of originality except in literary structure. This whole brief against the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch is simply an able compilation of facts and fancies borrowed from others of less conspicuous Christianity, made with the skill of a barrister. Unlike Colenso, who gave to the world the results of original investigation, Mr. Robertson Smith is a populariser of the investigations of others. It is believed, after careful investigation and with some knowledge of the history of this question, that no single piece of evidence adduced is given at first hand. Of course this statement is not put forth as affecting the intrinsic value of the evidence itself.

It soon becomes manifest to the reader that the scope of this book is wider than the question as to the age of the Pentateuch. In general terms the aim of these lectures is stated to be to lay before their audience "an outline of the problems and methods and results of Old Testament criticism." In other words the author says, "My effort has been to give a lucid view of the critical argument as it stands in my own mind, and to support it in every part from the text of Scripture or other original sources." In pursuance of this plan six lectures are given to the examination of the text of the Old Testament, with special reference to such themes as the office of the scribes, the value of the Septuagint, and the history of the Canon; one lecture is given to the authorship and date of the Psalter; whilst the remaining lectures are devoted to a substantiation of the post-Exilic date of the Pentateuch. An investigation of the substance of these lectures soon shows, however, that they have but one purpose, the subverting of the

current theory of the Old Testament history. This result it is hoped to produce by first showing the nature of the scientific methods for the study of the Old Testament, and by suggesting next that this method infallibly ends in the so-called "critical" hypothesis of the composite nature and late date of the Five Books of Moses.

Two questions, therefore, arise for solution. FIRST, *What is the nature of the scientific examination of the Old Testament?* SECONDLY, *Does this scientific method necessarily conduct to a belief in the post-Exilic origin of the Pentateuch or, more specifically, the Levitical law?* To each of these questions an answer will be attempted, attention being bestowed throughout upon the contentions of Mr. Smith. And we will endeavour to be a little more courteous than Mr. Smith. We will not indulge in the well-known advice of "abusing the plaintiff's counsel." In these Lectures there is too much of a haughty disregard of conflicting opinions. The scientific study of Scripture is supposed to be identical with the views of Graf, Kuenen, and Wellhausen. If the early date of the Pentateuch is not rejected, it is assumed that the study of Scripture has not been scientifically conducted; and supposing the examination to have been scientific, it is taken for granted that the "critical" views of Kuenen must result. Biblical criticism is used as synonymous with the views of the Dutch school. Such phrases as "progressive Biblical Science," "Old Testament criticism," "Historical criticism," "the historical study of the Old Testament," "the science of Biblical criticism," are used as equivalents to the so-called "Higher Criticism;" whereas, on the other hand, those who may equally pursue a scientific and critical method, if their conclusions are favourable to the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, are discredited by being called "the anti-critical school," "the traditionalists," "the light-hearted advocates of the traditional view." It would have been well if Mr. Smith had not followed the example of the advocates of the higher criticism, who first dub their views "critical," and then assume that there are no "critical" views but theirs. Courtesy at least demands the acknowledgment that a love of facts, and not a love of conservatism merely, may lead, however mistakenly, to a belief in the Mosaic authorship.

I.

Our author very rightly distinguishes between the devotional and scientific use of Scripture. It is necessary for every thorough teacher of the Bible to bid "his pupils consider what systematic and scholarly study involves, in contradistinction to the ordinary practical use of the Bible," and if he is as eloquent as Mr. Smith, he would express himself in just such language as that in which he describes the value and defects of ordinary devotional reading. The whole passage is so chaste and beautiful that we quote it entire.

"Ordinary Bible-reading," Mr. Smith says, on p. 6, "is eclectic and devotional. A detached passage is taken up, and attention is concentrated on the immediate edification which can be derived from it. Very often the profit which the Bible-reader derives from his morning or evening portion lies mainly in a single word of divine love coming straight home to his heart. And in general the real fruit of such Bible-reading lies less in any addition to one's stores of systematic knowledge than in the privilege of withdrawing for a moment from the thoughts and cares of the world, to enter into a pure and holy atmosphere, where the God of love and redemption reveals Himself to the heart, and where the simplest believer can place himself by the side of the psalmist, the prophet, or the apostle, in that inner sanctuary where no sound is heard but the gracious accents of divine promise and the sweet response of assured and humble faith."

"But, on the other hand," the passage very justly continues, "a study which is exclusively practical and devotional is necessarily imperfect. There are many things in Scripture which do not lend themselves to an immediate practical purpose, and which, in fact, are as good as shut out from the circle of ordinary Bible-reading. . . . And so we are brought to this issue. We may, if we please, confine our study of Scripture to what is immediately edifying, skimming lightly over all pages which do not serve a direct purpose of devotion, and ignoring every difficulty which does not yield to the faculty of practical insight, to the power of spiritual sympathy with the mind of the Spirit, which the thoughtful Christian necessarily acquires in the habitual exercise of bringing Scripture to bear on the daily needs of his own life. This use of Scripture is full of personal profit, and raises no intellectual difficulties. But it does not do justice to the whole Word of God. It cannot exhaust the whole mind of the Spirit. It is limited for every individual by the limitations of his own spiritual experience. Reading the Bible in this way, a man comes to a very personal appreciation of so much of God's truth as is in immediate contact with the range of his own life. But he is sure to miss many truths which belong to another range of experience, and to read into the inspired page things from his own experience which involve human error."

These wise words we would accentuate with all the strength we possess. Put briefly, they come to this: that the Bible is so Divine that he who runs may read with profit, but, being so divine, it is a vast mine for men as well as angels to explore, and only yields its choicest treasures to those who dig the deepest, and with the most skilled appliances. Mr. Smith might have added that when the knowledge of any portion of the Bible is consciously unscientific, it ceases to be of any use devotionally; and that, on the other hand, the more truthful and exact the knowledge of Scripture, the more it lends itself to practical devotion; untruth and devotion cannot co-exist, science is the handmaid of devotion.

Proceeding then to the "systematic" study of Scripture, our author's general statement of the method to be adopted is also excellent. "To get from the Bible," he says, on p. 18, "all the instruction which it is capable of yielding, we must apprehend the true method of study in its full range and scope, obtain a clear grasp of the principles involved, and apply them systematically with the best help that scholarship supplies." The outline given of this true method is as follows:—The Old Testament being an ancient record, an ancient book being a fragment of ancient life, and the first principle of criticism being that every book bears the stamp of the time and circumstances in which it was produced, "it is the business of the critic to trace back the steps by which any ancient book has been transmitted to us, to find where it came from, and who wrote it, to examine the occasion of its composition, and search out every link that connects it with the history of the ancient world, and with the personal life of the author." From the incidental statements scattered throughout these Lectures it may then be inferred that this general treatment of the Old Testament as an ancient record consists of three varieties of criticism,—textual, exegetical, and historical. In this general division of the duty of the scientific investigator, Mr. Smith is at one with all the prominent writers of all schools: it is when he comes to details and practical rules that his labours are crippled by his limitation of vision.

All scientific investigators are agreed, we say, that the first stage in Biblical criticism is the criticism of the text, a reasoned estimate in general and in detail of the original texts preserved

to us. By scientific investigators we mean those who proceed upon the inductive method, and by observation, classification, generalisation, and induction endeavour to ascertain, without bias or prepossession, what Holy Scripture is as compared with other books. { Not that the deductive method has not a large application in adjudicating upon the claims of Scripture, as far as professed Christians themselves are concerned; a man who believes in the Divine authority of Jesus may, for example, legitimately draw an inference from the Saviour's use of the Old Testament, or from the manifest estimation in which the apostles held the Scriptures of their time: but science is wider than Christianity, and aims at the erection of a concatenated series of truths which appeal to every reasoning mind. The scientific study of Scripture is therefore inductive, and its first concern is with the text in which Scripture has been transmitted. Start must be made with the text of Scripture,—for if the foundation be unsafe, what of the superstructure? or if the record be unreliable, what of the narrative?—not necessarily as we possess it now in English dress, for there is no question that the Old Testament was written and has been preserved to us in Hebrew. The Old Testament has to be treated like an edition of Homer or Thucydides, and the first stage in any critical treatment is to ascertain as far as possible, by the comparison of manuscripts and the legitimate processes of textual criticism, what were the very words of the poet of the *Iliad* or the historian of the Peloponnesian war. At the outset, in the critical method of investigation, the Bible must be submitted to the same treatment as every ancient book, although in the end portions of its contents will elevate it to a category all its own. Not possessing the autographs of the writers of the Law and the Prophets, but only numerous copies of a much later date, those copies must be critically weighed with the appropriate instruments.

Now, with respect to the text of the New Testament, one of the most valuable portions of recent theological inquiry, a tolerable unanimity has been reached, and it is this comparative unanimity which lends so great a weight to the praiseworthy and devoted labours of the New Testament Revision Company. In the Old Testament matters are very different, and many may well doubt whether the time has yet come for

a satisfactory revision. Indeed, the great task which seems to lie before the Church at the present juncture is exhaustive, comprehensive, and judicious research into the Hebrew text. Extant manuscripts will have to be carefully classified according to date and intrinsic worth; new manuscripts will have to be sought for with the zeal of another Tischendorf; the principles of Hebrew palæography will have to be laid down; the authoritative Masoretic text will have to be obtained and criticised; whatever aid can be gained from such versions as the Samaritan, the Greek of the Septuagint, and the Greek of Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion (not to mention a fourth translator, suggested by Dr. Nestle), the old Latin version, and Jerome's monumental translation; the Aramaic versions of the Peshito and the Targums, and even the Arabic version, which bears some relation to the text of Saadia Gaon, will have to be diligently sought; whilst the large number of quotations from the Old Testament in the Talmud and other Jewish literature, ought to render invaluable service. Only when this overwhelming task is undertaken with a will, can the question as to the text of the Old Testament be regarded as placed upon a scientific footing; and the time seems at hand for such final work. Already an immense literature has accumulated upon this pressing theme, and innumerable monographs have been directed to separate sections thereof. Lists of manuscripts and painstaking collations are to be found in the writings of Le Long, Wolf, Kennicott, and De Rossi; and many more modern writers, such as Strack, Steinschneider, Murlat and Riehm, Harkavy and Lagarde, supply most useful preliminary information of this nature. Thanks to Baer and Frensdorff, a good beginning has been made towards a just appreciation of the Masoretic text, which Dr. Ginsburg's great work, now publishing, must also further. The great controversy upon the Samaritan Pentateuch, which has agitated scholars from the hour of its discovery by Pietro de la Valle, would seem somewhat nearer to definitive solution, and very useful contributions have been made towards a critical text by Brüll, Harkavy, Bargès, and Petermann. As for the Septuagint, in spite of the lamentable fact that no great critical edition has yet appeared, nevertheless Tischendorf's collection of codices, and the labours of Baber, Holmes, Vercellone and Cozza, have largely facili-

tated such an edition, whilst Hody and Frankel have helped considerably towards a just estimate of its critical value and position. Here also Field's scholarly edition of the Hexapla of Origen must render invaluable aid. Upon the Latin versions some indispensable work has been done in collecting and classifying, as is also true of the Aramaic versions, very much remaining still to be done. On the whole, therefore, it may be said that very much preparatory labour has been completed, but that the Scholz or Lachmann, Tischendorf or Tregelles, is not yet forthcoming to place the science of the textual criticism of the Old Testament upon a path of steady advance. Hence arises one great complaint against these Lectures. Mr. Smith does not hint that the great problem of the text of the Old Testament has yet to be solved; he does not hint that the whole current of recent inquiries sets in the direction of the high value and correctness of the Masoretic text. Following closely the lead of Wellhausen and Lagarde, he seems to place almost as high an estimate upon the Septuagint as Hitzig did, who is reported by one of his pupils to have been wont to say in his classes, "Gentlemen, have you a Septuagint? If not, sell all you have and buy one." (*"Meine Herren, haben Sie eine Septuaginta? Wenn nicht, verkaufen Sie alles was Sie haben und kaufen sich eine Septuaginta!"*) Now it is unquestionable that very considerable use must be made of the Septuagint in any criticism of the Masoretic text; for versions will have to play a larger part in Old Testament criticism than in New. In fact, Mr. Smith's own words may be frankly indorsed when he says, "to shut our eyes to the evidence of the Septuagint, or to refuse to weigh it by the ordinary methods of common sense, would be an act of timidity, not of reverence." Nevertheless, a hasty instalment of the Septuagint in the one seat of honour must be severely deprecated. Mr. Smith's laudation of the Septuagint is precipitate; and premature opinions, categorically expressed, are to be avoided conscientiously in the present state of our knowledge. The few facts he adduces have been long known; they are capable of a very diverse application. The general tendency of the results hitherto attained in the investigation of the Septuagint, is towards attaching a very different worth, as translations, to the several books which compose the Alexandrian

Canon—those translations having been carried out in sections apparently, each of which was guided by different sentiments upon the admissibility of free renderings, as well as of emendations, omissions, and insertions. His remarks and instances drawn from the Septuagint are cases in point where Mr. Smith does not seem to be critical enough. In relating Wellhausen's supposed discoveries in the Greek text of the First Book of Samuel, it would have been well if Mr. Smith had exercised that caution which Mr. Matthew Arnold recommends us ever to observe in accepting German theories; for, as that acute writer has said: "A learned German has by no means, in general, a fine and practically sure perception in proportion to his learning. Give a Frenchman, an Italian, an Englishman, the same knowledge of the facts, removing from him at the same time all such disturbing influences as political partisanship, ecclesiastical antipathies, national vanity, and you could in general trust his perception more than you can the German's." In a word, Mr. Smith's conclusions upon the text of Scripture are premature. They are also contrary to the weight of evidence, so far as that has at present been collected. Similar remarks apply to his statement of the history of the Canon. He is perfectly right in acknowledging that history to be an important element in biblical criticism, but, judging from the materials at hand, he is wrong in the kind of suspicion he throws upon the reliability of our present collection of sacred books.

Having recognised the need of textual criticism in the study of Scripture, the scientific investigator still proceeds to treat the Bible like any other ancient book, and endeavours in the next place to ascertain the exact significance of the text he has criticised. He calls in the aid of philology, the laws of Hebrew grammar, and the facts of Hebrew lexicology. With these aids, together with the other helps of the practised translator, such as the Hebrew concordance, the perception of style, the resuscitation of habits and customs, the correction for age, in each of which he finds considerable room for the most wary literary instincts and the most polished culture—he inquires into the meaning of single passages. From the comprehension of brief passages he then advances to the understanding of sections, chapters, books, collections of books. At this point,

when ordinary exegesis has reached the goal of its pursuit, the higher exegesis steps in, and an attempt is made to prosecute individual lines of thought to facilitate the apprehension of the Bible as a whole, such as biblical chronology, or geography, or psychology. The higher exegesis finishes its task when it has given insight into the entire scheme of thought and practice recorded, and has framed the sciences of biblical history, biblical theology, and biblical ethics.

At this stage a third task opens. Having ascertained, as a matter of history, what the Bible contains, it is now necessary to inquire how far its contents are trustworthy. The historical veracity of the parts and the whole has to be considered. In other words, to textual and exegetical criticism historical criticism succeeds. By a rigid and unbiassed examination of the entire contents of the Old Testament, especially by a detailed investigation of the results of the several sciences of biblical geography, chronology, antiquities, history, theology, and ethics, conclusions are formed as to its credibility, now by comparison with all the external evidence available in profane writers and in monuments, and now by the consideration of all the internal evidence afforded by the Jewish records themselves. This is the task of historical criticism to which Mr. Smith has given so destructive a bent, with what justice we shall presently see. Just now it is important to add another remark,—that it is just here that the Bible displays itself to be pre-eminently THE BOOK. In pursuing the task of historical criticism the question arises whether the Old Testament is veracious, and whether it is veracious when it declares itself to be the revelation of God. Mr. Smith does not touch upon this question but it is needful to observe that historical criticism cannot proceed very far without coming face to face with miracles and prophecy as testimonies to the Divine origin of the Old Testament, and it would have been more satisfactory if these fundamental problems had been at any rate mentioned. Historical criticism itself, starting with the idea that the Old Testament is but an ordinary book, lands the inquirer in the demonstration that it is the most extraordinary book in the history of the world, belonging indeed to a category, as we have put it, all its own.

II.

Let so much suffice for the general statement of the scientific study of Scripture. The second question now opens before us, as to whether this scientific method inevitably leads to the views of Mr. Smith upon the age and composition of the Pentateuch. The principal strength of our author is bent upon the field of historical rather than textual or exegetical criticism, and we will follow the same course. We shall endeavour to show, *first*, that historical criticism itself, based as it must be upon a valid interpretation of the meaning of Scripture, leads to the rejection of Mr. Smith's leading conclusions; and, *secondly*, that historical criticism itself, with the same impregnable exegetical basis, leads to the rejection of Mr. Smith's ultimate result.

The course Mr. Smith pursues is as follows. Having selected the Psalms as an example of what can be learned from critical study—a very fine field of labour it must be confessed, but one in which the bias and narrowness of Mr. Smith's school peculiarly appear—the criticism of the prophets and the law is entered upon, bringing us “face to face with fundamental problems.” What is called “the traditional theory of Old Testament history” is first sketched. As an analysis of this theory it is said—so Mr. Smith puts it—first, that the whole law was given to Moses in the wilderness or in the plains of Moab; secondly, that this law contained a complete system of religion; thirdly, that the prominent features of the law, sacrifice, atonement, and forgiveness, are absolutely dependent upon the priesthood; hence, fourthly, as a first consequence, the religious history of Israel can be nothing else than the history of the nation's obedience or disobedience to the law; and, fifthly, a second consequence is, that the prophets are necessarily regarded as ministers and exponents of the law, and their work “less necessary and eternal than the law.” With the exception of the final statement, this analysis of the traditional view may be accepted. But Mr. Smith does injustice to the traditional view of prophecy, and, as the point is of some importance, Mr. Smith regarding his own view of prophecy as much more exalted and therefore commendable, a few words may be wisely given to this matter.

The Rationalist undoubtedly discovered a flaw in the current view of the prophetic office, which identified prophecy with prediction; the "critics" simply misrepresent when they assert that the orthodox view of prophecy makes the prophet subordinate to the priest. All recent writers of the traditional school regard the prophetic message as a *new revelation*, hence the sublimity of the prophet's position. Even if the prophet authenticated or emphasised an old revelation, he did so in response to a new revelation. His message, whatever it was, originated not in acquiescence in the past but in the present, in the thought of Jehovah, and not in his own. Nor was the *raison-d'être* of prophecy a mere upholding of the law. Undoubtedly prophecy did enforce the law by its new revelation, but it fulfilled other ends. A second end of prophecy was to insist upon the lessons already providentially taught by the national history. Moved divinely, the prophet also watched over the purity of morals and the sincerity of religion. Sometimes his inspiration took the form of a startling proclamation of Divine rewards and Divine punishments, extending to nations beyond the pale of Judaism and to a future life. These prophetic revelations often predicted the history of men, cities, and peoples. So also, in the realm of prediction, the prophet was frequently aroused to admonish or encourage by Messianic announcements. Nor should it be forgotten how frequently the prophet was called to point the attention of his hearers to a final judgment and the consummation of all things. It is a misrepresentation when the traditional school is said to regard the prophets as ministers and exponents of the law merely. It is the "critical" and not the "traditional" school which narrows the scope of prophecy. In other respects, the sketch given of the traditional theory may be generally accepted.

Upon this sketch Mr. Smith proceeds to observe that it is "the Rabbinical view supplemented by a theory of typology." Undoubtedly; it is the view of the greatest Rabbi of all—Jesus of Nazareth. The theory is also, he allows, perfectly logical and consistent in all its parts, "a complete theory of the religious life to which nothing can be added without an entire change of dispensation," and is, so far as we can see, the only theory which can be built upon the premises. But it has, he

contends, one fault. He describes two. The theory is belied by the historical books of Scripture, and it is belied by the prophetic books. "The standard it applies to the history of Israel is not that of the contemporary historical records, and the account which it gives of the prophets is not consistent with the writings of the prophets themselves"—a strong statement, he confesses, but expressing, not "a mere personal opinion, but the growing conviction of an overwhelming weight of the most earnest and sober scholarship." At the risk of being classed as neither sober nor earnest, it will be well to compare some of Mr. Smith's more prominent conclusions with Scripture.

Mr. Smith says that there are usages of language which show that the Pentateuch was written in Canaan, and not by Moses in the wilderness. The following is an instance of such usage, the only one he gives with any certainty :—

"In Hebrew," he says, "the common phrase for 'westward' is 'seaward,' and for 'southward' 'towards the Negeb.' The word Negeb, which primarily means 'parched land,' is in Hebrew the proper name of the dry steppe district in the south of Judah." "These expressions," it is asserted, "could only be formed within Palestine. Yet they are used in the Pentateuch, not only in the narrative, but in the Levitical description of the tabernacle in the wilderness. But at Mount Sinai the sea did not lie to the west, and the Negeb was to the north. Moses could no more call the south side the Negeb side of the tabernacle than a Glasgow man could say that the sun set over Edinburgh."

The etymology is not quite made out, but, passing this by, it is quite sufficient reply that these words *were* formed in Palestine. Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob might use "seawards" as equivalent to "westwards," and "towards the steppe" as the synonym of "south;" and it is at least a reasonable explanation to say that these words retained in Egypt their secondary signification, although the primary was no longer applicable. It is true Mr. Smith says this is "nonsense—when a man says 'towards the sea' he means it;" but is it not hazardous to base so revolutionary a theory upon an etymological meaning of a word, which denies one of the commonest characteristics of speech? Mr. Smith ought really to read Mr. Mill's famous chapter on the "Natural History of the Variation in the Meaning of Terms," or Mr. Whitney's *Illustrations of the Alterative Forces in Language*. Of course, when a man

says "lunatic" he means "influenced by the moon," or when he says "candidate" he means "dressed in white," or when he says "Wednesday" he means "Woden's day," or when he says "jovial" he means "born beneath the planet Jupiter." Or, to take a more pertinent instance, when an Anglo-Indian talks at Calcutta about the Orientals, he could not possibly mean the Turks, who are to the west of him, and not the east.

Yet again, Mr. Smith says, "that the prophet Jeremiah does not recognise the Levitical law of stated sacrifice as part of the Divine ordinances given in the time of Moses." He bases this astonishing statement upon Jeremiah vii. 22, where he reads, "For I spake not unto your fathers, nor commanded them in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt-offering or festal offerings; but this one thing I commanded them, saying, Obey my voice, and I will be your God, and ye shall be my people." A very little thought will show this passage to imply the very opposite to what Mr. Smith infers. In all fairness he should have quoted the whole of the passage, which would then read thus: "Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, the God of Israel, Put your burnt-offerings unto your festal-offerings, and eat flesh, for I spake not unto your fathers," etc. In this passage the prophet is showing the superiority of obedience to ceremonial unaccompanied by obedience. To enforce the great lesson, he recalls to their remembrance the words of the original covenant made with their fathers in the day, that is, at the time, when they were led forth from Egypt. That covenant, made prior to the declaration of the detailed law, had said: "Now, therefore, if you will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me above all people, and ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation." Jeremiah reminds the nation that general obedience to Jehovah was to be the condition of their acceptability as priests. But the matter of especial importance in the connection before us is that the exhortation is pointless unless the Levitical law, in some of its most familiar prescriptions, *were already in existence*. For what says Jeremiah: "Put your burnt-offerings unto your festal-offerings and eat flesh." In other words, he says, "There is something more imperative

than the rigid adherence to legal provisions ; be not so careful to give the burnt-offerings to Jehovah wholly, and to retain only the portions of the legitimate offerings for festal participation, as the law enjoins ; add your burnt-offerings, which are for God alone, to your festal offerings, which you may permissibly enjoy, and eat flesh ; legal provisions are a means to an end, and however scrupulously performed, are the acts of a nation that obeyeth not the voice of the Lord, if sacrifice is not accompanied by a spirit of obedience." This is only one of the many cases where the prophets desire to prevent the mechanical observance inseparable from ceremonial, and where they insist upon the subjective condition of acceptable sacrifice. If there were no commonly known law of sacrificial ceremonial, the exhortation is meaningless. The very phrase used, the contrast of *tsewach* with *olah* as if they constituted together a well-defined class of sacrifices, which we might translate "holocausts and merocausts," is a well-known legal technicality.

Yet again : Mr. Smith says that "the theology of the prophets before Ezekiel has no place for the system of priestly sacrifice and ritual," and that "the prophets altogether deny to the law of sacrifice the character of positive revelation ; their attitude to questions of ritual is the negative attitude of the Ten Commandments." In an article in this *Review*, which appeared last October, a series of quotations was given from Amos and Zephaniah, and other pre-Exilian writers, by no means as numerous as is possible, yet quite sufficient to disprove the above assertion.

Yet again : Mr. Smith says that it was not according to the law that Jehovah administered His grace to Israel during the period of the Judges. What saith the Scriptures ? There are few allusions of any kind, it is true, which bear testimony for or against this statement ; but the little evidence available presupposes the existence of distinct features of the Levitical law. Wherein lay, for example, the gist of the horrible story of the Danites (Judges xvii.-xxi.), but in the infringement of the Levitical law by the erection of the rival sanctuary of Dan ? Wherein, too, lay the sin of Saul (1 Sam. xii.), if not in the illegal presentation of sacrifice, as described by the rules of Leviticus ? Does not the passage in 1 Sam. ii. 22 use the

Levitical technicality for the Tabernacle,—the Tent of Assembly,—a most powerful witness, as Wellhausen himself unwillingly attests, for he endeavours to discredit it by saying that the verse “is from its contents suspicious.” As for Mr. Smith’s references to the sacrifices of Gideon and Hannah, they have received replies so often that they may be ignored. So, too, any one familiar with the Levitical law will find the whole ritual of Shiloh dependent upon the Levitical law.

Did space allow, we should like to have shown by express quotations the unreliableness of Mr. Smith’s assertions concerning the popular worship of Israel, the nature of the Davidic worship, the ritual of the first Temple, the aspect assumed by the reformation under Josiah, the question as to priests and Levites in Deuteronomy, the absence of atoning sacrifice in the days prior to the Captivity, the novelty of Ezekiel’s proposed system of worship. Every one of these points might be carefully treated in turn, with the result of arriving at the opposite conclusion to which Mr. Smith arrives. Any one interested in this controversy should read Dr. Dillmann’s new edition of Knobel’s *Exodus and Leviticus*, where he will see how doctors differ upon the cardinal facts, and how Dr. Dillmann, himself a most able exponent of the anti-Mosaic school prior to Graf, and with a full knowledge of all that Graf and his followers have written, nevertheless sees no valid ground for a change from his earlier opinion. The fact is that there is much need for a logical mind to survey the whole question. If some practical lawyer, skilled in the weighing of evidence, would survey the entire field from Astruc to Dillmann, rejecting assertions which were merely captious, and giving its just weight to every genuine argument ever employed, he would render a most eminent service. To repeat what we have previously said : it is high time that we had done with the counsel, whether for the plaintiff or the defendant. Hengstenberg and Keil have undoubtedly put constructions upon many passages of Scripture they will not bear, and have marshalled arguments too much with the skill of the practised advocate retained upon one side ; on the other hand, it is still more certain that Graf, Kuenen, Wellhausen, and their followers, have displayed a very large endowment of the same forensic skill. The present writer has, for his own use, drawn

up many balancings *pro* and *con.*, carefully eliminating all arguments which seemed to him worthless, strained, or irrelevant, and his conviction is that a careful review of the whole controversy, conducted with logical ability and popular tact, would be a most invaluable work just now. For his own part, although he believes there are some minor details of the traditional view which a scientific inquiry will amend, the more minutely he has examined the writings of all schools, the more certainly he has become assured of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch.

And perhaps it is not irrelevant at this stage, on the threshold of the inquiry into the soundness of Mr. Smith's ultimate result, to state that the present writer—in spite of his belief that it is a careful, wide, and thorough examination into the whole controversy, both historical and critical, which is demanded just now—has attempted to give a few popular summaries of the arguments for the Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch. When he was engaged upon his work on *Sacrifice*, this question presented itself for decision at the outset, and he therefore acquainted himself with the history and data of the entire controversy. As he had anticipated, his intentional silence upon the reasons for his acceptance of the Mosaic authorship was interpreted by some reviewers as a mere unreasoning acceptance of the traditional view. Dr. Kamphausen of Bonn, for example, in an unexpectedly laudatory notice in the *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, had something to say about the "credulous blindness" of attempting to give a view of Scriptural sacrifice without a preliminary settlement of "critical" views. In the May number, therefore, of the *Princeton Review* for 1879, the author inserted an article upon the "Critical Estimate of Mosaism," which called forth several notices and replies in Germany. It was this article which brought the writer into friendly contact with the editor of this *Review*, who had reprinted it in *Dickinson's Theological Quarterly*. At Dr. Paterson's request, a series of articles have been written during the progress of the Robertson Smith case upon the merits of the question in dispute. At first, remembering the tentative character of the article upon the "Bible," the writer preferred to approach the theme somewhat indirectly, and he wrote upon Wellhausen's *Geschichte Israels*, which Mr.

78.
120.

Smith had reviewed very favourably in the *Academy*, and from which he has extracted the large majority of the illustrations in these lectures. On the appearance of the article upon the "Hebrew Language and Literature," he next addressed himself to the two *Encyclopædia Britannica* articles. Yet a third review was inserted upon the philosophical basis occupied by Kuenen and Graf in an examination of Spencer's *Hebrews and Phœnicians*. Now, be it noted, that in each paper a special branch of the argument for the Mosaic authorship has been prosecuted. In the "Critical Estimate of Mosaism," after an analysis of Kuenen's views, which Mr. Smith follows implicitly, a statement of the phases through which the criticism of the Pentateuch had passed, and a survey of the methods of investigation open to the inquirer, one of those methods was prosecuted,—the evidence afforded by the completeness of the law as a religious system. In "The Latest Phase of the Pentateuch Question," the testimony of Scripture, which contradicts Wellhausen's view, was sketched. In the article on "Professor Robertson Smith and the Pentateuch" the vein of Scripture references was yet further worked. And the arguments thus adduced remain intact. Had the present Lectures been written, a few sentences concerning Mr. Smith's supposed standpoint would not have been penned; the general course of reasoning is not in a single instance affected. Another branch of evidence shall now be mentioned.

Historical criticism itself, conducted with sufficient knowledge and minuteness, will disprove the post-Exilic origin of the Pentateuchal code, nay, will prove its Mosaic origin, as one branch of evidence will especially demonstrate. In the ritual injunctions of Exodus and Leviticus, supposed by Mr. Smith to have been composed during the days of the Exile, there are many references which are inexplicable, except upon the assumption of their being written by a contemporary with the life in the wilderness. A few details only can be given of a line of argument which might fill a volume in the hands of an exponent sufficiently versed in the legal code of the Pentateuch. Dr. Franz Delitzsch has elaborated this section of evidence with some care in a series of articles in the *Zeitschrift für kirchlichen Wissenschaft und kirchlichen Leben*, which it is to be hoped will seek a wider audience by separate

publication. Some few details can alone be given, along a different line from that followed by Dr. Delitzsch, and open to the ordinary English reader, with the proviso that this is peculiarly the sort of evidence which, as Mr. Smith says, "turns," in its most conclusive branch of obsolete phrase and words, "upon nice questions of Hebrew scholarship."

A good case in point is seen in connection with a command which evidently gives Mr. Smith a great deal of trouble. Let any one read the laborious attempt (pp. 235-238) to refer the "blood" rites to the popular religion of Israel prior to the Levitical legislation, and compare it with the actual testimony of Leviticus and Deuteronomy, and he will see how much more consistent and credible the latter is than the former. According to the injunctions of Leviticus, spoken by the Lord unto Moses, as it is expressly said again and again, blood is a sacred thing,—a sentiment explicable enough on the Levitical theory of atonement by blood, which the Lord had given, had appointed, to be the covering for the sin of the soul; hence even the shedding of blood for food is to be a sacred act, and the eating of blood in any form is forbidden. But the significant fact is that in Leviticus, in the law which was given in the wilderness, where, that is to say, all the people were located in their sections around and within easy distance of the Tabernacle, the law is absolute that no blood was to be shed, even for food, except at the door of the Tabernacle. The command is given in the very chapter which presents the one precise interpretation of the significance of all rites of blood under the law: "And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, Speak unto Aaron, and unto his sons, and unto all the children of Israel, and say unto them, This is the thing which the Lord hath commanded, saying, What man soever there be of the house of Israel that killeth an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that killeth it out of the camp, and bringeth it not unto the door of the tabernacle of the congregation, to offer an offering unto the Lord before the tabernacle of the Lord, blood shall be imputed unto that man; he hath shed blood: and that man shall be cut off from among his people; to the end that the children of Israel may bring their sacrifices which they offer in the open field, even that they may bring them unto the Lord, unto the door of the tabernacle of the congregation, unto

the priest, and offer them for peace-offerings unto the Lord. And the priest shall sprinkle the blood upon the altar of the Lord at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation, and burn the fat for a sweet savour unto the Lord" (Lev. xvii. 1-6, retaining the rendering of the A.V., which is doubtless susceptible of considerable improvement, without however affecting the general sense). No exception is allowed to this regulation as to the effusion of blood, because in no instance is the distance to the Tabernacle insuperable. Now undoubtedly in the East "beef and mutton are not every-day food;" undoubtedly "the slaughter of a victim for food marks a festal occasion;" undoubtedly it is evident "from Nathan's parable and the Book of Ruth" that "flesh was not eaten every day;" but such statements do not explain the one peculiarity of the command,—its universality, the harmony between the universality of the injunction and the conditions of the wilderness life. It was possible in the years of wandering for any one who made a feast to hallow it by presentation at the altar of burnt-offering, and by making the priests participators in his joy: what was possible was demanded, and nothing was required which was impossible. But, be it observed, when the wilderness life was at an end, and the people were about to cross over Jordan to their permanent abodes, the severity of the restriction was mitigated, and sin was not made venial by the maintenance of a law that was impossible. Scattered throughout the tribes from Dan to Beersheba it would have been solemn trifling to constitute presentation at the brazen altar the religious sanction for the effusion of blood. Another course is therefore pursued for calling attention to the serious nature of blood-shedding. When Moses gives his popular summary of the law, together with some specific adaptations to the altered conditions of the chosen nation in the land of promise, this question of the pouring out of blood before the Lord comes in for notice, as any observant reader of the twelfth chapter of Deuteronomy may see. No change is announced in the fact of a central tabernacle; in the Holy Land burnt-offerings and tithes, heave-offerings and vows are to be still presented in the court of the Lord's house; the Levitical laws remaining in all their restriction, it will be better not to sacrifice than to sacrifice in any place remote from the one place of service,—with one great

exception. "Notwithstanding," it is said, "thou mayest kill and eat flesh in all thy gates, whatsoever thy soul lusteth after, according to the blessing of the Lord thy God, which he hath given thee. . . . *Only ye shall not eat the blood ; ye shall pour it upon the earth as water.*" And again it is said, "When the Lord thy God shall enlarge thy border, as he hath promised thee, and thou shalt say, I will eat flesh because thy soul longeth to eat flesh ; thou mayest eat flesh, whatever thy soul lusteth after. If the place which the Lord thy God hath chosen to put his name there be too far from thee, then thou shalt kill of thy herd and of thy flock which the Lord hath given thee, as I have commanded thee, and thou shalt eat in thy gates whatsoever thy soul lusteth after. . . . Only be sure that thou eat not the blood . . . thou shalt not eat it ; thou shalt pour it upon the earth as water. Thou shalt not eat it, that it may go well with thee, and with thy children after thee, when thou shalt do that which is right in the sight of the Lord." It must be again manifest how the injunction thus adjusted harmonises with the conditions of life in the land of Israel, and how effusion upon the ground is permitted, that the solemn import of the pouring out of blood be not wholly ignored. The two alternatives presented by these injunctions are therefore these : Mr. Smith asserts that the form of the injunction in Deuteronomy was written first, and somewhere about the days of Josiah, whereas the form in Leviticus was written by some prophetic follower of Ezekiel about the time of the Exile ; in other words, Mr. Smith asserts that the permission to eat flesh was given in the days of Josiah, and that many decades later, when some of the Jews were in Egypt, some in Babylon, and some in the Holy Land, the more narrow form was promulgated by which every animal used for food was commanded to be slain at the Temple in Jerusalem. The other and more rational alternative is, that where observance of an injunction with an universal reference was possible, universal observance was demanded ; and that when in Canaan universal observance was impossible, the law was relaxed. Is not this injunction, in its harsher and milder form, sufficient to settle the question of the relative age of Leviticus and Deuteronomy ? And numerous instances of a parallel nature might be cited. Let any one compare the changes of law said to

have been announced by Moses on the eve of crossing the Jordan with the primary proclamation, and he will be surprised to find how many originate in the altered condition of an agricultural life as contrasted with a nomadic. Mr. Smith would not deny this, but would explain it as the romance of a much later author; to us it is the history of a contemporary.

Then there is another great class of instances. The entire construction of the Tabernacle is adapted to the life in the wilderness. On the theory of Mr. Smith, the Tabernacle of the Pentateuch is a work of imagination. According to Dr. Kuenen, the Tabernacle was constructed from the Temple by the rough and ready plan of halving the dimensions everywhere; this hypothesis not exactly suiting all the data, the Tabernacle becomes to Mr. Smith a result of literary art, a deliberate adaptation with a purpose compounded of the Temple of Solomon and the dreams of Ezekiel. Will this theory account for the minuteness of the facts? All the details given must surely emanate from an eye-witness. Fiction would indeed be stranger than fact if so circumstantial and detailed a structure was imagined and not described. That the Temple might be so manipulated as to transform it into a tent is conceivable so long as generalities only are regarded, but that all the variety of adaptation actually narrated should have been imagined passes the bounds of what conception can frame. Should the general plan of the Tabernacle, with its division into court, and holy place, and holiest, not have verisimilitude, a sense of truthfulness grows as the minute character of the descriptions given are considered. Not only have we exact dimensions, but colours, shapes, materials, ornaments, articles of furniture are exactly described. We can reproduce the rods upon which the curtains of the court hung, and the rings by which they were suspended; we can reproduce the copper uprights with their silver-plated capitals and their copper sockets, their brass pegs and their taut ropes, and the peculiarities of these uprights when adapted to stand at the corners. Instead of one covering sufficing for the tent, four are expressly named and described. Every piece of tapestry, every column, every species of ornamentation, every method of juncture, every variation of material, is most carefully recorded, as an eye-witness could alone chronicle. There

is not a utensil employed which is not delineated with sufficient accuracy for its reproduction. The names of the workmen employed are catalogued. Where details fail, they are said to be supplied by a pattern divinely provided. Or, not to delay upon a form of argument capable of indefinite enlargement, but sufficiently illustrated, let the careful arrangements for transport be considered. Every part is expressly constructed so as to be movable; it could be readily taken to pieces and readily put together again; there was not a sacred utensil, from the ark to the laver, which had not rings and poles to facilitate its carriage. If all these details were the product of a writer of the Exile of ecclesiastical tendencies, the most realistic of modern novels is incalculably outdone.

The same line of argument might be illustrated from the details given of the priesthood and the ritual enjoined for sacrifice. There is no hint anywhere of its being impossible for any member of the congregation to offer sacrifice at the door of the Tabernacle. The priests are always Aaron and his sons. It is Moses and Aaron to whom all the injunctions are given. Breaches in observance, and their lamentable consequences, are ascribed to Nadab and Abihu by name. It is possible for Aaron or his sons to go rapidly without the camp. Certain sacrifices are ordered to be eaten by "all the males among the children of Aaron." The points of priestly observance at the altar will not suit the altar of burnt-offering in its later form in Solomon's Temple. And so on, and so on. Express mention is also made of a great change in the national circumstances, which is spoken of in such terms as these: "When ye be come into the land of Canaan, which I give to you for a possession, and when ye shall have come into the land, and shall have planted all manner of trees for food;" "when ye be come into the land which I give unto you, and shall reap the harvest thereof." Xenophon is dreamy in comparison with a writer who could fabricate such an Anabasis.

That historical criticism itself has something to say in favour of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch it is trusted has at least been hinted. Nor must the theological bearings of the question be forgotten. If the Levitical legislation of the Pentateuch had its origin in Ezekiel and the Exile (even according to the scheme of Mr. Smith, to say nothing of the antisuper-

naturalistic avowals of the leaders of his school), then Moses falls back into a position inferior to Solon, and our Lord's references to him and his work become extravagant; the statements of Paul as to the origin and influence of the Law, and the statements of the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, but display the credulity of their age; the use of the names of Moses and Aaron as the recipients of a Divine revelation resolves itself into a literary trick; the origin of the saintship of David, Isaiah, and Jeremiah is an unsolved problem; the Law and the Mishna belong to the same epoch; the Divine operation in Israelitish history is reduced to the ordinary action of Providence, and the salient features of the Old Testament illustrate a law of natural evolution rather than supernatural interference. Such consequences ought to have some weight also in the decision of the question.

ALFRED CAVE.

ART. II.—*The Probability of a Revealed Religion.*

AN earnest evangelist was once seen, at an English watering-place, cutting out in the chalk of a cliff such words as these: "God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son." The cliff itself, without the carved words, told something of a God. There were hieroglyphics in the weather-stains, the seams of various-coloured sand, the tufts of samphire just above the water-line. These spelled out part of a sentence: "God so loved the world that—" We could not well make out more. At all events, a hand was needed to fill in the declaration, "He gave his only-begotten Son."

Now, it is a great question, surely, whether, in addition to the hieroglyphics of nature, there has been such a carving by the Hand upon the cliff. In other words, has a revelation been given to the world? Or is Christianity only a natural religion like others, though the highest attainment as yet of the religious faculty in man?

In the present paper no attempt will be made to establish a positive argument on the subject. The view to be taken will be wholly from a *priori* ground. The existence of a personal God and of an immaterial soul in man being assumed, together with, so to speak, the physical possibility of a super-

natural or revealed religion, the question to be glanced at is—the antecedent likelihood or unlikelihood that God, being what He is, would give such a religion to the world in its actual condition. Is a revealed religion probable?

To the scientific mind in these days, the presumption is altogether against the idea of any interference, by revelation from heaven, with the close-linked order existing in nature. Its armour of chain-mail, ring held in ring, is impenetrable. Only to be repudiated, as a kind of impiety towards the God of order, is “the notion of a world governed by special acts of intervention such as the mediæval theologians imagined.” What may be called interposition on the part of a personal Divine Agent is not to be seen anywhere in nature, and if any action on the part of such an Agent is to be admitted, it is only in the original formation of the “protoplasm,” or first potential matter, the mystic ovum of all later and higher life. There are to be beheld everywhere only the developments of this parent force, the marvels brought by this “prestidigitateur” out of his exhaustless cabinet. Only evolution from within of coiled-up energies. No present-day interference from without. Such is the law all over the world of matter. And why, it is asked, should it be otherwise within the sphere of religion? Why retain there what can only be a superstition, that idea of special interference which has been exorcised from men’s minds in connection with every other department of knowledge? Let there be religion indeed! It is man’s glory, and his necessity; and that not only in the sense that he requires it, but also in the other sense that he is impelled to it.¹ And Christianity is the religion for man; as yet at least the topmost and most richly-laden branch of the old tree. We are not to think of the Gospel as anything else than the natural product of the religious faculty in humanity, the season-fruit of this age. “We claim no special gift,” says Max Müller again, “no *special revelation*. The only gift we claim is perception, the only revelation we claim is history, or, as it is now called, historical evolution.” And to the same effect is the utterance of Stuart Mill: “If God intended that

¹ “I maintain that religion, so far from being impossible, is inevitable, if only we are left in possession of our senses, such as we really find them, not as they have been defined for us.”—(Max Müller, *Origin of Religion*.)

mankind should receive Christianity or any other gift, it would have agreed better with all that we know of his government to have made provision in the scheme of creation for its arising at the appointed time by natural development; which, let it be added, all the knowledge we now possess concerning the history of the human mind tends to the conclusion that it actually did." A revelation, it is in effect contended, would be a thing so manifestly out of the Divine order that it could not be from God.

So strong is this conviction with some, that they decline even to consider what positive evidence may be offered in support of the view that Christianity is a supernatural religion. And others, who do not go so far, approach the examination of such evidence with a prejudice against it. Whatever may have been the case in former years, in these days of ours preconceived opinion is certainly not all with the supernaturalists. Traditional belief has to a large extent changed sides. It may be useful therefore to consider at the present moment where the presumption really lies. We do not stay to challenge the accuracy of the premiss that natural development, without special intervention at any time since the beginning, has prevailed historically in the material world: here evolutionists themselves are divided in opinion. Our course of argument leads us by another route. In whatever way—whether by evolution or otherwise—the system of nature which we see around us, and of which we are a part, has come about, that system of nature supplies no presumption against there being a direct revelation of religious truth from God: on the contrary, its actual testimony, rightly understood, is in favour of that supposition.

What may be called direct revelation is found to be one of the common phenomena of nature or the system of things. As soon as we pass into that region in our world where there is need for communication between individuals possessed of intelligence in any degree, we find "revelation" to be the law. There is direct utterance. Even the inferior animals are continually telling out by their many voices, "none of which is without signification," their various feelings. Wherever there is what may be called individuality, with power of feeling and volition, there utterance or communication exists: it being part of the order of nature that there be connecting

bond of speech between such as possess any faculty for understanding and fellowship. And when we ascend in our observations to the region of human life as social, we perceive a corresponding development of the powers noticed in the inferior creatures. Everywhere over society we observe *speech* of some sort; communication in a direct way from one to another; a constant immediate *revelation* of inward thought and feeling going on. There is really nothing more familiar in the economy of human life than this phenomenon of direct communication from mind to mind, sometimes by looks and signs, and usually by words. Parents tell their little ones this or that, and admonish them as to their behaviour. When older, the children go to school and get lessons through the medium of language. Our young men proceed to college, where in the same way their instruction is carried further. Scientists, moralists, and theologians address us by tongue or pen; unfolding with studied lucidity their meaning, and seeking to persuade us to adopt their views or follow their counsels. There is another world, then, besides this tongueless one of inorganic nature! There is in the universe this fact, that between individuals capable of it direct revelation is constantly going on. Where there are beings that require a medium of intelligent communication between them, there we perceive some sort of speech to exist. And hence it is not a suggestion *prima facie* opposed to the analogy of nature, at all events, which is offered when it is asked whether there may not be some direct personal and articulate utterance made by God to man. Is there to be eternal silence between these intelligences, these kindred natures, with their mutual capacity for love and communion? Are all creatures in the universe that have any measure of intelligence, or are even sentient, capable of telling out directly what is in them, and have they the means and the appetency thereto? Can man commune with man through the high gift of language? And is the Infinite Mind and Heart not to express itself, or is it to do so but faintly or uncertainly through dumb material symbols, never by blessed speech? Is there no "Word of God"? To give a negative answer here would be at least to go against the analogy of nature. All beings that we know of possessed of any intelligence—such beings generally, we can at all events say—and

especially the members of the human family, speak to each other in some direct way, make an immediate revelation of what is within them ; and one of the strongest of presumptions, surely, is this, that a Personal God, in whose image man was made, would, in his dealings with man, if sufficient occasion called, express himself in a similar direct manner ; in other words, give a revelation !

This conclusion might fairly be come to if God's being were only on the same plane with that of intelligent creatures in their relations to each other. But how is the inference strengthened by a consideration of what God is and men are, and of their actual relationship ! Is it likely—the question may be put with strong emphasis—that man being what he is as to nature, and existing in such and such an actual condition in this world, there should be no direct and articulate word from his Father to him ? We have assumed the existence of a personal God and of a soul in man. And have these two great entities no personal connection ? Is not that soul of man for God ? Is not God for that soul ? Religion grows out of the related existence of God and man. The two personalities—if we may use the expression with fit reverence—come together in it and commune with each other. And does not this of necessity involve a revelation ? Since there is religion, the meeting of God and man in fellowship, must there not be what we call the supernatural ?

Even normal, primary religion—not to speak yet of a religion specially suitable for a fallen being—seems to involve this necessity for a direct revelation. It does not appear that man, taking him at his first and best, could have had a sufficient and “workable” religion without the aid of some immediate personal manifestation of Deity to draw out the religious faculty into exercise, and supply it with its needed aliment. We do not require, with the idea of strengthening our argument, to minimise the ability of man unaided by revelation to arrive at acquaintance with God. Mill goes too far when he despairs of our being able to gather from nature signs and proof enough of there being a God, almighty, all-wise, strictly just, and benevolent. There are intuitions within us, a “law written in the heart,” fitted to lead us further than he deemed. And there are writings in external nature that could not have

remained undeciphered. "The invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity." And consequently we should have been "without excuse" in not knowing God, at least in some degree. But this is not inconsistent with the idea that, to make the religion of man, even as originally created, an efficient actuality by drawing it out into practical exercise, and to render it at once certain, definite, and full, a personal manifestation of God, such as Scripture declares to have taken place, was required. Religion must be no mere vague or doubtful sentiment. There must be, in order to it, some certain knowledge of the existence, nature, character, and claims of God. One thing essential is a conception of his *personality*. Only towards a personal God can there be piety, or obedience, or, above all, affection. Only with a personal God can there be fellowship. And how was this idea of the personality of an invisible God to be adequately realised? Granting that man, unaided, might have risen to the conception of it, it is manifest that, for sufficient certitude and practical fellowship, some personal manifestation of Deity was at least desirable. It is a common maxim relative to social life among us, that "who would have friends must show himself friendly." Where actual intercourse has never taken place, friendship is but a shadowy thing. There is need for meetings, or at least interchange of communications in some way, for the maintenance of communion. In a child, to take a different illustration, there is capacity of natural sort for filial feeling, but it needs manifestation of the paternal to draw the feeling out. Suppose children growing up and finding themselves in a house with suitable plenishing in it, and also finding every day food provided and ready for them, they would be "without excuse" if they had no belief in, or sentiment of admiration or gratitude towards, some personal benefactor; but if they had never seen a parent, or heard a word from or of him, how indefinite would be the direction in which their thoughts and feelings would go out? Is it not reasonable to think that parenthood would lead to some visit, or letter, or special communication of such a sort that the children would come to know with sufficient definiteness and impression *who* stood to them in loving relationship, and *who*, by the kindly instru-

mentalities that touched them, sent the supplies which they received? If the relation of God to man was meant to be *Fatherly*, and not merely that of Creator, if there was to be religion, and fellowship, or a relation of personal feeling between the two, then a measure of personal manifestation of the One to the other was necessary. There was no need or possibility of such personal manifestation on the part of God to the inferior orders of the creation; it was enough for *them* that they were part of a "scheme" of which, or its Author, they had no cognition; but if man was a child of God, and there was to be realised relationship between him and his Father, it was necessary that, in some unmistakeable way, that Father should declare and show himself. This would not be some addition to nature, or interference with it, but a part of it. Religion, in its essence, involves fellowship. The filial on our side is only the counterpart of the Fatherly on God's side. And if the filial implies manifestation on our part towards him, the Fatherly implies manifestation on his part towards us. So that, so far from personal communication of a direct sort from God to men, as his children, being incongruous with the essential idea of his procedure in the world, the opposite rather is the case. Fellowship is of the essence of religion, and manifestation by God of personality, such as takes place only in revelation, is essential to fellowship. It may be true that, for the secular business, so to speak, of the universe, that rigid fixity which belongs to the operation of physical law is best. Let day and night, and summer and winter, duly succeed each other; so will the earth "bring forth her fruit." Let the freighted ships know the certain seasons of the tides. It is a proof of Divine wisdom that there is nothing variant here, no "government by interference." But what, it is proper to ask, will the same wisdom do, just because it is the same, when it seeks, alike within the sphere of natural things, its higher ends? Shall not the higher end also have its appropriate means? Does the rich universe not hold more things than one within the aims of its existence; and do not different requirements carry with them necessity for modes of procedure that shall vary in accordance with their character? Let us not have contracted and hard ideas of what the "God over all" is to such a great creature of his as man. Manifold in his relationships, God

is varied in his working. He has fixed laws as a Creator and Administrator, but has he not free room, at the same time, for all suitable movements as a personal Sovereign and Father? Where, otherwise, were the perfection of the scheme of things? Is the going about among her people of a queen such as our own, or the mingling of parents with their children, to be called "government by interference"? It is manifestation of personality, which cannot be where all is rigid, but requires a freedom that has its own high laws. Religion thus involving fellowship, it is reasonable to admit the biblical teaching of appearances and speakings of a personal God to man in the world's prime, and the later teaching of a great "avatar" in the incarnation of the Son of God, as well as the kindred doctrine of the tenancy of the believing soul by the Holy Spirit. "Government by interference" may express an utterly false principle in the physical sphere, where, for its proper ends, it is necessary that all should be known as absolutely fixed; but in the no less real region of the loving heart of man, where religion lives, the order of fitness demands the principle of free personal manifestation in order to fellowship.¹

The necessity for some measure of revelation is thus suggested by the essential nature of religion in general, as including fellowship; and the necessity further appears when religion is contemplated in its aspects of *worship* and *obedience*. If religion be not revealed, or laid on us in a formulated or rubrical way from without—or from Above, as I should say rather—but is purely a product of the inward operations of the human mind, then worship and practical service of God must be merely general in their character. There is no possibility of an

¹ "We should most naturally expect that God would not hide himself from his creatures. He loves them, invites their love to him, asks them to be on terms of friendship with him. And what is this but to say that he will hear, communicate, be open to and receive their desires, doing for and with them as friends do, because they are friends. The infidels have said, 'If there is a God, why does he not show himself? Is there anything so important for man to know as God? Why, then, is this kept so ambiguous and dark, when other things are clear?' And are they not right—that is, right so far as they assume the certainty that a living God will show himself the living God? . . . There is nothing in the world of laws to discourage such a confidence. . . . Laws are not broken up by the specialties of faith, but are only transcended. Or rather, we may say that we are now exploring and searching out the higher laws of God, even those of his personal society and goodness."—(Dr. Horace Bushnell, Letter in *Life*, p. 358.)

authoritative rubric, with any details belonging to it, being evolved from man's inner consciousness, or photographed by the light of nature from anything in the outer world. No "positive" enactments are possible. The institution, for example, of a periodically recurring Sabbath could not take place as by Divine authority. For, by supposition, there is no intimation of the Supreme Will with regard to the matter, all revelation being denied; and, from the nature of the case, of course no feeling of obligation to observe, say a seventh-day Sabbath, could arise within the general consciousness of humanity. If any such positive institutions would be of use in the cultus of the religious life, they are impossible; for, in the absence of any external authority enjoining them, whence is a sense of their obligation to arise, seeing that the inner consciousness of man can know nothing of them in what is positive in their character? And when we come specifically to the idea of obedience or duty as towards God, we are still more seriously embarrassed, if all imposition of service or requirement *ab extra* is to be disallowed. Obedience to an external authority implies knowledge in some way of the will of such authority. This is the philosophy of conscience, "God's vicegerent," as it is fitly called, "in the soul." And if it be held that there is no outward revelation of duty, no "Ten Words" uttered from any Sinai, lifting its solemn peaks in the outer air, or engraved on any slabs of material stone, then it must be taken that conscience and reason, which constitute the inner light, are sufficient for an authoritative guide. But whether that inner light would have been adequate, even in a state of innocence, may be questioned. The biblical narrative, at all events, speaks of requirement being made and sanction uttered in a direct way from Heaven, as a matter of fact, in man's paradisaic state. And of course, there being no objective Law, which all could read and recognise, the only conception of duty would be that which arose within the general consciousness. This being the case, no one teacher could say to his fellow-man, "This or that is duty for *you*." The inner light is authoritative only to the individual within whose breast it burns. It is a lamp but for that single chamber. It is not a sun in the outward heavens, marking times and seasons for a planet. If any superior members of

the race attain to any loftier ideas and sentiments of duty than their fellows, they cannot say to the less-advanced, "Here is duty for you." They may teach, indeed, but they cannot "lay down law;" there being no general objective law to declare. The only Sinai is in each man's bosom. He knows no "Thus saith the Lord," except that of the voice sounding in his own reason and conscience. A man can only be a "law unto himself." The impossibility of any positive enactment such as that of a seventh-day Sabbath, or even monogamy, thus appears; and it may be said generally that if man was to be, not merely under law, but under *laws*, there was need for the articulate utterance of authority,—in other words, for a revelation. "Religion," says Mr. J. A. Froude, in language which is very suggestive with reference to this point, although he did not use it with such a bearing, "differs from moral science in the authority with which it speaks. Moral science addresses the reason, and is contented with probabilities. It indicates what, on the whole, after examination of the evidence, appear to be the ethical conditions under which human beings exist on this planet. Religion, on the other hand, speaks with command, and corresponds to the laws of the state." Mr. Froude says what is true in describing religion as distinguished by having an authoritative peremptoriness belonging to it, its laws being like those of the state. In a religion without a revelation, however, where is that which corresponds to the statute law of a country? Where are the enactments, specific and clear, which can be generally recognised and obeyed? Let us have "ten words" spoken from on High, and preserved by being written down in a "book of the law;" let us have a "Sermon on the Mount" from the lips of a "God manifest in the flesh," and then we shall know with sufficient definiteness what is required of us all in the way of obedience. Even to the first of the human family it could not but be necessary that a direct voice from heaven should utter its dread "Thou shalt," and "Thou shalt not."

The argument has proceeded hitherto on the hypothesis of man being in a good moral or spiritual condition to start with; it being contended that even in such a case, with his religion of a normal sort, a revelation or direct manifestation of God to him would be necessary, in order to the bringing of his religion

out into full and lively practical exercise. But the conclusion thus reached is strengthened greatly by the consideration, which it is impossible to dispute, that, whether in consequence of a "Fall" or not, the human race is, as a matter of fact, in a state of moral imperfection. The actual condition of man, as spiritually corrupt, renders a revealed religion an absolute necessity. Let us, for the purposes of argument, assume the fact of a fall, or moral cataclysm, on our globe. In view of such a catastrophe having taken place, it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that Divine interposition would follow. When a machine goes wrong the maker of it may feel himself called upon to look to it again; although in other circumstances he might have left it to itself. Those evolutionists who are not atheistical allow that there was a direct Divine act in the creation of the protoplasm at least; and some of them are not disposed to deny that there was a like immediate operation of God in the placing of man in the world. And such may well be prepared to admit that, if a necessity arose for man being made anew in a spiritual sense, so that there might be set agoing fresh developments of his history, and higher manifestations of the character of God brought about, another act of direct Divine power would not be a surprising thing. If a creation by direct act was worth while, why should a new creation not also be so? If from disobedience future obedience could not be naturally evolved, or purity brought out of corruption, why should a fresh force of a curative character not be introduced? But suppose that, for argument's sake, we went so far as to give up the theory of a fall, and took the ground that man is, and has been all along, only comparatively ignorant and weak, and liable, if not prone, to error, why, even in that case, should it be reckoned a "hard saying" that his God (whose existence and paternal relations are supposed to be acknowledged) should, by means of revelation, give him a knowledge, and put him under a cultus, fitted for his education and progress? Would it not be in the line of a fatherliness which might be looked for, for Him to say, "My son, hear my words"? Let us come back, however, to the hypothesis of a fall and a recovery. Considering what, in that condition of things, God and man *are* respectively, does the doctrine of a revelation seem strange? Moral disaster having happened,

was not the introduction of special means of restoration a necessity? It is not easy to conceive of the natural evolution of recovery from a condition so serious, of a sufficient *vis medicatrix* in a system that had been so radically affected by disease. If man, to speak in another style of metaphor, had lost his footing when he was strong and his head was clear, was it likely that, after he was morally weakened and brain-beclouded, he would be able by his own efforts to regain the far heights from which he had slipped? What is the testimony upon the point, of those countries which have been destitute of that system which is assuredly God's revelation if there be such a thing in the world—that is, Christianity? Self-recovery is not, as a matter of fact, seen anywhere. The efforts of Christian missions even—in connection with which a leaven of higher influence, at all events, if not a “revelation” from God, has been carried—have been only moderately successful. “It is an indubitable historical fact,” says Professor Flint, “that outside of the sphere of special revelation man has never attained to such a knowledge of God as a responsible and religious being plainly requires. ‘The world by wisdom knew not God.’ The whole history of the heathen world testifies to the truth of this affirmation of St. Paul.” These are suggestive words. If the experience of all the centuries and of all countries is to the effect that of himself man has “never attained to such a knowledge of God as a responsible and religious being plainly requires,” then surely it cannot be regarded as a thing incongruous with the proper action of a God towards an important creature and cherished child of his, in a condition manifestly so desperate, that he should give a revelation; speak directly some words of guidance; stretch down a hand from the dark for uplifting!

When, beyond giving ourselves to reflection in this more general way, we proceed to think out in any detail what is actually involved in the setting of man right as a religious being, we soon come to see that, from the nature of the case, special communication and action on the part of God were absolutely required. View sin, for instance, as carrying with it guilt and desert of punishment; how is the man who has sinned to know whether, as a matter of fact, a just God can pardon? Is there anything in the religious consciousness within him, or

in the facts of nature and history in the outside world, to enable him to come to a solid conclusion on this point? And suppose that, if pardon is possible, there are certain terms or conditions on which alone it can be fitly granted by the Moral Governor of all—such as the previous making of atonement, and the existence of a penitential and believing state of soul on the part of the recipient of mercy,—how is knowledge of these essential terms, originating as they do with the invisible Lawgiver only, to be arrived at by the guilty man concerned, unless the Lawgiver speak? And if, in addition to the obtaining of a pardon with proper moral and utilitarian safeguards, there be necessary, for the actual inward renovation of the man, a certain system of hygienic means and agencies, by whom is that system to be set up and applied? How is anything effectual to be accomplished in this way, apart from special action on the part of a redeeming God? Conceive a need for the bringing to bear upon the diseased soul of the medicine of powerful new *motives*, such as those lying in gratitude for forgiveness bestowed, and in hopes and fears associated with a great eternal future known to be certain, whence again is the pressure of these motives upon the man to come, if God do not reveal them? seeing that they could not spring up within the soul itself, the facts being dependent solely upon the Divine will. These things are not in the intuitions of our minds, they are not in external nature. They are with God, and cannot be ours unless He tell us of them. In a similar way, it might be asked with regard to certain usages and rites, such as the Lord's Supper, which are helpful in the Christian life,—What could have set these up as obligatory except the expression of the Divine will concerning them? Only through that could they become “ordinances.” And what, again, one might inquire, is the operation of God's Spirit in the renewal of a soul, if that be necessary, but itself a manifestation of the supernatural? It is obvious that, if there be a “method of redemption” with which we are to fall in, there must be a revelation to us; for how can we take advantage of that which we know not, and which, as being dependent upon another mind and will than ours, we could not have gained? As it is for the government of a country, in a given case, to say whether there is to be an amnesty or a reversal of attainder,

and if so, on what terms and in what manner that is to be granted; so not less is it for the Supreme Authority in the universe, and for that alone, to speak and act in connection with the matter of the restoration of a fallen humanity. The religion of a sinner—a religion essentially redemptive in its character—implies of necessity interposition from above. Historically, it must be a thing brought in, not evolved.

Our argument, briefly stated, is this. Revelation, so far from being a thing out of harmony with the known order of nature, is itself one of the commonest facts of nature; direct communication of thought and feeling constantly taking place around us on the part of the inferior animals, and among us, in our high gift of human speech. Why then—such is the inference suggested—should not *God* speak? You and I do so. The inferior creatures do so, each in its proper God-taught way. We find not mere dumb signs and symbols in the world, but manifold utterance of quite articulate sort. So that it is not to oppose the analogy of nature to ascribe such utterance or “revelation” to God. And we have seen that there is what appears to be sufficient reason why God should speak in this way to man. The higher ends of the very system of things, taking it as a whole, moral as well as material, have demanded it. The order of nature would have been imperfect without revelation. If nature requires fixity of physical law for its lower and secular ends, it equally requires free place for Divine manifestation in order to its higher and spiritual ends, viz., man’s fellowship with God, his worship of the Supreme, and his training to obedience. For the accomplishment of that part of the design of the general system of things which lies in man being religious, such a manifestation of God as involves a revelation was requisite. The necessity would have existed suppose man had not become sinful, some manifestation of a personal God being essential to the calling into exercise of the religious faculty within us, and to actual fellowship. This we sought to show, and we now quote on the point pertinent words which we have since come upon in Delitzsch’s *Messianic Prophecy*:—

“The history of finite and personal beings can have no other true and ultimate goal than an ever deeper entrance into a living fellowship with God. But a continuance in such fellowship without actual intercourse

between God and his intelligent creatures is inconceivable. It must therefore be possible, and can be proved as actual, that God and men can speak with and work upon one another."

If revelation would have been thus necessary to man in a sinless condition, how much more was it called for on his falling into a state of moral ruin! "Interposition" does not seem out of harmony with the "disorder" of things, if their "order" would not have required it. Altogether, revelation seems to be an essential part of the system of nature viewed in its grand entirety. Nature is large, and its order is not merely physical. What is called "interference" is as much the requirement of that order in one department as the severe absence of it is in another. A father, when he comes to visit his children, does not throw down the house which he had erected for them, but having left a door in the building, enters in where the little ones are, and makes himself known as their father, and tells them what is in his heart, and what he would have them be. Not violating any of his laws, a Father-God is able to manifest himself to men: what we name the "supernatural" being the "natural" to him. And we should seek him, "nothing doubting."

"Speak to Him, then, for He hears, and spirit with spirit can meet;
Closer is He than breathing, nearer than hands and feet!"

WALTER MORISON.

ART. III.—*The Archæology of Celtic Christianity.*¹

THE *Antiquary* was published in 1816; and by that widely-read work of fiction Sir Walter Scott rendered his fellow-antiquaries two dissimilar services: he brought their

¹ 1. *Scotland in Early Christian Times: The Rhind Lectures on Archæology*, 1879. By Joseph Anderson, Keeper of the National Museum of the Antiquaries of Scotland. Edinburgh: David Douglas, 1881.

2. *Life of Saint Columba, Founder of Hy*. Written by Adamnan, Ninth Abbot of that Monastery. Edited by William Reeves, D.D., M.R.I.A., Rector of Tynan, and Canon of Armagh. *The Historians of Scotland*, vol. vi. Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1874.

3. *Celtic Scotland: A History of Ancient Alban*. By W. F. Skene. 3 vols. Vol. II. Book II. Church and Culture. Edinburgh: David Douglas, 1880.

favourite pursuits into notice, and he brought those that pursued them into ridicule. As some Englishmen are indebted to the plays of Shakespeare for all the knowledge of English history they possess, so it may be conjectured there are some Scotchmen and not a few Englishmen who owe all their acquaintance with northern antiquarian questions to the racy conversations and the irate discussions of the laird of Monkbarns. When showing to Lovel what he believed to be traces of an ancient camp at the Kaim of Kinprunes, the Antiquary enlightened his friend about the decisive engagement between Agricola and the Caledonians, and the different localities fixed upon as the scene of conflict; and, before his fine theory was rudely shattered by Edie Ochiltree, he had gone over some of the salient points in Roman castrametation, the Decuman and Pretorian gates, the *porta sinistra* and *porta dextra*, and the Pretorium, on the central part of the tumulus. Then, in the after-dinner discussion between the Antiquary and Sir Arthur Wardour of Knockwinnoch, which resulted in such disaster, a good deal of antiquarian jargon, if not of genuine lore, crops up. Listening to the doughty champions as they exchanged home-thrusts, Lovel was overwhelmed with information; Picts *versus* Piets, Gothic *versus* Celtic dialect; a list of Pictish kings and an early copy of the Ragman Roll; the round towers of Brechin and Abernethy, and such antiquarian authorities as "the learned Pinkerton," "the indefatigable and erudite Chalmers," "Innes the Papist," Gordon, Ritson, and Sir Robert Sibbald—to these matters and authorities was the perplexed stranger treated when called upon to arbitrate in the deadly feud between baronet and laird. And, not to multiply instances, are there not some whose acquaintance with the controversy about the poems of Ossian is limited to what can be gathered from the conversation between uncle and nephew on their way to attend the funeral of Steenie Mucklebackit, in which conversation the hot-tempered Hector M'Intyre showed himself ready to fight knee-deep or forfeit life and land rather than suffer any aspersion to be thrown upon the battles of Fingal and Lamon Mor, and Magnus and the spirit of Muirartach? When to these passages are added the description of the Antiquary's den, the ruins of Saint Ruth's Priory, and the grave of Misticot with its "muckle stane that has the man

streakit out upon his back in the midst o't," and the proposal of the laird that his friend should compose a poem to be called the Caledoniad, or Invasion Repelled, into the appendix of which his Essay on Castrametation might be introduced, it must be admitted that a pleasant flavour of antiquity pervades the book which could only have been imparted to it by one who was himself the antiquary, and that not a little information regarding Scottish antiquities can be gathered from the pages of one of the most readable of Scott's novels.

On the other hand, the whole drift, whatever may hold good of the design of the novel, is to place in a ludicrous light antiquaries and their pursuits. In the opening chapter Mr. Oldbuck plunges into a sea of discussion concerning urns, vases, votive altars, Roman camps, and the rules of castrametation; and his discussions, or "eternal harangues," as his nephew called them, flow on in unbroken succession till the last chapter, in which we find him completing two essays, one on the mail shirt of "the Great Earl," and the other on the left-hand gauntlet of "Hell in Harness," and giving the finishing touches to his notes for the Caledoniad. Every one he comes in contact with is bored wellnigh to desperation with his prolix disquisitions, not excepting Lord Glenallan, who is compelled to listen to a dissertation upon the hill-fort of Quickens-bog, ingeniously transformed into Whackensburgh, and to the sore trouble of nephew Hector, who does not scruple to affirm that his relative's harangues and investigations about "invalided pots and pans, and tobacco-stoppers past service," are not "worth the spark of a flint." On every occasion, grave and gay, in all circumstances, seasonable and out of season, does the Antiquary obtrude his antiquarian lore upon hearers who are not always so interested and intelligent as his companion in the Queensferry diligence. One does not know whether most to commiserate the members of the societies of antiquaries who were condemned to hear "the slight Essay upon Castrametation," or the friends whom the laws of hospitality compelled to listen to what Edie irreverently termed his "nonsense maggots," or his correspondent at York, Dr. Dryasdust—readers of Carlyle know what use he made of that felicitous name—who had interchanged letters with the laird for six years, with the result that only the first line of the inscription on the

Saxon horn preserved in York Minster had been made out between them. But the fool's cap is placed on the head of the enthusiast, and antiquarian hobbies covered with inextinguishable laughter, when the tumulus, which the imagination of the laird had converted into a Roman camp, sinks into "a bit bourock," of which the king's bedesman could testify: "Pretoria here, Pretoria there, I mind the bigging o't," when a stone, which the explorer had taken to be "a sacrificing vessel," is, by a similar process of disenchantment, carried out by the same tormentor, transformed into "a stane that ane o' the mason callants cut a ladle on," while the mystic letters, which the excavator fondly hoped might stand for "Agricola Dicavit Libens Lubens," are ruthlessly associated with "Aiken Drum's Lang Ladle."

Against ridicule so pungent, satire so keen as that in which the *Antiquary* abounds, nothing could hope to make a successful stand. And so it fared with the antiquaries as it fared with the covenanters, afterwards satirised in *Old Mortality*. The uninformed public was made acquainted with them, and then constrained to laugh at them; and in both cases the misconception in the public mind to which the misrepresentations of the popular writer gave rise, was all the more hard to bear, seeing it was the doing of one who had something of the furnishing of an historian, and not a little of the lore of the antiquarian.

Within a comparatively recent period, certainly within the memory of living men, a great change has taken place in the method, though not in the matter, of antiquarian research. Conscious of the disrepute into which the names had fallen, mainly through the banter of Scott, students of ancient things have discarded the terms "antiquarianism" and "antiquary" in favour of "archæology" and "archæologist." From the time the word *antiquarius* first appeared in the later Roman writings of Tacitus, Suetonius, and Juvenal, with the signification of an affecter of old words and phrases, the term has always conveyed more or less the idea of a pedant, a discourser upon trifles, a collector of nicknacks. It was well to get quit of these associations so far as possible, although it might be difficult, if not impossible, to alter the names of chartered societies such as those of the Antiquaries of London and of Scotland;

but it is well to bear in mind that so far as the objects of research are concerned the field is the same. The antiquary is concerned with the products of the past, the archæologist studies ancient things ; for archæology, as Mr. Anderson states in his opening sentence, is "the science of things that are old." But a more important change than that of nomenclature relates to method. The antiquary of Scott's day made himself the laughing-stock of the literary world by a total disregard of all scientific principles and methods, and even prided himself upon a facility in drawing conclusions from irrelevant evidence. Not so the archæologist of the latter half of the nineteenth century. His study is that of a science, and he pursues his scientific studies according to a rigorous method, by applying sound principles of induction to his phenomena and specimens. He arms himself with that prime requisite of all scientific inquiry—accurate observation, and when compelled to accept the descriptions of others he discriminates sharply between statements that are the products of precise observation and statements that are the products of vague impression or general inference. Under such treatment archæology has risen to the dignity of a science, and few scientific pursuits can now rival in comprehensive interest the link between geology and history. A better specimen of an archæologist of the modern school could not be found than in the present Rhind Lecturer. Furnished, if we mistake not, with the advantage of that training in exactness which the teaching profession imparts, and favoured, through his official relation to the National Museum, with unrestricted access to the largest collection of specimens his native country affords, Mr. Anderson has in these Lectures proved himself a scientific observer and an artistic lecturer of no mean order.

In clearing the way for what is to follow, the lecturer is careful at the outset to determine the extent and the limitations of his favourite pursuit. Archæology is a logical not a chronological science, one of areas not of eras, of type and not of time determination. The first question is not, How old is this relic of the past? but, What are the facts about it? And the second is, What is it made of? In the case of implements gathered out of the soil a singular and suggestive fact discloses itself when the second question in the catechism of

archæology is being answered. For then we find the same tool repeated in three materials,—stone, bronze, iron. This has led, in the system of primitive archæology, to a distinguishing the Stone, the Bronze, and the Iron Periods, the first of these being, in modern designation, subdivided into the Palæolithic or Drift with its characteristic implements of chipped flints, and the Neolithic or Surface Stone period, characterised by weapons of polished flint and stone. But it would be a great mistake from this employment of the term “period” or “age” to conclude that archæology takes to do with time as history does, and that by a period is meant a portion of time ranging between two known dates. Even such an accomplished archæologist as Professor Daniel Wilson may have his own share of responsibility in connection with this error, for in the ninth edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, when writing the article “Prehistoric Archæology,” he uses the expression, “the archæological subdivisions of time;” but Mr. Anderson is careful to guard against such confusion by pointing out that the term “period” must be used not in its common acceptation, but in its restricted and technical sense, as is the case with the terms used in every science, and by insisting that archæology gives neither measurements to its periods nor dates to its specimens. With him accordingly the three ages become “three stages of progress towards the existing culture and civilisation,” so that when he speaks of the Stone Age in Scotland, he merely means the condition and culture which expressed themselves by the exclusive use of natural materials, like stone, or bone, and wood for implements and weapons.

How carefully Mr. Anderson confines himself within the limits of his own domain may be best seen by a reference to the two lectures devoted to structural remains. The archæological results reached and illustrated in these lectures may be stated in summary thus. Taking the twelfth century as that in which the non-historic passes into the historic, and excluding from view all ecclesiastical structures known to be of or after twelfth century date, those that are prior to that period present two types of structure, churches with nave and chancel and churches that are simple oblongs of a single chamber only. As the more complex and refined linked on to the style current in the dividing century, the chancelled churches, mostly

Norman in style, are not of the primitive type. That type must be sought for among the single-chambered churches, although this does not imply that any church which may be found to be constructed of a single chamber is necessarily earlier than one constructed with a chancel, for the conclusion relates, not to individual specimens, but to the typical form alone. Failing to find a type which is truly primitive in the line of chancelled churches, and turning to those of a simpler structure and smaller size, we find single-chambered churches linked on with and passing into the chancelled type having windows in the side walls, it being necessary to light the nave separately by windows in the side walls because of the addition of the chancel. But there is another group of this same type containing structures, oratory, chapel, or cell of the smallest size, the simplest form, and the rudest construction—structures, in short, of one chamber, one doorway, and one window. In this variety of the single-chambered structure the primitive type of Scotie ecclesiastical building is to be found. But here again the type shows two varieties, "those built with lime, and those that have reached the utterly simple character of construction that consists in the placing of stone upon stone without any binding material to keep them together." The former variety (of which the cell at Inchcolm in the Firth of Forth is a fine specimen) reveals the primitive type; but the latter presents the primitive type in primitive form. When specimens of this primitive form of the primitive type are met with, they are found to be in association with dry-built cells of beehive shape, presumably monastic dwellings, a rampart of uncemented stones enclosing the settlement. Of three such groups of structures Mr. Anderson gives a detailed account. The first group described is at Inchcolumcille in Skye; the second is on Eilean-na-Naoimh, a small island of the Garveloch group, not over a mile in length, and uninhabited; and the third is on the Brough of Deerness in Orkney. Since in all these cases there is found a number of beehive roofed cells of masonry without lime or mortar, or cement of any kind, gathered round churches of undivided apartment with doorway in the west end, and one window in the east end, the whole group contained within a cashel, or so insular as not to require such a defence, it is reasonable to suppose they present "the type of the ecclesiastical

settlements of the monastic phase of the Celtic Church." Now any one can see that in going over this ground the lecturer was under strong temptation to disregard the limits of his science and indulge in speculations, conjectures and guesses as to the age of the specimens with which he was dealing, and to identify them with some well-known name. Specially was this the case when dealing with what exists on the island Inch Columcille in what was once Loch Columcille, in Skye, and with the remains on one of the Garveloch islands. As regards the former the very name at once suggests Columba, and Dr. Petrie has no hesitation in affirming of what is found there, that they are "the most undoubted remains of a monastic establishment of St. Columba's time." But Mr. Anderson will not commit himself to that position, freely admitting there is lack of evidence sufficient to attribute the remains that now exist to the days of the founder of Hy, and only going the length of regarding it as "undeniable that the settlement is of Columban origin," and the remains "among the very earliest of ecclesiastical origin now remaining in Scotland."

The temptation must have been still greater in the case of Eilean-na-Naoimh or the Island of the Saints, lying between Scarba and Mull. In Adamnan's Life of St. Columba mention is repeatedly made of an island called Himba, Hinba, or Hinbina. When Dr. Reeves edited Adamnan's work he considered this island as not yet identified, but conjectured that it was "north of and not far from Hy," that is, Iona. In the appendix to the Edinburgh edition there is an interesting discussion of the point, and the conclusion reached by Mr. Skene is, that all indications point to the identifying of Hinba with the Island of the Saints in the group of the Garvelochs; and so certain does the matter appear to him that in the translation of the Life in that edition the name Eilean-na-Naoimh has been inserted as the modern name of Hinba, as Iona is of Hy. To Mr. Skene nothing can be clearer than that in these remains of primitive type and form we are to find the monastery founded by Columba, and over which he placed his uncle Ernan, the church in which he consecrated, in the presence of the four founders of monasteries, the holy mysteries of the Eucharist, the house in which he dwelt and which was filled with heavenly brightness, and the

hermitage (*locus anachoretarum*) in which Virgnous led the life of an anchorite for twelve years—all which is vouched for in Adamnan's Life. When, however, Mr. Anderson comes to deal as an archæologist with what the historian has thus disposed of, in the full knowledge of all that has been written, he abstains from indorsing any opinion that would involve a judgment regarding the date of the structures on the Island of the Saints.

"Standing on my own ground," he says, "which is non-historical, it is enough for me to have shown that the remains here are of the typical character of the early monasteries in Ireland. Whether the group of structures now remaining, or any of them, may be or may not be of the time of St. Columba himself, I, speaking as an archæologist, have no means of determining. Specific dates are the exclusive property of history, and cannot be reached except through specific record. . . . The type of these structures may have ranged over four or five centuries, and without the assistance of definite record or dated characteristics, it is impossible to say to which of these centuries any of its specimens is to be assigned."—(Lect. iii. p. 100.)

The thoroughness with which Mr. Anderson pushes aside everything not strictly archæological resembles the concentration with which Colonel Gordon, when in Central Africa, addressed himself to what he regarded as his mission regardless of everything else. Professing a supreme disdain for explorers' honours, the Puritan soldier does not care "whether the Nile has a source or not, or whether there are two lakes or a million." With a like indifference to everything but his own work of determining area and type, the Rhind Lecturer is unmoved by the fact that when Dr. Reeves concludes his account of the remains with the "Query, Is this Hinba?" Mr. Skene styles it "pertinent," and scruples not to say: "Indeed it matters nothing to me whether this may be Hinba or not." Would such a statement ever have been made by our old friend the laird of Monkbarrow?

Historians of the Celtic period in the history of Scotland have, in recent times, attached great importance to the missionary movements of the Irish Christians. Referring for details to such standard works as the late Hill Burton's *History of Scotland* (vol. i.), Skene's *Celtic Scotland* (vol. ii.), and Reeves's edition of *Adamnan's of Life Columba* (*The Historians of Scotland*, vol. vi.), we may state that the Irish was a spreading language, and the Irish Christians were essentially

missionary in their activity. The extent to which the Irish language became a literary one, and as such extended from Iceland to Italy, is strikingly brought out by Mr. Anderson in his lecture on Books, when telling of what has been accomplished by Zeuss in his *Grammatica Celtica*. That distinguished philologist, from manuscripts found in the Ambrosian Library at Milan, in the monastery of St. Gall, in Carlsruhe, Wurtzburg, and other places on the Continent, reconstructed the ancient Celtic language of Ireland, without ever setting foot on Irish soil, and without any assistance from literary remains in Ireland. The existence of manuscripts of the Celtic type scattered over the libraries of Europe is proof sufficient that the language of primitive Christianity in Ireland was one not only adapted to the public and domestic uses of civilisation, but that it became a literary language earlier than any of the Teutonic tongues. Then that the Celtic Christians of Ireland, once their ardent natures had received kindling at the touch of the new faith, engaged in constant efforts at propagandism is a statement that admits of ample illustration. At the opening of his second volume of *Celtic Scotland*, Mr. Skene gives a graphic picture of the state of surprise into which the ecclesiastics of Gaul were thrown towards the end of the sixth century by the arrival of a small band of missionaries on their shores. Wearing coarse woollen garments and white tunics, with heads shaved in front from ear to ear, but allowing their hair to grow unchecked from the back of the head, and to flow down their shoulders, each carrying a staff, a leather water-bottle, a wallet, and a case containing some relics, the answer given by the strangers to the inquiries addressed to them was: "We are Irish, dwelling at the very ends of the earth. We be men who receive naught beyond the doctrine of the evangelists and apostles." The band of twelve had for leader a man of commanding presence and moving eloquence, combined with no small determination of character and intensity of purpose, who gave this description of himself: "I am a Scottish pilgrim, and my speech and actions correspond to my name, which is in Hebrew Jonah, in Greek Peristera, and in Latin Columba, a dove." The conduct of this band of Irish missionaries, so far from their home as Burgundy, and with Columbanus (not to be confounded with St. Columba of wider fame) at their head,

had not a little to do with the controversy regarding Easter which occupies so large a space in the early history of the Christian Church in Europe, and that of itself is a lasting testimony to the important position held by the Scoto-Irish Christian communities.

At a still earlier period than that of the visit of Columbanus and his missionary band to Gaul, towards the end of the fifth century, we come upon traces of another Irish settlement nearer our own doors. At that time there were in Ulster a Christian people called Dalriads, occupying territory known as Dalriada. Some of these Irish Dalriads, landing in Kintyre, spread along the coasts of Argyll, and formed a Dalriad colony in Scotland, with a territory bearing the same name as that in Ireland. The eldest son of Erc, who ruled in Irish Dalriada, was Loarn More, or the Great Loarn, whose name still lives in the district and marquisate of Lorn, and he became the first King of Dalriada in Scotland, and, in the opinion of the late J. Hill Burton, "the first King of Scotland—at least it is impossible to carry the thread of even a probable ruling authority vested in the ancestors of the Kings of Scotland any farther back." With Dalriads in Ireland and in Argyll, and in each place a territory called Dalriada, the language in both cases was Irish Celtic, called by the Teutonic Scots Irish, Ersh, or Erse. It is probably in the intercourse that then sprang up between the two countries that we are to find the explanation of the fact that the name Scot became common as applied to the inhabitants of both. For, however strange it may sound in modern ears, it is beyond dispute that originally Ireland was Scotia, and the Irish were the primitive Scots. And so in Adamnan's *Life of Columba* he speaks of the Irish saint and missionary, resolved to seek a foreign country for the love of Christ, sailing "de Scotia ad Britanniam," a statement which in the translation of the Edinburgh edition is rendered "from Scotia (Ireland) to Britain." It is not safe to take for granted that the word Scot must mean a native of what is now known as Scotland when the period dealt with is earlier than the middle of the twelfth century; and the caution of John of Tinmouth in his *Life of Columba* is a safe one to respect—"est autem sciendum quod Hiberniæ proprie Scotorum est patria," to which we will only add, that as often as the annalists of early times speak

of two Scotiæ, the larger and the smaller, Ireland is to be understood to be Scotia Major.

This slight historical digression may be of some service to our readers, enabling them to understand and appreciate that archæological treatment of the early Christian period in Scotland on the part of Mr. Anderson, to which we now invite attention. Among the structural remains of Scotland in the five centuries prior to the twelfth, the round towers, one at Brechin in Forfarshire, and the other at Abernethy in Perthshire, were a great puzzle to antiquaries of the Oldbuck type. They are not connected with any remains of a church, and would seem from their construction to have been always isolated buildings. With no evidence that there ever were more of these towers on the mainland of Scotland, and with nothing to guide him but scientific principles and method, what does the archæologist do? He regards these structures as outlying specimens of a well-marked type which must have had its area somewhere else, and, directed by such historical facts as have already been given, he looks to Ireland in hope of finding such an area. And he is not disappointed. For in that country seventy-six round towers at present exist, and twenty-two others at one time existed. These towers are grouped by Irish archæologists in four classes, according to the character of the stones used in building, and the manner in which the stones are laid upon one another. The entire period of this style of structure can be shown from a comparison of the examples of Irish church architecture, the dates of which are approximately known to lie between the end of the ninth and the beginning of the twelfth century. Their characteristics cause the towers of Brechin and Abernethy to be included in one of the two later styles of the Irish type rather than in either of the two earlier. Now the purpose of the tower, as has been demonstrated by Dr. Petrie and others, was to afford an asylum for the ecclesiastics and a place of security for the depositing of such valuables as bells, and books, and croziers, and relics. The form, presenting the least possible surface for assault, the isolation, and the internal arrangement, all point to a place of refuge, while, in the case of the majority of the Irish towers, they are situate at or near the sites of churches known to have suffered from the ravages of the

Norsemen. It is hardly necessary to state that the Celtic Christians of Alba or Scotia Minor were subject to the plundering expeditions of the Norse sea-rovers, as well as their brethren in Scotia Major; but if details are desired, they will be found in the chapter, "Sufferings from the Norsemen, 750-850," in Burton's *History of Scotland*, vol. i. chapter viii. Here, then, is one valuable application of the science of archæology as it deals with its specimens, arranging them in groups principal and derived, determining the nature of the types of which these groups are composed, and ascertaining the sequences and geographical areas of the types. Among the articles deposited in the round towers for safety were church and monastery bells, and in treating of these also Mr. Anderson has made good use of the close connection between the Scots of Erin and of Alba. From the twelfth century to the present day bells for ecclesiastical use have been circular in shape, of cast-metal material, and designed to be suspended in some part of the building. But there exist in Scotland specimens of church bells differing in all these particulars, and presumably belonging to an earlier stage of matters. These are tall, narrow, tapering, four-sided, of metal hammered and riveted like caldrons, with an exterior coating of bronze, and all of such size and weight as to admit of being hand-swung, a handle or the remains of one being always found attached to the specimens. Several bells of this type are described and figured in Mr. Anderson's lecture devoted to this subject (Lecture v.), and interesting information given bearing upon their discovery and preservation in recent times. There is the bell of Kingoldrum in Forfarshire, discovered in the churchyard in 1843, now preserved in the Museum at Edinburgh; the Ronnel bell of Birnie, in Morayshire, still preserved at the church; the bell of Cladh Bhrennu, in the upper part of Glenlyon, which stood for centuries in the open air, and survived the church the services of which it regulated, but which has recently been placed under lock and key in a niche in the graveyard wall; the bell of Fortingall, "now figured and described for the first time;" and the bell of St. Fillan of Struan, in Athole, actually in use up to 1828, now preserved in the house of Lude. But the most interesting in all this group of Celtic bells is the one with a graphic state-

ment of the exhuming of which Mr. Anderson begins his lecture. This is the bell of Birsay, in Orkney. When in 1862 a sandhill only a short distance from Birsay was opened, several cists made of flat stones taken from the neighbouring beach were found, and in some of these human remains were enclosed, which, when professionally examined, were without hesitation referred to the ancient Celtic inhabitants of Orkney. Not far off, and only a few feet from the remains of a building, was unearthed a cist similar to the others, but found to contain what had the appearance of a rudely-constructed pitcher,—further examination, however, proving it to be a bell placed mouth upwards, and the mouth covered with a flat stone. “Clearly,” as Mr. Anderson remarks, “this bell was buried. It was placed in a cist like a human being, but not in company with a human body. There were no bones in the cist, and no indication of its having ever contained anything but the bell. It was buried alone, but buried in a graveyard in the midst of a group of interments of men, women, and children, and close by a building which contained evidences of having been inhabited—querns and combs and pins, and other waifs and strays of domestic life. That it was buried for protection and concealment is highly probable.” With all his unwillingness to be led into questions of history and chronology, the lecturer cannot resist the temptation to put to himself the question : —“At what time was there occasion for such a community thus burying their bells?” And he is led to place the time within the period of the early Norse invasion already referred to. Indeed, from the attachment which Mr. Anderson has evidently formed for this archæological relic now under his charge, he is led further into the region of hypothesis than is usual with him. Although unable to adduce any direct evidence, and relying entirely on what is circumstantial, he regards it as highly probable that there was an ecclesiastical community of Celtic foundation at Birsay, having a church dedicated to St. Columba. If that were the case, then “this bell *may* have belonged to them, and its special sanctity *may* have arisen from its being blessed by the great founder of Celtic Christianity in Northern Scotland, and sent as the token of his good wishes for the prosperity of the infant church in the Orkneys.” Supposing these hypotheses to represent the

actual facts, then it is quite conceivable that when the ecclesiastics of Birsay became alarmed at the approach of the Vikings, they concealed their bell in the manner described, and never had an opportunity given them of exhuming it, seeing their community never recovered from pillage and dispersion. Whether this be a warrantable conjecture or not, there can be no hesitation in indorsing the lecturer's statement about the Birsay bell, to the effect that "its resurrection, after an interment of a thousand years, invests it with an interest unsurpassed by that of any other relic of a similar kind now extant." Not satisfied with grouping the iron, four-sided, and portable bells by themselves, the archæologist sets himself to determine whether they form a principal or a derived group, and where the geographical area of the type is to be found. The matter is soon settled by a reference to ascertained and indisputable facts. The distribution of bells of this type in other countries stands thus:—In England only two, in France two, in Switzerland one, in Wales six or seven, and in Ireland between fifty and sixty. All those in Scotland the associations of which can be traced being attributed to Irish saints, and the type being well known in Ireland, there need be no hesitation in looking to that country for the parent group. Particulars regarding the Celtic bells of Ireland are given in Mr. Anderson's fifth lecture; but interest in other Irish bells must be subordinated to that which attaches to the famous bell of St. Patrick's Will. Full details of this Celtic relic are furnished by Dr. Reeves in a paper contributed to the *Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy* (vol. xxvii.), and representations of it and its shrine, printed in metallic colours, have been published by Marcus Ward and Co.; but the condensed information given by Mr. Anderson is sufficient to show how rich a harvest of interest awaits those who betake themselves for fuller knowledge to the publications just mentioned. In 1798 an Irish schoolmaster of the name of Mulholland, when on his deathbed, wrote a letter to a gentleman in Belfast, in which he bequeathed to him, as an old pupil and valued benefactor, a treasure as dear as life, which would not have been parted with were it not that the family was about to become extinct. "I therefore give it to you," said the writer, "and when I am gone, dig in the garden

at a certain spot, and you will find a box there, take it up, and preserve the contents for my sake." The contents of that exhumed box are among the most valued treasures of the Royal Irish Academy Museum, being St. Patrick's bell and its shrine. The bell itself is of hammered iron, riveted, and coated with bronze, similar in form, height, and composition, to the bells in Scotland already described. It is believed to be the bell mentioned in the *Annals of Ulster* as forming one of the relics of St. Patrick, placed in a shrine by St. Columba sixty years after Patrick's death, that is, in 552, and so is regarded as the oldest of all relics now existing in Ireland. Between 1091 and 1105 a shrine was made for what had by that time become a venerable relic. The case or shrine is fully described by Mr. Anderson, and illustrations showing front view, back view, and side views, greatly increase the value of the description. The material is bronze, with gold and silver panels containing decorative work of extraordinary elaboration. Of the thirty-one panels into which the front of the shrine is divided, seventeen still retain gold filigree work in interlaced patterns of great beauty and intricacy, exhibiting the zoomorphic character so conspicuous in the ornamentation of Celtic manuscripts. An inscription in Irish is engraved on the plain margin of the back of the shrine, and when translated, runs thus:—"A prayer for Donald O'Lochlan, by whom this bell was made [the reference is to the shrine, which is in the form of a bell], and for Donald, the successor of St. Patrick, for whom it was made, and for Cathalan O'Maelchalland, the keeper of the bell, and for Cudulig O'Inmainen, with his sons, who gave their help." This inscription explains how, at the close of the eighteenth century, bell and shrine came to be in the possession of a poor Irish schoolmaster, for Mulholland bore the family name of the early keepers of the relic, and could claim Cathalan O'Maelchalland, living in the eleventh or twelfth century, as his ancestor. Well might the dying man call what he placed in a box and buried in his garden a treasure, and write of it as that "which I hold as dear as life."

The practice of enshrining relics was peculiarly Celtic, and though found in the Scotland of Erin and Alba, is unknown in any other branch of the Christian Church. But the

practice was not confined to bells ; it was extended to manuscripts and to crosiers.

When the ninth abbot of Iona became the biographer of the first, the product was the *Life of Saint Columba*, founder of the monastery, written by Adamnan, pronounced by Pinkerton to be the most complete piece of biography that all Europe can boast of, not only at so early a period, but even through the whole middle ages. In his second preface Adamnan tells his readers that his illustrious master never could spend the space of even one hour without study, or prayer, or writing, or some other holy occupation ; and of the literary occupation of the laborious saint we get some interesting glimpses in the body of the work. There we read of the contents of his ink-horn being spilled by one who, in his haste to kiss the saint, upset the vessel with the hem of his garment, as was predicted by Columba he would do when he heard the man shouting on the other side of the Sound of Iona ; of the holy man sitting in his cell engaged in writing ; and of books “*stylo ipsius descriptis*.” We are further told of a satchel containing a number of books carried by a youth who fell into the river Boyne and was drowned, and which satchel, when recovered, after being twenty days in the water, was found to have all its contents destroyed with the exception of one volume—“*sancti Columbae sanctis scriptum digitulis*”—and it was as dry and uninjured as if it had been enclosed in a desk, a miracle of a similar nature being wrought in the case of a book of hymns for the office of every day in the week, also in the handwriting of Columba—“*hymnorum liber septimaniorum sancti Columbae manu descriptus*”—which was found uninjured and dry, white and beautiful, after a prolonged submersion. And in the touching account of “how our Patron passed to the Lord,” given in the closing chapter of Book III., it is said of him that, having descended the hill that overlooks the settlement, on the summit of which, with both hands uplifted, he had blessed his monastery, he returned and sat in his hut transcribing the Psalter, and coming to that verse of the thirty-third Psalm (E. V. Ps. xxxiv.) where it is written, “They that seek the Lord shall want no manner of thing that is good,”—“Here,” said he, “at the end of the page I must stop ; and what follows let Baithene write.” In view of the literary

tastes and pursuits which these references indicate, one can see how appropriate it was that when the relics of St. Patrick found in his tomb were distributed, and the cup was given to Down, and the bell of the Will to Armagh, the gospel of the angel should be given to Columba, which manuscript Dr. Reeves identifies with what, so far back as the twelfth century, was the chief reliquary of the Church of Derry—the gospel of Martin of Tours.—(*Introduction to Life of Columba*, pp. xc.-xcii.)

Turning to Mr. Anderson's fourth lecture, on "Books," we find archæology has, in his hands, some interesting contributions to make to our knowledge of the literary products, if not of Columba himself, certainly of the period in Scottish Christianity with which he is identified. One of the most valuable manuscripts in Ireland is preserved in Trinity College Library, Dublin, and is known to antiquarians under the name of *The Book of Kells*. Originally preserved at Kells, in the county of Meath, it passed into the possession of Archbishop Ussher, and at the Restoration it came with what remained of the antiquarian prelate's library into the custody of Trinity College. In the *Annals of Ulster* it is termed "*The Great Gospel of Columcille*," and traditionally it is called "*The Book of Columcille*." While such an authority as Dr. Todd would assign the volume to the latter half of the sixth century, the latest date suggested by others is the ninth century. Prior to 1006 it was encased in a shrine or cumdach of costly workmanship, adorned with gold and gems. This nearly proved its destruction, for under the date of 1006 the *Annals of Ulster* relate that, on account of its remarkable cover, this principal relic of the Western world was stolen at night from the sacristy of the church of Kells. As modern burglars scorn electro-plate, and abstract only what is solid, so these pilferers of the Kells treasure discriminated between the relic itself and the cover that contained it. The latter, with its gold and precious stones, they turned to their own use; the former, being in their eyes comparatively worthless, was found some months after under a sod, having sustained little injury—less indeed, Dr. Reeves declares with a touch of sarcasm which Monkbarns would have relished, than it received "from the plough of a modern bookbinder." To the intrinsic beauty,

artistic intricacy, and marvellous delicacy of the illuminations and decorations of the Kells manuscript, Mr. Anderson adduces several testimonies, including those of Giraldus Cambrensis of the twelfth century, who could not resist the impression that it was executed "by a hand not mortal," of Mr. Westwood, a high authority on palæography, who confesses to having examined its pages for hours together with a magnifying-glass, pondering the problem not only with what eyes, but also with what instruments, the details could have been executed, and of Miss Stokes, who edits with rare ability and discrimination Lord Dunraven's *Notes on Irish Architecture*, and who speculates about what can have been at the root of that energy whose finest result is seen in the illuminations of manuscripts. Unable to supply them with an enlarged representation of an illuminated page of the Book of Kells, the Rhind Lecturer makes up for the lack by presenting his readers with three plates of great artistic excellency, one of these being an outline drawing of a page of the Gospels of Lindisfarne, now preserved in the British Museum, and all three conveying a good impression of what is characteristic of the decorated manuscripts of Celtic art. On the question as to the relation in which this magnificent manuscript may have stood to St. Columba, Mr. Anderson declines to pronounce a judgment. Mr. Westwood sees no good reason for doubting that it might have belonged to the founder of the Ionian monastery; and Dr. Todd is in favour of regarding it as the autograph of Columcille, and so of accounting for the veneration with which it was regarded in the eleventh century; but Mr. Anderson, with true archæological caution, hesitates to claim for it such a high antiquity as is implied in its traditional ascription to the first abbot of Iona.

The Scottish keeper of national antiquities displays the same reserve of judgment when dealing with other two manuscripts which have a traditional association with the name of Columba. One of these is the Book of Durrow. With Dair-mag for its original Irish name, and Roboreti, Roboris, or Roboreus Campus for Latin equivalent, Durrow can claim to reckon among the earliest, most important, though not the most enduring, of Columba's foundations in Ireland. A sculptured cross, called St. Columkille's Cross, stands in the

churchyard, and near it is St. Columkille's Well. But the most interesting reliquary associated with the Abbey of Durrow is the beautiful *Evangelarium* now preserved in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin. Unlike the majority of early Celtic manuscripts, the version in which the Gospels are written is that of the Latin Vulgate. The character of the writing in the 248 leaves of vellum which constitute the manuscript is characteristic of the Irish school, and the ornamentation, tessellated, interlaced, or lacertine, is characteristically Celtic. The symbolism of the early church applied to the Evangelists is made use of by the Durrow scribe, St. Matthew being symbolised by the figure of a man, St. Mark by that of a lion, St. Luke by that of an ox, and St. John by that of an eagle. The silver-mounted cumdach in which the manuscript was placed in the beginning of the tenth century has been lost; but, thanks to Roderic O'Flaherty, who made an entry on the fly-leaf of the manuscript, we possess the Irish inscription which it bore, with a Latin rendering of it to the following effect:—"Oratio et benedictio S. Columbæ Cille sit Flannio filio Malachiæ Regi Hiberniæ qui hanc (operimenti) structuram fieri fecit;" and to this is appended the following explanatory note:—"Flannius hic Rex Hiberniæ decessit 8 Kal. Maii et die Sabbati ut in ms. Cod. Hib. quod Chronicon Scotorum dicitur anno æræ Christianæ vulgaris 916. Hanc inscriptionem interpretatus est Ro. Flaherty, 19 Jun. 1677."

But the ground upon which the ascription of the manuscript to Columba is most strongly rested is a colophon on the last page of the capitula of St. John's Gospel, which contains the usual request of the Irish scribe for his readers' prayers, and of which the following is a translation:—"I pray thy blessedness, O holy Presbyter, St. Patrick, that whosoever shall take this book into his hands may remember the writer Columba, who have myself written this Gospel in the space of twelve days, by the grace of our Lord." On the strength of this Dr. Reeves takes the Book of Durrow to be a manuscript "approaching, if not reaching, to the Columban age," and Dr. Petrie hesitates not to say, "Whatever doubt may be felt as to the exact age of the Book of Kells, no doubt whatever can be entertained as to the age of the Book of Durrow, the writing of which is ascribed to St. Columba, and in which there are

illuminations of the same style of art, though inferior in beauty of execution." But Mr. Anderson will not pledge himself to anything stronger than an admission that there is "no inherent improbability in the inference that the Book of Durrow is of the age of St. Columba, and as it professes to have been written by one of this uncommon name, and has been religiously preserved in the first and chief monastery of Columba's personal foundation, we cannot rightly reject its claims to be considered an actual relic of the great founder of the Church in Scotland."

The other manuscript is a Psalter, which with its silver cumdach or book-shrine forms the ancient reliquary called the Cathach or Battler. Of the manuscript Mr. Anderson gives the following account:—

"It is written in a small round hand. The initial letters are larger than the rest of the text, but neither so greatly enlarged nor so elaborately ornamented as they usually are in the manuscripts of the Gospels. There is no interlacing ornamentation, but the ends of the letters curl away and terminate in the semblance of dragonesque heads. A facsimile of its torn and wasted pages will be found in the first volume of the National Manuscripts of Ireland. When the silver case or shrine in which the Psalter was contained was opened by Sir William Betham in 1824, the ms. was compacted together in a solid mass, and it was only by steeping it in water that the membranes could be separated. It now consists of fifty-eight leaves, and some fragments of wooden boards, covered with red leather."

Fully as much interest attaches to the shrine as to the manuscript which it enriches. It was made at Kells by one of the family which furnished cerds or artificers to the monastery, and dates as far back as the eleventh century. Psalter and cumdach were committed to the hereditary custody of the family of Mac Robhartaighs, and what service they might be expected to render when carried by one of the family can be gathered from the statement of an Irish chronicler:—

"Now *The Cathach* is the name of the book on account of which the battle was fought, and it is the chief relic of Colum-cille in the territory of Cinel Conaill Gulban; and it is covered with silver under gold; and it is not lawful to open it; and if it be sent thrice, right-wise, around the army of the Cinel Conaill, when they are going to battle, they will return safe with victory: and it is on the breast of a coward or a cleric, who is to the best of his power free from mortal sin, that the Cathach should be, when brought round the army."—(O'Donnell, quoted by Dr. Reeves, *Introduction to Adamnan's Life of Columba*, p. xlii.)

This explains the application of the term Cath, that is, battle, to the reliquary, and how it has come to be known as the Cathach or Præliator. So late as 1497 the Cathach was employed for military purposes, but failed to bring victory to its possessors, for the Mac Robhartaigh keeper was slain and his treasure passed out of the hands of his family. In the eighteenth century the Cathach is traced to the possession of the O'Donnell family, by a member of which house, Sir Richard Annesley O'Donnell, removed by four-and-twenty generations from Cathbarr Ua Domhnaill (*ob.* 1106), who caused the shrine to be made, and whose name is engraved upon it, this most remarkable reliquary has been deposited in the Museum of the Royal Irish Academy.

The custom of carrying relics into battle, brought into view by the Psalter of Columba, and the name given to it and its shrine, is a curious one, and is discussed by Mr. Anderson in his closing lecture, devoted to Crosiers and Reliquaries. He is led to do so in connection with his interesting account of the structure and history of the crosier of St. Fillan with which the lecture opens. This famous pastoral staff was in the fifteenth century placed in the hereditary custody of Malise Doire or Dewar of that day, and there is documentary evidence to prove that it was used in unsettled times for the detection of crime and recovery of property, the Celtic Christians holding in such reverence the relics of this sort that they were much more afraid of giving an oath or of violating one on such relics than when the Gospels were employed. Hand-bells were used in this way down to the beginning of the present century, and Mr. Anderson gives some curious information regarding the usage in Ireland. Thus in the case of the Clog Oir, or golden bell of St. Senna, it was believed that if any one were to swear falsely upon it his mouth would open at one side until it reached his ear; and Mr. Anderson tells of a farmer, who having had twenty pounds stolen, applied for the use of the bell.

"It was brought to his house with much ceremony, and the following Sunday was appointed for the whole parish to appear and clear themselves from suspicion. On Saturday night a crash was heard, and the farmer thought that his last hour was come, but on going to the window he found only one pane broken, and there on the floor lay the bundle of notes, tied with the identical string, just as they had been taken."

Some archæologists are of opinion that in addition to this judicial use, the pastoral staff of St. Fillan, called the Quigrich, was employed as a Cathach, and was actually carried to the field of Bannockburn to bring victory to the Scots. As was to be expected, Mr. Anderson, while admitting the probabilities urged by Dr. Stuart in his *Historical Notices of St. Fillan's Crosier*, finding no solid basis of evidence, declines to proceed to this particular conclusion. That the Celtic Christians used these relics, as sacred vexilla or battle ensigns, for a purpose similar to that of the Israelites when they carried the Ark of the Covenant into the field of conflict, admits of no doubt, and is abundantly confirmed by Mr. Anderson towards the close of his sixth lecture. The interest, so far as Celtic Christianity is concerned, culminates in what is known to archæologists as the Brecbannoch, or, as Mr. Anderson spells it, the Brechbennoch of St. Columba. Dr. Reeves traces this relic as far back as the time of King William the Lion, who in 1204 granted to the monks of Aberbrothock or Arbroath "custodiam de Brechbennoche," and along therewith certain lands. In 1314 the relic passed by charter granted by the Aberbrothock abbot to the Monimusk family, "on condition that they shall perform in our name the service in the king's army which pertains to the Brecbannoch, as often as occasion shall arise." It is unnecessary, and would be tedious, to trace the history of the lands of Forglen and of the vexillum as they passed in succession through the hands of Urrys and Frasers and Irvines. It will be of greater interest for general readers to inquire, What was the Brecbannoch? This question may appear somewhat difficult to answer, seeing there exists no description of the relic, and no notice of it except what is to be found in the charters of monasteries and families. Founding on the term "vexillum" applied to the reliquary, Dr. Reeves concludes that it was a banner coupled with Columba's name, because connected with his history either by personal use, or by the saint's blessing of it for the use of others. The application, however, of the term *vexillum* does not prove the relic to be a banner. We have seen that the Psalter of St. Columba enclosed in a shrine became known as the Cathach or Battler, because borne to the field on the breast of the cerd or keeper, and it could certainly not be called a banner.

Rejecting the conclusion of Dr. Reeves, Mr. Anderson surmises the Brechannoch to have been "a shrine of brass plated with silver, enclosing a wooden box which contained some relic of the saint." After strengthening his surmise with such confirmation as he can command, the lecturer indulges in a speculation which does not lead him beyond the scientific limits he imposed upon himself at the outset, while it seems to lead to a very interesting identification. In the house of Monimusk there has been preserved, time out of mind and record, a shrine or reliquary which is figured in the frontispiece of the Rhind Lectures for 1879, and which is described as "a small wooden box hollowed out of the solid, and plated with plates of pale bronze and with plates of silver." The form and the ornamentation of the reliquary are Celtic, and, what is of great importance, it is supplied with appendages at either end for the insertion of a strap by which it might be borne on the breast. This seems to render it certain that the reliquary was a Cathach. History is silent regarding the Monimusk shrine, but it must not be overlooked, as is stated above, that the knightly family of that ilk were the first hereditary keepers of the Brechannoch. Who can wonder that, with these things present to his mind, the archæologist should put the question which closes his table of contents, "Is it the lost Brechennoch?" But, true to his resolve to confine himself to his own province, the lecturer resists the combined strength of analogies and coincidences, and declines to go the length of saying that the Monimusk reliquary is the Brechennoch, contenting himself with affirming that if it be not the last survivor of all the battle-ensigns and victory-givers of the founder of Celtic Christianity in Scotland, "it answers in every single particular to the description deduced as typical of such a *verillum* as the Brechennoch of St. Columba."

After what we have said commendatory of the spirit, method, and results of the present Rhind Lecturer, we will not be suspected of any lack of appreciation of the science of which he is so worthy and enthusiastic a votary, and so it may be permitted us to revert at the close of this article, to what was adverted to at the outset, the *Antiquary* of Scott. One of the delicious bits in that masterpiece of description of foible is the account of the interview between Mr. Oldbuck and the wily

clerk of Fairport. In order to render the laird of Monkbarns favourable to the water supply for the burgh being brought from the Fairwell spring through a part of his property, the town functionary makes apparently incidental reference to some stones of Donagild's chapel which the provost and council were agreeable should pass into the possession of the only man in the neighbourhood who seemed to care for them, and as the laird had been somewhat testy when first approached upon the subject, the town-clerk maliciously wounds his antiquarian sensibilities by fabricating this alarming piece of information:

"Deacon Harlewall thinks the carved through-stanes might be put with advantage on the front of the new council-house—that is, the twa cross-legged figures that the callants used to ca' Robin and Bobbin, ane on ilka door-cheek; and the other stane that they ca'd Ailie Dailie abune the door. It will be very tastefu', the Deacon says, and just in the style of modern Gothic."

This fiction, concocted upon the pressure of the moment, had the desired effect; it drew from the too credulous antiquarian the exclamation: "Good Lord, deliver me from this Gothic generation!—a monument of a knight-templar on each side of a Grecian porch, and a Madonna on the top of it! O crimini!" and the mendacious clerk is dismissed with the assurance that Mr. Oldbuck was anxious to get the stones, and would not differ with the town authorities about the water-course. Readers of Mr. Ruskin's articles in *The Nineteenth Century* (Nos. 41-43), entitled "Fiction, Fair and Foul," may remember that critic's delightful elucidation of the historical references in Scott's description of "the carved through-stanes." Under his manipulation Robin is a "classically endearing cognomen, recording the *errant* heroism of old days, the name of the Bruce and of Rob Roy;" while Bobbin is "a poetical and symmetrical fulfilment and adornment of the original phrase." "Ailie," again, by the application of the same method of treatment, becomes the last echo of "Ave," changed into the softest Scottish Christian name familiar to the children, itself the beautiful feminine form of royal "Louis;" while the "Dailie" is "symmetrically added for kinder and more musical endearment." Thus Robin, both in weight and time, balances Bobbin, and Dailie holds level scale with Ailie; while in all four, taken together, the author of *The Seven Lamps of Architecture*

calls upon his readers to note the last vestiges of honour for the heroism and religion of their ancestors, lingering on the lips of babes and sucklings. The only drawback to the pleasure experienced in following this master of sentences, when he thus unfolds the necessity the Fairport children found themselves under of completing the nomenclature rhythmically and rhymingly, arises from a suspicion that he is reading into the names a great deal more than Scott ever dreamed of. But, Ruskin apart, we ask our readers' attention to the fact that the stones in question showed three figures—two Crusaders and a Madonna. Now, when Mr. Anderson is describing, in his second lecture, the Round Tower of Brechin, he has occasion to dwell upon the doorway of that almost unique structure. The construction of that part of the building is peculiar, as the illustration testifies; and by way of ornamentation there is this notable feature, which we give in Mr. Anderson's own words:—

“Over the centre of the arch is a representation of the crucifixion. In the middle of the height of the jambs on either side are raised panels, bearing figures in relief of men habited as ecclesiastics. One bears a pastoral staff of the form peculiar to the early Celtic Church, having a curved head resembling that of a walking-stick. The other bears a book on his breast, and carries a cross-headed or tau-staff, which is of exceedingly rare occurrence, either in this country or any other.”

Here, then, as in the three “*through-stanes*” at Donagild's chapel, we have three figures, only in the fictional representation the crucifixion and ecclesiastics give place to a Madonna and Crusaders. Now, Sir Walter Scott was well acquainted with the Brechin Tower, explicit mention of which is made in the *Antiquary*. Mr. Ruskin says the Fairport of fiction is the Montrose of real life—we had an impression it was the Aberbrothock or Arbroath of Abbey ruins; but the places are not far apart, are in the same county, and have similar coast scenery. May it not be that the doorway of the Brechin Tower was before Scott, or, as Browning would say, “lived in his mild and magnificent eye,” when he wrote his description of the stones so contemned at Fairport, but prized at Monkbarns? Should our conjecture possess no other value, it may at least serve the purpose of a link wherewith lovingly to associate the limner of the *Antiquary* in 1816 and the lecturer on Archæology in 1881.

CHARLES G. M'CRIE.

ART. IV.—*Forgiveness—Divine and Human.*

THERE is evidently some relation between the forgiveness which we receive from an offended God and the forgiveness we render to an offending brother. (1.) It is a relation of similarity;—"forgiving one another even as, *in like manner as*, God for Christ's sake hath forgiven you." Let your treatment of one who has trespassed against you be similar to—modelled upon—the treatment which God extended to you, when ye had trespassed against him. (2.) It is more than a relation of similarity. It is the relation between a motive and the procedure to which it prompts;—"forgiving one another, even as, *since, seeing that*, God hath forgiven you." Let the fact that God hath forgiven you move you, prompt you, persuade you, prevail upon you, to forgive your brother also. Nay; (3.) it is even more than this. The connection is closer than that of mere similarity, and closer even than that of mere motive influence. It is a connection of concomitance, of intimate unfailing concomitance. Our reception of forgiveness from God is made in a sense to depend on our rendering forgiveness to our brethren. Not indeed that this can be regarded as compromising or traversing the great truth—that our reception of forgiveness is suspended alone upon our faith: "He that believeth is forgiven and justified from all things." But the harbouring of an unfor-giving, vindictive disposition is inconsistent with the present and prevailing exercise of faith. The faith that really sees, appreciates, and embraces the forgiveness of sins, effectually purges the soul from malice, revenge, resentment; and where these evil passions still prevail, proof is afforded thereby that true faith is not in action, and that the soul is disqualified and disabled from apprehending and appropriating the loving forgiveness of the covenant of grace. He that shows no mercy to man sees no mercy in God. He that shows no mercy sees no mercy. The same state of heart that shows no mercy is incapable of seeing mercy. He that refuses mercy to man refuses the mercy of God. In virtue of the one same dark frame of spirit

he does both ; the contrite heart which accepts mercy from God is proved to be wanting by the fact that he refuses mercy to man. Hence "*he shall have judgment without mercy who showed no mercy.*" With the same measure with which he metes out, it is meted to him again. "If ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you : but if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive you."

But this relation between God's forgiveness of us and our forgiveness of our brethren has been pressed too far, and that especially considered as a relation of similarity. And thus dealt with, it has been made to yield a plausible objection—perhaps the most plausible—against the doctrine of the atonement. It has been said, God requires us freely to forgive an offending brother. He requires us to do so without demanding any atonement or satisfaction for the trespass that needs forgiveness. Our forgiveness is to be apart from all execution of penalty, or punishment, or vengeance. We are to stipulate for no satisfaction to our offended dignity or honour. We are to demand no sacrifice. We are not to put our brother on the task of painfully expiating his offence. Frankly, freely, fully, we are to forgive him. And are we, on our part, to be more frank, or free, or handsome in extending forgiveness than God on his part ? Are we to exhibit a placability greater than we are to attribute to the Most High ? Are we to imagine that he will forgive only from regard to a plenary satisfaction—that he will demand a full execution of the penalty, a propitiation of suffering and blood-shedding and death—the sacrifice of a Lamb for a burnt-offering ? Is not the similarity between his forgiveness of us and our forgiveness of others destroyed if we think so ? Or, if a true similarity is admitted, does it not disprove that doctrine of atonement which represents the God of all grace as pardoning iniquity, transgression, and sin, only because they have been expiated in the blood of a great and glorious victim ?

Thus from our being required to forgive without the intervention of an atonement, many would argue that no atonement is requisite or intervenes when God forgives us.

The notion pervades many minds in all ranks of life. As an objection to the fundamental doctrine of Christ's propitiatory

sacrifice, it is proudly and very confidently put forward in those recent attractive but pretentious Anglican productions, whose authors exhibit considerable literary abilities, combined with still greater theological ignorance; and some of whom have had the senselessness and impudence to say that Calvinism is dead. It may be met with in the humbler and unlettered classes of society also. In that beautiful book, *English Hearts and English Hands*, where the truly heroic authoress describes her Christian efforts among a very rude class of the hard-wrought children of toil, a very graphic instance occurs. Such an one is recorded as having argued against the blessed truth of reconciliation and forgiveness by the blood or atonement of Jesus. He tells that he found after a conflict with his feelings of resentment or revenge that he could forgive an injury without insisting on anything like sacrifice or satisfaction or compensation for the offence, and felt comfortable after doing so; and he adds, with great simplicity, "Why could not God do a handsome thing like that?" Thus the unlettered child of nature, speaking the feelings of the natural man, adopts the very argument of the graceful sons of finest literature; and puts it, we humbly think, in a more striking form than they. But in whatever form it may be put it amounts simply to this, that the fact of our being required to forgive without an atonement argues that we may expect there will be no atonement concerned in God's forgiveness. We propose for a little to exhibit the fallacy of this notion. And in the first place—

I. It seems to be forgotten that this is reasoning in a circle, or perhaps rather a mere *begging of the question*.

It is true that when brother trespasses against brother, they are required to forgive each other without the intervention of any penalty, or sacrifice, or atonement in their relation and procedure towards each other. But what if this actually presupposes an atonement? What if this mutual forgiveness is enjoined in a world under a constitution that does not and could not exist save as founded on an atonement? What if this duty could be required in this world, only because the great leading feature of the Divine administration of its affairs and history is just the cross, or propitiatory sacrifice of Christ? This is a very peculiar world in which we dwell, and

in which we are called upon to forgive one another his trespasses. It is a very peculiar theatre for the moral government of God. It is utterly unlike to heaven : it is utterly unlike to hell. It is differenced from heaven by the presence of sin. What if it be differenced from hell—as we believe it is—only by the cross of Christ, by atonement for sin?—a dispensation of forbearance and long-suffering founded on and justified by atonement in the Cross? There is no sin in heaven. There is no atonement for sin in hell. Sin, and atonement for sin—these together, we believe, constitute the fundamental elements of this world's moral state and history, and of God's administration of his government over it. The presence of mutual offences through sin distinguishes this world from heaven. The possibility of mutual forgiveness differences it from hell. In this very peculiar world alone is the command given, "Forgive your enemies. Forgive ye one another his trespasses."

Your objection runs in such terms as these : I am called on to forgive an offending brother without demanding compensation, satisfaction, or atonement : how much more may I expect that God will forgive me without making any such demand ! The answer is : God *does* forgive you without requiring at *your hands* any satisfaction or atonement whatsoever—*himself providing the atoning sacrifice which justice demands* : how very much more may you be called on to forgive your brother without requiring him to render satisfaction, seeing you are not called on to do as God has done—provide, namely, for the expiation of the trespass !

In heaven there is no need of mutual forgiveness. There the inhabitants never say, I am sick. The sickness of mutual offence—of mutual estrangement—of mutual jealousy or envy—never enters there. The glance of conscious perfect truth and love meets on every side the glance of boundless responsive confidence. In hell there is no possibility of mutual forgiveness. *There*, the sweet refreshings of relenting pity—the pleasures and the charm of generous reconciliation—never come. Recriminations endless and mutual malignity, reign. According to the prophet's awful figure in describing the destruction of Babylon, hell is moved from beneath to meet the coming of its fresh-doomed inhabitants—to give them terribly malignant welcome to their place of woe.

But in this world—distinguished from heaven by the possibility that mutual offences may arise—distinguished from hell by the possibility that mutual offences may be forgiven—a difference like this from all other places of the Lord's dominions must have some deep ground to rest upon; there must be some peculiar distinguishing element in the Divine administration over it to bear out a difference so great—a character so peculiar and special,—a state of things so singular and unique. It is the atonement of Christ. It is the fact that God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son a ransom and propitiation for sin. It is this that underlies the whole dispensation. In the dispensation of the fulness of times God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law. In vain do we look anywhere else for anything to justify God in keeping this world in a different state from hell when it came into a different state from heaven. Different both from heaven and hell it cannot righteously be, under the government of a just and all-wise God, save for the sake of Christ's cross alone, and with a view to that dispensation of forbearance and forgiveness under which, for the sake of Christ's cross, this world is placed. Yet with this very difference of the world's estate, both from the realms of the blessed and the abodes of the lost, the command to forgive—the possibility of our forgiving—one another is bound up. There were no scope for such mutual forgivenesses were this world altogether akin to heaven, and no possibility of such forgivenesses were it altogether akin to hell. But strayed from heaven as this sinful world is, and yet not merged in hell; different from heaven in that offences may arise, different from hell in that offences may be forgiven; kept apart from heaven by the intervention of sin, kept apart from hell by the intervention of an atonement for sin: these things being so, can any reasoning be more pitifully helpless than that which attempts to show that as our forgiveness of each other is to be without atonement demanded on our part, there has been none required on God's? That whole constitution of things, in virtue of which mutual forgiveness may have place in this world at all, rests ultimately on the truth of that atonement which it would thus so strangely be pleaded to overthrow.

II. This objection to the atonement *professedly makes no account of God's supremacy and office as the Judge of all the earth.*

The command to us to forgive one another places us on a level towards one another; and this inference which some would draw from it adverse to the doctrine of a propitiatory sacrifice being the necessary channel of Divine forgiveness, really places God on a level with us all. It overlooks his sovereign supremacy, and his office as the Supreme Judge. It is not in the capacity of a judge that I am to forgive an offending brother; it is as being myself a brother, standing on equal terms, on equal footing with him. It is to a *mutual* forgiveness that he and I both are bound over. The forgiveness that I extend to him I may alternately require to have extended towards myself. Surely some caution is required in reasoning from a case like this up to that in which the All-holy Godhead condescends from his inviolable majesty to forgive the iniquities of his poor and puny creatures. I am to forgive my brother, considering myself lest I also be tempted. I am to forgive my brother, remembering how soon I may need to be forgiven by him. But the All-perfect God sitteth on high, the Judge alike of me and my brother, and there is no infirmity and no unrighteousness in him. Surely it is presumption of the highest kind in me to argue that because I am to forgive without demanding atonement or satisfaction, therefore the Godhead also must proceed in like manner.

It is as the Universal Lawgiver, and as invested with the office of Supreme and Universal Judge, that God requires atonement and satisfaction for sin. He does not stand towards his creatures in a relation like that in which they stand towards each other. He is their Moral Governor and Judge. It is in that relation that he demands satisfaction for sin, and vindicates the sovereignty of law. And when he delegates his office in so far to any of our fellow-creatures—when he sets any one over us as our lawgiver and judge—to him, in like manner, he commits the function of upholding the honour of law by sanctions and penalties also. If I stand as a criminal at a human bar, before a human judge, and am brought in guilty, how impertinent were it in me to plead towards my judge that it is his duty to forgive me freely and

to abstain from inflicting penalty on, or seeking reparation for, my offence! The case of private trespass between me and my brother is wide as the poles asunder from the case of my violation of public law cognosed by the public judge. The classing of these two cases as one overthrows all public law, government, and justice. Neither I nor my brother, in our brotherly and equal relation towards each other, is invested with the character and function of a judge. Nay, in this respect he and I alike are expressly warned against acting towards each other as if we were. "Speak not evil one of another, brethren. He that speaketh evil of his brother, and judgeth his brother, speaketh evil of the law, and judgeth the law: but if thou judge the law, thou art not a doer of the law, but a judge. There is one Lawgiver, who is able to save and to destroy: who art thou that judgest another?" No, in this relation I am to act as a brother, not a lord, not a lawgiver, not a judge. If, indeed, I happen to be invested with the office of a judge in the community, and my brother be brought before my bar, it is not then as a private man and a brother that I am to consider him and deal with him,—but as a public criminal, a breaker of public law. The rule of Christian mutual forgiveness does not then apply. It is wholly out of court then. My duty then is not to consider myself lest I also should be tempted; not to deal with him in the remembrance that I also in turn might need his compassion and forbearance. My duty is to uphold the supremacy of the law; to act and deal with the offender as the law requires.

The civil magistrate is invested with the *sword*, an instrument that has no place between brethren. "And he beareth not the sword in vain; for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil." Herein he is the representative, the agent, the delegate of God,—the Judge of all the earth. And this function he could not wield, he could not receive, he could not have it delegated to him, unless primarily and originally it belonged to God himself. It is for those who deny the righteousness and necessity of propitiatory sacrifice to show the righteousness, the validity, the origin of the office of a judge among men. As wielded among men, it is an office that has no Divine origin, and therefore no authority, unless God himself be a judge. The

Most High can delegate no office which is not his own. If he be not a Judge, bearing the sword—a revenger to execute wrath on him that doeth evil,—then every human judge is a usurper, an unauthorised oppressor, and his office a barbarism, an unrighteousness, an impertinence. The argument that would overthrow the atonement would subvert human society and abolish all civil government.

It is the introduction of this element into the question on hand which indicates where the analogy between our mutual forgiveness of each other and God's forgiveness of us ceases. We forgive each other mutually as brethren. He forgives us as the Judge of all the earth. We as brethren forgive our brother. God, as judge and sovereign, forgives our sin. In forgiving a brother we demand no expiation of his offence, because we do not stand to him in the relation of a judge; and have not the responsibility of maintaining the honour of the law. That belongs unto *his* Judge and ours; and our God, as Judge, forgives only through an expiation.

For us, in our private capacity as brethren, to demand satisfaction or atonement is impossible consistently with holiness and love. Satisfaction, demanded in such a case, indicates human wrath and passion, "which worketh not the righteousness of God." It is inconsistent with the love, pity, compassion, which brotherly forgiveness implies. And it is the thought that an atonement on God's part trenches on the truth and evidence of love and compassion with him, which has led to the argument and objection we are considering. But introduce the consideration that God is the righteous Judge and upholder of public law, righteousness and order in the universe, and the notion that an atonement or satisfaction for sin is inconsistent with true compassion on his part vanishes. A public judge among men is never subjected to the imputation of heartlessness, because, in the execution of his office, he pronounces even the awful sentence of death. Personally and privately he may do so with feelings of deepest anguish. His calm and resolute performance of his duty is his glory; and the more so because his heart burns with pity and love towards him whom he nevertheless condemns. Justice is not passion, fury, rage, in the case of a human judge. It is consistent with the most heartfelt interest and compassion for the criminal.

It is equally so—it is infinitely more so—with the Divine Judge. Hark to his solemn oath, the oath of him who will by no means clear the guilty: “As I live, saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked.” There is no malignity in God’s wrath; there is no rage, no fury, no passion,—no cruelty, no heartlessness. For he is the Judge, and he is righteous; there is no unrighteousness in him. I am not my brother’s judge when he offends me. In me, wrath towards him and demand for satisfaction would indeed be mere unholy rage, cruelty, heartlessness, malignity; for in my private capacity, as no judge, it could not be in vindication of the law, but only in gratification of my revenge that I should seek a satisfaction or atonement for his offence. But it is otherwise with God. God is Judge himself, and with him an atonement is a satisfaction to justice, not a gratification of revenge. This distinction is utterly forgotten in the argument and objection against the atonement which we are considering. But let this distinction be introduced; let it be remembered that the Lord is the Lawgiver and Judge; that what with him is competent and holy would be usurpation and unrighteousness with us; that the demand which on his part is satisfaction to justice, and perfectly consistent with love, would on our part be gratification of revenge, and clearly indicative of cruelty: and the utter vanity of this objection becomes manifest.

III. It is an objection which causelessly *takes for granted that in pious mutual forgiveness as enjoined in Scripture, believers have no regard to the atonement of Christ.*

It supposes that I can adequately discharge this scriptural duty before I have any true knowledge of the atonement, and before my heart has been influenced by it. For it supposes this duty so discharged as that I am thereafter free to consider whether there be any atonement. Nay, it supposes that my discharge of this duty is so utterly free and apart from, and uninfluenced by, the truth and nature of Christ’s atonement, that by discharging it I am the more free and qualified to consider, as an open question, whether there be any true and proper atonement by Christ at all.

But this is the reverse of the fact. Christian mutual forgiveness is directly influenced and prompted by the truth of

Christ's true and proper satisfaction for our sins. I do not, as a Christian, first forgive an offending brother without demanding satisfaction; and then feel my mind and heart free to consider whether the Judge of all the earth should in like manner abstain from demanding a satisfaction to his justice for sin. On the contrary, it is the fact that he forgives all my sin, and all my brother's sin also, freely through the blood of Jesus, which truly prompts in me a free and generous forgiveness towards my brother. For,

1. In the *first* place, it is the love of God alike towards me and my brother that prompts and prevails with me to forgive him. But, whatever others think or say concerning the mercy and compassion of God, as for me, if I have believed on Jesus Christ and him crucified, I know of no love of God save that which reaches me through the cross and death of his dear Son—that love which comes through the full, and righteous, and holy expiation of all my sin on the cross. Herein is love, not that we have loved God, but that he hath loved us, and given his Son to be the propitiation for our sins. Hereby we have known and believed the love that God hath towards us. All other fancied love with God is indeed the idle dream of merest fancy. Conscience in its righteousness and rising power puts the dream to flight, and awakes the dreamer to a sense of the infinite unrighteousness of sin, and the rectitude of death as its wages. But conscience sees this wages and death in the cross of Christ, and is at peace: and the heart, set free from the fear of condemnation, is satisfied, and overwhelmed, and melted with evidence of holy love by an atonement. Hereby perceive we the love of God, because he laid down his life for us. It is under the warming beams, and melting power, and holy sanctifying influence of this love, and just in so far as I yield to its generous, gracious promptings, that I find it impossible to avoid forgiving my brother also. But again,

2. *Secondly*, while the love of God in forgiving my sin through an atonement prompts me to forgive my brother, the righteousness of God in expiating his sin calls upon me also to forgive him. For if my brother is a believer—and I am to deal with him in charity on the supposition that he either is or may yet become a member of Christ—then Christ bare his

sins as well as mine in his own body on the tree, and satisfied Divine justice for all his iniquity. In particular, Christ bare in his own body all the guiltiness of this particular offence against me. For while it is an offence against me, its infinitely chiefest offensiveness is its being a sin against God. For God is the Lawgiver and Judge, not only in all that pertains to my duty and my brother's duty directly towards God, but in our mutual duty towards each other. When, therefore, we fail in our duties towards each other, we sin against that God who has enjoined them. And in everything in which we need forbearance and forgiveness from each other, we need infinitely more from God. My brother's offence against me is simultaneously an infinitely greater offence against God; greater as far as God is greater than I am. Yea, so true is this, that both I and my brother, even when we have offended each other, and are alive to our sin against each other, therein may turn aside to God, and say with truth, each of us to him, and without doing injustice to the other, "Against thee, thee only, have I sinned." Great and terrible, as against his brother, was the criminality of him who first uttered these memorable words.

But if, when I see my brother's sin and criminality against God so infinitely greater than in its aspect as against me, I see also the justice of God satisfied for all its guilt in the expiation of the cross, shall I disparage and disallow the glory of that atonement by refusing on my part to forgive, by insisting on a satisfaction for myself? Oh! may not the Lord well hold this as a proof on my part that I am setting aside that atonement for my own soul; that I see not its infinite power and preciousness; that I am casting such contempt upon it as is inconsistent with my own personal faith in it? and may not this fully explain why, if I cannot forgive man, I cannot have forgiveness with God, seeing that I do such dishonour and injustice to the only sacrifice and satisfaction through which the Judge of all the earth can forgive me? May not this well justify the Lord Jesus in saying—"If ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your heavenly Father forgive your trespasses"? And does not this bring out the force of the injunction—"Forbearing one another, and forgiving one another, even as God *for Christ's sake* hath forgiven you"?

So that instead of the fact of our mutual forgiveness being without an atonement affording any proof that in like manner there is no atonement with God, it is just because there is forgiveness with God through an atonement that we are to demand none in our forgiveness of each other.

IV. But, lastly, this objection to the atonement, which in one view arises from pressing the analogy between our mutual forgiveness of each other and God's forgiveness of us too far, can arise in reality only by not *attending to that analogy sufficiently*. The argument is to this effect: We are required to forgive our brother without demanding satisfaction; but if God demands a satisfaction, is not the analogy between his forgiveness and ours destroyed, and ours made the more gracious and handsome of the two? I reply, It is not the introduction of the atonement of Christ which would destroy this analogy. It is this very objection that destroys it. It is this objection itself which attempts to introduce a dissimilarity or failure of analogy between the cases which does not exist. We are to demand no reparation, no satisfaction, from an offending brother when we forgive his trespass. And if God forgave us, only in consideration of satisfaction demanded by him and obtained *from* us, then indeed the analogy were at an end. But this is not the doctrine of the atonement, as the objection, to have even the appearance of validity, must take for granted. If such were the doctrine of the atonement, we admit that it would set forth our commanded forgiveness of a brother in a light of higher graciousness, handsomeness, and generosity than the forgiveness which God extends to us. But forgiveness through the propitiation of the cross—through the true and proper satisfaction to Divine justice in the death of Jesus—through the full and perfect expiation of sin in the blood-shedding of the Lamb of God; forgiveness so bestowed, bestowed on this righteous, holy, valid ground, brings against *us* no demand for satisfaction any more than we are to bring against an offending brother.

Nay, it is this very provision freeing us as it does from all the demands of justice, which renders the analogy between God's forgiveness of me and my forgiveness of my brother complete. For really, at first, it would seem that there could be no analogy at all. God is my Judge; I am not my brother's

judge. And hence it would seem as if God's forgiveness of me and my forgiveness of my brother must from first to last be altogether heterogeneous and incomparable. God, as Judge, has claims against me, such as I cannot have against my brother. He has claims not only infinitely greater in degree, but heterogeneous; different, and incomparable in kind as well as incomparably greater in degree. It would appear that there can be no analogy at all. It is really the atonement which alone renders them analogous. The atonement answers those claims of God as a Judge, which threatened to make the cases eternally incomparable. The great Judge and Sovereign of the universe introduces the atonement in satisfaction of those very claims. He abstains from pressing those claims on me; he makes no demand on me; he requires no atonement, no satisfaction FROM me. On the contrary, he provides an atonement FOR me. He himself provides a Lamb for a burnt-offering. He freely in his love gives me a substituted surety. He so loves me that he spares not his own Son, but freely gives him up unto the death, making him to be sin for me. And then without money and without price he gives me a free and full remission of sin; a forgiveness infinitely handsome; a forgiveness which so secures and exalts me as to make me a son of God in Christ; a forgiveness which in its grace and handsomeness it is profanity to fancy can ever be excelled; and which I can only at an infinite distance imitate. For now it must be manifest that instead of my procedure in forgiving my brother without atonement from him being more handsome than God's forgiveness of me, it is God's unparalleled grace in providing an atonement for me and my brother both which must inspire both him and me with that mutual love in which we shall be found "forbearing one another and forgiving one another" in some faint reflection of that infinitely handsome, generous, sovereign grace in which "for Christ's sake God hath forgiven us."

Let a brief application close the subject:—

1. Be very sure that it is the sacrifice of the cross, provided for us by the infinite love of God, and satisfactory to his unbending justice, which will either fill our consciences with true peace towards God or our hearts with true love to man. Peace of conscience with God derived from any other source than the

cross of Christ will treacherously vanish in actual face-to-face dealings with God as he is in his awful majesty and inviolable holiness; and tenderness of heart towards man learned in any other school than that of Calvary will vanish too in actual dealings with men, as they are, full of infirmities and manifold weaknesses and perversities of temper. Your gentle amiabilities, not sanctified and strengthened by the stern realities of righteousness as it is vindicated in the cross, and not warmed beyond earth's power to cool them by the matchless love of the atonement, may live in the hothouse air of refined sentimentalism, but will never rough it in the tear and wear of actual weary human life.

2. Let your attempt to forgive a brother find all its success from a fresh contemplation of the incalculable expense to Christ, and the free love to you implied in God's forgiveness—"Forbearing one another, and forgiving one another, if any man have a quarrel against any, even as God for Christ's sake hath forgiven you." It is the fresh, sweet, humbling sense of being afresh and anew forgiven of God that will banish every angry and vindictive feeling. And realising your union with Christ, and having fresh sense of your right to say, "I am crucified with Christ," your feelings towards your enemies will coincide with those of Christ in his crucifixion hour—"Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do."

3. Nor need you be afraid of any unevangelical, legal tendency in embracing heartily the declaration—"If ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you." If from the heart you can give forgiveness to man, be encouraged thereby to expect forgiveness from God: seeing that it is the truth of *his* forgiving love and the work of his Spirit that have wrought this grace within you. "Our Father who art in heaven; forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us."

μ.

ART. V.—*Zoroaster and Zoroastrianism.*¹

THE religion of Zoroaster is among the oldest of the religions of the world, and one of the eight great ethnic religions which possess a sacred literature. It is the religion of our kindred at a time shortly after our Aryan ancestors began their migrations from their primitive home. It originated probably not less than twelve hundred years before the Christian era; it became a national religion, and, in spite of revolutions, conquests, and persecutions, it is still professed by a small Parsi community in India and a few devotees in their fatherland. The religion of Zoroaster is most intimately connected with the religion of Moses and the prophets of the Old Testament. The Magi are mentioned by Jeremiah, chap. xxxix. 3. The "Chief of the Magi" (*Rab-mag*) was in the retinue of Nebuchadnezzar at his entry into Jerusalem. Ezekiel speaks probably of Zoroastrians when he says there were "about five and twenty men" standing "at the door of the temple of the Lord, between the porch and the altar," who "put the branch to their nose;" "with their backs toward the temple of the Lord, and their faces toward the east; and they worshipped the sun toward the east" (Ezek. viii. 16, 17).

The Bible never classifies the Persians among idolaters. Isaiah calls Cyrus "the anointed of the Lord whose right hand the Lord has holden, to subdue nations before him:" the Lord's "shepherd" to carry out his counsels; "a ravenous bird called from the east, the man that executeth the Lord's counsel from a far country" (Isa. xlv. 1; xlv. 28; xlv. 11).

Herodotus declares that the Magi worshipped no idols (chaps. cxxxi. cxxxii.). We shall find their own sacred writings confirming this testimony. Magi came from the East to worship the infant Jesus at Bethlehem (Matt. ii. 1).

In the famous Behistun trilingual inscription, discovered by Major Rawlinson in 1835, consisting in the first four columns (omitting the fifth half column of thirty-five lines, which has been but imperfectly deciphered) of three hundred and seventy-six lines in an Aryan, a Semitic, and a Scythic

¹ From *The Methodist Quarterly Review*. New York.

language, the name of Ormazd occurs sixty-seven times. Darius says, "By the grace of Ormazd I am king;" "By the grace of Ormazd I hold this empire;" "Ormazd brought help to me;" "I prayed to Ormazd;" "By the grace of Ormazd, my forces entirely defeated the rebel army;" "Under the favour of Ormazd have I always acted;" "Ormazd is my witness;" "May Ormazd be a friend to thee." A true devotional spirit which may be favourably compared with the spirit disclosed in like passages of history in the Old Testament, runs through the whole account.¹

Until within a little more than a century our knowledge concerning the laws, customs, and religion of Persia came principally from classic sources. Modern Persian literature is poetic and traditional. Mohammedan writers give only the conquest of the country and the extinction of its religion A.D. 636.

Of the Greek writers who wrote concerning the religion of the Persians, prominent were Ktesias (B.C. 400), Deinon (B.C. 350), Theopompos of Chios (B.C. 300), and Hermippos of Smyrna (B.C. 250). Only fragments of their writings have been preserved by Plutarch, Diogenes of Laerta, and Pliny. Theopompos, in his eighth book of the history of King Philip of Macedonia, "On Miraculous Things," treats specially of the doctrines of the Magi. Hermippos wrote a book, "On the Magi," which must have been of great value. Pliny says that Hermippos investigated with great care and labour the sacred books of the Zoroastrians, which were said to comprise two millions of verses. The loss of such a work is to be deeply regretted. The Greeks and Romans derived most of their information concerning the Zoroastrian religion from Theopompos and Hermippos.

To escape the persecutions of the Mohammedans, the adherents of this religion left their native land and settled in Western India. Here the nations of Europe came in contact with them, and in the seventeenth century manuscripts of their sacred books were brought to Europe, but were valued only as curiosities. In A.D. 1700, Hyde, a celebrated scholar of Oxford, published *Historia Religionis Veterum Persarum eorumque Magorum*, which contained much and valuable information gathered from many authorities concerning their

¹ *Records of the Past*, vol. i. pp. 113-129.

religion. But Hyde, although having access to original manuscripts, could not read a word of them, and hence his work cannot be considered an authority.

In 1754 the enthusiasm of Anquetil-Duperron, a young Frenchman, pursuing oriental studies at the Royal Library, was aroused at the sight of a Parsi manuscript, and he determined to visit India and Persia and collect manuscripts, bring them back, translate them, and give the results to the world. He enlisted as a soldier in the service of the Indian Company, marched out of Paris "to the lugubrious sound of an ill-mounted drum," landed at Pondicherry in 1755, steadfastly kept to his purpose, studied hard, collected manuscripts, returned to Paris in 1762, and in 1771 published his translation of the so-called "Zend-Avesta."

The authenticity of these sacred books was much discussed. Even the great jurist and Oriental scholar, Sir William Jones, believed that they were forged, and that Duperron had been imposed upon by the priests from whom he received instruction in the Avestan and Pahlavi languages.

Richardson, the celebrated Persian lexicographer, also held the opinion that these languages were forgeries. Erasmus Rask, a Danish scholar, in 1826, in a pamphlet "On the Age and Genuineness of the Zend Language," proved its close relationship with the Sanscrit. Eugene Burnouf, Professor in the Collège de France (1833-46), laid the foundation of Avestan grammar and etymology; proved the translation of Duperron, however valuable for affording a general idea of Avestan literature, yet utterly inaccurate and incorrect; and gave the first real translation of two chapters of the Yasna.

Professor Westergaard, of Copenhagen, edited and published the first complete edition of the Zend-Avesta in 1852-1854. Martin Haug edited, translated, and explained *The Five Gâthâs* (two vols., Leipzig, 1858-1860), and did much in the interest of Zend scholarship (1852-1874) in other translations and philological works. His latest work,¹ from which we take the translations which we use, furnishes the most complete and reliable account of Zoroastrianism with which we are acquainted in the English language. Spiegel, Windischmann, West, Darmesteter, Justi, and other investigators, have entered

¹ *The Religion of the Parsis.* By Martin Haug, Ph.D.

this field of research, and the scriptures of the Parsis, of which, a little more than a hundred years ago, no man living could read a word, may soon be accessible to the general reader.

The scriptures of the Parsis are usually called Zend-Avesta by Europeans and Americans. The Pahlavi books call them *Avistāk va Zand*, Avesta and Zend, or "Text and Commentary," both being written, probably, in the Avestan language. "Avesta," originally confined to the sacred texts ascribed to Zoroaster, afterward acquired an extended meaning, so as to embrace at the present time all writings in the Avestan language. It may be derived from *a+vista* (*vista* is pluperfect of *vid*, "to know"), and hence would mean "what is known," or "knowledge;" or "what is announced," or "declaration," thus approaching very nearly the meaning of "revelation," like Veda, the name of the sacred scriptures of the Brahmins. When the Avesta language became unintelligible, a translation of these scriptures was made by priests of the Sassanian period into their vernacular, the Pahlavi. In later times the term "Zend" has referred to this translation. There are passages in the present Avesta which are supposed to be remnants of the old Zend. Zend is from the root *zan*, "to know," so that it means "knowledge," or science. Pâzand meant originally *re-explanation*, and some passages in the Avesta may be the old Pâzand in the Avestan language; "but at present the term Pâzand is applied only to purely Iranian versions of Pahlavi texts, whether written in the Avestan or Persian characters, and to such parts of Pahlavi texts as are not Huzvârish."¹ This word is applied to the Semitic elements in Pahlavi. The ancient Persians received their writing from a Semitic people. For Semitic words were translated bodily into Iranian writing as logograms, and pronounced as Pahlavi words of the same meaning; as though we were to write the Latin word "equus," but always pronounce it *horse*. These explanations of terms, in which I have followed Haug, seem to be necessary to the reading of works connected with Parsi studies.

The sacred writings of the Zoroastrians were very voluminous, but were greatly reduced when Alexander, at the instigation of the Athenian courtesan Thais (according to the

¹ *The Religion of the Parsis*, p. 122.

account, which may be somewhat traditional), in a drunken frolic burned the citadel and royal palace at Persepolis, thus destroying the historic and sacred archives. By fragmentary collections this loss was partially repaired, when the Mohammedan persecutions still more effectually scattered or destroyed the sacred books. The names, however, remain with short summaries of their contents. These summaries, in the absence of the works themselves, are of great value.

According to accounts which remain to us, the whole scriptures were divided into twenty-one books, called *Nasks*, each containing an original text and commentary. Each *nask* was indexed under a particular word of the most sacred Zoroastrian formula: "Yathâ ahû vairyô, athâ ratush, ashâd chid hachâ, Vanhêush dazdâ mananhô shkyaothnanam anhêush mazdâi, Khshathremchâ ahurâi â, yim dregubyô dadhad vâstârem." Haug translates: "As a heavenly lord is to be chosen, so is an earthly master (spiritual guide), for the sake of righteousness, (to be) the giver of the good thoughts, of the actions of life toward Mazda; and the dominion is for the lord (Ahura) whom he (Mazda) has given as a protector for the poor."¹

The *Nasks* were divided into three classes, to correspond with the three lines of this formula. Several descriptions of the contents of the *Nasks* have survived. They contain advice concerning prayer and all religious services; they teach virtue, truth, heedfulness, reverence, law, judgment, wisdom, knowledge, purity; they teach the value of good works and meditation, peace and obedience, duties to magistrates, and how kings should rule; they discourse concerning the creation of all things, good and evil, ranks among men, agriculture and culture of trees, medicine, astronomy, botany, philosophy; charities, and the merit of reciting scripture formulæ; the attributes of Ahuramazda, and final deliverance from hell; bringing mankind from good to evil, and the preservation and protection of cities; the good and evil influence of the stars; keeping evil spirits out of the heart, and the attainment of spiritual life; purification, care of the dead, the resurrection, future existence, rewards and punishments, things concerning the world to come, and other similar matters.

Of these *Nasks*, but one, namely, the *Vendidad*, is extant

¹ *The Religion of the Parsis*, p. 141.

complete. Of two or three others some fragments remain, but in the Zend-Avesta, as used at the present time, there are other books, such as the Yasna and Visparad. The Yashts also are not found in the Nasks, unless, as has been maintained, they are contained in the fourteenth and twenty-first.

The Yasna is the most sacred book of the whole Zend-Avesta. Haug suggests that the Yasna and Visparad may occupy with respect to the Nasks "the same rank as the Vedas in the Brahmanical literature do in reference to the Shâstras and Purânas." The contents of these books show remarkable literary activity on the part of the ancient Persians. The texts now extant and published in Westergaard's edition are the following: Yasna, Visparad, Vendidad; twenty-four Yashts, including fragments of two Nasks; fourteen short prayers of various kinds, called Afrîngân, Nyâyish, and Gâh; nine miscellaneous fragments, and the Sîrôzah, or calendar. Not a voluminous literature, to be sure, but priceless to him who is interested in the history of races when they think their first thoughts and breathe their first prayers to God.

Yasna is from the root *yaz*, which means "to worship by means of sacrifice and prayers." At present it consists of seventy-two chapters. There are two parts, which differ considerably in contents and language. The old Yasna is written in the Gâtha dialect, which differs from the Avestan not only in the lengthening of final vowels and the separation of certain syllables into two syllables, which we may suppose to be the result of chanting, but in other respects, showing it to be at least one or two hundred years older than the Avestan. All parts written in the Gâtha dialect have formed originally a separate book, and this book was already considered sacred when the other scriptures were written. These original writings are mentioned several times in the Vendidad with the meaning of "scripture." The later Yasna is in the ordinary Avestan language.

Gâtha is from the root *gai*, "to sing," and hence means "song." "The Gâthas, five in number, are comparatively small collections of metrical compositions, containing short prayers, songs, and hymns, which generally express philosophical and abstract thoughts about metaphysical subjects."¹ These Gâthas

¹ *The Religion of the Parsis*, pp. 142, 143.

contain all that was revealed to Zoroaster. He learned them when in an ecstatic state from the choir of the archangels. The Gâtha dialect may be the language of the native district or city of Zoroaster.

The Visparad in twenty-three chapters is in the usual Avestan language, and in contents resembles the first part of the later Yasna. The Yashts, twenty in number, are collections of prayer and praise. Some of them are highly poetical, and contain in many cases metrical verses to be traced to the days of the bards of Media. Unlike the Yasna and Visparad, the Yashts celebrate the praises of some particular divine being or class of beings, instead of invoking all these beings promiscuously. The Vendidad, in twenty-two chapters, is the civil, criminal, and religious code of laws of the Zoroastrians.

The five Gâthas contain the teachings of Zoroaster in their purity. He is expressly mentioned as their author (Yas. lvii. 8), while nowhere is he said to be the author of other sacred writings. He speaks of himself in the first person, and acts as a man conscious of being commissioned of God. He teaches a pure religion, and exhorts his countrymen to forsake idolatry and worship the one only and true God. The later Yasnas are not regarded as the genuine works of Zoroaster, but rather of some of his earliest disciples. They descend somewhat from his high and pure principles, make concessions to idolatry, reform some of the old sacrifices, and invoke the ancient *devas*, whom Zoroaster charged with the origination of all evil and sin. The Visparad ranks with the later Yasna, and the Vendidad is still further removed from the purity of the five Gâthas. The Yashts are most modern of all. The Gâthas were composed about B.C. 1200; the Vendidad, B.C. 1000-900; the later Yasna, B.C. 800-700; the Pazand portion of the Vendidad, B.C. 500; the Yashts, B.C. 450-350.

The Zoroastrian religion in its origin was a protest against Brahmanism. This is evident from several considerations. *Deva* in the Brahmanical literature is the name of the objects of Hindu worship; in the Zend-Avesta it is the general name for evil spirit or devil. The Vendidad is *vt-daēvōddāta*, "what is given against the devas." *Asura* is the name of the Parsi god in Ahuramazda; in the older parts of the Rigveda it is used in a good sense, but in the later Brahmanical literature it

is applied to the most bitter enemies of the Hindu devas. In the Yajurveda seven meters are called *âsurî*. These are found in the Gâtha literature. *Indra*, the chief god of the Vedic times, is a demon among the Parsis, second only to Ahriman (*Angrômainyush*). The latter the Parsis call "devil of devils." The Brahmans call him "god of gods."

However, some of the Vedic devas are transformed into angels in the Zend-Avesta. The close connection of these religions is also shown where there is no evidence of hostility, not only in the names of gods, but also in the names and legends of heroes, in matters connected with sacrificial worship, and in various other particulars. Brahmanism and Zoroastrianism, then, were originally one religion. The causes of the conflict which led to their separation we may gather from the Gâthas. After the migration of the Aryan tribes from their original home, they long led a pastoral life, paying little attention to the cultivation of the soil. This was their condition throughout the earlier Vedic period, while they lived in the upper Penjâb, whence they migrated to Hindustan proper. When they reached the highlands of Bactria, the Iranians, tired of a wandering life, formed permanent settlements and became agricultural. The other Aryans became hostile, and made many hostile excursions into the settlements for the sake of booty.¹ Before entering upon these excursions they besought the assistance of *Indra* by Soma sacrifices. Their religion, hence, became an object of hatred to the Iranians, and they came to look upon it as the source of all wickedness, and instituted the beneficent religion of *Ahuramazda*, which for ever separated them from their Aryan and deva-worshipping brethren. The Zoroastrian, *Mazdayasnian*, or *Parsi* religion was not originated by Zoroaster. He alludes to old revelations, and praises the "fire priests" as possessed of great wisdom (*Yas.* xlvi. 3, 6). He teaches reverence and respect to the *Angra* or *Angiras* of the Vedas (*Yas.* xliii. 15). These *Angiras* are often connected with the *Atharvans*; *âtharva* is the general name of the priestly order in the Zend-Avesta. The *Angiras* and *Atharvans* are the authors of the *Atharvaveda*, which greatly resembles the *Yashts* and *Vendidad*. To the *Saoshyantô*, or "fire priests," perhaps identical with the *Atharvans*, it is said the *Ahura*

¹ Vend. Fars. 1 and 2; *Yas.* xxxiii. xlv.

religion was revealed (Yas. xii. 7). Several centuries may have elapsed before the appearance of Zoroaster. He completed the separation of the hostile Aryan elements, established new laws, and absorbed the old religion of the fire priests (he himself seems to have been one of their number) into the true Parsi religion, and hence became its real founder.

But little is known concerning the life of Zoroaster. Greek and Roman accounts are legendary. Only in the Yasna does he appear as a real historic character. He belonged to the Spitama family. The Hêchadaspas appear to have been his nearest relatives (Yas. xlvi. 15). His father's name was Pôurushaspa (Vend. xix. 4, 6). One daughter is mentioned under two names, Haêchadaspânâ Spitâmi. His surname was Zarathushtra, which the Greeks changed to Zarastres or Zoroastres, the Romans to Zoroaster, the Persians and Parsis to Zardosht. This name seems at first to have designated the office of high priest, and, after having been worn by Spitama as high priest, clung to him as pre-eminent in that office. When there were several high priests in a district or province, Zarathushtrôtêmô was sometimes used to designate the office of "the highest Zarathushtra." There might, then, have been many Zarathushtras before Zoroaster and during his life, yet the one called Spitama was alone the founder of the Parsi religion. His home was in Bactria. He lived probably not later than B.C. 1000. We place him B.C. 1200, as more probable.

Zoroaster was undoubtedly a great soul who enjoyed a large share of divine illumination. He passed through great spiritual struggles. The Vendidad preserves traditions which may refer to such struggles. Drukhsh, an evil spirit in the service of Ahriman, attempted to destroy him, but Zoroaster repeated the most sacred formula, Yâtha-ahû-vairyô, and the evil spirit was defeated; Zoroaster threatens the destruction of the evils produced by the demons of Ahriman. Ahriman tempts him to curse the Mazdayasnian religion, with the promise of the fortune of the traditional hero-king Vadha-ghana. Zoroaster replies: "I will not curse the good Mazdayasnian religion, not (if my) body, not (if my) soul, not (if my) life should part asunder." He will smite the evils of Ahriman with the words of Mazda.¹

¹ Vend. Fars. xix. 1, 2, 5-9.

The early Zoroastrian religion was strictly monotheistic. The Saoshyantô, or "fire priests," worshipped good spirits, called Ahuras, "the living ones," of whom those who possessed creative powers may have been called Mazdâonhō, "joint creators," or "creators of all." Zoroaster reduced this plurality of gods to unity, and called the one supreme being Ahuramazdâo, of which Mazdâo was the chief name, and Ahura an adjectival epithet. Both words were at first inflected (in which, however, there was a difference of custom), but afterward were united in a compound, Ahuramazda; at the time of the Achæmenians, Aûramazdâ; in the Sassanian times, Aûharmazdî; in modern Persian, Hôrmazd or Ormazd. Their conception of Ahuramazda was quite identical with the idea of Jehovah held by Job and other early characters of the Old Testament.

Zoroaster was told by Ahuramazda that the best way to guard against evil spirits was to utter his different names. He then gave twenty names, among which we find "I am," "the living one," "I am the wisdom," "I am who I am, Mazda." These cannot but remind us of some of the names of Jehovah as revealed to men.

Ahuramazda is creator of all things, most munificent spirit, righteous, wisdom, everlasting, eternal, good, brilliant, glorious, happy, the essence of truth, manifesting his life in his works, primeval spirit, faithful, generous, father of the good mind, "having his own light" (Yas. xxxi. 7); "originator of all the best things, of the spirit of nature (*gâush*), of righteousness, of the luminaries, and the self-shining brightness which is in the luminaries" (Yas. xii. 1); giver of health, truth, piety, earthly good, and immortality; the rewarder of the good and the punisher of the evil.

Zoroaster was evidently staggered by the problem of evil. In attempting to solve it, he gave to one God two spirits, a beneficent spirit and a hurtful spirit.

"Speñtô-mainyush, and Angrô-mainyush (Yas. xix. 9; lvii. 2), 'the two creators,' 'the two masters.' These two spirits fought against the devas, but not against each other. 'Speñtô-mainyush was regarded as the author of all that is bright and shining, of all that is good and useful in nature, while Angrô-mainyush called into existence all that is dark and apparently noxious. Both are as inseparable as day and night, and, though opposed to each other, are indispensable for the preservation of creation.

The beneficent spirit appears in the blazing flame, the presence of the hurtful one is marked by the wood converted into charcoal. Speñtô-mainyush has created the light of day, and Angrô-mainyush the darkness of night; the former awakens men to their duties, the latter lulls them to sleep. Life is produced by Speñtô-mainyush, but extinguished by Angrô-mainyush, whose hands, by releasing the soul from the fetters of the body, enables her to rise into immortality and everlasting life.¹

The transition from this form of Monotheism to the later dualism was easy. Speñtô-mainyush, "the beneficent spirit," was taken as a name of Ahuramazda himself, and Angrô-mainyush, "the hurtful spirit," was opposed to Ahuramazda. Hence arose the Zoroastrian notion of God and Devil, each independent and waging war against the other. Certain abstract ideas representing the gifts of Ahuramazda were personified and became archangels, forming the celestial council over which he presided. These were Vohu-manô, Asha-vahishta, Khshathra-vairya, Spenta-Armaiti, Haurvatât, and Ameretât, meaning originally, respectively, "good mind," "the best truth," "wealth," "devotion and piety," "health," and "immortality."

Separate from the Ameshaspentas or archangels stood the archangel Sraosha, who seems to have been a kind of mediator between God and man, the great teacher of the good religion. He points out the way to heaven and judges human actions after death; at least, a part in these offices seems to have been assigned to him. Like Ahuramazda, Angrô-mainyush (Ahriman) has an infernal council over which he presides.

Fravardin Yasht is dedicated to the praise of the *Frohars*, in the Avesta *Fravashi*, in the Cuneiform Inscriptions *Fravartish*, which means protectors. Every being, living, dead, or still unborn, has its own guardian spirit, Fravashi. Originally they represented only the departed souls of men, like the *manes* of the Romans, and the *pitaras* of the Brahmans. We may compare them with the *ideas* of Plato.

In favour of a primitive Parsi Monotheism we may consider such passages as the following :—

"In the beginning there was a pair of twins, two spirits, each of a peculiar activity; these are the good and the base, in thought, word, and deed. Choose one of these two spirits! Be good, not base. And these

¹ *The Religion of the Parsis*, p. 304.

two spirits united created the first (the material things), one, the reality, the other, the non-reality. . . . Of these two spirits you must choose one, either the evil, the originator of the worst actions, or the true holy spirit. . . . You cannot belong to both of them" (Yas. xxx. 3-6).

Although Haug urges a primitive Monotheism, his translations, as may be seen above, do not make this as plain as could have been desired. (See, however, Yas. xlviii. 4, and other passages.)

If you choose the good spirit it will be well :—

"Ahuramazda gives through the beneficent spirit, appearing in the best thought, and in rectitude of action and speech, to this world (universe), perfection and immortality, wealth and devotion. From his most beneficent spirit all good has sprung in the words which are pronounced by the tongue of the Good Mind (*Vohu-manô*), and the works wrought by the hands of Armaiti (spirit of the earth). By means of such knowledge Mazda himself is the father of all rectitude in thought, word, and deed" (Yas. xlvii. 1, 2).

Ahuramazda created the world in six periods in the following order:—In the first period heaven was created, in the second the waters, in the third the earth, in the fourth the trees, in the fifth the animals, and in the sixth man.

There was a golden age in the reign of Yima, "the most sunlike of men," during which men and cattle were free from death, water and trees free from drought, food inexhaustible : there was "neither cold nor heat, neither decay nor death, nor malice produced by the demons ; father and son walked forth, each fifteen years old in appearance" (Yas. ix. 4, 5).

Besides the doctrines we have named, we may mention among the other original doctrines of Zoroaster, the following : The twofold nature of man as body and soul, the twofold origin of knowledge as heavenly and earthly, human responsibility, the value of prayer, angelic mediatorship, heaven and hell, immortality, a general judgment, future rewards and punishments according to the works, the resurrection of the body, the final overthrow of evil, and the renovation of all things.

A few quotations will give a fair idea of Zoroaster's teachings on some of these points :—

"I will proclaim, as the greatest of all things, that one should be good, praising only righteousness. Ahuramazda will hear those who are bent on furthering (all that is good). . . . All that have been living, and will be

living, subsist by means of his bounty only. The soul of the righteous attains to immortality, but that of the wicked man has everlasting punishment. Such is the rule of Ahuramazda, whose the creatures are."¹

The soul of the dead during three days sits near the head chanting the Gâtha Ushtavaiti, and experiences as much of pleasure each day as all that which it had experienced when a living existence.

"On the passing away of the third night, as the dawn appears the soul of the righteous man appears, passing through plants and perfumes. To him there seems a wind blowing forth from the more southern side, from the more southern quarters, a sweet scent, more sweet-scented than other winds. Then, inhaling that wind with the nose, the soul of the righteous considers: Whence blows the wind, the most sweet-scented wind which I have ever inhaled with the nostrils? Advancing with the wind there appears to him what is his own religion (i.e. religious merit), in the shape of a beautiful maiden, brilliant, white-armed, strong, well-grown, erect, tall, high-bosomed, graceful, noble, with a dazzling face, of fifteen years, with a body as beautiful in (its) limbs (*lit.* growth) as the most beautiful creatures. Then the soul of the righteous man spoke to her, asking, What maiden art thou whom I have thus seen as yet the most beautiful of maidens in form? Then answered him his own religion, I am, O youth, thy good thoughts, good words, good deeds, (and) good religion, who am thy own religion in thy own self. Every one has loved thee for such greatness and goodness and beauty and perfume and triumph and resistance to foes, as thou appearest to me."

The soul of the righteous then advances four steps and reaches the four grades in heaven—good thought, good word, good action, and the eternal luminaries. Before entering heaven, the angel Vohuman has given him a cup of Zaremaya oil, which has made him oblivious of all worldly concerns and prepared him for eternal happiness.

The course of the wicked is directly opposite in all its stages till he reaches the fourth or lowest grade in hell, "eternal glooms."²

The Vendidad adds somewhat more to this account:—

"After a man is dead, at daybreak after the third night, he reaches Mithra, rising above the mountains resplendent with their own rightful lustre. The demon Vizareshô by name carries the soul bound toward the country of the wicked Deva-worshipping men. It goes on the time-worn paths, which are for the wicked and which are for the righteous, to the Chinvad bridge, created by Mazda, and right, where they ask the conscious-

¹ Gâtha Ushtavaiti, Yas. xlv. 6, 7.

² *Haddokht Nask*, Yt. xxii. 1-36.

ness and soul their conduct in the settlements (i.e. world). She, the beautiful, well-formed, strong (and) well-grown, comes with the dog, with the register, with children, with resources, with skilfulness. She dismisses the sinful soul of the wicked into the glooms (hell). She meets the souls of the righteous when crossing the (celestial mountain) Harôberezaiti (Alborz), and guides over the Chinwad bridge. Vohumanô (the archangel Bahman) rises from a golden throne; Vohumanô exclaims: 'How hast thou come hither to us, O righteous one! from the perishable life to the imperishable life? The souls of the righteous proceed joyfully to Ahuramazda, to the Ameshaspentas, to the golden throne, to paradise (Garô-nemâna).'¹

Garô-nemâna is "the house of song," with which we may compare the Christian idea of heaven.

A splendour originally created by Ahuramazda attaches itself to the dead, causing them to rise.

"This splendour attaches itself to the hero (who is to rise out of the number) of prophets (called *Saoshyants*) and to his companions, in order to make life everlasting, undecayable, imperishable, imputrescible, incorruptible, for ever existing, for ever vigorous, full of power, (at the time) when the dead shall rise again, and imperishableness of life shall commence, making life lasting by itself (without further support). All the world will remain for eternity in a state of righteousness; the devil will disappear from all those places where he used to attack the righteous man in order to kill (him); and all his brood and creatures will be doomed to destruction."²

Garô-demâna, "house of hymns," heaven, where the angels sing hymns, is the abode of Ahuramazda and the righteous dead (Yas. li. 15). Another name is *ahu vahishta*, afterward shortened to *vahishta* only; modern Persian *bahisht*, "the best life," "paradise."

Drûjô-demâna, "house of destruction," hell, is the abode of the bad, especially the devotees of the Deva religion (Yas. xlv. 11).

Chinwad bridge, which the pious alone can pass, the wicked falling from it into hell, is also mentioned in the Gâthas (Yas. xlv. 10, 11).

The resurrection and the renovation of all things are also mentioned in the Gâthas (Yas. xxx. 9). We see, then, that these were original doctrines of Zoroaster, and only reached a fuller development in the later Avestan writings.

The Zoroastrians divided into two parties; the Magi held to the primitive monotheism of their religion; the Zendiks, whose doctrines are expounded in the Bundahish, adopted the

¹ Far. xix. 28-32.

² Zamyâd Yt. xix. 89, 90.

later dualistic doctrine. The Magi found a proof of the unity of the supreme being in the term *Zarvan akarana*, "boundless time" (Vend. xix. 9). This doctrine concerning "*Zarvan akarana*," which has been held from early Sassanian times to the present, resulted from a grammatical misunderstanding. Translating in the locative instead of nominative the doctrine disappears: "The beneficent spirit made, he made (these weapons required to defeat the influence of the evil spirit) in *boundless time*, the immortal benefactors (*Amesh-aspentas*), the good rulers and good arrangers co-operated" (Haug).

The Zoroastrian religion is emphatically in its spirit a religion of work, devoted especially to the encouragement of agriculture. The five most pleasing spots on this earth are: the temple, the home of the pious, cultivated lands, stables, and pastures (Vend. iii. 1-6). The history of the rise of Zoroastrianism shows its close connection with agriculture. The earth was considered especially pure, and, lest it should be defiled, the dead were exposed on an iron grating in the *Dokhma*, or the "Tower of Silence," to be devoured by fowls of the air, or to decay. The bleached bones fall through into a pit beneath, from which they are removed to a subterranean cavern.

This religion, which at one time prevailed throughout Upper Thibet, Cabulistan, Sogdiana, Bactriana, Media, Persia, and other contiguous territory, and had it not been for the victories of Marathon and Salamis, might have extended widely over the world, is now confined to a very limited territory. In India, near Bombay, there are (1879) 132,000 Zoroastrians, or twenty per cent. of the whole population. In Yezd and Kirman and twenty-three other surrounding villages there are 8000. A few are found in Teheran, Ispahan, Shiraz, and Baku. The whole number in Persia is 8188. The Parsis of Yezd and Kirman are poor, degraded, and ignorant; those of Bombay, wealthy, intelligent, and philanthropic, even beyond the other inhabitants.

The Parsis are monogamists; they eat nothing cooked by a person of another religion; they object to eating beef and pork. Their priesthood is hereditary, but the son of a priest need not become a priest unless he so wish. They have many and careful purification ceremonies.

They pray sixteen times a day, but none of them—not even the priests—understand the language in which these prayers are composed. They have no pulpits, and no discourses in the vernacular of the people. The Parsi devotee may recite his prayers for himself; or, at any time when he pleases, he may go to the fire temple and give something to the priests to pray for him. The priests are bigoted and superstitious. There may be a dozen priests who know the meaning of the *words* of the Zend-Avesta, but know not the language.

There are two parties among the Parsis, the Conservatives and the Liberals. The Conservatives hold to all the old and traditional customs; the Liberals are striving to work reforms in abolishing the filthy purifications; in reducing the number of obligatory prayers, in customs concerning marriages, weddings, and funerals; and in the education of women, in all of which they have made considerable progress.

To the Parsi, the sun and other heavenly bodies, or fire, are symbols of the divine presence. In their Catechism (published less than fifty years ago) they say:—

“We believe in only one God, and do not believe in any besides him, the God who created the heavens, the earth, the angels, the stars, the moon, the fire, the water, or all the four elements, and all things of the two worlds; that God we believe in. Him we worship, him we invoke, him we adore. Our God has neither face nor form, colour nor shape, nor fixed place.”

The commands God has sent us through his prophet Zoroaster are:—

“To know God as one; to know the prophet, the exalted Zurthost, as the true prophet; to believe the religion and the Avesta brought by him as true beyond all manner of doubt; to believe in the goodness of God; not to disobey any of the commands of the Mazdashna religion; to avoid evil deeds; to pray five times in the day; to believe on the reckoning and justice on the fourth morning after death; to hope for heaven and to fear hell; to consider doubtless the day of general destruction and resurrection; to remember always that God has done what he willed, and shall do what he wills; to face some luminous object while worshipping God. Your saviour is your deeds and God himself. He is the pardoner and the giver. If you repent your sins and reform, and if the Great Judge consider you worthy of pardon, or would be merciful to you, he alone can and will save you.”¹

¹ Catechism in Guzerati; quoted by Max Müller in *Chips*, vol. i. pp. 169-174.

It will be seen how unjust it is to call the Parsi "Fire-worshippers." They feel reverence in the presence of the sacred flame, as it is a symbol of the divine presence. The priests protect the face with a veil, lest their breath might defile the fire. They will not blow out a candle if they can help it. They are the only Eastern nation not addicted to smoking. They cling to their creed, which has become so compact, for the very reason that they cannot read it from their sacred books; they cling to their creed with great tenacity of religious affection. Pure thoughts, pure words, pure deeds: this is the substance of its practical part. Its most earnest exhortation to every man is, "Be bright as the sun, pure as the moon" (Müller).

J. N. FRADENBURGH.

ART. VI.—*Our Earlier Literature.*¹

IN these stirring days of modern thought, we are far too apt to forget that centuries before the time of Elizabeth there flourished upon English soil a noble literary people, and that, in point of time, the three centuries from Spenser to Tennyson are more than trebled by the ten centuries from Cædmon to Spenser. Even long before the *Canterbury Tales* were written, the first Heroic in the English tongue was given to the world in the pages of Beowulf; and Charlemagne himself—king of the Franks—sat, as a teachable child, at the feet of the English Alcuin; while Bede and Alfred, and a host of worthy spirits, on to the days of Wiclif, had laid in England an enduring basis for the literary future of the people. Such a history as this is a sufficient rebuke to our past neglect of these earlier times, and a sufficient justification for that healthful and increasing interest therein which is possessing the modern English mind.

It is the object of this paper to show that, at the foundation of this early literature, there is ever visible the presence of the moral element, and to deduce from this fact some valuable lessons as to the ethical character of our later authorship.

¹ From the *Presbyterian Review*.

"The story of our literature," says Morley, "begins with the Gael." It begins here, we may add, as a moral story. It will thus be essential to a just discussion of this subject to go back for a moment to this Celtic age as an age of Moral Preparation.

We have from the early fathers most abundant testimony as to the introduction of Christianity upon British shores. Tertullian, writing in 208 A.D., says: "Those places of Britain inaccessible to Roman arms are now subdued to Christ." From Chrysostom, in the fourth century, we hear that "the British Isles, which lie beyond the sea, have felt the power of the Word." Frequent mention is made by contemporaneous writers of severe persecution, even unto martyrdom. "It is to be remembered," says Earle, "that, when our Saxon ancestors were pagans and barbarians, Christian life had taken so deep a hold of Ireland that she sent forth missions to convert her neighbours." It is most interesting, moreover, for us to note that the Romish faith and polity were not received without questionings. It certainly is evident, from all authentic history on this subject, that the relation of the Anglo-Saxon Church to the Papal power was quite different from that of others; and this characteristic, we are bound to remark, was largely an inheritance from the Celts, ever preferring, as they did, the simpler forms of the Eastern Church to the more complex and carnal rites of the Western. Just at this point begins that providential overruling of this Romish work in Britain, whose last and best result appears in the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century. Britain was now full of native Celtic teachers, taught, indeed, of Rome, yet diverging just enough from their preceptress to indicate the presence of a more evangelic spirit; and God is to be praised that, if there was with the Cymri a Pelagius working among his countrymen in the cause of a corrupt faith, there was, none the less, at Carthage a Saint Augustine to overthrow the foundations of such error, and lead the Celtic wanderers to the light. Here was Saint Patrick of Erin, a man of the Pauline type in his religious zeal. With him was Columba from far-famed Iona—the great headquarters of British evangelisation—whence multitudes went forth to disciple their

countrymen. These were men efficient to such a degree that modern missions can look to no better exemplars.

Such was the hopeful state of things, in a moral point of view, when the Anglo-Saxon invasion^s began in the fifth century, bringing with them to Britain all the superstitions of the old Gothic worship; and it is at this point that we clearly see the wonderful preparative providence of God. There is, we believe, a special providence in every great historic movement, and, therefore, a "fulness of time" in each. These heathenish multitudes were thus poured right into the bosom of a people with the worship of God already established. Angle, Saxon, and Jute stand face to face with Gael and Cymri; heathenism and true religion confront each other; and we await, with deep anxiety, the manifold results. At first, the moral Celt recedes before the physical Saxon and Angle; many grow indifferent to the teachings of the pious Culdees, and follow the leading of Pagan priests. Still, not a few of the old religious centres are maintained, and in these the real conflict is waged between native and invader. In this long and desperate struggle, the old faith, nurtured at Iona, seems to be all hidden; but we know that it is the hidden leaven working inwardly toward a grand result. At length the contest between Saxon and Celt is ended; the honest frankness at the heart of the one comes into communion with the Christian spirit of the other, and the happy result of all the trial and all the teaching gave to the world that English type of character which is second to no other, and that spirit and content of English literature which has made the race that possesses it immortal.

We have dwelt thus at some length upon this preparative epoch of Celtic influence because of its vital relation to our entire subsequent literary history, and because the religious tone in English letters is, apart from this, without sufficient explanation. It may be said of Celtic faith, as of Celtic wit, "that the main current of English literature cannot be disconnected therefrom;" and though Christianity, in those times of social and mental simplicity, was quite a different thing, in its degrees and expressions, from the enlightened Christianity of to-day, still, it was a true faith in a true Jehovah, and expressed, if with less intelligence, with equal candour and

devotion. It was out of the heart of such a series of religious movements as these, culminating in the abbey at Whitby, that a new and nobler song broke forth to the nations in the verses of Cædmon. It is at this interesting point that we enter upon the Age of Development, and begin the more particular notice of the ethical element in our earlier literature.

We turn, at once, to the Paraphrase of Cædmon: "For us it is very right that we praise with our words, and love in our minds, the Keeper of the Heavens, Glory-King of Hosts." Such is the text, and such the sentiment, at the very opening of this heroic poem. "In the latent spirit of this will be found," says a living English writer, "the soul of nearly all that is Saxon in our literature." Throughout this entire poem there is evident the character of that teaching which the author received in the abbey of the holy Hilda; and it was most fitting that, within such sacred precincts as these, English poetry should be born in the person of Cædmon. How striking the short description of him which we have from Bede! "A brother specially distinguished by divine grace, . . . by whose songs the minds of many were made to glow with contempt of earthly, and desire for heavenly things." We are forcibly impressed by that beautiful tradition of those simple times which makes him steal away from the music of the feasts, lest he, who had no music in his soul, should be called upon to play the harp; and afterward, as he is dreaming, and is asked to sing the origin of creatures, tells us that he broke forth in this Christian song. How significant such a tradition, as confirming the fact that English poetry, in its origin, is from above! We wonder not that Bede regarded this poem as a "pure inspiration." There was no theme that stirred the soul of the old bard till the great thoughts of Scripture came upon him, and caused him to utter forth the divine praise to all nations. "A nation," says Earle, "that could believe their poet to be divinely called was the nation to produce poets." He was the true Milton of his day, and his simple paraphrase, the "Paradise Lost" of that early age. It is most interesting for the English student, with Cædmon and Milton before him, to note the numerous parallels, both in method and spirit. It is a remark of Conybeare, in referring to a certain section in Milton, "that much of this portion

might be almost literally translated by a canto of lines from the great Saxon poet." Sharon Turner calls it "a 'Paradise Lost' in rude miniature." Dr. William Smith does not hesitate to speak of Milton's actual indebtedness to it. He must certainly have been conversant with those early periods, as we have, from his own pen, a history of England up to the time of the Norman invasion. Very able writers, however, are in doubt as to whether the English poet had access, in any way whatever, to the work of the Saxon bard. Be this as it may, the resemblances are full of suggestion. One of the seventh century, the other of the seventeenth; one standing at the very borders of a Pagan age, the other enjoying the rich results of the Protestant Reformation,—and yet the subject of their song the same, the same holy oracle consulted as the only source of true poetic fire, and the aim of each alike to elevate the thought of the race toward God and all that is good.

Passing by much intervening Saxon poetry, in all of which "the tender mercy of God is ever the theme," we find ourselves in the presence of Bede, the great Anglo-Latin historian of the time, and the biographer of Cædmon. We have, from his own pen, a brief account of his life after the age of seven. "I wholly applied myself," he says, "to the study of Scripture." He prays "that he who has partaken of the words of divine wisdom may, in fit time, come to the presence of Him who is the fountain of of all knowledge." It is scarcely necessary, after a statement and prayer of such a tenor, to institute an examination of Bede's writings in order to discover their ethical spirit. We should be glad could we feel that English authors since his time had so committed themselves to God for guidance ere they began, and while they prosecuted, their high vocation as instructors of the people. Bede and Hume! Each writing for us a history of England. The one in his quiet monastic home at Yarrow, penning the artless story of old Britain, that the people may be instructed and God somewhat glorified; the other maliciously weaving into the web of his narrative the fatal theories of an infidel philosophy, that God may be dishonoured; and the eighteenth century of light and liberty sits at the feet of the eighth for moral tuition! The works of so voluminous an author are too abundant for

recital, and yet whatever be the subject-matter of the treatise, the moral feature is manifest in all. This is not only true of his *Exegesis*, his *Ecclesiastical History*, and his *Homilies*, but in discussions the most secular. If astronomy is the theme, he discourses at times upon the glory of God in the stars; if physical philosophy, he adores his Maker as visible in the earth; and had he but a calendar to compile, it was made an occasion of honour to the Lord of the Seasons.

We pass from Bede to the scholastic Alcuin, who seems to have worthily worn the mantle of his predecessor which Providence cast upon him. A child of the monastic discipline, he began the service of God in the Church from very infancy, and, in his own expressive language to the monks at York, was "by the discipline of fatherly chastisement brought up to manhood." There was, in fact, no place at this time for mental culture apart from the sacred cloister. Work and worship were in continuous and pleasing harmony, and everything was done through the Church as a medium, and with reference to religious ends. We can thus see how true it must have been that "at the death of Bede the Anglo-Saxon Church presented the best practical scholarship in Christendom;" and a great part of the moral element prevalent in our literature is directly traceable to this most important agent in the practical life of our ancestors. With all the evils incident to the monastic life which would make its existence, as Mr. Hallam remarks, "deeply injurious to the general morals of a nation," and utterly unwarrantable in our day, it does seem to the impartial mind as if, in those primitive times, no other agency could have done that mighty work for the mind and heart of Europe which we owe to such an order. In one of these, Alcuin was educated as a scholar and a Christian, and, when he went forth from his quiet retreat at York to instruct the subjects and family of Charlemagne, he went forth fully determined to impart a religious culture. It is pleasant to note the gradual power for good which the learned Christian monk was exercising over the conscience of his royal master, so that when, in accordance with the rude spirit of the time, he went forth, sword in hand, to convert the erring Saxons, it was the better spirit of Alcuin that impressed upon the heart of the Emperor the principles of the true religion, and saved his countrymen

from cruel death. Thus he lived and wrote : now penning a homily, and now a treatise on philosophy ; now a commentary, and now a history ; writing, as a scholar, in behalf of education, and, as a Christian, in behalf of religion, and yet so incorporating the moral element in all the operations of his mind that the religious tendency was evident in all. Thus we might continue making mention of the Celtic Scotus, from whose expressed opinions as to the nature and limits of Christian philosophy modern research has made but little advance ; of Aelfric, called by Shaw the " great light of the tenth century," and especially noted for his opposition to Romish faith in defence of Celtic and Saxon Christianity ; and, finally, of the magnanimous Alfred, making giant efforts to restore the language and faith of his fathers, and, in many respects, the best exponent of these early times. Here, however, we must close our brief survey of the Anglo-Saxon period, and view the old literature and life as modified by the Danish invasion and the Norman conquest.

Hordes of barbarians from the north rushed into England with unsparing fury, breaking up the religious life and retarding the growth of their incipient literature. Afterward, ingressions from Normandy, less rude, but far more significant, came upon them in rapid succession. That the spirit of our forefathers was not altogether crushed by these experiences ; that national life was maintained when national organisation and order were gone : this it is which argues a native solidity of character and iron-like tenacity of purpose which has made the English race what it is in history, and has put within its power, if it be faithful, the moral government of the world.

We have noted a few of the representatives of its literary life in the days of its prosperity, Cædmon, Bede, and Alcuin ; the Christian poet, historian, and ambassador, standing as the first worshippers at the newly-erected shrine of Saxon literature, and dedicating themselves and their writings unto God ; sending forth poetry, history, and diplomacy as of divine origination and for divine ends, and bidding the nations be encouraged.

So decided a movement as the Conquest had, of necessity, a marked effect upon the Anglo-Saxon, so that, at one period, " the unwritten songs of the people were almost the only litera-

ture." The Norman mind was so entirely different, in its quality and aim, from the Saxon, that the civil and mental struggle was a severe one, but yet, in the providence of God, so contested as ever to retain in its essence the influence of the native character. Despite the fact of immediate intermarriage as the policy of the Norman and the weakness of the Saxon, still, for years after the Conquest, the old language remained in comparative entirety. In time, however, the foreign influence was sufficiently strong to supersede, for a season, the employment of the "birth tongue" for purposes of literature, until we find it reinstated, with much of the freshness of its old life, by the simple priest of Arely. We are here obliged to content ourselves with the mere names of Orderic, worthy successor of Bede in moral aim and spirit; of William of Malmesbury, eulogised by Saville as an "historian who had discharged his trust;" of Gerald the Welshman, who, true to Celtic memories, "represented in the twelfth century the church militant in Wales;" and last, of Walter Map—another Celt in lineage—who, in giving to the early legends of King Arthur a Christian signification well deserves the encomium of "chief of the reformers before Wiclif; the mainspring of whose power was a sacred earnestness." These are they who, between Alfred and Layamon, in the trying times of the Anglo-Norman period, worthily sustained the reputation of their literary sires; and as the early Anglo-Saxon age of literature opened before us, in the person of Cædmon praising and praying ere he began his Paraphrase, so, in this later epoch, we begin our reading with the prayer of Layamon in the midst of his books. He had travelled far to collect the materials for his history, and now, at home again in his secluded parish, and about to commence his labour, he indulges in the sweet soliloquy, "Layamon laid down these books and turning the leaves beheld them lovingly. May the Lord be merciful to him!" He was in spirit, language, and aspiration, as genuine an Anglo-Saxon as ever honoured English soil; and taking down the old harp, which had, during their captivity, been hung upon the willows, he breaks forth again in native song to tell to the people "the noble deeds of England." We note, at every turn, the true simplicity of the Saxon; the sober earnestness of purpose pervading the entire history; the comparative absence of metaphor, that, Saxon-like,

he "may speak right on." Seeming to feel that he stood, as Cædmon before him, at the very opening of a new era in English literary history, for whose entire tone and quality he would be responsible, he begins, as did the poet, the history of his home-land with earnest prayer, and again commends the expanding volume of English letters to the Triune God.

Thus happily do we find the moral continuity of English thought and feeling fully maintained, at every period, as the story goes on, until, passing the days of the old English chroniclers, the ballads of the bards, and the songs of the people, we come at last upon a new and fruitful epoch. Here we find the zealous Wiclif devoting every energy to the rendering of the Scripture into the mother tongue, and, before the close of the century, giving to his countrymen the completed translation. We find in this list the holy Langland, discoursing in his *Piers Plowman* against all the corruptions of his time, and groping earnestly after a vision of Christ; a poet so chaste and ingenuous that even the dissolute Byron was charmed by his purity, and of whom Mr. Marsh and Dean Milman speak in terms that can be applied to but few of his successors. Here we find the "moral" Gower, in his *Vox Clamantis*, calling his countrymen to social reformation, and in his *Confessio Amantis* battling away with all his Anglo-Saxon might and morality against the deadly sins of the soul. Thus, ere we are aware, we stand in the presence of Chaucer himself, the best expresser of all that is just, and the worthy representative of a new and nobler awakening. The seventh century of Anglo-Saxon is perfected in the fourteenth century of national English.

The general tendency of Chaucer's writings is moral. Despite occasional improprieties, it is impossible to believe that he wrote with an evil motive. In such an assertion as this a few salient particulars are to be noted. (a.) The character of the times and the usage of language. We shall find, in this respect, that much that might now seem objectionable was then harmless. The people of his day were more outspoken and ingenuous, and it is still an open question whether the fastidious delicacy of modern times is not more to be deprecated than this primitive freedom. The manners of London in Chaucer's time, blunt as they were, were far more

desirable than the conventional correctness of later eras. Chaucer wrote as a true exponent of the English life of that day; and because it is necessary for us to revise his pages to suit modern scruples, it is not thereby proved that he was an immoral author. (b.) Further, Chaucer had an all-comprehensive mind. Like his great dramatic successor, he was many-sided, and in his writings discussed all classes and conditions. He aims to present a complete sketch of human nature, and in common with the primitive preachers and the early editors of the English Bible he makes use of many terms that are now questionable. We find the best illustration of this in his *Canterbury Tales*. Their main excellence lies in the fact that they give a full-sized portrait of English life. No more truly does the pious parson speak as a parson should, than does the drunken miller speak as he should. To make the clerical sobriety of the one the standard of the action of the other would not only destroy the poetry, but the whole effect as natural. We should as soon expect to hear common talk from the one as religious talk from the other. Each is consistent with his character and station. The jolly cook does not discourse on Aristotle, nor the clerk of Oxford on stews and fries. Chaucer knew that were we to meet the Reeve on the Strand, he would accost us in obedience to the roughness of his nature and his trade. It is in this consummate naturalness of description that these tales are matchless. It is John Bunyan anticipated and surpassed, in that real life takes the place of allegory. (c.) The strongest argument, perhaps, for the high moral motive of Chaucer is seen in the fact that he repeatedly warns his readers against anything in the text that may seem to them immoral; points them to the portions at which no one can take umbrage, and, at the close of his writings, in the most penitent and childlike spirit, craves divine and human forgiveness for every error innocently committed. It is by reason of such a spirit as this that we are able to argue for the essential purity of Chaucer's writings. Even upon the supposition that they are grossly improper, we must accept his closing confessions. If he warns us against the wrongs, and we still persist in our charges, the spirit of criticism overreaches itself. We believe that it is because most of the readers of Chaucer have read him ignorantly that they indorse

the common cry of vulgarity. We may quote a few lines in point. In the tale of the drunken miller, a recital apparently so objectionable, we read in the prologue :—

“ For Goddes love, as deme not that I say
Of *evil intent*, but that I moste rehearse
Hir tales alle, al be they better or werse
And, therefore, who so list it not to here
Turne o’er the leaf and *chese another tale*
For he shall find ynow both gret and smale
Of storial thing that toucheth gentillesse,
And eke *moralite* and *holiness*
Blameth not me, if that ye chese amiss,
The miller is a churl, ye know well this.”

Such language would seem to be sufficient to convince the most suspicious as to the morality of Chaucer. He calls God to witness that he has no bad intent; that he wishes to give the whole story of human life, be it better or worse, and casts upon the conscience of the reader the moral responsibility. Better, we say, one map of such a mould as this, than a thousand kid-gloved advocates of modern propriety. Better by far that frankness that dare be true to nature while kindly giving warning of its errors, than that affected etiquette which, under a plausible exterior, conceals an evil conscience. No writer of large sympathies can be properly judged by occasional sentences, or even by extended passages, in which as a true dramatist he is unfolding character, but rather by the undertone of all his writings and the governing motive of their production. In no better manner can this be seen in Chaucer than as to the moral improvement which he makes upon the French and Italian models which he uses. The poem of “Troilus and Cressida,” for instance, is founded upon the “Filostrato” of Boccaccio. The moral of the Italian story is the fickleness of woman; that of the English, her constancy. Boccaccio dedicates his work to his mistress Fiameto; Chaucer dedicates his to the “moral Gower.” The one lived at a voluptuous court, and he presents a series of questionable pictures to suit the tastes of the time, while the other elevates at once the moral character of the court by the purity of his pages. *The Canterbury Tales*, as modified from the *Decameron* of Boccaccio, proves the same truth. The scene, in the one case, is a company of idle pleasure-seekers pur-

posely evading their solemn duty to the perishing at Florence ; in the other, it is a company of honest Englishmen on a pious mission to the shrine of Becket. The manner in which these low Italian tales were made to contribute to a high conception of life and female honour argues, to our mind, Chaucer's real character, and reveals it to have been infinitely above the lower levels of Continental authorship. The tone of his literary life and teachings was eminently ethical, and it gave moral character to his entire era.

We have thus rapidly gathered a small part of that sum of moral evidence which exists in our early literature, and as we read the history of the English mind from this period on to the time of Tennyson, we may be supposed to have an unquestionable right to look for an ethical element in and under it all, and when we find it we are under obligation to remember the important part which the fathers took in awakening and transmitting it. It would be a most instructive study to note in detail the representative eras and authors of our later literature, and mark in what respects and to what degrees this ethical quality manifests itself. Such a survey lies far beyond the limits of the present discussion. Assuming it, at present, as capable of proof that the *general* character of our subsequent literature has been moral, special attention should be called to that exceptionable epoch in English letters since the time of Elizabeth, which has more or less departed from primitive moral teachings. We refer to the reign of Charles II.

We are now brought to a period of sad and general defection. It is not our purpose here to apologise for this moral decline, in so far as it really existed. It is our purpose, however, to call attention to the fact that popular criticism has gone to extremes in this direction in its failure to detect and make prominent what may be termed the *redeeming* features of the period. The court and the Comic drama of the day, it must be confessed, were as corrupt as they could well have been, and it is to these that our literary historians should have restricted their wholesale onslaughts upon the immorality of the era.

This important fact, so often lost sight of by critics of this period, bids us be exceedingly cautious in making up the moral estimate of the time. Politics and the drama, we re-

peat, were as abandoned as they could be, and in the measure of their influence wrought a moral devastation throughout the realm; and yet we cannot forget that other classes existed besides the courtiers and the comedians. Here was the Church of England dating its ecclesiastical restoration from the establishment of the new political *régime*, and, though much can be said, and ought to be said, bearing upon the want of courage and zeal in the Anglican Church at this critical juncture, and though, had the Church been less engaged in crushing Puritanism it would have been more successful in exalting Christianity, due account should also be taken of the voice lifted up, more or less distinctly, against the defection of the time. Far more decided was the influence exerted by the Nonconformist divines. Shut out from conventicles and public speaking by the rigorous Act of Uniformity, the printed page became the oracle to the people, and they succeeded in circulating the truth which they were forbidden to preach. The same Providence which made the suppression of Tyndale's version of the Scriptures the very occasion for a new and better issue, made also the silencing of Puritan divines the occasion of a mightier power for good. The great Milton had done a good service in the interest of truth, when, previous to the Restoration, he had pleaded before Parliament for liberty in thought and utterance, and the present epoch was enjoying a partial freedom of the press.

Not to speak of the effect of such writings as those of Baxter and his compeers, we note the most important fact that all the representative authors of the Restoration (Dryden excepted) wielded their potent influence on behalf of morality. Barrow stood at the Court of St. James's as Paul did at the palace of the Cæsars, and with apostolic ardour "reasoned of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come." Newton passed part of his retirement in writing upon the prophecies of the Old Testament, and never failed in his principles of natural philosophy to accept, as equally certain, the principles of a supernatural religion. Bunyan sat in his prison at Bedford for the sin of preaching the Gospel, and lo! the world becomes his great conventicle, and his *Pilgrim's Progress* the second gospel of the nations; while Milton, blind, forsaken, and destitute, was released from imprisonment by the act of

oblivion only to pen a poem destined to eternal remembrance. Tillotson was a worthy contemporary of Barrow, as Boyle was of Newton. Burnet was so faithful to the King in rebuking his profligacy that he lost his position thereby, while Cudworth, with a mental acumen of no inferior order, exposed the fallacies of Thomas Hobbes in the interests of Theism and Christian morality. These were men of such a character that they must have possessed a numerous and an upright constituency. Of this constituency we naturally hear little amid those days of political and religious persecution, and yet it was mainly through them that the nation was not wholly given up of God, and that there remains enough of integrity to maintain the historic morality of the race. When Dr. Johnson remarks "that the playhouse was abhorred by the Puritans and by those who desired the character of seriousness or decency, that a grave lawyer would have debased his dignity and a young trader would have impaired his credit by appearing within it," it is of this very constituency that he is speaking. Most assuredly, if dignity as a gentleman and credit as a merchant depended, in those days, upon abandonment of the theatre, that constituency must have been larger and its moral tone far healthier than common history affirms.

Such a record serves to redeem, in great part, the ethical reputation of the age of Charles II. We are inclined to doubt whether we have appreciated the moral steadfastness of these heroic men and women. "To keep one's-self unspotted from the world" in Charles II's reign was something quite different from a similar restraint in the Augustan age of Queen Anne, and just in proportion as we magnify the turpitude of the time do we exalt the integrity of this minority. "There is in the English mind," says M. Taine, "an indestructible stock of moral instincts, and it is the greatest confirmation of this that we can discover such a stock at the Court of Charles II." If it was true, in those days, that immorality was the law and possessed the numerical majority, morality, though the exception, possessed the literary strength; and it is to the lasting honour of the England of that day to know that licentiousness and literary talent were in an inverse ratio. The libertines of the time were the weaklings of the time, and

when the names of those minor dramatists and minor men, which have survived even until now, shall have perished in oblivion, the names of their most noble contemporaries will but have passed a small portion of the opening hours in the eternity of their fame. In point of numbers alone, there were a hundred dissolute Wycherleys to a single pious Bunyan; but in point of all else that makes manhood, character, and influence, there was an overwhelming majority for Christian principle and social purity. In fine, the period was in all respects an abnormal development from English literary life.

In M. Taine's racy history of English literature, we have read nothing with so much interest as the repeated remarks which he makes in reference to the substantial integrity of the English mind. With all his satire upon the race, in other particulars, his testimony on this topic is clear and uniform. It is thus that he defines an Englishman to be a man "preoccupied by moral emotions." Nowhere are his declarations more decisive and abundant than when he is discussing this very period which is now before us, as if he would have us understand that it was an exhibition of morals not to be expected of the Anglo-Saxon race, and altogether out of precedent and explanation. He strikes the very point which we are aiming to enforce when he says, "The English Restoration, altogether, was one of those great crises which, while warping the developing of a society and a literature, show the *inward spirit* which they *modify*, but *contradicts* them," and he adds the significant words, "all was *abortive*." Whatever the imbecility of the age was, we are glad to know, and from French authority, that it was contradictory and abortive. The old Anglo-Saxon period of Cædmon and of Bede protests against it. The later era of Gower, of Wiclif, and of Chaucer protests against it. The splendid literary record from Spenser onward contradicts it. It was, in the language of Lear, "a thwart disnatured torment," a great literary monstrosity, altogether false to English memories and English aspirations, grafted in upon the national stock through the medium of political changes and foreign influence, and giving maturity to a kind of fruitage as unnatural as it was unwholesome. If, in the age of Charles II., moral degeneracy was the undoubted law, and moral excellence the exception, the law in power was an

unquestioned usurper of the English literary throne and the exception in abeyance, the true expression of the national conscience. Two inferences of practical purport engage us in closing.

(a.) Our moral indebtedness to pre-Elizabethan authors is made clearly manifest. We are well aware of the habit of literary historians in this particular. English letters, as to their moral quality and progress, are rarely traced further back than the great Reformation of the sixteenth century; this general religious awakening fully accounting, as they argue, for every phase of ethical life developed in the later literature. It is scarcely possible, we concede, to lay too much stress upon the distinctively moral effect of the Reformation on English literature. In the nature of things it must have been potent and persuasive, sending throughout the body of our authorship the inspiration of a nobler life. The point of interest just here, however, is as to the moral character of this literature previous to Elizabeth, and to what extent this later and more conspicuous development of moral life is traceable to that earlier era. In a late work, *Illustrations of English Religion*, in which Mr. Morley's definite purpose is to show the moral character of English authorship, we read the suggestive statement—"During the First English time nearly our whole literature had religion for its theme." The statement seems startling to any one save to him who has for himself read and studied the earlier authors. From the "Paraphrase" of Cædmon to the "Vision" of Langland we find little but hymns and homilies, commentaries and moral colloquies, sacred history and biography making up the teaching of the time. Ere the reader is aware, he finds himself surrounded by an atmosphere spiritual in its character, and is somewhat at a loss where to turn for the distinctively civil history of the epoch. In reference to the Reformation itself, it is never to be forgotten that the germs of it were deposited in Saxon soil long before the days of Chaucer.¹ To say nothing of the primitive Celtic period in its relations to Christianity, it is to be noted that the great missionary movement from Rome to England, under the direction of Augustine, at the close of the sixth century, had but fairly become estab-

¹ See *Princeton Review*, March 1881.

lished in Kent, ere departures more or less important from the extreme type of the Latin Church began to be manifest. It was then and there, attribute it to what influence we may—Celtic, Saxon, or Providence direct—that the first *protestation* was heard against the exactions of Romanism. Gradually, but surely, the leaven that was then hidden did its silent and effective work. The spiritual presence of our Lord in the sanctuary was magnified above the bodily. The free circulation of the Bible was encouraged by the translation of various portions of it into the mother tongue. An outreaching after a purer faith and a more scriptural order was everywhere visible. In one way or another this was the movement going on, too firmly grounded in the hearts of the people and too graciously ordered by Providence to be, for any length of time, impeded. It passed from Aelfric and Bede to simple-hearted Layamon, to Langland, Wiclif, Tyndale, and Chaucer, and when at length the Protestant Reformation became an established fact, we are not to forget the historical continuity of the movement from these earliest times of feeble beginnings. The name of Elizabeth should suggest that of Alfred. We speak of the philosophy of history. It is in its unbroken unity that its philosophy finds basis and explanation. This unity, in its highest aspect, is moral more than historical, connecting the names of Cædmon and Milton, and these in turn with that of Tennyson.

The time has fully come when the current twaddle as to our Saxon ancestors spending their days in drinking mead from the skulls of their enemies should give fitting place to the hearty acknowledgment of our varied indebtedness to these earlier ages. The civilisation of the time, crude as it was, contained the germinal elements of all later progress, and its substantial morality, however honest and homely, made the English Reformation a possibility. Among the results which are yet to appear from that increasing attention now being given to this particular history of our English race and literature, none, as we believe, will be more marked or more gladly welcomed than this—the full discovery of the debt which we owe to these periods in all that pertains to a people's good. These may have been the days of small things, and yet it was the time of principles and elements and first forms. There is

no nation in history which can so ill afford, out of deference to its own honour, to depreciate the evidences of its first life. We search in vain among the literatures of the Continent for such a moral pedigree. It is not in France among the Troubadours, or in Germany among the Minnesänger. We find its only counterpart in the chosen land of Judea. English literature is Hebraic in its origin; "God is in the midst of her." For a nation to be possessed of such antecedents as these is a matter of no common moment. 'Tis well, indeed, to find purity at the sources, and sad will it be for those who guide the pen of modern thought in England and America if they ever forget their moral relationship to the English past. The English pen, in deference to its history, should be a very "sword of the Spirit," and English letters a testimony to the world for truth. "God knows," says Gower, "my wish is to be useful. Give me, O God, that there may be less vice and more virtue for my speaking." "This," says Morley, "is the old spirit of Cædmon and of Bede, in which are laid, while the earth lasts, the strong foundations of our literature."

(b.) We inquire further: Is English literature, as now developing before us, maintaining its character as a moral literature? Is there any evidence of moral decline? This is a question too vast in its scope, and manifestly too delicate in its application to living authors, to admit of detailed discussion. A general answer, however, is possible and needful.

Mr. Devey, in his able treatise on *Modern English Poets*, represents it as a characteristic conviction among them, "that no poetry can be good, even in an æsthetic sense, which is divorced from the moral principle." To the same general effect such writers as Brooke and Forman and Stedman have spoken. In scanning the names of those who have guided the course of literary thought in the last quarter of a century, no substantial exception perhaps can be taken to the general tone of this morality. While this is true, it must also be stated that there is at present an element of danger manifesting itself in English letters. The one great exception to the uniform character of English literature as moral has already been noted. The source of that evil was Continental influence. The special sphere of its expression was the drama, and its type was sensuous. The danger that lies at the door of modern English authorship is

both domestic and foreign in its origin ; embraces in its compass both prose and poetry, and in its special type is speculative. The cause of moral decline at the Restoration was in the line of coarse animal passions leading the people, at length, to the grossest social extremes. Its crime, at present, is in the line of liberal thought. Its form is philosophical and sceptical. Otway and Congreve represent the former period, as Arnold and George Eliot do the later. It is not our purpose to sound, at this point, any false alarm. If, however, we have read aright the content of our modern English literature, its hidden nature and moral undertone, and have properly connected present literary development with present philosophic speculation, then it is time to note the tendencies of the hour and to urge anew the importance of being true as writers to English memories. There is an absence not only of that healthfulness of moral sentiment which was prominent in early times, but even of that sobriety of thought prevalent in the critical age of Pope and the Augustan essayists. If the present moral tendency has any precedent in English literary history, it is to be found at that time when the progress of English Deism was at its height, and the speculative reason usurped the place of simple faith. The morality of the present, as it appears in literature, is worldly rather than Christian—too cautious and reserved to be inspiring, and more inclined to adjust itself to the scientific investigations of the age than to the truth of Scripture. In fine, as Mr. Selkirk has ably shown, modern English literature tends to take on a materialistic tone and temper. Herein lies the literary peril of the hour both in a mental and moral point of view. Critics are discussing with ardour the suggestive question—Whether it is probable that English literature will ever again evince the masculine vigour of Elizabethan times ? We believe that the fullest answer to this question lies in the subject before us. So vital, after all, is the relation of conscience to intellect that it requires no prophet to foresee that if English literature comes more and more into union with modern materialism, its doom is sealed. Golden Ages are the product of far different influences. Especially is this true in poetry. The creative and impassioned imagination of the poet cannot work under the shadows of the dominant philosophy. Its influence upon the poetic instincts is repressive and chilling. The

"vision and faculty divine" must have a wider area and a loftier range for its outlook and exercise. Taking facts as they are, and tendencies as they manifest themselves, English literature, for the next quarter of a century, as to its prose, will be speculative, and as to its poetry, didactic and formal. The Augustan age may reappear before the close of the century. Reference must here be made to a moral danger still more serious than that already mentioned. It finds its best expression in such an author as Swinburne, in some of whose writings we seem to have a studied and successful combination of the sensuous and the sceptical. We are not here discussing the practical merits of Swinburne. We simply state the fact that as an exponent of our modern literature he represents a combination of the sensuous and speculative which is ominous of evil, and which unifies the worst elements of the Stuart and Victorian Ages.

On the speculative side he teaches us that death is a sleep; the kingdom of Christ, a structure based on sand; and God, an idea of the brain detrimental to human progress. He glories in being called the prophet of man—the leading Pananthropist of English poetry, and, at times, as in "Songs before Sunrise," even condescends to blasphemy. On the sensuous side, as we read him in "Chastelard," "Laus Veneris," and elsewhere, not only is evil paraded before us dressed in a kind of chivalric glamour, but common decency itself is shocked by his shameless revelations. It is not necessary for us to dwell longer upon this exceptional phase of our modern literature. What we make emphatic is, that it reveals a tendency baneful beyond conception. If asked, therefore, whether our literature *has* morally declined since the days of Cowper and Coleridge, we answer—That it *is* declining. The leaven is in the lump, and it is working.

What is to counteract its evil influence? A recall to the primitive and pervading morality of English letters as represented in its leading periods and authors, and a repetition upon a more glorious scale of the religious awakening of Elizabethan times. The salvation of English authorship depends on nothing less than a general and profound moral awakening. We need an English Reformation of the nineteenth century. The future of English literature in its ethical character rests upon the revival of conscience and faith and spiritual life.

THEODORE W. HUNT.

ART. VII.—*The Jewish Question in Europe.*¹

THOSE who carefully follow the course of contemporary history will, no doubt, have noted the great and growing prominence in Central and Eastern Europe of what is there known as "the Jewish question." Within the past one or two years, the position and prospects of the Jews have been discussed in Europe, in pamphlets, newspapers, reviews, and even in popular novels, to an extent that is quite unprecedented.²

The anti-Jewish agitation in its present form may perhaps be well dated from the time that in 1878 the Congress of Berlin lifted Jewish affairs into a new and special prominence by insisting that Roumania should recognise no distinction in civil privileges, as based on creed, between Jew and Gentile. From that time on, an anti-Jewish feeling has steadily increased till, in the latter part of the autumn, a petition was set in circulation throughout the German Empire by the "Anti-Semitic League," imploring the Chancellor, according to the Berlin correspondent of the *London Times*,

(1) "To limit at least, if not wholly hinder, the emigration into Germany of foreign Jews ; (2) To exclude Jews from all offices of authority, and restrict their activity in the legal career, particularly on the bench ; (3) To prevent their becoming teachers in Christian schools, and to admit them only in very exceptional cases into others ; and (4) To cause statistics to be collected as to the Hebrew population of the Empire."

The circulation of this petition was made the occasion, on the 20th of last November, of an interpellation of the Government by the Progressive party in the Reichstag, which gave rise to a very animated debate, lasting through two days. The

¹ From the *New Englander*.

² The pamphlet literature that this subject has called forth in Germany within the past two years has been astonishingly voluminous. The matter has also received special attention in many thoughtful editorials in English papers, as, e.g. in the *Saturday Review*, the *Spectator*, the *Pall Mall Gazette*, etc. The *Contemporary* and *Fortnightly Reviews*, as also the *Nineteenth Century*, have all had, within the last few months, one or more articles upon the subject. And the novelists also, as, e.g. George Eliot in *Daniel Deronda*, and the *Impressions of Theophrastus Such*, Lord Beaconsfield, Freitag in his *Soll und Haben*, and others, have in one way or another given Jewish affairs a more or less prominent place in their works. All this shows in what a remarkable degree this so-called Jewish question has commanded the attention of all classes of people in Europe.

popular feeling in the matter was quite unusual ; it is said that the galleries of the Reichstag have never been so crowded as on that occasion, while even the pavement outside was thronged with an excited multitude. The answer of the Government to the interpellation was to the effect that as regarding the petition they could do nothing, as it had not yet been presented ; but that the Government had no intention of altering the existing laws, touching the equality of all creeds in political privileges. Both sides claimed the victory in the long debate, and the interpellation had at least no immediate effect in calming the excited feelings of the "Semites" and the "anti-Semites" in the German Empire. Up to the present time, however, it does not appear that the anti-Semites are at all likely to carry their points. About the time of the above-mentioned interpellation, a counter-paper protesting against the whole anti-Jewish movement, was set on foot by Professor Mommsen of Berlin, and received the signatures of a large number of such men as Professors Kirchhoff, Virchow, Scherer, Weber, and many others of a like standing. The Emperor and Prince Bismarck do not appear to have publicly committed themselves on the subject ; but the Crown Prince has repeatedly expressed himself as opposed to the whole movement against the Jews, and the King of Bavaria authorised the issue of a ministerial decree condemning the agitation. Thus although, no doubt, a numerous party, said to be especially strong among the students of the Universities, still keeps up the opposition to the Jews, it appears thus far to be kept effectively in check, and, despite efforts to the contrary, the Jews seem to have suffered little in the late elections, the Jewish Mayor of Berlin, for example, Herr Strassmann, being re-elected by a very fair majority. In Austria and Hungary, the movement has not advanced so far, but would still seem to be gathering strength.

To perhaps most intelligent people at this distance and in this land of perfect political equality, the feeling which is shown upon this subject among some European communities is not easy to understand. It is true that not even on this side of the Atlantic do most men like Jews ; but any general dislike that may exist does not force itself upon the attention of Congress and demand anti-Jewish legislation. And so it is sometimes asked with wonder, what there is in the past or present history

of the Jews, which could seem to any intelligent man anywhere, to be a just occasion for so deep a feeling as we hear some of the best men in Germany express, or could appear to call for some kind of restrictive legislation? It is the object of the present paper to answer this question, and indicate the chief facts touching the present status of the Jews, which, whether with reason or without, are so profoundly affecting and moving the passions of men, in one way or another, through a large part of Central and Eastern Europe.

Rightly to appreciate the present state of things, we need first briefly to recall to memory the history of the Jewish nation for almost eighteen centuries from the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus. It were only repeating one of the commonplaces of history to say that, with whatever occasional exceptions here and there, the history of the Jews throughout this period was but one long tragedy. Under Pagan Rome their lot was hard; under so-called Christian Rome it became harder still. They became, to all practical intents, an outlawed people. Justinian, whose code became the basis of the civil law of Europe, excluded Jews from the provisions of that code. From that time on, they were the objects of the most unreasoning and pitiless hatred and persecution that was ever visited upon any people. Again and again the blind hate of the ignorant populace was stirred up by slanderous accusations of the most atrocious crimes. Nothing was too bad to be believed of a Jew. They practised, it was said, the black art; they would steal the sacramental wafer, that they might insult it with spitting and with piercing in their assemblies; they poisoned the wells; they celebrated the passover with the blood of Christian children, whom for this purpose they kidnapped, tortured, and crucified. And the effect of such malignant slanders was as might be expected. Confiscation, violence, torture, massacre, banishment, and every kind of ingenious and systematic insult, were the common lot of the Jews throughout Europe. From the beginning of the Crusades especially began for them a midnight watch of terror, which lasted, with only an occasional lightening of the gloom, for many centuries. Everywhere the Jew existed but to be plundered. Now it was at the hands of brutal mobs, hounded on by fanatic priests; now in a more formal way and on a

more extensive scale by the "most Christian" monarchs of Europe, who, after the fashion of the time, were wont to plunder, banish, torture, and murder Jews as it pleased them, under the high name of Christ and law. And while the bloody severity of these persecutions was somewhat mitigated by the Reformation, through the weakening of the Papal power, which had so often instigated or condoned these atrocities, yet it must be confessed that, with but here and there an honourable exception, the Protestant princes of Europe showed no more willingness than their Catholic predecessors to accord to the Jew the common rights of man. In many countries, as in Sweden, Norway, Russia, Spain, and even in England, down to the close of the seventeenth century, they were not allowed to live at all. Where they were tolerated, it was only on the condition of submitting to every kind of systematic indignity, insult, and oppression, from both rulers and people. In many places they were compelled to wear a peculiar and distinguishing dress. Their residences were confined by law to certain narrow and unwholesome districts of the cities. They were forbidden to be out of their houses after a certain early hour of the evening; and on the festival days of the Church they were in many places forbidden to leave their houses at all. The number permitted to live in any place, even under such odious conditions, was rigidly limited by law. Even for this most ungracious permission they were compelled often to pay an exorbitant tax. In most, if not all countries, they were commonly prohibited from owning land. They were excluded from all universities and schools, and, in a word, from almost every honourable and useful occupation of life, while the ingenuity of the statesmen of Europe was exercised in devising new ways of plundering the Jews by various special taxes, under the forms of law.

Such was the miserable state of the Jewish race throughout Europe till about the close of the last century, when, with a suddenness that astounded alike the Jews themselves and their enemies, a tide of Jewish emancipation swept through Europe, and Jews began to be recognised by law, and treated by men as men. From the middle of the century the influence of the great Mendelssohn, and the new doctrine of the

equal rights of men, as promulgated by Voltaire and others, had been silently preparing the way for this great change. The first movement of permanent consequence, however, appeared in 1782, when Joseph II. of Austria sounded the signal of the on-coming revolution by his edict of liberation. By this imperial decree, all at once the vexatious and oppressive restrictions of which we have spoken were removed; the schools and universities of the empire were thrown open for the first time, and equal civil rights proclaimed, to Jew and Gentile. The spirit of revolution was now abroad. The air was full of voices ominous of the approaching change. In 1784, Louis XVI. of France abolished the detested Jewish capitation tax; in 1787, Frederick William of Prussia repealed many of the oppressive laws against the Jews which Frederick the Great had enacted, and the Academy of Metz convened an Assembly to consider the best means of improving their condition. In 1788, Louis XVI. appointed a royal commission, with the excellent Malesherbes as president, "to remodel on principles of justice all laws concerning the Jews." Shortly after, the great Revolution broke out, and in 1790 the Jews sent in a petition to the National Assembly that they might be admitted to the full rights and privileges of free citizens of France, on the basis of those principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity which the Revolution represented. The petition in the next year was granted, and in France the emancipation of the Jews was complete. As the Revolution, like a mighty conflagration, consuming thrones and kingdoms, spread through Europe, everywhere went with it the proclamation of liberty to the Jews from the bondage of ages. In one land after another their chains fell off. In 1799, Napoleon, then on his Syrian campaign, issued a proclamation summoning the Asiatic Jews to rally around his standard in Palestine, to restore and rebuild Jerusalem. Thousands, we are told, had gathered to the standard of this would-be Cyrus, but with the failure of his Oriental campaign, his startling project fell through. Nevertheless, the work of emancipation went on, till the close of the Napoleonic wars saw the work either wholly or in great part carried through in almost every country of Europe. And so, finally, the Congress of Vienna, when peace was concluded, signalled the introduction of a new order of

things as regards the Jews in that all the contracting Powers there formally pledged themselves to turn their attention to the improvement of the condition of the Jewish people throughout Europe. Suffice it simply further to say that this emancipation movement has never ceased. Periods of reaction, indeed, there have been, such as now we see in Germany, but they have at the most only checked for a little, but not arrested the progress. In most lands Jewish liberation has been brought about by successive stages, nor is it even yet in all countries completed. The Revolution of 1848 accomplished much that had till then remained undone. From that time on, in Prussia, the Jews have enjoyed absolute equality. In England, the last vestige of the old *régime* only disappeared in 1858. In Turkey, where, it must be confessed, the Jews have on the whole been treated with more humanity than they were until the present century in Christian Europe, legislation of late years has been still more in their favour. In 1867, a firman of the Sultan gave the Jews, in common with all foreigners, the right to buy and own land in Palestine and other parts of Asiatic Turkey. Russia furnishes the chief exception to the general emancipation, and even there we hear of rumours of approaching change.

This rapid historical sketch will show how great and unprecedented has been the change which has passed upon the condition of the Jewish people within the last hundred years. From an age-long condition of abasement and practical slavery, they have been suddenly lifted, or, in some lands, are being lifted by the democratic spirit of the age, to be the equals of the Gentiles in the midst of whom they live. For the first time in history since their dispersion, they are in a large part of Christendom allowed an equal chance with others in the "struggle for existence." It is a question of special interest, even to the mere student of social and political science, and much more to the philanthropist and the Christian, what has been the result thus far of their emancipation? And in the answer to this question we shall see some of the chief reasons of that excitement on the Jewish question which so agitates the public mind in Germany and the States of Central and Eastern Europe.

The answer is in brief to this effect:—That in spite of the

hatred and prejudice of ages, which is by no means yet extinct, within less than a century from the beginning of their emancipation, the Jews are everywhere showing a tendency to outstrip their Gentile fellow-citizens in the race of life and so become a dominating class. A feeling of jealousy and envy on account of this is, without doubt, one chief reason of the anti-Jewish feeling in Europe in its present form, and one which probably underlies many other reasons that are put forward. Another consideration, however, and one which seems to be felt most by many of the most earnest religious men, is the belief that in view of the pronounced hostility of the Jews to all evangelical Christianity, the undue preponderance of their influence cannot but be most pernicious in its effect on the Christian life of any people. The whole case is well put by a recent German writer as follows:—"The question has in our day arisen—not as on former occasions, whether the Jews shall have *equal* rights with all others—but whether they shall be allowed to have and exercise *more* power and influence than others."¹ The facts which give rise to these apprehensions are of course most evident in those lands where the Jews are found in the largest proportion to the population, and where their emancipation has been the most complete. And this, in particular, is the explanation of the special importance which the Jewish question has assumed in the German and Austrian empires. Out of about 7,000,000 Jews in the whole world, it is said that 512,000 are found in Germany, and 1,375,000 in Austria and Hungary. A more particular account of the present position of the Jewish nation in the countries of Europe will enable us better to understand the deep feeling which is exhibited by many in all classes of German society over this subject. We may well pass over in our survey charges of a general nature, such as greed of gain, self-assumption, etc. etc., which are freely made in the anti-Jewish German press. Such assertions may or may not be true, are in the nature of the case hard to prove, and, in any case, in the present excited state of public feeling, are very likely to be much exaggerated. It will be better to confine our attention to facts such as can be expressed in a definite

¹ *Neue Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, Berlin, den 7 August 1880; article "Die Culturgeschichte des Judenthums von den ältesten Zeiten," u.s.w.

statistical way, and which are therefore capable of proof or disproof.

First, then, we find everywhere noted the extraordinary tendency of *capital* in Europe, more and more to concentrate in Jewish hands. The position which has long been held by the Rothschilds as one of the foremost banking firms of Europe, is well known to every intelligent person. But the prominence of this noted Jewish house is by no means an exceptional fact. It is even affirmed that in Germany and Austria the Jews almost monopolise the business of banking. One of the religious papers of Berlin asserts that "the Bourse of Vienna actually lies wholly in Jewish hands."¹ As a natural result of this, the Jews have become more than ever before the money-lenders of Europe, and the ancient laws having been abolished, which forbade them to hold land, they are becoming, it is said, to an extent that is quite startling, the actual or virtual owners of the soil through a large part of Central and Eastern Europe. One of the Liberal papers of Germany is quoted by the *New York Tribune* as saying that "the rapid rise of the Jewish nation to leadership is the great problem of the future for East Germany." The writer justifies this opinion by the statement, that

"All the lower forms of labour, in the workshops, the fields, the ditches, and the swamps fall to the lot of the German element, while the constantly increasing Jewish element obtains enormous possessions in capital and land, and raises itself to power and influence in every department of public life."²

Another number of the Berlin paper above cited says, that

"More than a sixth part of the Jews in Russia live by means of the liquor trade, as is admitted by the Jews themselves. The same is true of the Jews in Roumania and all the Slavic lands. . . . With the liquor trade usury goes hand in hand. As the result," we are told, "it is a fact which can no longer be denied, that the population of the remote districts of Russia, Austria, Hungary, and Roumania, are only the nominal possessors of the soil, and for the most part quite strictly cultivate the land only for the Jews, to whom they have mortgaged their lands for their liquor debts."³

¹ *Neue Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, Berlin, den 13 März 1880; article, "Weitere Stimmen zur jüdischen Frage."

² The *New York Daily Tribune*, Feb. 9th, 1880; article, "The Anti-Jewish Movement in Germany."

³ *Neue Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, Berlin, den 10 Januar 1880; article, "Der gegenwärtige Stand der jüdischen Frage."

To the same effect, it was lately said in the German Reichstag, in a debate on the famine of last year in Upper Silesia and Posen, that one of the special causes of the extreme distress was the fact that the lands of these provinces had so largely passed by mortgage foreclosures out of the hands of the German population into those of the Jews, that "the Christian population, stripped and impoverished, were almost incapable of raising themselves again."¹ There is no doubt, in any case, that official statistics of the States of Central and Eastern Europe show a disproportionate concentration of capital in Jewish hands. It were easy to multiply illustrations. In Prussia, even so long ago as 1861, according to the official returns, out of 71,000 Jews capable of work, 38,000 were engaged in commerce, while, on the other hand, among the day-labourers there was only one Jew among five hundred and eighty-six day-labourers.² In 1871 it appeared that out of six hundred and forty-two bankers in Prussia, all but ninety-two were Jews, *i.e.* six-sevenths of the bankers. Yet the Jews are less than two per cent. of the population. In the same year, in Berlin, where the Jews are five per cent. of the population, out of every hundred Protestants, thirty-nine were returned as employers, but out of every hundred Jews, seventy-one; fifty-five per cent. of the Jewish population were reported as engaged in mercantile life, against twelve per cent. of the Protestants. Similar facts are found in the Austrian empire. In Lower Austria, out of 59,122 merchants, 30,012 are returned in the census as Jews. In Galicia the amount of the encumbrance of real estate by mortgage has for several years past increased at the rate of about eight millions of florins per annum, and one-third of this total encumbrance has already passed by foreclosure into the hands of the Jews. Of the private mortgages registered in the province of Bukowina in 1877, eighty-two per cent. were, according to the official returns, owned by the Jews. In Galicia again, the number of sheriff's sales of peasants' land-holdings had risen from 164 in 1867, to 3164 in 1879; and it was almost exclusively the Jews who brought about these foreclosures. So also in Hungary, in 1878, there were 16,000 sheriff's sales of property, of which "by far the greater part"

¹ *Neue Evang. Kirchenzeitung*, den 13 März 1880.

² *Ibid.*

passed into the hands of Jews.¹ In fact, the London *Spectator* assures us that in Hungary the Jews have already obtained possession of so many of the old estates as to make a change in the Hungarian constitution a necessity. The facts are indeed so notorious that in the neighbouring country of Roumania, according to the *Spectator*, it was claimed in the Parliament that "the true difficulty in the way of allowing the Jews the equal rights which were secured by the treaty of Berlin," was "the certainty entertained by the Roumanians and Servians, that if the Jews were thus given an equal chance, they would gradually oust the peasantry till they possessed the whole land." Summing up the whole case, the *Spectator* remarks that "the Jews display a talent for accumulation with which Christians cannot compete, and which tends to make of them an ascendant caste." Whatever of truth there may be in this, it is plain that it is likely to become more and more true, in proportion as, with the progress of democratic ideas, position and influence in society and in politics shall be determined less and less by rank and race, and more and more by wealth and the advantages which wealth specially commands in democratic communities.

A second element which contributes to the present popular feeling regarding the Jews in Europe, is the no less eminent and exceptional position which they have taken in the matter of *education*. It is not yet a century since the Emperor Joseph II. of Austria first threw open the doors of the universities and schools of the Empire to the Jews equally with the Christians. Other States of Europe sooner or later followed this royal example, till now in most European countries the same facilities of education are afforded alike to Jews and Christians. In all Europe, the Jews have entered eagerly into the intellectual contest with the Christians, and as compared with the latter, a much larger percentage of their total number is already found among the educated and educating classes. We are pointed to the fact that in every land where they have any chance, men of Jewish blood, and, in most cases, of Jewish faith, are found holding positions of the highest prominence and influence as scholars and educators of the people, to an

¹ For full statement of the facts as regards Austria and Hungary, see *Neue Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, den 18 Dec. 1880.

extent out of all proper proportion to their number. A remarkable example is afforded even in Islam. In Cairo, Egypt, is the largest theological college in the world. It has three hundred professors and ten thousand students. Those students come from all parts of the Mohammedan world, from West Africa to China; they take their course of study, and go forth devoted missionaries of Islam, into the depths of Africa and the wilds of Central Asia.¹ It is not easy to over-estimate the influence of this great Arabic university, perhaps the most effective religious propaganda in the world. But at the head of this ancient institution of learning stands one of the Jewish race. For it is a Jewish pervert to Islam, by name Abbasi, who holds authority over all those three hundred professors and ten thousand students, and so occupies the highest position of theological instruction in the Mohammedan world. If we turn to Europe, we find a remarkable proportion of men in the foremost rank as scholars and as educators, to be men of Jewish blood. On the side of Christian scholarship, we may mention as examples, such names as the late Professor Neander and Professor Delitzsch, of the University of Leipzig. On the side of the anti-Christian radical criticism, the name, again, of a Jewish scholar, Dr. Marcus Kalisch, stands high on the list, supported, it is said, in his Old Testament studies, by the munificence of the Jewish Rothschilds.² To such names as these might be added many others, as, *e.g.* Dr. Julius Fuerst, well known to scholars by his Hebrew Concordance and Dictionary; among historians, Jost and Grätz, whose great work, *Die Geschichte der Juden*, is said by competent judges to be unsurpassed in that line. In the department of philology, Frank, lately deceased, who succeeded M. Renan as Professor of the Semitic languages in the College of France, and was pronounced, when living, the ablest philologist in the French Empire; the late M. Munk, member of the "Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres; Jules Oppert, Professor of Assyrian Archæology and Philology in the same institution; all these and many others,

¹ See *From Egypt to Japan*, by H. M. Field, D.D. (New York, 1877), pp. 45, 46.

² *Eminent Israelites of the Nineteenth Century*, by H. S. Morais (Philadelphia), 1880, p. 172.

whose names would at once be recognised as of the highest authority in their respective specialties, are Jews. In the German Empire, indeed, where they are not two per cent. of the population, the Jews, it is said, hold seventy professors' chairs in the universities. And this tide of Jewish influence appears to be still rising. Herr Stöcker, one of the court preachers to the Emperor of Germany, stated lately in a public address in Berlin,¹ that in the gymnasia of that city, where the Jews are five per cent. of the population, they form thirty per cent. of the students. In a late number of the *Presbyterian*, a similar statement is made, that of 3609 students in the University of Berlin, 1302 are Jews. In the high schools of Vienna, out of 2488 students, 1039 were last year reported as Jews; and in Lower Austria, out of 2140 Advocates at Law, 1024 return themselves as Jews. These facts abundantly bear out the statement of Professor Treitschke, of the University of Berlin, that while in the whole German Empire the proportion of Jews in the population is only one in seventy-five; yet "in all the higher institutions of learning, the proportion of Jews is one in ten;" so that, as he argues, "in only a few years more every tenth educated man in Germany will be a Jew."² To the same effect Professor Von Schulte, in a recent number of the *Contemporary Review*,³ argues from the educational statistics of the German Empire,—which he gives in a tabulated form in his article,—that "it needs no prophet to foretell that the offices of state, the legal and medical professions, trade, and industry will pass in ever-increasing proportion in Germany into the hands of the Jews;" "and," he adds, "the educational returns show the same state of things in Austria." Apropos of these facts may be cited Herr Stöcker's statement in the recent Jewish debate in the German Parliament, to which reference was made in the beginning of this paper. On that occasion Herr Stöcker said: "At the post-mortem examination of a body lately, there were present the district physician, the lawyer, the surgeon, and a fourth official, all Jews, and none but the corpse was a German. 'Behold,' he cried, 'a

¹ No. 239 der *Neuen Preussischen Kreuzzeitung*, Berlin, den 12 October 1879; article, "Nothwehr gegen das moderne Judenthum."

² Quoted from the *Preussisches Jahrbuch*, in above cited article.

³ For August 1879; see article, "The Religious Condition of Germany."

picture of the present!" "This fierce epigram," says the London *Spectator*, "in some places where every prominent person seems to be more or less a Jew, becomes literally true."¹ The position of the Jews in Hungary is strikingly illustrated in the last Report of the Hungarian Ministry of Worship and Instruction, concerning the whole educational state of Hungary during the school year 1878-9. According to the correspondent of the *Catholic Presbyterian*,² it appears from this Report that—

"Though the entire Jewish population of Hungary is only 550,000 out of a total of 13,576,480 souls, yet it furnishes a predominant proportion of pupils to all the different classes of schools. . . . There are some of the gymnasia in Hungary where *three-fourths* of all the pupils attending them are Israelites, and in others there are certain classes which are under the necessity of observing the Jewish feast-days, because they are almost wholly made up of Jews. In the gymnasia generally throughout the kingdom, they furnish eighteen per cent. of the pupils, in the '*Real-schulen*' thirty-six per cent., and in the faculty of law twenty-five per cent."

The same correspondent quotes in the same connection the *Allgemeine Evang. Luth. Kirchenzeitung*, as commenting on these facts in the following language:—

"Considering that the Jews constitute only four per cent. of the whole population, this is a proportion which not only proves the vigorous activity of this people, but also points to an educated proletariat, which, though trained intellectually, is not yet trained morally, and therefore can scarcely be a blessing."

The feeling of disquiet and of opposition to the Jews which the above facts occasion, is further increased by their extensive control of the European *press*. This is much insisted on and greatly lamented by many of the most prominent Christian men in Europe. The fact is to be noted in every country where the Jews exist in any large proportion. In London, it is said that the paper having the largest circulation is owned by a Jew. In Spain, since the terrible banishment of the Jews in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, they have never cared to live, and there are not, it is said, 4000 Jews in the whole country. But even there, as it is a Jew who leads the radical party, so it is a Jew, a member also of the Cortes, who is the

¹ *The Spectator*, London, Nov. 27th, 1880; article, "Jewish Success and Failure."

² *Catholic Presbyterian*, October 1880, pp. 317, 318.

editor of the Madrid *Correspondencia*, said to be the most influential paper in Spain. In Italy, the Liberal press is said to be greatly indebted for its vigour and brilliancy to Jewish pens. With the memories of the Mortara outrage and the merciless cruelties of the Inquisition fresh in their minds, the Jews in Italy, as elsewhere, are the most unsparing enemies of papal pretensions, and by their influence thus exerted through the press, are said to have powerfully contributed to that change in Italy which culminated in the final overthrow of the temporal power of the Pope. Returning, however, to Germany, we have statistics such as the following. According to Marr in *Die Deutsche Wacht*, out of twenty-three Liberal and "*Fortschritt*" papers of the Berlin daily press, there are only two which are not in the hands of the Jews, either as editors or financial proprietors. The *Neue Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* quotes a certain Herr Perrot as saying that on the last journalist's day in Dresden, out of forty-three representatives of the press that were present, twenty-nine were Jews. In Lower Austria, of three hundred and seventy authors returned in the last census, two hundred and twenty-five, or nearly two-thirds, were Jews.¹ Professor Christlieb's testimony is to the same effect.²

Yet another element in the situation, which contributes to the popular feeling where the Jews are numerous, is the exceptionally prominent and influential position, in proportion to their numbers, which they are taking in connection with the *politics* of various European countries. The fact is so obvious as everywhere to attract attention and comment. In Italy, the Jews number scarcely 40,000, but they hold eight seats in the Chamber of Deputies, including the Vice-Presidency. In England, where there is only one Jew in eight hundred of the population, they held last year nine out of the 658 seats in the House of Commons, while, as every one knows, one of their race was at the same time Prime Minister. So also it is a Jew, Sir George Jessel, who is the Master of the Rolls, and is pronounced the ablest lawyer in equity that has sat in that Court in the present generation, and the most distinguished

¹ The *Neue Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, March 13th, 1880, in above-mentioned article makes it 325. I take the lower figure, elsewhere given.

² See below, p. 748.

living graduate of the University of London.¹ If we cross the Channel to France, where, less than a hundred years ago, every Jew had to pay on crossing a bridge the same tax that was levied on a donkey, and where they number not more than 50,000, we find a similar remarkable proportion of men of the Jewish race, of late years, in many of the highest positions in the government of the country. On a late national festival, no less than twenty-one Jews were decorated with the order of the Legion of Honour. As instances of Jews in high positions in the French Government may be mentioned the names of Fould, late Minister of Finance under the Empire; Cremieux, the late Minister of Justice; Jules Simon and Camille See, the able and successful champion of female education in the Chamber of Deputies, not to speak of many others. It is not, however, the mere fact of the political success of the Jews that is the full explanation of the angry feeling, which it awakens. It is the feeling on the part of the Conservatives in Central Europe, that the ascendancy of the Jewish race in politics is a danger to the State. They point to the undoubted fact that there is a strong sentiment of nationality in the Jews everywhere, which binds them together almost as one man, and gives them an influence out of all proportion to their numbers. It is charged that, as a rule, the Jews throughout Europe belong to the radical, progressive, and often to the revolutionary party, and therefore, that they form a disintegrating element in the State. We are urged to note the fact that of the men who are inspiring and directing the various great democratic and socialistic movements of the day, a significantly large proportion are of the Jewish race. The founder, for example, of the "German Working Men's Union," out of which, with marvellous rapidity, has developed the German Socialist party, was a Jew, Lasalle, of whom President Woolsey remarks, that he "held an almost sovereign position at the head of his party," and whom Heinrich Heine, the philosopher and poet, himself also a Jew, declared to be "a man of the greatest acuteness that had ever come under his notice."² Lasalle is

¹ *The Spectator*, London, May 8th, 1880; article, "The Candidates for the University of London."

² *Communism and Socialism*, by Theodore D. Woolsey (New York, 1880) pp. 172, 173, *et seq.*

now dead, but the men who have succeeded him as leaders of the German socialists, Marx, Bebel, and Liebknecht, are, all of them, Jews; and the text-books of the socialist schools are to-day Lasalle's *System of Acquired Rights*, and Marx's *Critique of Capital*. In Russia it is said

"A Jewish secret society, the *Kagal*, exercises the most dangerous authority over the persons and the property of the Jews, and its members show themselves the most radical of Nihilists. From this association have proceeded the so-called 'anarchists,' who in the end of last May issued a diabolical programme from Geneva, in which they opposed every tendency to those more peaceful paths, which, since the accession of Melikoff to power, had seemed possible to many of the nihilist party. They wished to destroy from the foundation everything that was in any way connected with Gentile nationality and Christianity."¹

With this accords the testimony of Professor Wassilieff, that "it is an open secret that the Jews are among the leaders of the nihilist agitation." The correspondent of the London *Times* who cites this statement, whilst himself inclined to doubt it, says that the conviction that this is the case is so general, that it has put off the proposed emancipation of the Jews in Russia for an indefinite period. Still later, however, we are told that in sixty-two recent convictions in the nihilist trials, no less than nineteen of the convicted were Jews, that is, nearly one-third of the whole; a number, it need not be said, which is out of all proportion to the number of the Jews in the Russian Empire or any district of the Empire. The feeling of the Russian Government in the matter is strikingly illustrated by the following remarks of the Rev. S. G. Wilson, a missionary of the Presbyterian Church to Persia, in a late letter to the *Presbyterian Banner*, written *en route* for Persia, from Odessa. He says:—

"The municipal government of the city is controlled by the Jews, who number about 30,000. They are, however, held in check by the general government. In Vienna we had noticed a large number of signboards in Hebrew, duplicating the German, but none such appeared in Odessa, being prohibited on the general principle of checking anything showing Jewish power and influence."

And although it is not true that the Jews in Europe generally are such political extremists as many appear to be in

¹ *Neue Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, Berlin, den 14 August 1880; article, "Die Dictatur in Russland."

Russia, where the hardships they endure from the Government are, for this day, quite exceptional, yet it appears to be the fact that to a great extent Jewish sympathy on the Continent is with the radical party in politics, and, it should also be noted, with the radical party in religion also. It is freely asserted and extensively believed that it is the Jews who, since their emancipation in Europe, have been, however unconsciously, among the most prominent agents in unsettling the public faith in Christianity and the loyalty of the people to the existing order of society, and so bringing about and continuing the present condition of insecurity on the European continent. Whether this be true or not, many remarkable facts appear to point in that direction, and it is the judgment, moreover, of not a few who, by their character and position, should be abundantly competent to discern the secret forces which are influencing and determining the social and political development of modern Europe. In Spain the radical leader, Señor Castelar, who is said to be the most effective orator in Europe, is of the Jewish race. So also in Germany, Herr Lasker, the leader of the radical opposition to Bismarck, as also the eminent radical statesman, Schultze-Delitzsch, Oppenheim, and Bamberger, not to mention others of less note, are all of them Jews. The position of Lasalle, Marx, Bebel, and Leibknecht as socialist leaders, has been already noted.

Another element in the case, which is beginning to attract the notice of those interested in social and political science, is the fact that according to *vital statistics*, it appears that the Jews everywhere tend to increase in a more rapid ratio than the non-Jewish populations among whom they live. During the centuries in which they were in all lands compelled to live, at the best, under the most unwholesome sanitary conditions, and repeatedly put to death in great numbers, the natural increment of the people was of course kept in check, and, so far as we can get at the probable facts, it would appear that their numbers rather diminished than increased. Basnage, 170 years ago, gave their number as about 3,000,000. It is certain that it is much more now: it is commonly estimated at about 7,000,000. Since the removal of repressive restrictions, and the cessation of violent persecution in Europe, the comparative increase of the Jews in Europe has been most remarkable. It is illus-

trated by such facts as the following, given in a paper published in the *Transactions of the Society of Biblical Archaeology*, from which we quote :—

“Between 1816 and 1867—a period of fifty years—the general population of Prussia increased ninety-one per cent., while the Jewish population was augmented by one hundred and twelve per cent. Elsewhere the facts are still more remarkable. In Austrian Galicia, in fifty years, 1820-1870, the ordinary population increased twenty-five per cent., and the Jewish population one hundred and fifty per cent. The same fact has been observed at Bucharest and other places. Pressel and Neufchatel give similar statistics. . . . The great increase of late years in the number of the Jews was remarked recently by the president of the Anthropological Society, and Holland, Switzerland, Bavaria, and Hungary were mentioned as countries in which it was manifest.”

The paper concludes with the remark, which the statistics given appear quite to justify, that “the soberest statistician may venture a large increase in the opening future of this ancient and wonderful people.”¹

With this enumeration of the facts which have given rise to the modern Jewish question, if we listen to some, we might fitly conclude. It is asserted by many with much warmth, that mere jealousy of wealth, rank, and power is at the bottom of the whole agitation. That it has much to do with it, we think no one can deny. The Jew, if the statistics given are of any value, seems to be outstripping the Germanic peoples in the intellectual and commercial race. Remembering the way in which most people look at the Jews, and the astonishing change in their position in these Germanic countries within so short a time, it were not to be supposed that the average German, or any other man suffering thereby, should look on with perfect equanimity. But if any regard is to be paid to the repeated assertions of some of the most eminent Christian men in Europe, this, although a part, is not by any means the whole explanation of the agitation. Hofprediger Stöcker, chaplain to the Emperor of Germany, a man soundly abused indeed by the “Semitic” party, but whose sermons and addresses show him to be animated with a fervent Christian spirit, insists upon it that the Jewish question is “above all

¹ *Transactions, etc.*, vol. iv., Part 2, 1876; article, “On the Numbers of the Jews in all ages,” pp. 325, 326, 331.

a religious question." Whether right or wrong, it is certain that this aspect of the case is that which many of the best men in Germany seem to feel most deeply. To appreciate the case fully, we must remember that the modern Jews, to speak in a broad and general way, are divided into two schools, the Orthodox and the Liberal or Reformed. The former substantially agree with Christians in their belief in the infallible authority of the Old Testament Scriptures, and are still looking for the Messiah to come and fulfil unto them the promises made unto the fathers. The Reformed, on the other hand, are avowed rationalists, of various grades; and their views as to the divine authority of the Old Testament, however they may differ among themselves, seem to agree in general with those of rationalists in the Christian Church. These expect no Messiah; but in general maintain that the Messiah, the "servant of Jehovah," is the Israelitish nation, appointed of God to be the Saviour of the world. Their position is well represented in a sermon preached by the Rabbi Wise some time ago at the dedication of a Jewish temple in Cincinnati. On that occasion he is reported as having said:—

"The whole Messianic idea . . . rests on the royal and dynastic claims of King David, against both of which the republican solemnly protests. He protests against the principle. . . . No man has a right to govern. . . . We do not wish to return to Palestine, nor do we pray for the coming of Messiah. An American Israelite who trusts in God and believes in the divine truth of the Bible, needs no king to govern, no Messiah to redeem, and no miracles to demonstrate the truth of religion."

Numerically the Orthodox are much stronger than the Reformed. In Russia and Roumania, as in the far east and in Africa, the great majority are of the Orthodox school. The Reformed, however, are much the stronger in wealth and general education, and it is in their hands that the press in Germany and Austria is said to lie. Both Orthodox and Reformed, it need not be said, are intensely hostile to Christianity. The Reformed, however, are much the more bitter and aggressive of the two, and among the Germanic peoples, using every advantage which the possession of capital and education can confer, they are giving their whole strength, with the greatest ability and activity, to the extension of that rationalistic movement against all evangelical religion which

the Jew Spinoza, two hundred years ago, in a manner began.¹ Such names as those of the Rabbi Cohen of Paris, Professor Adler, Mr. Heilprin of this country, Dr. Kalisch of Germany, and many others, will illustrate the rationalising spirit of this party. And so, not unnaturally, in the address above cited, Herr Stöcker bitterly complains of the ridicule and scoffing which the judaised press of Germany continually pours upon the holiest sanctities of the Christian religion. He says that he "can no longer look on with a quiet conscience" when he sees "how the Jews, while holding tenaciously by their own faith, seek to destroy the faith of Christendom;" that "the Jewish service of mammon threatens to corrupt the whole nation, while the Jewish press labours earnestly to destroy its faith," till "Germany is actually threatened"—I render his words literally—"with de-christianisation (*entchristlichung*) by means of the Jews."² All this the editor of the *Kirchenzeitung* indorses with the remark that "modern Judaism threatens to become a consuming fire to the German nation,"³ and, elsewhere, that the "spiritual life of Austria also threatens to fall wholly under the influence of the Jews."⁴ We cannot regard these, apparently, as merely quite baseless exaggerations of alarmists and pessimists, men incapable of taking a calm and philosophic view of all the elements of the situation.⁵ On the contrary, these apprehensions are based, as is plain, to a great extent upon officially given data. Nor can it be anything less than a grave calamity, however modern unbelief and indifference may regard it, that the capital and intellectual power in

¹ The researches of scholars like Munk, Joel, Mises, and others, have but lately shown us how intimate and vital is the relation between modern rationalism in the Christian Church and the speculations of mediæval Jewish scholars, conveyed, chiefly through Maimonides and Spinoza, into the theological literature of Christendom. Many modern writers of repute, as, *e.g.* Dean Milman in his *History of the Jews*, Mr. Lee in his *Inspiration of Scripture*, and, more lately, Professor Flint in his *Anti-Theistic Theories*, and Mr. Pollok in his recent *Life of Spinoza*, have admitted and called attention to this striking fact.

² Report of Hofprediger Stöcker's Address, in the Supplement to the *Preussische Kreuzzeitung*, above cited.

³ *Neue Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, Berlin, den 25 October 1879; article, "Hofprediger Stöcker und das moderne Judenthum."

⁴ *Ib.*, 13 März 1880, in above cited article.

⁵ So, naturally, argue not a few, as, *e.g.* Herr Oppenheim, in *Die Gegenwart*, Berlin, den 10 Januar 1880. But he fails successfully to disprove the truth of the facts above stated, or explain away their significance.

any country should be held in a disproportionate degree by any class, whether Jew or Gentile, who, as a class, are the sworn enemies of the Gospel of Christ. Despite, therefore, the bitterness with which some of the anti-Jewish agitators are assailed in the judaised press of Germany, and allowing for the possible exaggeration which we may admit when the feelings of men are profoundly aroused, one cannot, it would seem, but give men like Professor Von Schulte and others, his peers, a thoughtful hearing. We are not at all sure that the King of Prussia was not more than half right, from a Christian point of view, when in 1847, just before the completion of Jewish emancipation in his dominions, he declared that to accord the Jews complete civil equality in privilege with Christians, would be found "incompatible with the well-being of a Christian State." Certainly this must at least be true where State and Church are related, as in Germany. And in the opinion of many of the most competent Christian men in Germany, the event is justifying the anticipation of the King. When in Germany two years ago, one of the most eminent Christian professors in the Universities remarked to the writer in substance as follows:—"The root of this whole antichristian movement in the German Empire is with the Jews. They have come to control almost the entire secular press, and are using all the power of that press to diffuse unbelief in Christianity among the masses of the people." Professor Christlieb, in a lately published work, attributes the prevailing indifference of the German churches to Foreign Mission work in large part to this antichristian Jewish influence. His words are:—

"The many and deeply rooted obstacles to a warmer missionary spirit have been often exposed. I shall not repeat them here. I would only lay great stress on the shameful fact that the liberal press, which is still the greatest power in forming public opinion, is for the most part in Germany in the hands of the Reform Jews, the bitterest of all the opponents of Missions. Is it then to be expected that the educated classes in Germany will give a juster treatment to the subject of missions, so long as they do not seek to free themselves from the Jewish spirit of the age?"¹

In England also, the same feeling of hostility to Christianity and to Christian Missions finds strong expression in the Jewish

¹ *Protestant Foreign Missions*, 1880, p. 43.

community, and sometimes makes itself heard. On the 15th of last March, for example, a formal protest of Jews against the work of the London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews was handed in to the Bishop of Liverpool, insisting on "the abolition" of what they termed "these disreputable societies." The animus of the signers will sufficiently appear from a single paragraph :—

"We should accept Christianity indeed, as soon as the dove becomes an owl—as soon as the lion becomes a lamb—as soon as the devoted husband becomes a brutal wife-kicker—as soon as the loving son becomes a parricide—as soon as the affectionate mother deserts her children— . . . as soon as the believer in *one* God shall believe in *three*—as soon as day turns into night and light into darkness,—then, and not till then, shall the Jew turn Christian."

The *Jewish Chronicle*, from which we quote,¹ expresses regret that the petition should have contained "intemperate expressions," but yet describes the protest as giving utterance to "righteous feelings of indignation."

A single witness further will suffice. Professor Ebrard of Erlangen, in the concluding chapter of his *Apologetik*, uses the following impressive language :—

"Where do we stand ? To the man who will attentively consider the signs of the times, it will appear as if our time might be compared to the last year of the ministry of Christ, when the great mass of the people of Israel, who before that had followed him with a half-blind enthusiasm, turned away from him and left him alone with his disciples. Also in these days is it again that same Semitic people, which, having entered into the phase of a modern Sadduceeism, is working as the chief agitator to turn the masses of the Germanic and Germano-Roman nations, especially the former, astray in their Christian faith, and form a propaganda for the pantheistic view of the world."²

Such then are the facts which have given rise to the Jewish question in its present form in the politics of modern Europe, and such is the aspect in which many thoughtful men regard it. What the developments of the immediate future may be is not easy to say. That any such governmental measures as the anti-Jewish party desire will be successfully carried through is however most improbable. The day for distinc-

¹ Issue of March 15th.

² *Apologetik. Wissenschaftliche Rechtfertigung des Christenthums*, von J. H. A. Ebrard, Dr. philos. et theol. Gütersloh, 1880, Zweiter Theil, Zweite Auflage, S. 591, 592.

tions in privilege, based on distinction in race or family, is about gone by, and the shadow will not go back on the dial. Granting this, it seems then probable that in the absence of any restrictive anti-Jewish legislation, Jewish influence in Central Europe will reach a yet greater height in the near future than even at present. The increased and increasing number of wealthy Jews who are now receiving a liberal education in the gymnasia and universities of Germany and Austria make this apparently certain. Whether the popular jealousy of the Jews will increase in proportion to the growth of their influence is a question, and a question of no little moment, especially to the Jews themselves. The Middle Ages, we may be sure, in any case will not return; and yet we can easily conceive that the position of the Jews in many parts of Europe might easily become for a season most unenviable. In any event, it seems clear from the facts before us, that the Jews, through their control of the capital of Europe and their intellectual and political influence, are likely, according to the ordinary principles which operate in human affairs, soon to become a more important factor in the political history of the world than at any time before since their dispersion, or indeed in their whole history hitherto. Nor can we ignore their present increasing influence on the religious thought of the age as a very significant fact. All who believe in the Old and New Testaments as a true revelation of God, however they may differ in their specific interpretations and consequent anticipations for the future, will certainly agree that in the light of that revealed Word, the present and prospective position of the Jewish nation is a fact, to the Christian, exceedingly impressive and suggestive.

S. H. KELLOGG.

ART. VIII.—*On Causation and Development.*¹

I AM not singular in holding that the whole subject of causation has become confused in the minds of educated men, including scientific men; and that the time has come for reconsidering it in the light which science now furnishes. In

¹ From the *Princeton Review*.

our day two or three doctrines have been elaborated which require us to revise (so I think) the statements made as to cause, more especially in its relation to force and energy. It is to be understood that throughout this paper I refer to causation objective, and not subjective; that is, to causation as it acts independent of our mind observing it (an ignited lucifer-match will kindle a rick of hay whether we notice it or not), and not to the special metaphysical question of ages, as to the origin and nature of our belief in the relation of cause and effect. It is further to be borne in mind that in the body of the article I speak exclusively of physical causation; that is, of the forces or activities of bodies; only towards the close showing that there may be mental or spiritual powers operating in our world quite as certainly as there are physical forces. It has been established that—

First, there is a duality or plurality in causation; that there are two or more bodies in all causal action of a physical nature. There were thinkers who had a glimpse of this doctrine from an old date. Aristotle spoke of *συναίτιον*, which Hamilton in noticing it translates concause.¹ But the truth was first clearly enunciated by Mr. J. S. Mill in his *Logic* (B. IV. c. v.): "The statement of the cause is incomplete unless in some shape or other we introduce all the conditions. A man takes mercury, goes out of doors and catches cold. We say perhaps that the cause of his taking cold was exposure to the air. It is clear, however, that his having taken mercury may have been a necessary condition of his catching cold; and though it might consist with usage to say that the cause of his attack was exposure to the air, to be accurate we ought to say that the cause was exposure to the air while under the effect of mercury."

The doctrine had occurred to me before I read Mr. Mill's *Logic*; but as he published it first, I do not claim any credit in it. As approaching it, however, from a somewhat different direction, I believe I can make it more explicit and comprehensive. In all physical action there are two or more bodies, molecular or molar; at the present stage of science I ought to add that this body may be the ether in which the undulations of light take place. Now the cause—by which I mean that

¹ Sextus Pyrrh., iii. 15, speaks of *συνεκτικά*, *συναίτια*, and *σύνεργα αἴτια*.

which invariably has produced the effect, and will invariably produce it—consists in the mutual action of two or more bodies ; that is, their action on each other. Thus in the case adduced by Mr. Mill the true cause of the effect, the cold, was not the air alone or the body alone, but the air and the body under mercury. Without the concurrence, or rather the joint action of the two, the effect would not have been produced. It is the same in all other cases. A ball at rest is struck by a ball in motion ; the one ball is made to move, the other has its motion stayed. The cause consists of the two balls in a certain state, and the effect the balls in another state. A picture-frame falls from the wall and breaks a jar standing on a table below. We say that the frame, or rather the fall of the frame, was the cause of the fracture of the jar. But the true cause, that which for ever will produce the same effect, is the frame falling with a certain momentum and the brittleness of the jar. Had the frame come down with less violence, or the jar been stronger, there might have been no breakage. In most cases of action a considerable number, in some a vast number, and variety of agents combine to produce the result. Take the sprouting of a flower in spring : in the cause there are the increased heat and light of the sun, the state of the plant in the earth, and the state of the soil. Without the concurrence of all these the effect would not be produced.

Secondly, there is a duality or plurality in the effect. This is a further truth which Mr. Mill has not expounded, but which occurred to me as I was thinking out the doctrine which Mr. Mill preceded me in unfolding. It follows from Mr. Mill's doctrine, when it is properly understood, and seems to me to be quite as certain, and fully more important, and of wider range in its applications. Thus in Mr. Mill's illustration the cause was the state of the atmosphere, and the body as affected by mercury ; the effect was the same atmosphere insensibly changed in temperature, and the body under a cold. In the second case the true cause consisted of the two balls, one in motion striking the other at rest ; the effect (which would be for ever produced by the same cause) the ball which was at rest moving and the ball which was in motion at rest. In the third case the cause was the picture-frame with a certain momentum striking a jar of a certain structure ; the

effect was the frame losing part of its momentum and the jar broken. In the case of the plant germinating there must have been in the effect changes—it may be, incapable of measurement—in all the agents acting as the causes in the sun's heat and light absorbed in the earth and in the plant sprouting.

Taking these views with us, it may be of great use to have appropriate and definite phrases to express them. The word Cause, that which invariably produces the effect, should be reserved for the combination of agencies producing the result. The cause of the man's taking cold is not merely the cold atmosphere or his frame being affected by mercury, but in the two acting on each other. The word Effect should in like manner be applied to the combined result, and comprises the change in the air as well as the colded affection of the body. In the other illustrative cases it implies the movement of the one ball and the staying of the other ; the loss of momentum in the picture-frame as well as the breaking of the jar ; and the change in the rays of heat and light coming from the sun as well as the germinating of the plant.

As causes are dual or plural, it is proper to have phrases to express the parts. The law is often stated that the same cause always produces the same effect in the same circumstances. But in order to clearness and accuracy it is essential to specify what are the circumstances ; it is in fact necessary to put them into the cause, as without them the effect would not follow. In order to the germinating of the flower there is not only the state of the plant and soil, but the additional heat of the sun. All the acting parts may be called agents or agencies, without specifying what they are. They are bodies in a certain state acting on other bodies.

Very often one of these agents is more important in itself, or in our estimation, or for our present purpose, than the others ; this is designated pre-eminently the cause, and little or no evil may arise from this, provided always that it be understood that this agent needs one or more co-operating agents which are parts of the full cause. If it be said that the cold air was the cause of the man being colded, it was because his body was disposed towards such an issue by mercury. It is not easy, or perhaps even possible, to lay down a rule as to which of the

agents should be called the special, the main, or the prominent cause; for the cause consists in the mutual action of the whole. When man is working he often calls in one agent to produce an intended effect. If he wishes to kindle a heap of straw, the agent he attends to is the fire he applies; if he wishes a good crop from his ground, he looks to the manure; if he wishes to be cured of a disease, he selects his medicine; though in all such cases there is need of co-operation in the state of the straw, or of the ground, or of his bodily frame. In nature there is often one agent that is particularly potent. When a tree is struck by lightning it is the electricity that is specially noticed, though the structure of the tree had also to do with the effect produced.

Fixing on the agent that is most prominent in itself, or in our eyes, as the cause or special force then co-operating, that agent may be called the *Occasion*. This phrase is specially applied to circumstances which cast up to call forth a power into exercise, or to work with causes steadily operating. Thus that ill-constructed house fell on the occasion of a storm arising. I was prompted to write a letter to a friend by my affection; but the occasion was his suffering a severe loss; the two actually called forth the letter. Malebranche was the philosopher who brought the phrase "occasional cause" into general use. He represented the will of God as the true cause of all creative action, but the volition of man might be the occasion of the forthputting of the Divine Power. Thus when I move my arm the true cause is the Divine Will, but my purpose is the occasional cause. In such a case we may allowably give a prominence to the Divine Power, but it should be noticed that while one of the agents is the important one, the other or others—the action of the brain and nerves—are necessary to the production of the precise consequence, which will not follow without the co-operation.

We are thus enabled to give a philosophical explanation of what is meant, or rather what should be meant, by *Condition*, a phrase so often used vaguely and illegitimately in the present day in its application to physical operation. In order to be rid of an agent, or to drive it into a corner, they say it is simply a condition. In order to the production of a given effect a certain agent is fixed on as producing an end, the other

or others are represented as simply conditions. As proving design, we show that animals with a stomach for digesting flesh have also claws and strong muscles to catch and hold their prey. But an attempt is made to do away with the force of the argument by urging that these adjuncts are merely the conditions of the machine working. But properly understood the argument lies in the circumstance that the co-operating conditions have met. The presence of strings in a harp is a condition of it producing music, but the evidence of design is in the presence and combination of the necessary strings.

We may legitimately and conveniently use such phrases, provided we understand them ourselves and let our readers or hearers understand what we mean by them. But it should be distinctly explained that all the agents acting, whether circumstances, occasions, or conditions, constitute the cause, without which the effect would not follow.

It is needful to make like explanations, and come to the same understanding as to the Effect. In all cases of physical action the effect is also dual or plural; it consists of two or more agents changed—I hope to show the same agents as are in the cause. These constitute what has been, and what will always be, produced by the cause. But it often happens that a special end is contemplated when we set an agent or agencies a-working; and when this is effected it is regarded as the proper or the only effect. But there may be other consequences which we did not consider or look for, or which we regard as minor or irrelevant ones. We wish for a shower to refresh the ground; as it falls it accomplishes that end, but it may also so swell a stream that it works destruction as it overflows its banks. A new machine is invented which produces a greater amount of work, but it throws out of employment a number of people who followed the old methods. It is desirable to have a phrase to denote these secondary effects, as they are regarded; and they may be described as *Concomitants*, or more expressly as *Incidents* or *Incidentals*. Perhaps some would call them Accidents, and they may be so called as they were not intended, as when one fires an over-charged gun and is wounded by its striking backward. But these accidents are quite as much caused by the agents as the others that were expected. In all cases the effect properly

understood consists of the whole of the agents that have been acting put in a new state. Any one who sets new agencies agoing, say starting a new trade or passing a new law, is bound to look not merely to one but all the consequences that must follow.

Thirdly, there is the grand doctrine established in our day of the Conservation of Energy. It has long been known and acknowledged that the sum of matter in the cosmos is always one and the same. We burn a piece of paper and it disappears from our view, but is not annihilated; one portion of the matter has gone down in ashes, the other has gone up in smoke, and if we could bring the scattered particles together they would constitute the original paper. It has been established in our day that the same is true of the energy in matter. This doctrine was anticipated by Leibnitz and established in our day by Mayer, by Joule, Grove, and others. According to this doctrine, the sum of energy, actual and potential, in exercise or ready to be exercised, is always one and the same. It cannot be increased and it cannot be diminished by any human, indeed by any mundane, agency. When any portion of it leaves one body it enters into another. The sum of energy in the two balls have in them the same amount of energy before they strike and after they strike. When the energy disappears in one form, say in mechanical force moving a mass, it appears in another, say in heat, which is molecular motion. But the sum is always one and the same.

It is an integrant part of this doctrine that the physical forces are all correlated, a truth which has been beautifully expounded by Grove. The energy may take various forms, say the purely mechanical, the chemical, the electric, the magnetic. These forms are capable of being transmuted into each other, and this in definite quantity, so much mechanical force into so much chemical force, which chemical force may be reconverted into the mechanical. This shows the whole physical forces of our cosmos to be correlated and capable of being transmuted into one another; the sum always remaining the same.

It may be difficult to point out the full relation between these three doctrines which I hold to be severally established. But there is no inconsistency between them. Perhaps the

full doctrine may be so stated as to embrace all the three and make them aspects of one grand truth. Our cosmos may, as the Pythagoreans supposed, be like a closed globe with an immensely large but definite number of bodies in it. Each of these bodies possesses a certain measure of physical force or forces. These act and react upon each other, producing all the activity, all the movement, in our world. The bodies act on each other, forming a cause. In doing so they modify each other, and the result is the effect. Meanwhile the sum of matter and the sum of the forces in the bodies continue one and the same, and both are incapable of increase or diminution. This is at least an intelligible enough doctrine, and embraces the three truths which have been separately stated, and seems in perfect consistency with all that has been established in regard both to the persistence of matter and the persistence of energy, as Herbert Spencer calls it.

Meanwhile the conservation of energy may be regarded as an established doctrine. Savans do indeed continue to assert that some of the most eminent among themselves do not understand it, or have not expressed it properly, or have illegitimately applied it. But it is universally admitted that the doctrine is a true and an all-important one.

But let us properly understand and explain it, and keep it within its proper limits. It will be admitted by all at once that we are not entitled to affirm that the law extends beyond our cosmos or knowable universe. For anything we know there may be other worlds beyond our world, and we have no right to say that in these worlds there is only a definite amount of energy which cannot be increased or diminished. God may or may not be creating suns, or earths, or living beings beyond our ken, and altogether beyond our science. The doctrine of the conservation of energy, as I understand, holds only on the supposition that our cosmos is like a closed globe. It is conceivable that our world may not be so closed in; that the dissipated heat which is passing into space may travel into other worlds and influence them without our being able to notice it.

This restriction of the doctrine is so obvious that it is scarcely worth noticing it. But there are other limitations which it is of vast moment to bring into prominence, as they

are being overlooked by some of our scientific men. There is clear evidence that there are other potences or powers in nature besides the mechanical or physical forces. It is not proven that the doctrine of the conservation of energy applies to these.

Take Life. So far as I understand him, Herbert Spencer seems inclined to hold that the doctrine applies to all the powers in the world, even to the vital and mental; indeed, he seems incapable of distinguishing between nerve force and mental force. But he brings no proof that physical force and psychical force can be transmuted into each other. The language of most of our scientific speculators is hesitating. Huxley and Tyndall resolutely maintain that there is no proof that living beings can proceed from non-living. Darwin calls in three or four live germs, which he ascribes to God, before he can account for the development of vegetable and animal life. I have observed that those who reject a separate life or vital force are obliged to bring it in under another form. Thus Darwin calls in a pangenesis pervading organic nature, and Spencer has physiological units which play an important part in generation and heredity, and these are certainly vital forces. Then the arguments and experiments of Beale have to be met, and they have not yet been met by those who would deny the existence of a vital potency of some kind different from mechanical force.

But there are other agents in our world more clearly distinguished from the physical forces than the vital powers are. I refer to the psychical or mental; to those of which we are conscious, which in fact we know immediately; such as our sense-perceptions, our memories, our judgments, our reasonings, our desires, our emotions, our resolves. These we know as directly and clearly as we know the affections of body, such as extension and resistance, and we have quite as good evidence of the existence of the one as of the other. Are these mental powers to be included in the physical forces which can neither be increased nor diminished? Can the physical forces be transmuted into the mental, say mechanical, or the chemical into thoughts, inclinations, and volitions? Nearly every scientific man in the present day admits, nay, maintains, that there is no proof of this. Many affirm that they cannot even

conceive it to be so. Tyndall, no doubt, in his Belfast address, hastened on to a high vaporous generalisation, and declared that it looked as if all things could be brought under the potency of matter; in the meantime declaring, however, that he could not conceive how matter could produce mind, or mind matter. Mr. Fiske talks of our now needing to assume only one universal assumption, "the principle of continuity, the uniformity of nature, the persistence of force, or the law of causation;" but then he is obliged to add that "in no scientific sense is thought the product of molecular movement, and that the progress of modern discovery (correlation), so far from bridging over the chasm between mind and matter, tends rather to exhibit the distinction between them as absolute." The contradiction is here evident, and has been pointed out by scientific men; but I need not dwell upon it, my object being simply to show that thoughts and mental affections have not yet been reduced to physical forces. No doubt mind and body do so far affect each other. If a person is told that his dearest friend has died suddenly, his pulse will be apt to rise. Professor Barker attaches a great importance to an experiment of a person first reading easy English, when his pulse was not affected, then reading Greek, when it rose several degrees. Such cases, and they might be multiplied indefinitely, show that mental thoughts and feelings do affect the brain-action, but they do not show that they add to or diminish the physical forces in the brain, or that the mental feeling or thought has been transmuted into a movement of the pulse. A man standing by a stream pushes a big stone in the water aside, and the stream flows a little more rapidly for a minute or two; but he has not thereby added to the quantity of water. Just as little does mental action, reasoning or feeling, add to or diminish the amount of physical force in the cerebro-spinal mass.

There is no evidence, but the very opposite, that our mental actions are identical or correlative with bodily motions or activities of any kind. Take as example the discoveries of science, the reasonings of mathematicians, the visions of poets, the penetration of such philosophers as Aristotle, the ardour of the patriot, the beatific vision of the Christian, the sacrifices made by the poor for honour and honesty's sake. What savant will estimate for us in quantitative expressions of physics or

chemistry the depth of affection in the mother's bosom when she incurs death herself to save her son, or the height of genius reached by Shakespeare when he conceived Hamlet or Lady Macbeth? There is no one proper quality of matter, such as the occupation of space, or resistance, or elasticity, that can be predicated of thoughts or affections. There is no one quality of mind, such as perception, thought, reasoning, or love, that can be applied to this table or that chair. The instrument has not yet been invented that can weigh or measure our intellectual or voluntary operations. When a tree dies it carries into the ground not only the particles of matter which composed it, but the forces in the tree to add to the forces in the ground. It is the same with the body of brute or of man when it is buried—it carries with it into the grave all the physical forces; but were there any new psychical forces added to the earth when Plato, Milton, Bacon, or Newton died?

It thus appears that in the very midst of the physical forces and their correlations there may be other operations, mental or spiritual, and against this science has and can have nothing to say. I mean to refer to these further on in the article. Meanwhile, let us look at the physical forces acting according to the principles laid down.

1. Without attempting to explain their exact nature, or to enumerate them, let us designate the physical agencies operating in our world by the letters of the alphabet, and inquire how they act. A ball at rest is struck by a ball in motion. Let us call the ball at rest A, and the ball in motion B. The two constitute the cause, which is

The cause A B.

As they act the effect follows: A moves while B's motion is stayed, and as the effect we have bodies changed,

The effect A' B'.

But in its motion A strikes C, and B is struck by D, and we have

Two causes A' C and B' D,

and the

Double effect A²C' and B²D'.

But these agents come to act on other agents, E, F, G, H, and we have a

Complex result, A³E, C³F, B³G, D³H.

On the supposition that these agencies are in a closed ball, and act on each other and on nothing else, the sum of energy would be one and the same, while each body might be gaining or losing energy, one or both.

In the first action of A B, A gains energy from B and moves, while B loses what energy it gives and is stayed. But A going through the air and over a surface loses the energy it gained, imparting it to the air and surface, and comes to rest; and B is struck by D and gets the energy it has lost and moves. There is thus a continual action kept up among the bodies. The energy in each body varies, it may be from moment to moment, but the amount among all the bodies continues the same.

2. We see that the effects come to act as causes. Thus if we represent the cause as A B and the effect as A' B', we see that each of the agencies A and B is ready to act always when combined with some other agency, such as C and D. These last acting as causes become effects, which may again become causes in combination with other or the same things. The conservation of energy thus keeps the world the same through ages, while these constant changes give it its activity: the one, as it were, constituting an unchanging ocean, the other the tides that agitate it. It is thus, as the Eleatics held, that everything is fixed and immutable; but equally true, as Heraclitus and the *φιλόσοφοι ῥέοντες* taught, that everything is becoming.

3. We see that in physical nature (and I speak of no other) the effect consists of the agencies which have been the causes appearing in a new form. When the cause is A B, the effect is A' B'. When the cause is more complex, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, all of these agencies are changed or modified; and these as changed constitute the effect that will for ever follow the cause. This makes all physical causation a kind of evolution or development, a favourite doctrine with certain theosophists, who derived all mundane things from other mundane things, and all things from God. This doctrine was apprehended and expressed in a mystical way, but contains an important truth which can be separated from the error with which it was associated and put in a scientific form. It is not that the effect emanates from the cause; but the effect consists in the agencies constituting the cause being put in a new state.

4. It is altogether wrong to represent with Hume the rela-

tion of cause and effect as being merely or essentially invariable antecedence and consequence. It is something deeper in the very nature of things. The effect which is always dual or plural consists of the things that constituted the cause in a new condition. There is and always must be invariable and unconditional antecedence and consequence, but prior to this and producing this there is the conservation or persistence of force which comes out from the agents acting as the causes, goes into the effect, and thus necessitates antecedence and consequence.

5. We see what is the inertia of body. Newton's First Law of Motion follows from the principles we have laid down. A body at rest will continue at rest for ever unless it is acted on by some other body; a body in motion will continue in motion in the same straight line unless stayed or deflected by some other body. All this is a corollary from the principle that causal action is the action of two bodies, and that a body will not act unless acted on by some other body.

6. We see the nature of the law of action and reaction. A body will not act unless there is some other body acting on it. Under this view matter is passive. It acts only so far as it is acted on. In another sense it is active. One body acts on another body; thus two bodies are A and B, and A and B are both changed. A at rest moves and B is stayed. What B loses in being stayed, A gains and moves. This gives us Newton's Third Law of Motion, that Action is always equal to and the opposite of Reaction. B gives what it loses to A, but the sum of energy of the two is the same after action as before action. It follows that the energy given to A is equal to that lost by B.

7. It is sometimes stated that the same effect may be produced by different causes. This is not true, or it is true according as we understand it. A jar may be broken by a picture falling on it, but it may also be broken by a stone flung at it. The breaking of the jar may thus be produced by two different processes. But in both cases the breaking of the jar is only part of the effect. The full effect in the one case was the jar broken and the picture stayed; in the other, the jar broken with the stone stayed.

8. It is often said that great effects follow from small causes.

A cow kicks a kerosene-lamp, and first the shed is ignited, and then the half of a great city is burned. The British Government denies Colonial America a comparatively small claim; and a revolution breaks forth which separates Great Britain and the United States for ever. But it is not quite correct, it is not the full truth, to say that one cause did all this. In all such cases there is a co-operation and succession of various causes. The fire is carried on by there being all around inflammable materials to propagate it, and the separation of the countries was really produced by a widespread discontent. In like manner a mighty agency may often issue in a very insignificant effect, because there are no conspiring powers.

Finally, we see what a complexity there is in the activities in our world. There are two or commonly more agents in every act of causation, two or commonly more in all effectuation. What a variety of powers at work in the great natural occurrences, say in the seasons, say in the production of spring, with its increased heat, its buds and leaves and blossoms! What a complication in the production of the great epochs of history: in the spread of Christianity; in the revival of learning in the fifteenth century; in the great Reformation; in the English, American, and French revolutions! This complexity is vastly increased by the circumstances that the agents in combination possess properties which they did not exhibit in their separate state. Water exercises qualities which did not appear in the separate action of the oxygen and hydrogen. When combined in living plants and animals the elements exhibit powers, such as absorption and assimilation, not shown by the oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, and ammonia. I feel that there is need in this complication of a regulating power to produce order and beneficence. Without this all these powers might work capriciously and injuriously and have formed only powers of evil, mosquitoes, serpents, flaming meteors, and burning worlds, destructive machines, and pestiferous creatures devouring each other and arresting all forms of beauty and beneficence, and yet incapable of dying. We find instead those millions of agencies combining to accomplish good and benign ends. All this seems to me to show that there has been a mind disposing and a wisdom guiding them.

To prove this it is not necessary that we should settle what

are the original constituents of the universe: some suppose them to be atoms, some represent them as centres of force, some will allow them to be only centres of motion. Some of our most distinguished physicists, such as Helmholtz and William Thomson, are favouring the idea of Descartes, somewhat modified, that they are vortices in perpetual whirl. Whatever they be, they need a wise and good disposal to make them perform bountiful ends. I discover traces in nature of various kinds of design.

I. There are concurrences of agents to accomplish special beneficent ends. Take the eye. What a combination of independent agencies before we can see the smile on that friend's face! There are vibrations coming from the sun ninety millions of miles away; these have passed at various rates through an ether, they touch and are reflected from the countenance; some of them reach the corner of an optical instrument called the eye; they go through an aqueous humour, thence through the gateway of iris into the crystalline lens; they are there refracted and pass through the aqueous humours to the retina, where they impact on thousands of rods and cones, and are sent on to the optic-nerve and the brain; and we now see the smiles on our mother's face. Let any one of these be absent or fail, and nature would remain for ever in darkness. Take the ear. A sister utters a word, a vibration is started, it reaches our ear, is collected by the outer ear and knocks on the tympanum, is propagated into the middle-ear, where it sets in motion the hammer and the anvil and the stirrup, thence it penetrates into the inner ear, where it vibrates through a liquid, affects the thousand and more organs of Corti, is sent round the semicircular canals into the cochlea, on through the auditory nerve into the brain; the silence is broken, and we are cheered by a voice of love.

II. We may discover a plan and purpose in development as it is carried on in our world. Development is evidently not a simple power in nature like mechanical force or chemical affinity or gravitation. It is clear that there is a vast, an incalculable number and variety of agencies in the process, whether it be the development of the plant from its seed, of the bird from the egg, of the horse from its dam, of the threshing-

machine from the flail, of the reaping-machine from the reaping-hook, of our present kitchen utensils from those used by our grandmother.

Development is essentially a combination of causes fulfilling a purpose. It is an organised causation for ends, a corporation of causes for mutual action. It has been admitted for ages that causation works through all nature; not only divine causation, the source of the whole, but physical causation; that is, the ordinary occurrences of nature are all produced by agents working causally; in other words, fire burns, light shines, and the earth spins round its axis and rotates round the sun, and the consequence is that we have heat and light and the beneficent seasons. Men of enlarged minds do now see and acknowledge that in the doctrine of causation, in the doctrine of God acting everywhere through second causes, there is nothing irreligious. On the contrary, the circumstances that God proceeds according to laws is evidently for the benefit of man, who can thus from the past anticipate the future and prepare himself for it. On the same principle I hold that there is nothing irreligious in development, which is just a form of causation. It was my privilege in my earliest published work to justify God's method of procedure by natural law. I reckon it a like privilege in my declining life to defend God's method of action by development, by bringing the present out of the past.

There is an arranged combination necessary to produce evolution. The present is evolved out of the past and will develop into the future all under an arrangement. The present is the fruit of the past and contains the seed of the future. The configuration of the earth, its hills and dales, its rivers and seas, which determine the abodes and industries of men and the bounds of their habitation, have been produced by agencies which have been working for thousands or millions of years. The plants now on the earth are the descendants of those created by God, and the ancestors of those that are to appear in the coming ages. There is through all times, as in the year, a succession of seasons; sowing and reaping, sowing in order to reap, and reaping what has been sown in order to its being sown again. This gives a continuousness, a consistency, to nature, amidst all the mutations of time. There is not only a contemporaneous order in nature, there is a successive order.

The beginning leads to the end, and the end is the issue of the beginning. This grass and grain and these forests that cover the ground have seed in them which will continue in undefined ages to adorn and enrich the ground. These birds that sing among the branches and these cattle upon a thousand hills will build nests and rear young to furnish nourishment and delight to our children's children in millennial ages. Every naturalist has seen a purpose gained by the nutriment laid up in the seed or pod to feed the young plant. I see a higher end accomplished by the mother provided for the young animal. That infant is not cast forth into the cold world unprotected : it has a mother's arms to protect it and a mother's love to fondle it. Development is not an irreligious process ; every one who has been reared under a father's care and a mother's love will bless God for it.

"Evolution," says Herbert Spencer, "is a change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent homogeneity through continuous differentiation and integration." He has sufficient philosophy to refer all this to a power supposed by him to be unknown working behind the known phenomena. A deeper philosophy will discover a so far known divine power producing these effects.

In development there is usually progression. At times there is degeneracy, chiefly the result of human sin, as we see in the degeneracy of the Indians. But as a whole there has been an advance in our earth from age to age. The tendency of animal life is, upon the whole, upward—from all-fours to the upright position, in which men can look up to the heavens. Agencies have been set agoing to produce these evidently intended ends. Causes that operated ages ago have called in other causes to co-operate with them, and have thereby added to the power and riches of the product. The geological changes have made our earth fit for the abode of man. Human beings have taken the places which in earlier ages were handed over to wild animals. There is a greater amount of food produced on our earth than at any earlier stage. There has been, as the ages rolled on, a greater fulness of sentient life and a larger capacity of happiness. The intellectual powers have been made stronger and firmer like the trunk of the tree, and the feelings like the flowers have taken a larger expansion and a richer colour by culture.

I am inclined to see purposes in the very forms of animals and plants, and the manner in which they grow into their type; while the type ever advances as if to realise an idea. Our roses are all supposed to be derived from the common dog-rose, and I see a beauty in that rose as it grows by the roadside. But I discover a higher manifestation of skill in the way in which the rose becomes more fully expanded in our gardens. God, who rewards us for opening our eyes upon his works, bestows higher gifts on those who in love to them bestow labour upon them. Dogs, it is said, have all descended from some kind of wolf, and I see a fitness in their primitive forms; but I discover a fuller development in the shepherd's dog and the St. Bernard dog with their wondrous instincts. I discover a fitness of parts in the old eohippus which used to tread with its five toes on marshy ground; but I discover an advance in the pleiohippus, and still higher perfection in the animal we ride on, so useful and so graceful, so agile and so docile.

III. I discover an end in the manner in which plants and animals are produced. Two systems of development are necessary to effect this. First, the tendency of every living thing to produce a seed or germ. The powers necessary to accomplish this are very numerous and very complex, but all conspiring towards this one end, as if it were one of the purposes for which the plant was created. Secondly, there is the development of the plant and animal from the seed or germ. This, too, implies an immense combination of arranged elements and forces. It looks excessively like an end contemplated, an idea to be realised. It looks all the more like this when we notice that the seed or germ is after its kind, and produces a living being after the same kind. There is thus a double development in all animated nature; we see it in the oak producing the acorn, and the acorn the oak.¹

These are mainly operations of the ordinary physical forces which are all correlated with each other, needing only a dispos-

¹ "When will apologists begin to perceive that the best apology for the universe would lie in the belief that it was not designed at all?" This is the melancholy conclusion reached by Mr. Grant Allen in a review of Professor Cleeland's recent work. Some are regretting that Mr. Allen should have become so slavish a follower of Spencer, and be using his power as a critic in the London *Academy* to depreciate those who have the courage to avow that they see design in nature.

ing power. But there are in our cosmos other and higher powers. In closing let us look at these.

First, There is evidence of new, and these higher, powers appearing in the progress of nature. I have shown at an earlier part of this article that in physical causation there is merely a changed state of the agents acting as the causes. There is no power in the effect which was not in the causes. If heredity has a gift committed to it, it may transmit it from parent to offspring, and from one generation to another. But if there be a new power appearing, it must be from superadded causes. But there are products in our world which cannot be developed from the original elements or powers of nature.

Was there Life in the original atom, or molecule formed of the atoms? If not, how did it come in when the first plant appeared? Was there sensation in the original molecule? If not, what brought it in when the first animal had a feeling of pleasure or of pain? Was there mind in the first molecule, say a power of perceiving an object out of itself? Was there consciousness in the first molecule or monad—a consciousness of self? Was there a power of comparing or judging, of discerning things, of noting their agreements or differences? Had they a power of reasoning, of inferring the unseen from the seen, of the future from the past? Were there emotions in these first existences, say a hope of continued life or a fear of approaching death? Perhaps they had loving attachments to each other; perhaps they had some morality, say a sense of justice in keeping their own whirl, and allowing to others their rights and their place in this dance! Had they will at the beginning, and a power of choosing between pleasure and pain, between the evil and the good? Perhaps they had some piety, and paid worship of the silent sort to God!

It is needless to say that there is not even the semblance of a proof of there being any such capacities in the original atoms or fore-centres. If so, how did they come in? Take one human capacity: how did consciousness come in? Herbert Spencer, the mightiest of them, would have us believe that he has answered the question, and yet he has simply avoided it. In his *Psychology* he is speaking of nerves for hundreds of pages; he shows that in their development there is a succession of a certain kind; and adds simply that "*there must arise a*

consciousness"! This is all he condescends to say, bringing in no cause or link or connection. Thus does he slip over the gap—a practice not uncommon with this giant as he marches on with his seven-leagued boots.

It is pertinent to ask, How did these things come in? How did things without sensation come to have sensation? things without instinct to have instinct? creatures without memory to have memory? beings without intelligence to have intelligence? mere sentient existence to know the distinction between good and evil? I am sure that when these things appear, there is something not previously in the atom or molecule. All sober thinkers of the day admit that there is no evidence whatever in experience or in reason to show that matter can produce mind; that mechanical action can gender mental action; that chemical action can manufacture consciousness; that electric action can reason, or organic structure rise to the idea of the good and the holy. I argue according to reason and experience that we must call in a power above the original physical forces to produce such phenomena. I may admit that a body may come out of another body by the powers with which the bodies are endowed; but I say that a sensitive, intelligent, moral discerning soul cannot proceed from the elements of matter. New powers have undoubtedly come in when consciousness and understanding and will begin to act. They may come according to laws not yet discovered, but they are the laws of the Supreme Lawgiver.

I can find no more satisfactory account of this process than that in the opening of Genesis, where new manifestations appear in successive days or epochs, the whole culminating in man in the image of God. "Howbeit that was not first which is spiritual [*πνευματικόν*], but that which is natural [*ψυχικόν*]; and afterward that which is spiritual." "And so it is written, the first man Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a quickening spirit" (1 Cor. xv. 45, 46)—where we may mark the advancement from the merely living soul (*ψυχὴν ζῶσαν*) to the quickening spirit (*πνεῦμα ζωοποιούν*).

Secondly, There are mental and spiritual powers working in our world. Of the operations of the mental powers we are conscious. I am quite as certain that I have thoughts and wishes as that I have hands and feet. But not only are there

psychical acts, there may be spiritual powers. I am aware that some of our savans will turn away from such an idea, not only with unbelief, but with scorn, declaring it to be inconsistent with the uniformity of nature, with all history, and with all science. But this arises, not from the comprehension of their views, but from fixing their eyes so exclusively on their own favourite subjects that they do not see others lying alongside of them possibly higher and more important.

Earnest men in all ages have been seeking after intercourse with God. They have prayed in the belief that there may be One to hear them, and they have expected an answer. They do not allow to you that God has so shut himself out from his own world that he cannot act on it. They deny that there is any proof that our petitions are so bound to the earth by gravity that they cannot mount upward and reach the ear of their heavenly Father, who is felt as pitying them. They believe that their spirits can hold communion with God, who is a Spirit, quite as certainly as our earth can act on the sun and the sun on the earth. They have faith that there are wider and more intimate unions than those produced by the attraction which all matter has for other matter. They are sure that all holy intelligences throughout the universe are in union with the holy God.

Christians believe that they live under the dispensation of the Spirit. We have seen that there have been in the history of our world times or seasons in which new powers, apparently always advanced powers, appeared. There was a time in which life appeared, in which consciousness appeared, in which intelligence appeared and will appeared, and a conscience discerning between good and evil appeared, and the full man in the image of God appeared. There has been a like introduction of new powers, and a like advance in the revelation which God has been pleased to make of his will, first in the shadow going before, then in the grand Personage appearing in the fulness of time. The Jewish dispensation comes out of the patriarchal, and the Christian out of the Jewish, in each case something new being added. Under the old economy there were promises of the coming dispensation, and there were anticipations of it in persons moved by the Holy Ghost. It was thus in the geological ages ; as Agassiz delighted to

show, in lower creatures stretching up towards higher, and towards man himself. But the full dispensation of the Spirit was introduced when the Mediator, having finished his work on earth, went up to heaven: "If I go away, I will send him unto you."

Christians believe that in this dispensation they have access to God. They maintain that science has nothing to say even in appearance contradictory. Some of the profoundest investigators of science have believed all this and avowed their convictions, such as Newton and Leibnitz, Brewster and Herschel, Faraday, Mayer, and our own Henry. They have been quite as sure of this as of their own great discoveries as to the laws of the universe.

No doubt these spiritual operations are not without law of some kind. But that law is not the same with the physical laws operating around us. It may be such that we cannot by searching find it out. The arc visible to us is too small to enable us to calculate the full circle or sphere. So we piously ascribe it all to the sovereignty of God. "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit."

JAMES M'COSH.

ART. IX.—*Current Literature.*

IN these days of the historical study of exegesis the Jewish commentators necessarily bulk largely, and amongst Jewish exegetes there is no more justly honoured name than that of Abraham Ibn Ezra, commonly called Aben Ezra, who was born at Toledo in 1092, and who, after a changeful life, died at Rome in 1167. Aben Ezra has always had a high repute among the Rabbis of the Middle Age, not only for Biblical lore, but also for a multifarious learning as a Talmudist, Kabbalist, poet, philosopher, astronomer, and physician. Any one interested in the writings of the man would do well to study Dr Friedländer's exhaustive *Essay on the Writings of Ibn Ezra*. It has been long known that Aben Ezra left behind him a

commentary upon the Proverbs, and such a work has been printed in the Rabbinical Bibles. Recent research, however, has shown most conclusively that this reputed commentary did not emanate from Aben Ezra, but from Moses Kimchi. Singularly enough, yet a second commentary, really written by Joseph Kimchi, has also been palmed off as the long lost writing. Yet a third commentary, making the same pretension, has come to light (1). Last year, Dr. Neubauer, purchased at Venice for the Bodleian an octavo volume, in the Italian Rabbinic character, which also claims to contain, together with a commentary by Moses Kimchi on Ezra and Nehemiah, the missing manuscript upon the Proverbs. Upon the credibility of this superscription opinions are likely to be divided. Dr. Friedländer decides against, and Mr. Driver seems to be of a similar opinion. All who are curious in Rabbinic literature can have, nevertheless, but one opinion as to the commendability of the labour of love bestowed by that accomplished Hebraist, Mr. Driver, in editing and issuing this *brochure*.

The great leaders of the Reformation occupy so exalted a position amongst the heroes of mankind, the interest as well as the influence of their lives is so fascinating, that they have put into the shade many of their less gifted and prominent coadjutors. Amongst the second rank of the Reformers none is more deserving of grateful and reverential remembrance than John a Lasco, (2) or von Lasky, whose changing and earnest life brought him into harsh conflict or into friendly contact with many princes and prelates. Even to the majority of English people who are familiar with the history of the stirring days of the English Reformation, he is only known by a few sentences in Neale's *History of the Puritans*. Though the father of English Presbyterianism and Puritanism, his name is almost dead amongst us. Happily there are signs of his being rescued from oblivion. A few years since, Dr.

(1) *A Commentary on the Book of Proverbs*, attributed to Abraham Ibn Ezra. Edited from a MS. in the Bodleian Library by S. R. Driver, M.A., Fellow of New College, Oxford. The Clarendon Press, 1880.

(2) *Johannes a Lasco; Beitrag zur Reformationsgeschichte Polens, Deutschlands, und England*, von Hermann Dalton; mit Portrait. Perthes, Gotha, 1881.

Cuyper gave us an entire edition of the works of Lasky, together with a collection of his letters, promising to complete at leisure a story of his life. As it is probable that promise will never be redeemed, with the approval of the Dutch scholar, and using his materials, Herr Dalton has endeavoured to resuscitate, with the aid of careful and enthusiastic acquaintance with the age depicted, the splendid episode of the Reformation in which Lasky took part. The author has undoubtedly exceptional facilities for his task. As he himself says (we translate from his preface): "England is the land of my fathers. I saw the light as an English citizen, and with love and piety I cleave to the beautiful land and its early history; but Germany and its history is dear to me, as only home can be; in its ground lie the roots of my spiritual life, the pleasant remembrances of childhood and youth; its language is my mother-tongue: the years of my manhood have for twenty years been spent not far from Poland." The scenes, therefore, in which Lasky moved in England, Germany, and Poland are all familiar to the author, and much of his writing stands out with the vividness of an eye-witness. Hence a most enjoyable book. Of Lasky's life in his early Polish and Catholic home, of his many travels during the days of the formation of his character, of his voluntary exile, of his sojourn in Friesland and England, of his intimacy with Erasmus, Cicolampadius Pelicanus, Melancthon, Calvin, Hooper, Cranmer, Henry VIII., and Elizabeth; of his influence upon the ecclesiastical and doctrinal controversies which then agitated England, of his return to Poland and his association with the Polish Reformation, we have no space to speak, but we cordially refer all readers of German who enjoy a historical biography well written to the book itself. Is not Herr Dalton sufficiently conversant with English to issue this life in English dress?

Dr. Lipsius's *Manual of Protestant Dogmatics* (3) is already so well known to all professed students of Systematic Theology that the appearance of a second edition merely calls for brief

(3) *Lehrbuch der Evangelisch Protestantischen Dogmatik*, von Dr. Richard Adelbert Lipsius. Second Edition, Brunswick.

notice. In this edition some minor matters have been emendated, and some suggestions of critics have been weighed, and in some cases adopted. As a whole the book is the same. That such a treatise should have reached a new issue is cause for congratulation; for at least a testimony is thus borne to a delight in the study of the severer aspects of theology: the numerous incidental discussions it contains upon the history of doctrines are also of large value. As a system we do not hold the book in esteem. Religion to the learned author is simply a phenomenon grounded necessarily in the nature of man, and Dogmatics is the delineation of religion. Systematic Theology is thus a history of subjective states, a branch of psychology indeed, rather than an examination of objective facts, and a branch of exact science. To us Systematic Theology is a reasoned concatenation of the revealed truths of Scripture, not an analysis of the religious feelings of man.

Another recent work (4) upon Systematic Theology calls for somewhat longer notice, a treatise of Dr. Schöberlein's upon the Principle and System of Dogmatics, an introduction, as he calls it, to a System of Christian Doctrine. And the proviso is wisely made, for this is by no means a doctrinal system, it is rather a description of the growth of a system. It is a kind of fore-court to a doctrinal system. The plan of the writer will be seen from the following outline. Christianity, he says, and Christianity alone, brings full mental content. This content is first visible in the realm of feeling. Soon, however, its influence spreads, and demands rational conviction, a representation of Christianity, the source of contentment, as truth. Christian science, which is thus demanded, may proceed along various lines. If an endeavour is made to analyse the nature of the spirit that has felt content, we have Christian Philosophy; and if the truths which have brought content are arranged systematically, we have Christian Dogmatics. The great requirement of Christian Dogmatics is a principle, a merely personal sense of salvation being insufficient. The sources of this principle are threefold,—the Bible, the Church,

(4) *Das Princip und System der Dogmatik; Einleitung in die christliche Glaubenslehre*, von Dr. Ludwig Schöberlein. Heidelberg, 1881.

and the Believer. "Dogmatics has to combine these three spheres; it must be *ecclesiastical*, it must be *biblical*, and it must at the same time be *personal and individual*. It must not merely echo the church—that would be to fix a precise section of the development of doctrine as a perpetual ideal; it must not desire to be biblical only—that would be to restrain the development of the blossom of spiritual knowledge; and it must not be individual only—for that would be to permit the doctrinal development of the church to be lost in separate foci. Mere Biblicity would impart to Dogmatics a legal character, mere Ecclesiasticity a character that was narrow, and mere Subjectivity one that was arbitrary." The problem, therefore, is to bring these three elements into union. To attain, it is said, the correct *principle* and *system* of Dogmatik, we have to seek, first in the Bible, then in the History of the Church, and then in the Christian consciousness, what are the leading features of Christianity. In pursuance of this plan, we first have a "foundation-laying part," and second "a presenting part." In the former we have an analysis of the principal Christian ideas as they are to be seen in the Bible, in History, and in Experience. In the latter these ideas, beginning with love and ending with the angels, are presented in orderly sequence and connection. Again we are compelled to say that as a system the work does not commend itself to us. The very use of the words "Principle" and "System" is confusing, because so unusual. Nevertheless the book is worthy of the closest perusal. There is such a clearness of statement, there is such an all-pervading charity, there is such an evangelical tone, there is so marked an acquaintance and sympathy with Biblical truth, there is so large an eye for the cardinal facts which are the secret of the success and need of Christianity, that every reader of this volume will rise up refreshed. The statement of the truths of Scripture forms a most suggestive treatise on Biblical Theology, and the statement of the peculiarities of the Christian Consciousness is a most inspiring page in the history of the moral transformation of man. We could wish the book translated as a choice companion for the overworked and dispirited pastor, fragrant as it is with piety, faith, love, zeal, peace, and blessedness.

Dr. Marcus Dods' *Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph* (5) may be commended as a model of popular exposition. The analyses of character are striking and subtle, and the author reveals everywhere a marvellous gift for what may be called moral dissection; indeed, were we asked to indicate the special virtue of the book, we should point to its quick and keen insight into human nature. The characters of Jacob and Joseph afford a good opportunity for the exercise of such a gift, but it is equally evident in the treatment of the subordinate characters. Here, for instance, is the manner in which Esau and Laban are described and contrasted:—"Esau could never see that there was any important difference between himself and Jacob, except that his brother was trickier. Esau was the type of those who honestly think that there is not much in religion, and that saints are but white-washed sinners. Laban, on the contrary, is almost superstitiously impressed by the distinction between God's people and others. But the chief practical issue of this impression is, not that he seeks God's friendship for himself, but that he tries to make a profitable use of God's friends." We cannot read such a delineation as this without feeling that the two men have been set visibly before us, and also, perhaps, that both the Esau and the Laban type of man is still to be found in the world and in the Church. It is by such handling as this that Old Testament story becomes alike real and profitable to us. As a specimen of more delicate analysis we may point to Dr. Dods' skilful representation of Joseph's position when he was in prison smarting under the vile charge of his master's wife. Within the compass of a small volume we cannot have everything, and some may miss here in some measure what we may call the "evangelical" aspects of the subjects handled; but on this side our literature is sufficiently rich already, and we have by no means too many of such character-studies as those before us.

In turning now to Dr. Wilson's *Memoir of Dr. Candlish* (6), it is with no idea of attempting anything like an exhaustive

(5) *The Household Library of Exposition: Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph*, by Marcus Dods, D.D. Edinburgh: Macniven and Wallace.

(6) *Memorials of R. S. Candlish, D.D.*, by William Wilson, D.D.; with concluding chapter by Robert Rainy, D.D. Edinburgh: A. and C. Black.

review; this would demand an article at least to itself. Rather let us talk of it for a moment as setting before us certainly one of the greatest figures in Presbyterian Church history within this generation. With the exception of Dr. Chalmers, there has been no man of equal greatness in the Free Church; and whilst it has been common to talk of the three C's—Chalmers, Cunningham, and Candlish—the order, so far as the latter two are concerned, is rather one of seniority than priority. For, without disparagement to the eminent gifts of Dr. Cunningham, it can scarcely be doubted that, regarded as a personality rather than an author, Candlish is destined to take a still higher place than Cunningham. In writing this memoir of him, Dr. Wilson had a difficult task to perform, and it is conceivable that some parts of the work might have been more successfully done by one who had been less in the thick of the battle with Dr. Candlish than Dr. Wilson; but, on the other hand, few had the opportunities for accuracy which is founded upon this very closeness of association. The work does not lay any claim to high literary art in its execution; the author is content to give us a plain and unvarnished account of Candlish, what he was, and what he did; and certainly if it be a great merit—as we think it is—that a biographer should conceal himself behind his subject, that merit belongs to Dr. Wilson. We do think, however, that it would have been well had less space been occupied with Dr. Candlish's speeches; the introduction of these causes a break in the interest of the narrative, while speeches thus introduced, as a rule, fail entirely to make the kind of impression upon the reader which was made by the living voice. Moreover, this points to what, upon the whole, is the one defect of the memoir—the almost exclusive portrayal of the *public* life of Dr. Candlish during a great part of his career. Yet, after all, we are inclined to think that this probably arises from the fact that few materials were left which would have enabled the author to draw such a picture of his private and inner life as we should have wished to see. Upon the deepest matters the Scotch character is peculiarly reticent: good men do not say much regarding them either in their letters or in conversation, as a rule; and we should think that Dr. Candlish had probably much of this reserve. The memoir opens with an interesting sketch of his early days, and, in speaking of his

parentage, mentions a curious link between Scotland's greatest poet and one of her greatest ecclesiastics. It seems that Candlish's father was one of Burns's most trusted friends, while his mother is celebrated in one of his songs among the "belles of Mauchline." Candlish's father died on the very threshold of what promised to be a brilliant career as a physician, leaving him fatherless at the age of five weeks. Mrs. Candlish brought up her family with great care and devotion, and left the impress of her "wit" (which Burns celebrates) upon the understanding of her boy, as she did of her goodness upon his heart. But we cannot stay to notice further the early part of his career. Born in 1806, he entered Glasgow College in 1818, and, passing the Arts and Divinity courses, finally left it in December 1826. Amongst other friendships formed there was that with James Craufurd, afterwards Lord Ardmillan, which terminated only with death. Those who have met with that distinguished judge will remember how playfully he used to recall the picture of Candlish "playing football at Glasgow College." The story of his weary waiting, after licence, for a permanent sphere of labour is interesting and instructive; nothing is finer than the patience with which young Mr. Candlish bore it all, disappointed but not soured, "biding his time." Though licensed in 1828, he was not ordained till 1834, when he became minister of St. George's, Edinburgh. From that time he became a prominent figure in the city and in the Church. The "Ten Years' Conflict" had already begun, and it could not be that a nature so strong, so true, so free, and—in a good sense—even so combative, should long keep aside from the fray; and in 1839 he made his first Assembly speech, and from that time onwards through the history, first of the Evangelical section of the Church of Scotland, then of the Free Church, he was a great part of all. It is impossible for us to dwell upon the stirring scenes through which he passed, or to tell of the manly heroism which he throughout evinced himself and inspired in others. For all this we must refer the reader to Dr. Wilson's volume, which at this point becomes necessarily not merely the history of Candlish, but of the Free Church. With later years comes the story of his part in the negotiations for union with the United Presbyterian Church; in the debates which arose out of these the

appearances of Dr. Candlish are now amongst the memorable; and one recalls his firm and compact, if somewhat peculiar, figure, his vigorous gesticulation, his torrent-like eloquence, which swept down opponents rather ruthlessly before it. One must not forget also that he found time to take large part in educational matters, and his prominence in this department was acknowledged by his election to the Principalship of New College, Edinburgh, upon the death of Principal Cunningham. The story of his last days is very touching. All that was best in the man came out then: his clear and strong faith, his warm affections, his kindliness of nature (which his vehemence in debate sometimes seemed to gainsay, yet only seemed, as his opponents well knew), his humility,—all these came into prominence in these dying days. To our mind nothing in the whole life is finer than his good-bye to a servant, to whom he thought he had sometimes spoken too sharply. “Is that Elizabeth? Come here. I have often been sharp to you about my study-fire. I am sorry for it. Will you forgive me?” We have left ourselves no space to speak of Principal Rainy’s closing chapter, which gives an able and succinct estimate of his qualities as a theologian. Enough to add, that we pass from this volume of Dr. Wilson’s thankful for what it has given us, and specially for the impulse which is gained from the study of a man so whole-hearted, so powerful of understanding, so courageous, so faithful to his Master, as was Robert Smith Candlish.

In Dr. Stoughton’s *History of Religion in England* (7) we have the evident gathering together of the results of a life-work, and no one who peruses these volumes will say that the labour so spent has been spent in vain. Indeed, this History of Dr. Stoughton’s is sure to have a place among our standard ecclesiastical works, and no future writer upon the times here sketched will fail to turn to it as an authority. It may be described as containing the substance of the various historical works which Dr. Stoughton has issued, and which have been known under such names as *The Church of the Civil Wars*, *Church and State in England Two Hundred Years Ago*, *The*

(7) *Religion in England*, by John Stoughton, D.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Church of the Restoration, The Church of the Revolution, and Religion in England under Queen Anne and the Georges. All these fragments are now collected, and thus the history embraces the story of Religious England from the time of Charles I. to that of George III. A good many years ago Dr. Stoughton wrote in the preface to one of these books, "A history of the eighteenth century lies among the visions of the future;" let us congratulate him over the happy realisation of his vision. As an historian, Dr. Stoughton's qualities are already well known; he writes history not for the select few, but for the many, and his manner is such as to be "understood of the people." But whilst we say this, we are not to be understood as meaning that his style is not cultivated, or that his treatment of his subject is superficial. On the contrary, the style is remarkable for its grace; and no one can read this book without being struck alike by this and by the evidence everywhere present of patient and exhaustive research. The work has been so done as to produce a narrative very even and smooth in its flow, carrying the reader forward with little effort through one of the most varied tracts of English history. Indeed—shall we say it?—if Dr. Stoughton has a fault in style, it is his faultlessness; he is too even and regular; he has too much of balance in his sentences. And the same feature, we think, marks his way of looking at the times of which he treats; he is ever calm and self-possessed, and not even the struggles of the Civil Wars infect him with anything like turgidity. It would be difficult to say which part of this work is the most interesting; probably that just referred to,—the time of the Civil Wars. As we read, we feel ourselves in stirring times and amid remarkable men, men whom our author's fine delineations place clearly before us. Here we are tracking the steps of Oliver Cromwell, a "rough piece of humanity," but containing "some of the rarest elements of power which this world has ever felt;" we are with "that grand and religious gentleman," Pym, or we are listening to the noble John Hampden. Here, too, we meet with our great Presbyterian ancestors in the Westminster Assembly (in the treatment of which, by the way, Dr. Stoughton is just a little superficial, as we think); and we are held in admiration before the figures of Stephen Marshall and Calamy, and other of their

fellows,—Calamy “followed,” says some one, “by all his rampant dog-day zealots,” as “a football in cold weather.” Let us say in passing that we have not observed in these volumes the name of Herbert Palmer, one of the finest spirits among the Puritans of his time. Dr. Stoughton is very guarded in his references to the execution of Charles I.; he calls it a “blunder;” he exonerates the Presbyterians from any share in it, and the great body of the Independents also; yet he reminds us that it has been defended by pious men. For our part, we could wish that he had condemned it more strongly; and the sooner we shake ourselves free of any apologetic relation to it the better. We cannot follow the history in detail, much as we would. We by and by part with Oliver Cromwell, and come to his son, a Cromwell, but not an Oliver, born to till paternal acres, but not to rule. All through this part, as was necessary, the history is almost as much that of the nation as that of the church; but with the Restoration there may be said to come a severance, and there is thenceforward—certainly from 1662—a religious life in the nation with which the State has nothing to do, save sometimes to persecute it. Probably one of the most interesting portions of the history at this stage is that in which Dr. Stoughton describes the prominent men of the time,—Chillingworth, Baxter, Howe, Izaak Walton, and the rest. So the work passes on, bringing us at last to the comparatively “quiet haven” of the reign of George III. The work which began with the struggle of Puritanism with a kind of semi-Romanism, ends with the triumphs of the Wesleyan movement and the beginning of revived missionary effort. After all, one cannot go through this history without feeling that through all her struggles, England has, under grace, fought her way to something better and higher. The Church in England at the beginning of this century had in it many elements of good which were not so manifest in 1640; shall we not say that since this century began, and till now, progress has continued, and that religious life has expanded and deepened since the days of George III.?

Dr. Llewelyn Bevan's *Sermons to Students and Thoughtful Persons* (8) may be said to claim for themselves a special

(8) London: R. D. Dickinson.

character from the special class to which they were addressed. For ourselves we are somewhat inclined to think that for "students and thoughtful men" the best kind of sermon is that which leads them away from their ordinary themes into the higher region of plain Gospel truth; but there will always be wide differences of opinion as to the best method of accomplishing this end. Dr. Bevan's plan is to make each great department of professional study in turn his starting-point, and in this way he takes up law, medicine, science, theology, and art, and shows how religion stands related to each, as well as how the student in each branch may be helped and guarded by a Christian faith. The style of discourse is that which marks, we should think, all Dr. Bevan's utterances; it is frank, simple, and direct; the diction is often very beautiful, and the preacher's tone in referring to intellectual and scientific studies is warmly appreciative and sympathetic. The book is fitted to give a spiritual stimulus, especially to the youthful student, whose highest life is only too apt to suffer from absorption in that particular study which is to form his life-work. The doctrinal element in these sermons is not very prominent, but we may add that the careful reader will find evidence of the fact that Dr. Bevan's mind has scarcely been cast in a Calvinistic mould. None the less there is a warm evangelical fervour and a ring as of true metal which will insure alike their popularity and their usefulness.

Messrs. Blackwood and Sons are following up their "Ancient Classics" and "Foreign Classics" by a third series, entitled "Philosophical Classics for English Readers." These ought to be exceedingly useful, for, though the names of Descartes, Locke, Butler, Berkeley, Bacon, etc., are often enough quoted, the sum of most people's knowledge regarding them and their teaching is, we fear, exceedingly small. We have the first volume of the series before us, viz., *Descartes* (9), by the Rev. J. P. Mahaffy, and we may say generally that it offers considerable promise of the good work to be done by the series. In such a book the great desideratum is that thoroughness of analysis should be combined with popularity of style in sketching the man and expounding his thought; and both these

(9) *Descartes*, by J. P. Mahaffy. Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons.

qualities will be found in Mr. Mahaffy's volume. He has wrought together the various facts of the great philosopher's life with much literary skill, and we think that his plan of making the story of the life and that of the successive productions of Descartes more forward, as it were, on parallel lines, deserves special commendation. It keeps the personal interest from flagging, and it insures against the too common evil of dissociating the *man* from the *thinker*, by making the personal and the intellectual life a unity. And certainly, as we review once more in these pages this man and his work, we feel that we are in contact not with a great mind only, but with a striking personality. He was one of those in whom philosophy was allowed, first, ruthlessly to destroy, and so to prepare for such a reconstruction of belief as should give stability to thousands of souls besides the thinker's own. His "*cogito ergo sum*" has been for modern times one of the surest safeguards against barren scepticism for all thinking men. It is a charter of intellectual liberty. One is disappointed, however, to find Descartes endeavouring to establish a *modus vivendi* between this freedom in the working of his mind and implicit obedience to the Church of Rome. We do not think, as Mr. Mahaffy seems to do, that this apparent endeavour was an act of hypocrisy, rather we regard it as a desperate attempt to compass the impossible in harmonies. Mr. Mahaffy's volume has one defect, which is this, that, while he tells the story of Descartes and his system with his accustomed clearness and ability, it is too evident that he has no enthusiasm for his hero.

A little book entitled *Thoughts on the Times and Seasons of Sacred Prophecy* has recently appeared from the pen of the Rev. T. R. Birks (10), best known as the biographer of Bickersteth. It was called into existence partly by some misunderstanding of former utterances of Mr. Birks upon this subject, and partly by the appearance of Mr. Grattan Guinness's book on *The Approaching End of the Age*, a very able book, which seems to have given Mr. Birks' thoughts on the subject a fresh impetus. This little book consists in part of a review of E. B. Elliott's "*Horæ Apocalypticæ*," and an indication of what he regards as

its errors, in part of a lengthened review of Mr. Guinness's work, the latter half being occupied with Mr. Birks's own views on Prophecy and its Interpretation. He combats very earnestly the idea that the question of the fulfilment of prophecy should not be studied, and he very well disposes of some of the objections to such studies. The last chapter is entitled "The World's Great Sabbath," and enters into those arithmetical and chronological questions with which we are all now so familiar. Here we generally part with our friends, content always to hold the certain fact of our Lord's coming, but doubtful of the practical end of their arithmetic; and when we find the estimable author bringing into his calculations what he calls "the pseudo-liberal statesmanship which ceases alike to hold fast the national faith in Christ and the everlasting gospel, and to protest against the Church of Rome," we are still more impressed with the difficulty of finding any common ground for settling what are "signs of the times" in contemporary history.

The *Memoir of William MacKerrow, D.D.* (11) gives us a well-written and thoroughly interesting account of a man who has several claims to be remembered. First of all, he was an able Christian minister; second, he was a friend of the great Temperance movement when it was less popular than it is now; and, third, he was an earnest and far-sighted Manchester politician. It was in the last of these characters, as an eloquent supporter of Free-trade and an opponent of the Corn Laws, that he was most prominent; and it may well be said of him that on the political platform he was still every inch a Christian minister and a Christian politician. He weighed questions social, commercial, and national, not merely in the balance of expediency, but in that of moral right and Christian duty, and thus his political convictions and actions had a distinctly religious side, and this, let us hope, increased his influence in religion as in politics. Perhaps his biographer has made him pose rather too much, however, as the politician and the reformer; and we could have wished a few more glimpses than we get here of the inner and spiritual side of his life. It is always

(11) By his son, Rev. James Muir MacKerrow, B.A. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

refreshing to get new proof that the tear and wear of public life may be associated with the genuine warmth of inward piety. We also think that his ministerial career—a long and honoured one—is but too lightly sketched; yet, admitting all this, Mr. MacKerrow has given us such a memoir of his father as will be read with unflagging interest and with profit as the record of an eloquent advocate, on the platform and in the pulpit, of “truth and righteousness.”

A new volume of Lectures from the pen of Professor Godet, of Neuchâtel (12) demands from us a passing word of notice. These lectures in Apologetics were delivered in Neuchâtel, in answer to others which had been given by Rationalistic theologians, and hence what we may call their local colouring. But they touch upon just those points which are being discussed everywhere in these times, and which are demanding ever fresh enforcement from the Christian point of view. The subjects of the lectures are these:—The Resurrection of Jesus Christ, The Hypothesis of Visions, The Miracles of Jesus Christ, The Supernatural, The Perfect Holiness of Jesus Christ, The Divinity of Jesus Christ, and The Immutability of the Apostolic Gospel. To us, perhaps, the most interesting portion has been that which deals with Christ's Resurrection and the visional hypothesis regarding it, since the latter has been made so well known in England through the popularisations of it in the works of Dr. Abbott. We think that any one who reads Professor Godet's two lectures will be struck with the hollowness of this theory. He well asks, for instance, What became of the body of Jesus if He did not rise? and he puts all those who attempt to explain away His resurrection in this dilemma: “Either the body remained in the hands of the disciples, or it was given up to the Jews.” If the disciples retained it, then they were impostors: but this is a position not maintained by modern rationalists. If the Jews retained it, then why did they not produce it as conclusive evidence against the disciples? The fact is that rationalists have attempted too hard a task in attempting to deny the resurrection, and some of them at least

(12) *Lectures in Defence of the Christian Faith*, by Professor F. Godet. Translated by the Hon. and Rev. Canon Lyttelton. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

have manifestly felt it. The second lecture, which deals more directly with the theory of Visions, is a bit of very hard and inexorable logic, showing very clearly that the condition of the disciples when they saw the risen Lord was as far from that of ecstasy—which the visional theory demands—as it could possibly be. We cannot go into the later lectures, much as we should wish: we could have willingly dwelt at length upon Professor Godet's profound and unique lecture upon "Miracle." The line which he takes, however, will be understood if we quote the following sentences:—

"Miracles are possible, because matter is the work and the born instrument of spirit. If this possibility, in the abstract, of miracle was to be realised through the agency of a man, one condition was requisite, namely, that there should exist a man fit to be associated with the exercise of the creative Omnipotence—a man whose will should be at one with that of God. This condition, the advent in the world of the holy man, prepared for by the whole course of the Old Testament, only realised itself perfectly once in the history of the world, and that hour was, in the strict sense of the word, the hour of miracle."

Thus the question of miracle involves the question of the Perfect Holiness of Jesus Christ, which is dealt with in a separate lecture, showing that we have means of *proving* Christ's perfect holiness, and claiming also that this is a genuinely *human* holiness. It will be well understood that both these points demand much delicacy of treatment; and at certain stages we have felt ourselves on perilous ground. To distinguish perfect *human* holiness in Christ from Divine holiness in any complete or satisfactory fashion must be impossible, as impossible as to define the place of the Divine and the Human in His Person with perfect accuracy. The attempt, however, is reverently made; and if it fails in some degree, it is because it must. We may add a closing word regarding the style of these lectures. It is simply charming, as is everything from Professor Godet's pen; and we are bound to add that he has found a skilful and successful interpreter in Canon Lyttelton. The book deserves a wide circulation among us; for wide circulation must mean in such a case wide usefulness.

From the Religious Tract Society we have received Principal Reynolds's *Philosophy of Prayer and other Papers* (13.) The other papers contained in this volume are entitled : "The Titles of the Lord Jesus Christ and the Crown of the Conquerors," "The Horizon," "Religious Service," "Mount St. Michel," "Tombs." Those, however, specified in the title are by much the most important. The essay on Prayer is divided into four parts. After an introduction—setting forth the universality of prayer and dealing with exceptions—the direct advantages of prayer, the answer to prayer, an illustration of the method of Divine response to prayer, and the conditions of acceptable prayer, are discussed in succession. Under the second of these heads, the blending of Divine and Human, the relation of prayer to immutable law, and the prophetic character of prayer, are treated with admirable ability and in a candid, reverent spirit. Touching the reality of prayer, Professor Reynolds says : "We think, therefore, that the subjective consciousness of the possibility of prayer—this universal impression, tradition, conviction, and experience—points to a Divine and eternal fact. Prayer is the drawing near of human spirits to the Father—the stretching out of human hands to lay hold on God."

Touching the inflexibility of the Divine purpose, he says :—
"It were easy to quote many Scripture texts which show that God is unchangeable, the same generation after generation—'yesterday, to-day, and for ever,'—that in all things which He has been minded to do, He must have chosen the best course and resolved upon the absolutely good. He is not and cannot be God to us unless He would refuse to our most importunate prayer the blessing, which, though we ardently desire it, He might know to be fraught with evil to our souls. However importunate may be our cry, we cannot imagine that the Eternal would, by the repetition of our desires, be wearied into a change of His intention. We cannot suggest to Him that which He does not know ; we cannot imagine anything nobler for the well-being of His universe than that which He has determined. If we thought that God would really alter His decrees, make new decrees, as earthly rulers may do, at our instance, we should

(13) *The Philosophy of Prayer and Principles of Christian Service, with other Papers*, by Henry Robert Reynolds, D.D. Religious Tract Society, London.

be afraid to pray to Him ; we should be alarmed at the dread responsibility of taking our well-being into our own hand more awfully than it already is, still more of taking into our hands the well-being of others, or of the entire universe."

And again : " God has so determined His relationship to us, that prayer is the ascent of the human soul into His purposes. . . . The sovereignty of God does not override the want, the will, the tears, the cry of His children, but does, in the first instance, express itself through that very want—those tears and strong desires. It is not that man changes God's purpose, but that man verily and indeed discovers that purpose through his own earnest prayer."

In speaking of Evolution, he says : " Modern science in dispersing one mystery has revealed a thousand in its place. The theory of evolution itself forces upon our consideration a multitude of points where the reverence of true science is awed in the presence of His unveiled glory. We have not reached as yet the real link which unites any two phenomena whatever. Who can dare to assert that the Infinite One cannot interpose in His own universe wheresoever and whensoever He pleases to originate or prosecute hitherto unrevealed purposes of His eternal mind ?"

Touching the relation to law, he says : " The ordination of God must leave room for prayer ; the laws of God's operation must include within themselves the freedom of man's choice. The prayer and the answer to prayer must be one of the laws of the universe, as certain within its rightful dominion as gravitation, or the movements of light and heat are in their peculiar realms." This is not new, but it is true and well put, and most seasonable truth. The teaching of the essay is in entire harmony with the old Puritan doctrine of the subject, so clearly and simply expressed in the Shorter Catechism of the Westminster Assembly. " Prayer is an offering up of our desires unto God for things agreeable to His will, in the name of Christ, with confession of our sins, and thankful acknowledgment of His mercies." It is viewed and expounded in relation to current speculations. We can only glance at the essays, eight in number, on the principles of Christian service. The one on the mission of Apollos is specially interesting. The last four were addressed to students for the ministry, to

whom the whole volume will be very valuable. Thoughtful and devout readers of every class will find it stimulating and helpful. It will confirm their faith and refresh their spirits, while it will be found very instructive.

"This book," (14) says Dr. Stanford in his preface, "is simply an attempt to preach the gospel through the press." These twelve sermons, taken out of a long series, preached in the course of many months, expound consecutive passages of Scripture. They are on the words written, spoken, or fulfilled at Calvary while our Saviour was actually on the cross. The volume bears traces of its origin. The colloquial and conversational style is preserved, and considerable freedom is used in the descriptive parts—a pre-Raphaelite vividness and minuteness—which some readers may feel painful, but which will doubtless be very acceptable to a much larger number. Many beautiful and suggestive things are said, as all who are acquainted with Dr. Stanford's other writings would expect. Some of the chapters are more finished in form and style than others. The volume will doubtless answer the purpose for which it is issued, in a very effective manner. There is such a persuasive gentleness and aptness in all Dr. Stanford's utterances, that we only regret the infrequency of his appearances as an author.

Contemporaneous criticism has its advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand it has access to full materials, and can avail itself of the best opportunity. On the other hand, it is exposed to the peril of prejudice resulting from peculiarities of relationship and position. In his survey of *Church Systems in the Nineteenth Century* (15), Mr. Rogers does not fail to lay under contribution all available sources of information, and he is honourably careful to avoid misstatement and misrepresentation. Consequently his work is likely to prove of permanent value. Even in discussing forms of

(14) *Voices from Calvary: a Course of Homilies*. By Charles Stanford, D.D., author of *Symbols of Christ*. London: Religions Tract Society.

(15) *Church Systems in the Nineteenth Century*, by the Rev. J. G. Rogers, B.A. Sixth Congregational Union Lecture. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

thought and lines of action with which he can have little sympathy, he manifests a commendable anxiety to discover and demonstrate whatever truth and rightness may be contained in them.

About one-half of this large volume is occupied with a fair and elaborate portraiture of the various schools comprehended in the Church of England, accompanied by a judicial estimate of their present force and influence. In the latter part of the volume he discusses the relationship between "the Established Church and the Free Churches" (ought it not to be the Established *Churches*?), and he devotes one lecture each to "The Plymouth Brethren," "Methodism," "Presbyterianism," and "Congregationalism." Mr. Rogers regards Presbyterianism in England as "part of that great spiritual movement in Scotch Presbyterianism of which the establishment of the Free Church was the most conspicuous manifestation." Of the Disruption in 1843 he speaks with marked sympathy and admiration. His statement that the "memorable procession *down the Castle Hill*" was a public and scornful repudiation of Erastian rule may pass without comment. But we are inclined to join issue with him when he criticises (gently, we admit) the present attitude of Presbyterianism in England. The following sentence, we submit, is neither fair nor correct: "Even the attempt on the part of certain Presbyterians to pose as the champions of orthodoxy *par excellence* need not disturb those Congregationalists with whom they are inviting an invidious comparison." If there be such a comparison invited, and we confess that we have not any such knowledge of it as Mr. Rogers assumes, may the explanation of it not be found rather in the pronounced aberrations from sound doctrine of certain Congregationalists, whom it would not be difficult to name? The taunt which follows, in the light of recent events, loses whatever force it may have had when these lectures were delivered. "Undoubtedly Presbyterianism depends more upon elaborate formularies and strict subscription; but there is little proof that restrictions of that kind are the best defences for the purity of a creed. Experience seems to tell altogether in a contrary direction. The Presbyterian Churches of Scotland at this moment are not free from those internal difficulties with which some of their champions are disposed

to reproach Congregationalism." What are the facts? There have been three trials of heresy, one in each of the three leading Presbyterian Churches in Scotland, within the last few years. In the United Presbyterian Church, which is certainly not the least liberal in thought and action, the minister accused was removed from his charge, and ceased to be a member even of that church; in the Established Church, the minister accused only escaped further proceedings by explaining that his words were not intended to convey the meaning that gave rise to distrust and suspicion; while, in the Free Church, the Professor accused of publishing erroneous and unsettling doctrine was, after a protracted and patient trial, removed from his chair. We ask confidently, Where is there anything similar of recent date to be found in the annals of Congregationalism? We admit freely that discipline cannot prevent the rise or spread of heretical teaching. But it can and does disavow *the responsibility of the Church by which it is judged* for its existence. And we venture to say, in these days, even that is an advantage not to be lightly prized.

We are sorry to appear as in any degree antagonistic to an author who discusses a delicate subject so fairly and so well. But in the interest of his own Church, no less than in the interest of our common Christianity, we feel bound to call his attention to a present danger and an important safeguard. Churches cannot prevent heresy, but they can disavow it. The rule is at once authoritative and ancient: "Be ye not partaker of other men's sins; keep thyself pure."

We should welcome the new series of *The Expositor* (16) with greater cordiality if we had any guarantee that it was likely to return to the earlier lines on which it gained at the outset a great and, to some extent, deserved popularity. Then it based and made good its claim for acceptance on a minute, careful, suggestive, and practical exposition of Scripture. There was then in many of its articles, and, we may specially note, in many from the pen of its accomplished editor, a charming freshness and vigour. Of late there has been a tendency to maintain freshness by the introduction of ephemeral speculations, that have not even the merit of originality. There is

room, ample room, for such a periodical. And Mr. Cox is eminently qualified to conduct, if, avoiding matters of doubtful disputation, he would guide his contributors back again to that fruitful study of the "unnoticed things of Scripture," of which he has proved himself to be a master. We are not obscurantists, and we admit that there is no reason why our preachers should not be informed as to the trend of speculation in Germany or elsewhere; but there is a more pressing need, which this journal might worthily supply, that our preachers should be fully qualified for "rightly dividing the word of truth."

Dr. Gibson has done good service already by the publication of his admirable book on the *Ages before Moses*, and we are thankful that its success has determined him to publish the lectures now before us on *The Mosaic Era* (17). Although purposely avoiding questions of what is presumptuously termed "the higher criticism," the straightforward strong common-sense which runs through these lectures furnishes a very effective antidote to many of the wild surmisings that have been so recklessly and persistently shouted and re-shouted as solutions of problems previously prepared. We venture to say that this volume will take rank as one of the most useful and satisfactory of modern expositions. It is orthodox without narrowness, evangelical without bitterness, popular without superficiality, and practical without being prolix.

Some carping critics have called in question the statement contained in the opening sentence of Dr. Fraser's *Life of Dr. Chalmers* (18). He has dared to speak of him as "the greatest Scotsman of modern times." In making good their objections they have furnished us with one of the curiosities of modern criticism. For at once they proceed to name Scott, and Burns, and Carlyle, confident that those names are sufficient to sustain their fault-finding. After quoting Dr. Fraser's first sentence, why do they not quote the second and third? Here

(17) *The Mosaic Era*, by J. Monro Gibson, D.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

(18) *Thomas Chalmers, D.D., LL.D.*, by Donald Fraser, D.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

they are :—" We do not say the greatest genius, or the highest literary ornament of Scotland ; *the names of Burns, Scott, and Carlyle* would forbid such an assertion. But, we say again, the greatest man, the most important and influential personality that has sprung up in Scotland for at least two hundred years." In the biography that follows the reasons for this assertion are fully and convincingly adduced. It need hardly be said that Dr. Fraser is peculiarly qualified for the delineation of such a life. His eye intuitively rests on its salient features, his heart sympathises with its varied emotions, and his pen, at once graceful and facile, gives a life-like presentation of everything noteworthy and distinctive. For those who wish to study the times in which Dr. Chalmers lived, and his manifold relationships to them, Dr. Hanna's biography is indispensable ; but for a clear and vivid comprehension of the great man in his varied walks of usefulness, and in his influence and action on the history of the Church, this handy compact life of "a man worth remembering" cannot be surpassed. In its own sphere it deserves to rank as a Christian classic.

The two recent *Handbooks for Bible Classes* (19) are eminently satisfactory. In "Judges," by Principal Douglas, some may be disappointed by the absence of homiletical hints and helps, but there can be no doubt about the scholarship and thoroughness of the historical elucidation. Mr. Macpherson handles the "Confession of Faith" *con amore*. His notes are exceedingly judicious and instructive.

The Bohlen Lectures for 1881 (20) discuss the *quæstio vexata* of Discrimination, in its relation to Dogma, Evidences, Ritual, and Amusement. From our standpoint things appear in a somewhat different light from that in which they are seen by our worthy Church brother. Nevertheless, we read his frank manly utterances on these four subjects with respect and

(19) *Handbooks for Bible-Classes—Judges*, by Principal Douglas, D.D. ; *The Confession of Faith*, by the Rev. J. Macpherson, M.A. Edinburgh : T. and T. Clark.

(20) *A wise Discrimination the Church's Need ; Bohlen Lectures for 1881*, by Thomas Underwood Dudley, D.D., Assistant-Bishop of the Diocese of Kentucky. London : James Nisbet and Co.

sympathy, and we commend them as at least likely to awaken helpful thought, if not certain to produce conviction.

"Restoration" of churches in England has not contributed to the maintenance of sound doctrine. The buildings and appliances that are adapted to the scenic worship of Rome are not well fitted for the preaching of God's Word, and for that simple spiritual worship which Scripture exhibits and enjoins. Let us hope, however, in spite of fears that are not altogether groundless, that the day is far distant when Presbyterians shall be tempted to introduce emblems and ritual without the authority of apostolic precedent and instruction. So far as the restoration of historic monuments is concerned, we have no quarrel with the archæologist; but the whole history of the past warrants our suspicion of ecclesiastical antiquarianism that is not brave and honest enough to go back to the first century. The words of the late Professor Black of the New College, Edinburgh, are pungent and pertinent: "We have no objection to antiquity, if they will only go far enough back. We wish to listen not only to the Fathers of the Church, but also to the Grandfathers." We do not care to say more about the "Restoration" of St. Giles', Edinburgh, in calling attention to the first series of the St. Giles' Lectures (21). It goes without saying that no section of the Presbyterian Church in Scotland can retrace the steps of their forefathers "from the earliest times to 1881," without being influenced in some degree by present position and associations. With this volume in our hands it needs no proof that the ministers of the Establishment cannot. This is neither matter of surprise nor reproach. With their convictions, it is not to be wondered at that they serve themselves heirs to all the good and great men who have gone before, and that they disavow what appears to them the rashness and follies of enthusiastic zealots. Still, we could have wished to find in this volume, if not approbation, at least a fuller appreciation of the struggles and sufferings of brave men, on whose constancy and consistency all that is good in modern Scottish Presbyterianism rests. We are not inclined to be captious, but it is rather trying both to patience and logic to be

(21) *The Scottish Church from the Earliest Times to 1881.* Edinburgh and London: W. and R. Chambers.

told that the mistakes of 1843 are the advantages of 1881! And when we read of the freedom which the Established Church now enjoys—and of that freedom there ought to be no jealousy—we cannot help thinking that a Free Churchman might fairly argue, that the bestowal of that freedom as a political concession is very different from the acknowledgment of it as a “claim of right.”

However, with the exception of those questions on which no two parties in Scotland can be found in agreement, we confess that on the whole these lectures are scholarly, painstaking, and interesting. Within reasonable compass they present a very fair picture of the origin and progress of Scottish Christianity. To a few statements made, particularly in one of the lectures, we might take serious exception. But in the circumstances of the case we are rather disposed to be thankful that the lecturers have striven, with considerable success, to tell their tale with as little prejudice and as much fairness as possible. The introductory historical sketch of St. Giles' Cathedral by Dr. Chambers is characteristically clear and concise.

The Rev. Robert Gilchrist is evidently a preacher of the good old Scottish school, of which, perhaps, Boston and the Erskines are the best types. In the volume before us, entitled *Christ lifted up* (22), there are eight chapters on “Christ lifted up on the Cross,” mainly expository of the last words of the Crucified One, and eight chapters, with a supplementary conclusion, on “Christ lifted up in the glory following.” In the second part, such subjects are discussed as “The Resurrection,” “The Commission,” “The Ascension,” and “The Outpouring of the Spirit.” The whole contents of this volume are eminently profitable to the use of edifying.

The Lord High Commissioner to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland evidenced no mean appreciation of profound and profitable theological thought when he requested Professor Flint to publish the sermon preached by him (23) on

(22) *Christ lifted up*, by the Rev. Robert Gilchrist, Shotts, N.B. London: Morgan and Scott.

(23) *Jesus Christ, the Faithful Witness, the First-begotten of the Dead, and the Prince of the Kings of the Earth*, by Robert Flint, D.D., LL.D. Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons.

the 29th May 1881. Very rarely indeed have we found in a single sermon such a combination of philosophy and spiritual insight. We have been particularly impressed and gratified by the fresh and forceful exposition of "Christ's witness to the truth," and "His lordship over the kings of the earth." One expression startles us: "Many in Scotland seem to have come to think that outside of the Church secularism is the true theory of things, and not a few appear to fancy that the sovereignty of Christ is only a something which may be pleaded to secure ecclesiastical arbitrariness from review, and ecclesiastical arrogance from restraint." Doubtless, however, the "seeming" and the "appearance" may depend on Professor Flint's standpoint. At all events, we venture to say that suspicion cannot attach to Christians either in the United Presbyterian or in the Free Church.

